Prima Secundae
Lecture 33: Circumstances of Human Acts: Definition and Nature

Transcript
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That's right, and maybe it's more a question of fear, right? And therefore, as Gregory Nyssa says, do we say it in English, Gregory Nyssa? Gregory of Nyssa. Of Nyssa. And therefore, as Gregory Nyssa says, to excluding those things which are done through fear, in the definition of violent, he says not only that the violent is that whose, what, the source is outside, but adds, conferring nothing, right? The thing undergoing, nothing to it. Because to that which is done through fear, the will of the one, what, fearing, confers something, right? That goes back to the definition there, Stahl gave of the violent, right? That the one undergoing confers nothing, right? Now to the second, it should be said that those things which are absolutely said, something added remains such as, what, hot and white. But those things which are said relatively are varied according to a comparison to diverse things. For what is great compared to this is small compared to another. But the voluntary is said, something said to be voluntary, not only in account of itself, as it were absolutely, but also in account of another, as it were relatively. And therefore, nothing prevents something that is not, what, voluntary to another compared to become, what? Stopped over from when he considers sales, profits, and all the rest. But compared to the storm, the affected life, it is. To the theory it should be said that that which is done through fear without, what, condition, is voluntary. That is according as it is done in act, right? What's involuntary under condition that is in such a fear was not, what? Pressing, yeah. Once according to that argument, one could more conclude the, what? Opposite, huh? Now, the concupiscence causes the involuntary, right? Gotta have an apple pie, just apple pie. The seventh one precedes us. It seems that concupiscence causes the involuntary. For just as fear is a certain passion, so also what? Concupiscence, huh? But fear causes in some way the what? Involuntary. Therefore also what? Concupiscence, huh? I'm afraid Thomas is going to be a tough confessor, I think, huh? Yeah, I think this is not specific about what Father Merkelbach said about it. Concupiscence causes them to be more involuntary. Yeah, yeah. It's even more inclined to it, right? You will then. Moreover, as to fear, The one who's timid or fearful acts against that which is, what? Reposed, right? So the incontinent man can contain himself, control himself, on account of what? Concupiscence, right? But fear in some way causes the involuntary, therefore also what? Concupiscence, huh? Moreover, knowledge is required for the voluntary. But concubiscence corrupts knowledge, huh? For the philosophy says in the sixth book of the Ethics that pleasure, or the concubiscence of the desire of pleasure, corrupts the, what? Estimation of prudence, huh? Therefore concubiscence causes the, what? Involuntary, huh? I blacked out. What does it, as we said about in Italy there, you know, if the husband comes home and finds his wife in bed with another man, and he kills a man, well, it's... He's a boy, you know? There was a case of that when I was teaching in California there, where the husband worked in the cement business, right? And I tell you this story, I don't know before. And he, like, one day at loontime, he happened to just be near home, you know, and said, well, let's stop and surprise the wife and have lunch with her, you know? And because he saw this real fancy, you know, convertible in front of the house, you know, and so on. And so I don't know who that is. So he opened the door to hear the voices in the bedroom, and he gathered what's on. And he was so embarrassed that he walked out, you know. He was going to drive off, but then he got a second thought and backed up this cement thing and lowered the cement into this open convertible. Well, for one case, I guess the judge, you know, when the guy sued him, right, the judge said, you know, case dismissed. I mean, it was justified, you know? Yeah, yeah. It's kind of a great story, you know. I'm guilty for it because of temporary sanctity. I mean, served him right. Yeah, really. She offers such a deed there in a fancy convertible. It deserves to have a load of cement in it. But against this is what Damascene says, that the involuntary is worthy of pity or indulgence and what is done, what is done with sadness. Neither of these belongs to that which is done by concupiscence. Therefore, concupiscence does not cause the involuntary. Thomas answers, I answered, it should be said that concupiscence does not cause the involuntary, right? What more makes something voluntary? For something is said to be voluntary from this that the will is borne towards it, right? But concupiscence, but through concupiscence, the will is inclined to willing that which is desired, right? And therefore, concupiscence more makes it about that something be voluntary than that it be, what? Involuntary, right? This reminds me of the arguments, you know, about whether something done to a habit, like a gentle virtue, you know, right? Is more praiseworthy than something done without virtue, right? Well, if you've done it through virtue, right, then you're really inclined even more to do it, right? Thomas takes an example there of two of the, the monk or someone who obeys his vows, right? Is he less voluntary? The man doesn't have the vows and abstains from food or whatever it is in an ad hoc basis, you might say, right? Well, if there's more to incline you towards doing this, right, then it's really more, what? Involuntary. More involuntary, yeah, yeah. And that's something that most people get mixed up by, you know, they