Prima Secundae
Lecture 41: The Will's Motion by God and Necessity

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So what is he saying there in reply to that third ejection? It goes back to the beginning sentence there, right? To nature there always corresponds something one, proportioned nevertheless to the nature, right? So the one that corresponds to the will might be something like the good in general, right? So you can't will something except under the aspect of being good, right? Maybe in a true good, maybe in a apparent good. It's got to be seen as good in some way, right? Some people it seems to be good to be contrary, right? I read the novel there, one of those English novels there where the Scotsman, you know, he always contradicts you whatever you say, right? He's pretty good, pretty good at, you know, taking the opposite side no matter what you say, you know? It's a little bit like the sophist in a sense, right? No matter what you say, you've got to contradict yourself, right? You'll make your period of contradict yourself. So we have time for one more article, right? Thanks so much. Whether the will is moved of necessity by its own object, to the second one proceeds thus, it seems that the will of necessity is moved by its own what? Object, for the object of the will is compared to it as the mover to the mobile, right? As is clear in the third book about the soul, right? First, I was trying to talk in the third book about the soul there, about the locomotive power of animals, right? And he says that it goes back in a way to what? Both knowledge in some way, right? And to desire, right? But these two are united in the object, right? Because the object is known and desired, right? So the object is the first mover, but that object, who's the knowing power and the desiring power, right? And maybe the desiring power is the knowing power, but in a way there's one mover, which is the object, right? Okay. So is it, what moves me to go into the restaurant? Is it knowledge of this place, what it's all about? Or is it the desire to go into the restaurant? Or is it food that's moving both my knowing power? You sense that. It smells good in there. Yeah, yeah. You used to go buy a bakery, you know, something like that. Yeah. Oh, I've got to go in there, you know. You're a kid, yeah. Like a kid, huh? Yeah, I was going to say, a kid's relative. Yeah. There was a guy who worked at the package store there. He's talking about going down south there, I guess, and it's kind of like a parkway like that, and all the blacks are out there making their fried chicken, you know? Oh, yeah. One after another, you know. The smell is just, you know, he says it's just overpowering. But the mover, if it is sufficient, if it is sufficient of necessity, moves the movable, right? Therefore, the will of necessity can be moved by its, what? Object, huh? Moreover, as the will is an immaterial power, so is the understanding. And both power are ordered to a universal object. But the understanding of necessity is moved by its, what? Object, huh? And therefore, the will from its, huh? Moreover, everything that someone wills is either the end or something ordered to the end. But the end, someone of necessity wills, as so it seems, right? Because it is just like a, what? Beginning in looking things, huh? Expectative matters, right? To which we, a necessity is sent, right? The whole is more than the part. But the end is the reason for willing those things that are for the end. And thus, it seems, also, that those things that are for the end, that we will them of, what? Necessity, right? The will, therefore, of necessity is moved by its, what? Object, huh? Of course, you could go back and say, well, the reason doesn't, what? Isn't moved necessarily to the conclusions, right? Some of these amazing theorems in Euclid, you know, you don't see how they're following us from what's going on before, you see? You're not moved to, necessarily to a sense of these things until it's shown, you know? It's done. If we can look at the last theorems there and the odd even number theorems, right? And he's determining what even numbers are even, even only, and what even numbers are even, odd, only, and what even numbers are both even, even, odd, even, right? Even, odd. And of course, what he shows is that every even number that is doubled from two, two, four, eight, sixteen, thirty-two, they will be even, even, only, right? And he proves that, right? By the earlier theory, it's beautiful. He proves that. And then, what even numbers are even, odd, only? Well, all even numbers whose half is odd. It's like six, huh? Half of six is three. So it's going to be even, odd, only. Okay? Now, what even numbers are both even, even, and even, odd? Well, those which are neither doubled from the dyad, from the two, and whose half is not, what? But, yeah. So, for example, that would be twelve, right, huh? See? It wouldn't be ten, because ten is, half is an odd number. So it's going to be even, odd, only. And the only thing that multiplies to ten is two times what? Five. But now twelve, it's not doubled from two, because that's two, four, eight, sixteen. And it's not, it's half is not, odd, but it's six, which is