Prima Secundae
Lecture 35: Circumstances of Human Acts and the Will's Object

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Now, fourth article, to the fourth one goes forward thus, it seems that those are not the chief circumstances, on account of which, right, and those in which there is, what, the operation, as is said in the third book of the Ethics. So, first objection, for those in which there is operation seem to be place and time, right, because that's the first meaning of in, right, in place, and to that sense of in is attached in time, as Thomas says in the commentary in the fourth book, where Aristotle takes up place and time, which do not seem to be the chief among the circumstances, right, since they are most of all extrinsic from the act. You can see that kind of, you know, you can say, oh yeah, it doesn't make much difference where I kill you, or when I kill you, you know, it seems to be kind of beside the point, doesn't it? Well, in some way, yeah. Yeah. You know, like these renaissance things, you know, there with the, in Florence and so on there, you know, where they decide the best time to kill somebody off is during the consecration, right? Oh, okay. So that, that adds, you know. Yeah. Um, some suffering. There is malice there, yeah. Yeah, yeah. But it's not that they're, they're trying to disgrace the sacrament, but they, you know, they're doing that, you see. So it's not the very substance of what they're doing there, they want to kill the man, which is, because it's the only reason for being bad, but this adds sacrilege, huh? So it's worse for me to, to knife you in the church, knife you on the street, but still kind of outside the act in a way, isn't it? Yeah. It's a circumstance, right? But it's to be taken into account, right? Mm-hmm. Moreover, the end is extrinsic to the thing. Therefore, it ought not to be the chief, one of the chief, or the most chief of the circumstances, huh? Moreover, that is chief in each thing, that is its cause and its form, right, huh? But the cause of an act is the person acting. The form of the act is its mode, right? Therefore, these two circumstances seem to be, what, chief, huh? Against this is what, now who said this? Gregory Nyssa, that's who they think it is. Yeah, but they have a footnote here, they said Nemesius, huh? That's another guy? Yeah, that's the other, the other quotes from Gregory Nyssa are the same, right? Yeah, is he a doctor of the church, or what is he? Nemesius. Nemesius? I don't know. Yeah, yeah. Sometimes. Anyway. Okay. But he says, anyway, Gregory, whoever he is, Nemesius, that the chief circumstances are cuyas gratia, something is done, right, huh? Mm-hmm. And what it is that is done, right, huh? Okay, that's the, well, I guess Aristotle said the same thing, right? Just seen by the article. Mm-hmm. The answer should be said that acts are properly said to be human, as has been said above, insofar as they are voluntary, right? But what's the mover of the will and the other the will? It's chiefly the end, right? That's going to be the principal thing then, right? And therefore, principalissima, that's the, what's the proletive, huh? Mm-hmm. The chiefest of all the circumstances, huh? And therefore, that is the chiefest of all the circumstances, huh? That which attains or touches upon the act on the side of the, what, end, right? That is cuyas gratia, that for the sake of which. Mm-hmm. Secondarily, the act which attains the very, what, substance of the act, that is what he did, right? Mm-hmm. The other circumstances should be more or less chief according as the more or less approach to, what, to these things, right? Right. So, the first objection, based upon misunderstanding. Right. To the first therefore it should be said, that to those things in which there is operation, the philosopher is not understanding time and place, but those things which are joined to the act, what, itself. Whence Gregory, this is, that's him. And Inecius, as we're expounding the saying of the philosopher, in place of that which the philosopher says, in quibus est operatio, he says, what is what? Yeah. The, who am I complaining about the modern philosophers, you know? Which one? You know, it's hard to figure out sometimes what they're saying, right, huh? So, you spend, you know, most of your time trying to figure out what they're saying. And that leaves you very little time to judge whether what they say is true or false, huh? You know, a fair example is a professor when I was teaching at St. Mary's College for three years. When I arrived, he was trying to figure out what Heidegger meant by being. When I left three years later, he's still trying to figure out what Heidegger means. So, I say, the proportion is all wrong, you're right. You should spend most of your time trying to decide whether what somebody says is true or false, right? You have to spend all this time trying to figure out what he really means. And you're still not sure what he means. You know? I don't think anybody understood me as Hegel said in his death penalty. Anybody's really understood me, you know? And, uh... Well, he's the only one who admitted it. Yeah, yeah. I much more prefer a guy who says, water is the beginning of everything. You at least know