even, right? So it's both. Three, four, and two, and six, right? Mm-hmm. You can go through all the way. It's beautiful, you know. Oh, yes. It's stunning. Stunning, these things, huh? Yeah. Never get even with them, huh? Yeah. And odd. Yeah, odd. It's beautiful, yeah. Beautiful, yeah. I think that kind of way that you have to kind of introduce you to these things, you know, is to give them examples, you know, huh? You say, you know, top of four, you know, you know, figure out, by the example, even by even, right? Two times two, huh? Eight, huh? Well, two and four, it's all you can get to get, yeah. Ten to five, only, right? Mm-hmm. And 12, you see, it has both, right? They might see, well, I want to see, well, what's the rule here? Is there a rule, right? You know? Yeah. How about 64? Yeah, but 64 is two times 32. So it's when the one is doubled from, you know? Mm-hmm. So it's going to be only, what? Yeah. So it can be eight times eight, I guess, huh? Two times 32. Four times 16, you know? You know? But no matter how you do it, no matter how you cut it, it's still the same old two even numbers, right? You know, it's kind of marvelous, you know? How about 128? Yeah, that's doubled from the diet, right? They'd say the diet instead of two, but doubled from the two. Yeah, yeah, so, you know? When I was a little boy, they used to always, the $64 question, you know, it was kind of on TV or something like that, you know? I don't know how they write it, 64, but what's interesting about 64, you first get attached to it because it's both a square number and a, what, cube number, right? Four times four times four is 64. four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four times four and 8 times 8, you know. So the same number could be both square and, like, cube. Now, which numbers are... Just give us a little teaser there. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Just lead us in, unaware. Now you realize it's an even number only, 64. There's got a lot of things there. Can't you go there more often? Why don't you stay a week? Don't forget your hat, honey. It's the expression, put your thinking hat on, you know? I used to go back to the fact that they lectured the middle ages with the hat on, right? And so the peasants thought, you know, that that's where... I'll have to leave my hat on. Yeah, I used to get an expression when I was little. I don't know if it's when you're still in your family. Right, and you're thinking hat. Some of these, yeah, some of these little expressions, you know, were more circulating around in those days. But against this is that the rational powers, according to the philosopher, are two opposites. Now that's what comes up in the beginning of the first part of the ninth book, right? First, I was taking up ability before act, right? And then he'll distinguish between the rational ability and the natural ability. The natural ability is determined to one, it seems, right? So if the fire burns, it doesn't cool, right? By the rational ability, like the doctors, he can eat you or kill you, right? You mean, you know, cure you or anything. You know, if I possess logic, I can reason well and badly, and I can teach and deceive, right? And if I know grammar, I can say, I use your professor and, you know, know that it's capable of opposites, right? The fire can only burn, right? Eat the thing that's in front of it. Okay. But the will is a voluntary power, right? A rational power, rather. For it is in reason, as is said in the third book about the soul, right? Therefore, the will has itself to opposites. Therefore, not a necessity is it moved to either of the, what? Opposites, huh? That's why, you know, you can say that the dialectic and rhetoric, you know, very much seem to correspond to the ability of reason, right? To go to opposites, huh? Dialectical reasoning, sometimes, Aristotle says, is reasoning from probable things even to contradictory, what? Conclusions, you know, like you do in the case. Dispitate. Or like you do in rhetoric, you know, where, you know, these debate teams, too, you know, we have to defend, and opposites, right? My answer, it should be said that the will is moved in two ways, huh? In one way, as regards the exercise of the act, huh? And that means what? To do will or not to will, right? Another way, as regards the specification of the act, which is from the object. In the first way, will is moved to necessity by no object, huh? For a man is able, about any object, not to, what, think, think. And consequently, neither enact to will that, right, huh? So you're always thinking about God? Having better to think about than God, really. But as regards the second way of motion, right? The will by some object of necessity is moved, and from some not, right? For in the motion of any power by its, what, object, there is considered the reason by which the object moves the will. For example, the visible moves sight under the, what, notion of color in act, right? That is, what, visible. Whence, if color is proposed to sight, of necessity, it moves, what, sight, right, huh? Unless someone averts his, what, sight, right? Okay. Which pertains to that other thing, the other mode, the exercise of the act, right, huh? Okay. The same thing could be said about the ear, right? You know that if you're in some place where some noise is in your frame with your, you're better thinking, right, huh? De Connick was to compare about that, you know, some people access, they own the ear, you know? De Connick, you know, his office there, the door was soundproof, right? Right. And so the question was, if you were going to go visit De Connick, and you'd knock on the door, and you couldn't hear what he's saying, you know? So what would we just do? We'd knock on the door, and then open our walkie, you know? Yeah. Hopefully he, he, he, he, you know? It would be the, you know, perpetual motion machine. Yeah. It would forever be knocked. Yeah, but you can see how, like, silence, right? But then in the wintertime, sometimes they want to set up a skating rink down, somewhere down outside the building that his office is in, you know? And then they have this, you know, blurring machine there that's playing this awful music, you know, and so it's kind of, you can't escape this, you know? And they kind of say, you know, as if they own the air, you know, and they can, you know? And so if you go out, you know, on the beach or something like that, they have someone on these stupid little radios, you know? So Maria's pretty good, though, you know? I said, go over and tell them to shut that radio off. And Maria would, would not afraid. She said, go over there, you know, turn it down, and tell them, you know, and they'd actually turn it down. But you might not, if I were over there, probably, you know, I'd probably get a fight or something. I do that when I used to go to the doctor's office. They got the rock and roll playing on the stereo, at the same time they got the TV blaring. And I said, if anybody wants to have a nervous breakdown, go to a doctor's office, go to the waiting room. But so, at least I would turn off the TV. I can't do anything about the music, but at least I'd turn off the TV. I don't know, I got Warren Murray to come into a restaurant, and they got this awful music playing, just to walk out, you know? But they tell the one story of this, that Father Boulay was in the restaurant, right? And they had these guys up there playing this stuff, you know? And so he sent some money up for them to stop. So they were so insulted that they did stop, you know? They could eat his dinner in peace, you know? Father Boulay was a good friend of the conductor, you know, of the Quebec Symphony Orchestra, you know? So it was a good appreciation of music. We always got a kick on that, you know? It actually happened, I guess, you know? They just sent money up and... What, did they keep the money and they give it back? No, they didn't get to the money, but they decided, you know? They were insulted. Probably when we tell them their lives, they sent money to stop playing, you know? Usually, the kind who plays it, you see, calls the tune, you know, they say. If I were there, suppose, something to sight that was not, in all ways, a color and act, right? But in some respect, right? Not simply with such, right? Then, according to this, something not such, right? Say, couldn't have already quit, non-tale, huh? That means... As opposed to some beachy terror, right? Say, couldn't have quit, right? Not of necessity would sight see such a, what? Object, right, huh? Kind of a skewer there, I would say. For it is able to, what, tend towards it from that, what, part in which it is not colored in, what? Act, right? And thus, he would not see it, right? It was like a magic trick, right? The hand is quicker than the eye. You wouldn't see it, right? So just as the colored in act is the object of sight, so the good is the object of the, what? Will. Whence, if there is proposed some object to the will that is, what? Universally good, and according to every consideration, of necessity the will would tend towards that, right? If it wills something, right? So if you saw God as he is, right, you would necessarily tend towards him. You couldn't not will God. You would not be able to will the opposite. But if, however, there is proposed to it some object that is not according to what? For some consideration. Yeah. I mean, it's not good as such. Yeah. Not of necessity would the will be born towards that, right? And because the defect of any good has the notion of not good, right? Therefore, that good only that is perfect and to which nothing is lacking, right, is such that the good, is such a good that the will is not able not to will it, which is beatitude, right? So like the atheist says this, beatitude is a stake made perfect by somebody of all goods, right, huh? Okay. I will show you every good, he says to Moses. Okay. Other particular goods, insofar as they fall short from some good, can be taken as not good, right, huh? Now, what does that mean? It means you can say, I suppose, that any particular good prevents you from what? Pursuing some other particular good, right? So in some way, it's what? Not good. Yeah. And therefore, you can refuse it, right, huh? Okay. Therefore, they can be taken as not good, right? And according to this consideration, they're able to be repudiated or what? Approved by the will, which can tend towards the same thing according to diverse considerations, huh? So I kept going to Mass this morning. Well, I'm tired, you know. It's going to interfere with my sleep and getting a full night's sleep, you know? So that's one way of considering the thing right now. Take to the theory of Euclid today. I haven't been burned yet, you know? See? He is relaxing his homework, you know? I need to relax a little bit, huh? And your wife might say, yeah, but you wouldn't have time to break the leaves. That's true. Some things are determined to one. It struck out a woman that is very, you know, like something like the bed is to be made of you every day, right? 