what he's saying, you know? It may not be true, and I can find some, maybe, argument for or against this. But if you don't know what the guy is saying, you know, it's just crazy. You spend all your time on what should be the least difficulty and the least thing. And it's the method that, for some reason, probably so many modern philosophers have been in the 20th century found so appealing. It's a method I call two steps forward and three steps back. That's where they write. That's where they think, you know? Yeah. It's hard to find. Let's give an example from the, you know, the senior paper one time. The student says, desiccation is a greater problem with land animals than with water animals. Mostly we aren't too sure what desiccation exactly is, right? But if you'd use the familiar word, drying up or drying out, is a greater problem for a land animal than for a fish, right? Yeah, you can see right away, right? A white man might say that, right? You know, you can go right away to judge you if these two are false, right? It's a reason for it being true, right? But we use the word desiccation, which most of the students are kind of not quite sure what that means, right? It sounds more scientific, but it's not quite clear to most people what he's saying. And the way, you know, they play with words, you know? Ernst Dallow is often quoted, you know, by Thomas there, you know, he used words the way men, what, use them in daily speech, right? Ratzinger had a talk he gave once, maybe, I don't know, 10 or 15 years ago to a group, you know, he was instrumental starting this Comunio magazine or quarterly, whatever it is. And he gave them a talk, something about trying not to just, they seem, he said, some scholars tend to get kind of closed in on themselves, in their own little circles, in their own little vocabulary, and he was trying to encourage them not to do that, but without naming names or saying, you people who are here, and they, so he gave his talk, and all about that, and using common languages, being accessible, and when he gave his talk, after he finished his talk, some jerk, and the audience raised his hand and said, who are you talking about? And he, he just had this humility, he obliged that, and I said, well, chiefly myself, I suppose. I said, wow. My brother, they were a professor there at Notre Dame, you know, who knew these words that even other professors don't know, right? And so, of course, he sticked them into his speech and so on, and our professors are embarrassed to ask, because what does that word mean, you know, just some word they don't know the meaning of, right? So they can't be attacked when he's saying, you know, what the guy's saying. Well, he might get to talk about some battle or whatever, and he goes, and after he finished, he says, are there any questions? And I said, oh, no, it's wonderful, it's wonderful. He says, really? There's no questions at all? No, no, not at all. It's marvelous. Fantastic presentation. He says, you fools, I made the whole thing up. Of course, that makes his name his butt in Oxford after that. No. No. No. To second objection, although the end is not of the very substance of the act, it is nevertheless the chief cause of the act. It's a causa causarum, as we say, insofar as it moves one to what acting, right? Whence also maximae, most of all, a moral act as its species from its work. What about the person acting? Isn't that pretty important? Yeah. But to the third, it should be said that the person acting is a cause of the act according as he is moved by the what? End. And by this, he is chiefly ordered to the act. The other conditions of the person are not chiefly ordered to the act. Of course, the objection about the modus, huh? The modus here is not the substantial form. The form makes it to be what it is, right? For this is noted in the act according to the object in term or end. But it's a certain accidental quality, right? Because objection is taken as being the substantial form, the form that makes it to be what it is. Now we go to start at question eight, and we've got another premium there. Then we're not to consider about the acts of the will in what? Particular, right? And first, of the acts which are immediately of the will itself, elicited by the will itself. And then secondly, about the acts commanded, what? By the will. And that's not down until question, what, 17. Now the will is moved both towards the end and in those, or towards those things which are to the end, right? First, therefore, we're not to consider about the acts of the will by which it is moved in the end, or to the end. And then about the acts by which it is moved in those things which are, what, towards the end, or to the end, huh? That's not down until question, what, 13, huh? Now the acts of the will, towards the end, seem to be three. I didn't know that. Thank goodness, three, huh? That's amazing. It seems pretty complete. Yeah, it does. First, to will, to wish, I guess, huh? Frui, to what? Enjoy. You never know, I'm just in talking about it all the time. And what? Intent. Yeah. So first, careful not to consider about the act of the will. Well, secondly, about what? Yeah? And that's not until question 11. What's he going to do in 8, 9, 10? And