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Thank you, God, and thank you, guardian angels, thank you, Thomas Aquinas, deo gratias. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, broaden the room in our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. I'll give you a little example of an apt quote from Scripture, right? This is back in the earlier days of our country here. And not to be concerned with the legal thing he was involved with, but the law moves very slowly, right? He was very annoyed at the court and so on, right? To win this case was not enough for this acceptable person ever. He had suffered a good deal in mind and purse by the law's delay. And his keen wits darting about for an effective way of making Chief Justice Dudley and his associate Linde smart for their failure to unite with judges Saltonstall, Sewell, and Cushing, he had upon the idea of caricaturing the court. Accordingly, he had painted and hung in front of his inn a sign which cost him 40 pounds and some subsequent trouble. For the sign represented, the whole court sitting in state in big wigs before an open book entitled Province Laws. The dissenting judges are shown with their backs to the book. Of course, the learned gentleman heard of the sign. And of course, they sent a sheriff to bring it before them. But Dr. Ames, this is the guy who put the sign up, who happened to be in Boston at the time, also heard of the sheriff's errand. And he rode out to us where his inn was and did him in all haste. Now, this is supposed to get the quote. You have to realize people know the scriptures in those days and I assume you guys will be able to appreciate this like I did because now it's the scripture. When the officer of the law arrived, he found on the pole where the lampoon had hung, right, only this legend. This is the quote. A wicked and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign, but there shall have no sign to give it in. Oh, a wicked and David would have been doing scripture, you know. It's a little book about the old inns of New England, you know. But, oh, these little anecdotes, huh? The one inn there where, you know, there's a ton of different inns that George Washington stopped at when he was coming through and so on. And the one inn there when George Washington was leaving, the owner of the place had his little daughter, you know, opened the door for Washington to go out, right? And Washington, you know, very piked and said, there's a better office for you than this, you know. And he said, oh, yes, she says, letting you in. Isn't that clever? Yeah. You know, like a better office would be to let him in than to let him out, right? Then he would want the great man to be in there. But another one where the little girl fixed something for him, you know, his glove or something, you know, and sewed up and she gave her a little kiss, you know. And she wouldn't allow her face to be wiped a whole week afterwards by George Washington. Marvelous little stories, you know, because you don't know about other things. They describe, you know, the return of Lafayette and all these inns he stopped at. He's coming up the one street there, I guess, I think in Boston, Tremont, you know, Tremont. And this woman who had been the wife of some man who knew him 40 years before she had seen him, right? So she's up there on the balcony, right? And of course, he comes down the road there and he looks up and he sees her. He recognizes her, right? He gets out and he makes his bow and so on. And she's just, I've lived long enough, she said. I made Lafayette, too. So he finds wonderful little things about these inns and taverns. We also have evolutionary plots in there. It reminds me of Mayor Washington of Chicago when he was running for mayor. And he had spent some time in the Cook County Jail. So the inmates of the jail hung a sign outside that said, Washington slept here. That was me about Louisiana, you know, and all the corruption there, you know. And I guess Jindo has, you know, fixed the places up a lot. But anyway, someone's describing here before the corruption, he says, and the problems there with the, you know, rains and so on. Half the state is underwater and the other half is under... Take that. Okay, so Article 3 here in Question 10. To the third one proceeds thus. It seems that the will is moved of necessity by the passion, the emotion, the feeling of the, what? Yeah. Lower appetite, right? For the apostle himself says, huh? In Romans chapter 7, verse 15. Not the good that I, what? Will. Do I do that? But the evil that I hate, that's what I do, right? So even St. Paul, it seems, is pretty good, you know. Argument. Which is said in account of, what? Concupiscence, which is a certain, what? Passion, right? Looking at Summa Congentilis this morning, he's denying, you know, that God has the passionis. But that has many meanings of the passionis, applied to many things. So he calls them the passionis affectionis, you know. That's kind of a way to signify it there. Here he calls the passionis a pity to its inferiorities, right? More, as is said in the third book of the Ethics, that's the famous Nicomachian Ethics. Some people think Nicomachus was, what? The name both of the father and the son of Aristotle, right? So it could be the Ethics he wrote for his son, but he didn't even Ethics written for the student, he didn't even was. But it could also be the Ethics that he got from his, what? Or the father, huh? So Aristotle says in the third book of the Nicomachian Ethics, qualis unis quisque est. Such as a man is, so does the end seem to him, right? But it is not in the power of the will that at once one get rid of the passions, right? So what is it that, as Jefferson said, you know, if you're very angry, you know, count to a hundred or something, you know. So even the man who's resisting this, it takes time, right, for his anger to, what, calm down, right, huh? Okay. So when one is under the passion, he can't get rid of it right away, if it's a strong one. And then, what, such as he is, so does the end seem to him, right? I should hit you, because that's the way it seems proper now for me. When I'm angry, right? When the anger calms down, I don't think I have to hit you, but, well, so long as you're under the feeling of anger, I can hit you, right? I can get even with you. Therefore, it is not in the power of the will that it does not will that to which the passion inclines itself. We have the words in English that we have the word about emotion. And sometimes you use the word feeling in the sense of emotion, too, huh? You hurt my feelings. That means you're emotions, huh? Those are both interesting arguments, huh? Moreover, the universal cause is not applied to a particular effect except through the medium of a particular, what? Cause, huh? Whence the universal reason does not move except by means of a particular estimation, as is said in the third book about the soul. So reason, you know, knows something universal, but doing is in the singular, right? So you have to apply the universal down to the singular, to something singular that brings in the senses and so on. But just as universal reason has itself to the particular estimation, huh? To the senses, so the will to the sense appetite. Therefore, for willing something particular, the will is not moved except by means of the, what? Sense appetite, huh? Therefore, if the sense appetite is disposed through some passion to something, right, then the will is not able to move in the contrary, huh? Let's see Thomas here in the disputatio, you know, the public disputatio. You know, you know, you know, you know, Handling these objections, right, and I always tell the story of Thomas coming in, you know, and this young guy, there are objections, you know, and everybody's scandalized that they would object to the great pastor, you know. Thomas sits down and very quiet and explains to that, you know, and answers his objections, right, takes them seriously, you know. But against this is what is said in Genesis chapter 4. Under you will be your, what, desire, right, and you will dominate it. Therefore the will of man is not moved or necessity by the lower, what, appetite, huh? I blot out with fear. I answer it should be said, that has been said before or above, the, what, passion of the sense, desire, moves the will, right, in that, on that side by which the will is moved by its, what, object, huh, okay? Not by a, what, efficient clause, something like that, okay? Insofar as a man, in some way disposed to emotion, judges something to be suitable and good, that he would not judge so, existing outside of the passion, right? Now, this change of a man to passion happens in, what, two ways. I didn't know that, did you? In one way, thus, that reason is wholly, what, bound, huh? So much so that the man does not have the use of, what, reason, huh? Just as happens in those who, on account of vehement, anger, or concupiscent, are, what, mad, mindless, it is, they come to be Orlando Furiosa, is that the name of the Italian classic? Just as an account of, what, some bodily disturbance, how, they can lose the use of their, what, reason, huh? For these passions do not happen without a change that is bodily, right? And about such cases, there is the same reason, as in the case of the brood animals, right? Who, from necessity, follow the impetus of their, what, passion, right? So man is kind of reduced to an animal, in a sense. Down voice, a woman is supposed to say down voice. In these things, however, there is not any motion of reason itself, huh? And consequently, there is no motion of the, what? The will, huh? Okay. But sometimes reason is not wholly absorbed by passion, but there remains, to some extent, the judgment of reason to be still free, huh? Free