third, about what? Okay. Intention, huh? That's going to be, what? Question 12. Now, about the first, three things should be considered. First, of what things the will is. Ontas, that act. It's named from the will itself, Ontas. Secondly, by what it is. Moved, huh? That's the next question, question 9. And then, in what way it is moved? Question 10, huh? So he's very, what? Thorough here, right, huh? I've been reading these sermons of Bernard of Clairvaux and the Song of Song. He's still in the first chapter now. I'm up to about sermon 42. He's not going to finish the book. He takes at least a sermon for one verse, you know, one line, and sometimes more than one, because the things that are surrounding it and so on. So I have my questions, but he's going to get through the whole saga song. I only have the first two volumes up. I think there's four volumes in the Cistercian series, you know. Wow. I got a part of it too, but we have to buy the paperback edition because it's third and fourth. You might have it on your way down if you go by Spencer. Yeah, I'll go up there. Actually, I got these first years, you know, but it's kind of beautiful to see them, you know. Like once they're done, you know, spend a class or two on one or two lines of times, you know. You can't do that sometimes, you know, because it gets kind of itchy, you know. It takes a while to absorb these things, you know. Okay. So, in a sense, this first question is about what the object of this first act, right? About the first, three things are asked. Whether the will, this first act called Voluntas, is only of what? The good. Second, whether it is, what? Only of the end, or whether it is also those things which are towards the end. Third, if the answer is yes, it's also in some way of those things which are towards the end. If it is in some way of those things which are towards the end, whether by one motion one is moved to the end and to those things which are for the sake of the end. Yeah. Okay. So, to the first one proceeds, it seems that the will, the willing, is not only of the, what? Good. Good. For the same powers of opposites as sight of, yeah, and taste of what? Sweet and salty. Bitter. It's bitter as it is. It's a contrary sweet, huh? Not sour. Sour is not as far away from it as bitter is, huh? I was thinking salty. It's not as far away, though, from sweet, no. So, they have these pins now, you know, with the sweet and salty, you know, sweet and sour. I know, they complement each other. Yeah. They have bitter sweet chocolate, too, I mean. 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But the will is not only of what? Beings, but also non-beings. For we will sometimes to not walk and to not speak. We will also sometimes of future things which are not beings in act. Therefore the will is not only of the good, huh? Well, what are we going to do? I'm really tied up, huh? I was talking to the students last night there at the house. One of my first studies, you know, is of Aristotle's Poetics, and the influence of Austerlian, things like this. Aristotle says the plot is the soul of tragedy, right? Then Aristotle divides the plot into beginning, middle, and end. He defines them by before and after, beginning, middle, and end, right? Well, in the metaphysics there he says the philomuthos, the lover of plots, right, is in a way a philosopher. If you love plots, you're loving what has a beginning, middle, and end. And if you're loving, what, to know the before and after, right? Now it's in Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? But then you have the, what, the other side, right? Either way he divides the plot into tying the knot and untying it, huh? That's what Thomas does, right? He ties the mind up in a knot, and then he what? Yeah, yeah. And Aristotle says the young and inexperienced poet is better at tying the knot than what? Yeah. That's true about the human mind, right? It's better at tying itself into a knot than to untie the knot, huh? Thomas says you would want to untie the knot, and Aristotle is, but most of us, left to ourselves, would be tied into a knot, you know, with Voltaire or somebody giving us these objections, we'd just be tied in a knot and give up, you know? I told you when I first started out in philosophy there, I was at some kind of social function, and I ran into someone, and I just got talking to her there, you know. She found out I was in philosophy, and she said, oh, oh, oh! She told the story of this young man who went to the University of Minnesota, went to this class, and this professor said this, and went to that class, and that professor said that, and this professor said that, and this professor said that, and they're all contradicting each other. Finally, he left the university, and he's out on the farm now, and he refuses to pick up a book. Yeah, but he's just, you know, he's tied a knot, and then just can't sort anything out, and so on. So, but what the Summa Theologiae is, is kind of an abbreviation of the, what, questioner disputat, then, where you might have more than just the objections, you know, but basically it's the same thing, but actually the way to do, if you took the time to teach properly, you would give the guy the objections without the rest of it. And let him struggle for a day or two. How merciful, and then come in and resolve, right, huh? In the mind of the media, you get to... Okay. The beginning, this is what Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names, that the bad is, what? Praetor, volentati, apart from it. And that all want the good, right? All desire the good, all want the good, huh? Okay, so that's what Aristotle says, too, in the beginning of the Ethics, huh? So he gives a kind of induction around it, everybody wants the good, and then he said, and therefore they say, well, the good is what all want, huh? So God is the good, huh? So, the answer, it should be said, that the will is a, what, rational or reasonable desire, right, huh? But all desire, all wanting is not except of the, what, good, huh? The reason for this is because the, what, because desire or wanting is nothing other than the inclination of the one desiring towards something, right, huh? But nothing is inclined towards something except towards something, what? Nothing is inclined except towards something, what? Like it or... And suitable. Suitable. Suitable for it, yeah. Since therefore everything, insofar as it is a being and a substance, is some, what, good, if it is inclined then to something that is like itself, or suitable to itself, is necessary then that its inclination be in the, what, good. And hence it is that the philosopher says in the first book of Nicomarckian Ethics that the good is what all want. I've often thought, you know, you should kind of imitate Socrates in the dialogues, right? Or Socrates comes in and, you know, asks somebody, what is something? And they don't come out with a definition of what it is, but they give examples of what it is, yeah. So I imagine Socrates talking to a boy, and he says, what's good? What is good? And the boy doesn't say, good is what I want, no. He says, candy's good, popcorn's good, hot dogs are good, right? Baseball. Baseball's good, and so on, right? And then Socrates says, what do these things all have in common that you call them good? Why do you call them good? And then he comes out with, insoc, the first definition of good, right? Because all the things that he wants, he calls good, right? And I remember my kids, Paul there, little boy there, figuring out, you know, when dinner came, you know, if you like what's there, it's a good meal, you know, good dinner, you know? If you don't like it, don't want to eat that stuff, it's a bad meal. And then I go to the next step and say, well, is it good because you want it, or you want it because it's good, right? Okay? But here Thomas is arguing a little differently, right, huh? He's arguing that, what, wanting is being inclined towards something, right? But you want to be inclined towards something that is, what, like you, right, or that fits you, right? But you are, by nature, something good, right, substance and so on, so you're naturally inclined to something that is, what, good, right? But it should be considered that since every inclination follows upon some, what, form, huh? Natural desire, right, follows upon a form existing in, what, nature, huh? But a sensitive, huh, desire, right? Sense desire. Or also, what, an intellectual or rational desire, which is called the will, follows upon a form, but a form that is, what, grass, right? Thus, therefore, just as what the natural appetite tends toward is a good existing in the thing, right? So the plant grows towards the sun, right? And down towards the water in the soil, nutrients in the soil, and so on. So that towards which the animal, the sense appetite, sense desire, tends, or the will is a good, what, grasped, huh? Apprehended, grasped, is the English word, I guess. In order, therefore, that the will tend toward something, it is not required that it be, in fact, good in reality, right, in re veritate, but that it be, what, grasped under the notion of the good, right? In account of this, the philosophy said in physics, that the end is a good or an apparent good, right? This is very fundamental stuff, huh? Convinced by Thomas? So I was drawn to this bishop, right? Boom, boom, boom. Shakespeare, Bernard Clairvaux. One, two, three. Protestant father, Catholic mother, you know, knowing Shakespeare, yes. Three strikes you're out. Sanctuary, now, is Benedict XVI is a Montserrat composer? I don't know. I think Benedict, I would say. Yeah, that draws me toward him, yeah, yeah. You're drawn to what is like yourself. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. If a man likes salmon or something, I'm not drawn to him, you know, that way. It kind of separates us, right? Or if he likes Mick Jagger or something. Yeah, yeah, yeah. What about this famous thing that there's the same power of opposites, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the same power is of opposites, right? You're admitting that, right? But not in the same way does it have itself to what? Each. To both. For the will has itself both to the good and to the bad, huh? But to the good by what? Desiring it. And the bad by what? Fleeing it, huh? Fugiendo, huh? Get the word fugue, huh? Fugiendo. So you can see the wills of both the good and the bad, huh? But the one that's wanting, right? Who wants the good of what