in the passion, to some extent. And by this, there remains something of the motion of the, what? Will. For insofar as reason remains free and not subject to the passion, to that extent, the motion of the will also, but which he remains, does not of necessity tend towards that to which the passion inclines. And thus, either the motion of the will is not in man, as in the case, now he's gone mad, right? But only the, what, passion dominates. Or if there is a motion of the will, of necessity, it does not follow, what? The passion, huh? Well, he's a good guy to go to the profession to this, Thomas, maybe, huh? So Thomas is saying that the emotion would be so intense that it, what? Yeah. Like fear, I don't think of fear like that. Somebody, you know, bombs are going off, all right, people go crazy. Yeah. Now, what about this text of St. Paul? He's going to handle this. That's a pretty hard thing to face up to. To the first, therefore, it should be said that although the will is not able to, what, act, but that the, what, motions of gibbons will arise, about which the apostle says in Romans 7, that the evil that I hate, right, that I do, right, that is I, what? Yeah. Nevertheless, the will is able to not will to, what? Desire. Or at least not to consent to the, what? Desire, right, huh? Was it St. Bernard that, or St. Benedict, right? Did you put in the Bramble Bush or something? St. Francis did, too, yeah. Yeah, yeah. So I'd say that's not consenting, right? Mm-hmm. They're doing what's in their power, not to. Yeah. So remember that when you're hearing confession, too, now, did you jump on a Bramble Bush? Well, there wasn't one available, my father. And thus, not from necessity, follows what? And therefore, from necessity, it doesn't follow the motion of concubisence, huh? Do you see that as far as that answer? To the second, it should be said, that since in man there are two natures. Now, it's interesting that Thomas would speak that way, right? I don't know what my colleagues say. Thomas would never say that man has two natures. Because I think there's only one nature, right? Except for Christ. But notice what he speaks here, huh? Of course, Aristotle sometimes speaks of what matter and form is being to what? Senses of nature, right? This is something like that. Intellectual and sensitive, huh? Sometimes, man is aliqualis, he's of some sort, right? Uniformly, according to his whole soul, right? Because either the sensitive part is wholly subject to reason, as happens in the virtuous people, right? Or, e converso, reason is totally absorbed by the passion, as happens in the mindless, right? But sometimes, although reason is clouded over, right? I guess that's come from the word cloud there, right? By passion, there remains something of reason free, right, huh? One arm is tied behind your back, but not both arms. And by this, it can either wholly repel the passion, right? Or at least, owe to self, lest it, what, foul to passion, right? In such a disposition, then, because man, according to diverse parts of his soul, is disposed in diverse ways, huh? Other, something seems to him according to reason, and other, according to passion, huh? That's a pretty description of temptation, right? Something seems to you according to your reason, something else according to your, what, passion, right? It's an old monastic saying that the young man comes to the old man, and he says, I feel like I have two dogs fighting inside of me. I don't know which one will win. And the old man says, well, which one are you going to feed? But it seems like, you know, that, you know, during the Iliad again, that both Agamemnon and Achilles, right, they know in the sense that they're following their aim, right? And this is not reasonable rights, that they're in this kind of a, of course, then finally, when the thing starts to go against the Greeks or the Kians, the Danians, then they send this whole delegation, you know, to Achilles, you know, and they promise them So much, if he still won't do it, right? You know, in a sense, he knows that he should, right? To the third, it should be said that the will not only is moved by the universal good, apprehended by reason or grasped by reason, but also by the good grasped by what? To the senses. Look, he's saying that, right? He's saying that the will can be what? Moved, even by the good apprehended by the senses, right? Got to feed the baby or something, right? Somebody did something awful to his baby. I didn't get the whole story there, but the paper there the other day, you know? He was drinking beer and playing video games, and the baby was crying and interfering with his thing, so he took the baby to something, and I forgot to get the whole story, but my wife was feeding it to me or something. But he could have sensed the baby needed something, maybe, huh? Couldn't have known by its reason. Telling the babies to cry when they have something. And therefore, he is able to be moved to some particular good without the passion of the sense appetite, right? So he can know, right? He turned to the senses, something singular, right? And he can choose it, right? Even without sense appetite. For many things we will and do without passion through