appears at least to be good, right? And it flees the bad of what at least what appears to be bad, right? Get up in the morning and so on. I get up in the morning because I'm bored if I get up. I go read a little Thomas, you know, fresh to mind. Wake up. Now, they, what? Actual desire of the good is called, what? Voluntas, huh? According as it names an act of the will, right, huh? For now, in this way, we are speaking about, what? Voluntate, right, huh? But the flight from the bad is more said to be, what? Voluntas. Yeah, voluntas, huh? Said no word for me. Yeah. Whence just as voluntas is of the good, so noluntas is of the bad, huh? So if you compare that to the mind now, can the mind know the true? But can the mind know the false? Well, if I know the false is false, then that would be true, right? The false is false. But could I know, for example, that two is half of five? Could you know that? Yeah. You might think that two is half of five. Could you know that two is half of five? You would opine that. Yeah, yeah. But you might think that you think of being an error. But then I'd be mistaken, though, so. That's what this saying that I used before, when we learned years ago in studying about knowledge and saying, the only thing worse than ignorance is error. So somebody, I forget who it was who said it, said, men don't get in trouble so much by the things that they don't know, but the things that they know that ain't so. Not to the second it should be said, huh? That the rational power does not have itself towards, what, pursuing any opposites whatsoever, right? But to those which are contained under its, what, suitable object, huh? For no power pursues except something, what? Fitting. Yeah. An object that is suitable or fitting. Convenience. Convenience, what, etymologically means coming, what? Coming together. Together, yeah. Fits. Comes together. Harmony, yeah. But the object of the will is the, what? Good. Good, huh? Once the will has itself to, what, pursuing those opposites, huh? Which are, what? Comprehended under good. Right. Just as to move and to, what? Rest. To speak and to be sound, huh? Scripture says it's time to talk and time not to talk. And others of this sort, huh? Mm-hmm. But in both of these, the will is born towards it under the, what? Under the good. Yeah. Yeah. So my will can choose to speak or to be sound, right? In the court, you can speak or be sound, right? Mm-hmm. Forever hold your peace. Yeah. Yeah, speak now or forever. Should I reveal what I know or not, huh? Father Hardin says one of the many, many times, one of the most important uses of your will is to direct your mind what to think about. Mm-hmm. Because you're going to think about what you want to think about and what you don't want to think about. Mm-hmm. He says train your will in that way to direct your thoughts. Mm-hmm. If I knew a man who'd been unfaithful to his wife, would I tell the wife? Or would I choose not to tell her? Yeah, see, you might see that as being good, right? Better, you know, huh? If someone is asking you a recommendation about somebody, right, you might have to, I'm not a particular man, but you might have to reveal something of his lack of qualifications for the position, right? Okay, to the third now, huh? About the connection between the being and the, what, good, which are convertible, right, huh? Mm-hmm. To the third it should be said that that which is not a being in verum natura, right? The reality is taken as a being and what? Reason. Reason, huh? Whence negations and lacks are said to be, what, beings of reason, right, huh? So to be ignorant, is that to be? Is that a being of verum natura, as he says, or in razzionic? No, that's a being. Oh, it's a lack, I'm sorry. It's a lack. It's a being, yeah. People think that's the reality of reason. Through which way, in which way, future things, insofar as they are, what? Apprehended our beings, right? They're beings of, what, reason, right, huh? Mm-hmm. So dinner tonight, if you know what's going to be for dinner tonight, that can exist in your mind, right? But doesn't exist yet, reality. Hmm. Insofar, therefore, as this kind of being are, what? Yeah. Yeah. And thus the will tends, what, towards them, right, huh? Whence the philosopher says in the fifth book of the Ethics, that the lack of evil has the notion of, what? Good. Something good, right, huh? Okay. The other car there missed me, or something like that, right, huh? Yeah. That's good. That's what God says about the saints in heaven. They think about hell, because they consider what they really deserved. Mm-hmm. And what God was kind enough to give them. Mm-hmm. So we don't. Mm-hmm. Yeah, I guess the saints in heaven will still be humble, right? And they'll still be a virtue in heaven, I would think. Yeah, they still fear God. Yeah, yeah. Fear of the Lord and endure forever and ever. Yeah. It's not a fear of being punished at this point, right? That's what it says in the psalm. Fear of the Lord is holy. Mm-hmm. Enduring forever. Yeah. That's good. That's good. It's helping us, too, in a moment, to write a master's thesis on fear. All these things by God. Okay. Take a little break here now, before we go to article two? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.