what? Choice alone, right? As is most of all clear in those things where reason exists, you might say, huh? Passion, huh? So now, important question, whether the will is moved or necessity by the exterior mover that is God, right? Because he's more powerful than the sense appetite, right? In fact, he's all powerful, right? To the fourth, one proceeds thus. It seems that the will of necessity is moved by God, huh? For every agent to which one is not able to resist, a necessity moves, right? But to God, since he is of infinite power, right, one is not able to resist. Once it is said, Romans 9, to his will, who can resist, right? So by reason and by authority. This objection is really a powerful one, right? Therefore, God of necessity moves the, what? Will. Moreover, the will of necessity is moved towards those things which it naturally wills, huh? That's why naturally will happiness, right? But that is, to each thing, natural that God does in it. As Augustine says in the 26th chapter, I guess, against Faust, huh? He was the big Manichaean, I think, Faust, huh? It was Faust, the guy that, talking about all these things above Augustine's ability to judge, but then he discovered he didn't know the liberal arts. Yeah. So how do you know these more difficult things, you know? So, once he did, you know, say, well, that doesn't have been, then, without the liberal arts. He would have been deceived by Faust, huh? Contra-Faust. Therefore, the will of necessity wills everything to which it is moved by, what? God, huh? It's natural, right? Moreover, the possible is that which, when it is posited, right, there follows nothing, what? Impossible, that's what Aristotle says, right? But there follows something impossible, if it be laid down that the will does not will that, to which God, what? Moves it, huh? Because according to this, then the operation of God would be inefficacious, right, huh? Okay? You'd be like, that's trying to move somebody to do something, and you can't get them to do it, you know? I mean, a horse in water, and I mean, a drink. Yeah, yeah. Therefore, it is not possible for the will, not to will that to which God, what? Moves it. Therefore, it is necessary for it to will this, right? But against all this is what is said in Thysiasticus, I guess, huh? What do they call it now? Sirach, yeah. God from the beginning constituted man and left him in the hand of his own, what? Consul, right? That's a nice concrete way of saying in the hand. Consul, right? Most obviously in English, you know, it's out of my hands. I have no control over it, right? It's out of my hands. But he left man in the, what? Hand of his own, what? Consul, right? Librium, arbitrium, huh? Therefore, not of necessity does he move, what? His will, right, huh? So Thomas says, I answer it should be said that as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names, it does not pertain to Divine Providence to corrupt the nature of things, huh? But to save him, right? Servire. Whence he moves all things according to and agree with their condition, right? So that to necessary causes, right? There follows the effects of necessity through the Divine, what? Motion, right? And from contingent causes, there follows the effects contingently. Because, therefore, the will is an active principle, not determined to one, but indifferently having itself to many, right? The example Thomas always gives us up to us to be able to walk or run, right? It's so funny because I think, you know, did he run? I always say Thomas is moving slow, you know. He describes me now as man, you know. He's not in a hurry to get any place, you know. So it seems to me that Thomas, you know, as I walk or run. Wow. Because, therefore, the will is an active principle and not determined to one, but indifferently having itself to, what? Many. So, or thus, God, what? Moves it, right? That in such a way that not from necessity or by necessity does it determine it to one of the two, what? Opposites, right? But it remains his motion contingent, right? And not necessary except in those things to which it is naturally, what? Moved, huh? So that makes you think, no, what that is. Second objection, was it? Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the divine will not only extends itself to something, what? Come about through the thing that he moves, right? But also in that way, which is in agreement with or congruent with his nature. And, therefore, it would be more repugnant to the divine motion if the will was moved or necessity, right? When this doesn't, what? Fit its nature, right? Then if it be moved freely, which befits his, what? Its own nature, right? Now, to the second one, the objection from natural. To the second should be said, that is natural in each thing, that God works in it, that it be, what? Natural to it, huh? For thus to each thing belongs something, according as God wills that it, what? He does not however will, that whatever is done in things be, what? Natural to them, huh? As an example, that the dead rise. That natural? But this he wishes to be natural to each thing, that it be subject to the, what? The divine power. So does he disagree with Augustine or not? Augustine says, someplace else, God respects the laws that he's created, and he lets his creatures make their own moves, which is all of the word-for-word translation. Well, when Thomas is saying that God moves the will to choose something, let's say, right, huh? Is he always moving it so that it would be natural for it to choose this? He seems to be saying that he doesn't always do that, huh? But it's still, you might say, in accordance with the nature of the will, right, huh? So maybe you have to see that, right? The nature of the thing has to be free and contingent, you know? Yeah. So was it natural for me to pick up Omer and read a book of Omer today? Like doing what becomes natural? To your particular natures. I said to my sister, well, you know, I don't feel right, I don't have to fear and be okay every day. So there's something wrong with you, she says. You could say it's natural to us to be, it's natural to our will to be invited. Invited. Invited meaning, here's your choice, you're invited to do this. Yeah. But you're free to do other things, but you don't invite you to do that. Yeah, yeah. When you speak of the saints, it's acting in fact the divine instinct, right? But does that mean that what they chose to do, and maybe, and did do right, that this was something that is natural? It could be, the expression that comes to my mind, is something like an acquired taste or something. I was just reading the second book of the physics, right, there, you know, in the fifth reading there. That's where Aristotle talks about the influence of custom upon our thinking. And you can be more explicit than Aristotle is there, because there Aristotle is talking about the influence of custom upon the way we want to proceed, right? And so he says those who are brought up, say, in geometry or something, want to proceed mathematically everywhere, right? And I always remember Lord Kelvin there, the great physicist of England, my brother Richard's physics book in high school, you know. No matter what the matter is, if it's not, you know, mathematical, it's not science, you know. And so you see that, right? And Thomas, but you could say, you know, that custom also makes us think we know something that's obvious that isn't even obvious, right? And maybe even something false, you know. And people are just, they hear this thing said enough, you know, they didn't think they know it, right? You know, people think they know the earth is round. Do they really know that? Well, it's on Google Earth. Or they know that the earth is turning on its axis, right? Yeah. You know? When I've told us so much, you know, do I really know it? Brother Mark used to be annoyed at these states. Today we all know, though, that. We don't all know that, right? Today we all, except maybe, maybe, that the earth is on its axis, rather than the sun goes around the earth, right? But I don't know if we know it, most of us. Do we know that? Yeah, I believe it. I believe it. I mean, even the weatherman, the meteorologist, is the one who always tells us about sunrise and sunset. Does he think that the earth is on its axis? Why does he call it sunrise and sunset? But in speaking about the force of custom, right? It can make something that's not obvious seem obvious, right? Or it's in the way of proceeding as being the way you should proceed, right? Thomas says it's because custom is like a second nature, right? And so it makes something seem, what, natural, right? And therefore, obvious, right? Just like the things that are naturally known, right? So it's hard for you to get, to not be a slave of custom, right? What Shakespeare calls a custom tyrant, right? It's a tyrant, right? I was going to say it could be tyrannic. Yeah, because it rules the mind, not altogether for the good of the mind, right? But more for the good of the, what, custom itself, right? So, when a man acquires in a habit or a disposition, right, then something seems natural that is maybe not, but, yeah. But it is something like nature, right? It's a second nature. It's a second nature to me, I can hear it in the song, you know? So, if a person's been brought up in virtue, then some things just seem natural to do, right? And things to avoid, right? Look, he says there, None out to invult, he does not ever wish that whatever is done in things should be, what? To them is natural, right, huh? And he gives you a very striking example there. It's an example that the dead rise, right? But this he wishes for each thing to be natural, that it be subject to the divine power, right? I'm naturally subject to the divine power. But I don't naturally rise in the dead. Not to worry about me coming back for a while, anyway. Or at least not by yourself. Yeah. By your own power. Okay. What is the third thing? Now, this is a subtle distinction here. It's easy, missed. To the third, it should be said that if God moves the will to something, it is incompossibile, right? Sounds like, what's his name? De Eichnitz, incompossibles. To this position, right? That the will be not, what? Moved to it, right? But it is not over, impossible, what? Simply, right? But through that condition, right? Whence it is not foul that the will by God is moved to what? Necessity. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.