get kind of... That's what often I think whenever somebody is recognized and praised for some courageous deed, they often will say, oh, anybody would have done that in the circumstance, because they recognize it may not have to have it. But in that circumstance, they would propel to do that, which is praiseworthy, certainly, but they would often... I remember that man who, when the plane crashed in the Potomac River in January, whenever it was, in Washington, and the people were drowning, and the helicopter's coming, and they're pulling people out one by one, and there's a stewardess in the water. She kept giving the rope to other passengers to go up, and then finally she was the last one, and just as the rope came to her, she sunk under the water, and she was drowning. And the fireman on the shore, I remember watching it live when it happened, he just ripped off his coat, he jumped in the river, and he saved her, pulled her out, pulled her out from under the water, and everybody praised him, and he says, anybody would have done that. I'm like, well, can't do that. Okay, so, he's not going to let me off on confession, I can see that, I'm not going to go to confession with this guy. It's going to be some loose they can freeze. Some softy. To the first therefore, it should be said that fear is of the evil, right? But concupiscence regards the what? The good. But the bad, as such, is contrary to the will. But the good is what? An agreement to the will. Whence fear has more to itself to cause the involuntary than does what? Concupiscence. That's interesting what he says in that. To second it should be said that in that which is done through fear, there remains a repugnance of the will to that which is done, considered in what? Itself, right? But in that which is done through concupiscence, as in the man of lacking self-control, there does not what? Remain the prior will by which he what? Concupiscence. That which is desired. Desired. But he is changed to willing that which is before he repudiated, right? And therefore, what is done through what? Fear is in some way involuntary, right? But what is done through concupiscence is in no way. Just think of the penance he's going to give me. For the man lacking self-control, he acts against that which he proposed before, right? But not against that which he now wills, right? But the timid man acts against that which even now... As such he wants. Yeah. It's all because he grabbed that burning ember, right? Yeah. After the temptation, that was it. Yeah. You know, the story of Thomas there. Yeah. I think that Father Hardin talks about that because he said that he doesn't refer to this as such, but he's talking about... He's fairly frank about it. He said that at one point in his career, his priesthood, he didn't say where or exactly when, but he said he knew some, whether they were colleagues at a university or whoever it was, but they hired a woman to seduce him. To seduce him. To seduce him. Yeah. Because, you know, it's one thing, you know, you teach certain things, but when you're in certain things, nature takes over, and you have to be very easy if it's led astray. But thanks for your God, he didn't consent to it. He told me, he says, go back to the ones that paid him. They lost their money. They think it's a losing deal. But, because I think of that, that how we, I think spies, you know, because they're all, that's like, that's part of the business, is just get something out of somebody, hire a woman, you know. Yeah. Because that's the easy, that's the weak link of the change. Now, what about knowledge, right? To the third, therefore, it should be said that if concupiscence, holy, takes away, what? Knowledge, right, huh? As happens in those who, on a kind of concupiscence, become, what? Out of mind, right, huh? It would follow that concupiscence takes away, what? Voluntary, right, huh? Nor, nevertheless, properly there is the involuntary, because in those things it should not have the use of reason, there's neither the voluntary nor the involuntary, right, huh? But sometimes in those things which are done through concupiscence, not holy is taken away, what? Knowledge, huh? Because it's not taken away the power of knowing, right? But only the, what? Yeah, in this particular thing being done, right, huh? So in a sense, when Aristotle describes it, the man is saying, you know, this is adultery, adultery is bad, right? This is pleasant, you know, and when he sins, then he's adhering to the one that this is pleasant and therefore I will do it, right, huh? So he's not really, what, thinking the other thing, but he still is able to think about it at that time, right? He should have considered that, huh? And nevertheless, this is voluntary, according as the voluntary said to be what is in the power of the will, as to not act and not will. Likewise, in his power to not, what, consider, huh? Yeah. For the will is able to resist, huh? The faction, huh? I think St. Alphonsus uses an expression, he says, there's been a willful inconsideration in certain things. I don't want to think about that right now. Otherwise, I might not be able to do what I want to do. Yeah, yeah. This is very much in terms of abortion, right? You don't want to consider what's actually being done, right? Just get it done. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's why even Obama, nobody really likes abortion. That was his assessment. Yeah. Why? Yeah. Why not? You don't want to think about it too much, yeah. No, he says beyond his pay grade. No, no, that's, I think his preface to that one, nobody really likes abortion, but that other thing went on with that, nothing. Yes, when he was senator there in Illinois, he was, you know, opposed to the law against what they call partial birth abortion, freely abortion, when the person's been born, right? Yeah. That's really, you know, something even the Congress as a whole, you know, thought was, they had to go against, you know? Yeah, yeah. They just, well, now, fittingly, he goes on to now with the ignorance cause of being involuntary, right? Well, I think I'll break, I'll break the date, right? Yeah. The article here, where the ignorance causes the involuntary, right? To the eighth, one goes forward thus. It seems that ignorance does not cause the involuntary. For the involuntary merits, what, forgiveness, I guess, as Damascene says. But sometimes what is done through ignorance does not merit, what, forgiveness. Yes, according to that of the first epistle to the Corinthians, if someone is ignorant, he will be ignored. Interestingly, the word ignored, you know, in English, does it mean not known? It doesn't really mean that anymore. But you're ignored, it's treated as if you were not known. So we say when you put on hold, I call it being put on ignore. Okay. Moreover, every sin is with ignorance, according to that of Proverbs chapter 14. They err who do something bad, right? Christel says that too. Thomas Alvarez, Christel. If therefore ignorance causes the involuntary, we would follow that every sin is involuntary. Which is against Augustine saying that every sin is what? Voluntary. Voluntary, right? Moreover, the involuntary is with sadness, as Damascene says. But some things are done ignorantly and without, what? Sadness. Sadness. As if one kills, what? An enemy. Yeah. Whom he, what? Sought to kill, right? Thinking he was going to kill a stag, I guess, huh? Yeah. But why did he say any host of the enemy? The enemy. So he did this ignorant that he killed the enemy, but he doesn't, he's not sad about it, right? Yeah. Oh, yeah. Okay. Okay. There's a movie, what is that one? An English movie there where the guy's sent back to Europe there during the Second World War, or First World War, I guess. And he's supposed to get rid of somebody who's going to be, but he has to identify the guy first, right? And they think this guy must be the guy, and they decide to kill him, of course, and find out that he's not the guy, you know? Now they're really feeling guilty, right? You know? And the sadness is that they realize that they killed the guy who's not really the spy that they thought he was. And the other guy confronted with his real nice wife, you know, very close, and the guy was, they're convinced he was the guy, you know? Okay. But against this is what both Damascene and the philosophers say, right? That the involuntary is what? Some kind of involuntary, huh? Quadda. Yeah. Is the ignorance, right? I answered, it should be said that ignorance has to be a cause of the involuntary by reason of the fact that it, what, lacks knowledge, right? Which is required for the voluntary, right? That was the definition of voluntary, right? It was a thin with a knowledge, right? Nature was a felt knowledge, right? There was a distinction between the two, right? But not every ignorance is of such a kind as to deprive us of knowledge. And therefore it should be known that ignorance in three ways has itself to the act of the will. In one way, concomitantra, huh? Accompanying that, right? Another way, consequently. Another way, what? Yeah. So before, after, and with, huh? During, yeah. Okay. Concomitantra. When the ignorance is of what is what? Done, right? Nevertheless, if it were known, it would nevertheless, what, what? Be done. Be done, right? For then ignorance does not induce to, what? Willing. Willing that this thing come about, but it happens together with something, what? Done and ignored. And ignored, yeah. As in the example, what? Positive on the third argument there. When someone wishes to, what, kill the enemy, right? But, ignorantly, he does this, right? Thinking he's killing a... Stag. Stag, yeah. And I appreciate some examples of that. I think it's fiction, too, right? Yeah, I should. So what he has said, yeah. I think that's a great story for us. Yeah. That's true. And such ignorance does not make something involuntary, right? As the philosopher says, huh? Because it does not cause something that is, in fact, repugnant to the will, right? But it makes something, what? Not voluntary, right? So the distinction he's making between not voluntary and involuntary, right? One is merely a negation of the voluntary, right? The other is opposed to the will, right? Because that is not able to be an act willed that is, what? That is not known, right? So in shooting at that stag, did you will to kill that man? No. Well, that's not against your will, either. But so you're not involuntary, right? Because you didn't know that he was behind that. So if you disguise yourself as a, like the lamb, like the fox, disguise yourself like a lamb, disguise yourself as a servant. Because as they stay, you might be killed. Anyway. Consequently, ignorance has itself to the will, insofar as ignorance is itself, what? Voluntary, right? And this happens in two ways, according to two ways of the voluntary, above laid down. In one way, because the act of the will is done in ignorance, right? As when someone wishes to, what? Be ignorant. That he might have an excuse of, what? Sin. And that covers a lot of people there. It's very common. Or that he not, what? Be withdrawn. Withdrawn from sinning, right? According to that in Job, chapter 21, we do not will or wish the knowledge of your ways. And this is called affected ignorance, yeah. So, Catholics don't know what the church says about these things, right? Oh, I didn't know that. Well, that's like when our Lord said, the Pharisees who sent John's baptism, and they, as I like to say, they studiously replied, we don't know. They considered the options and they preferred ignorance. In another way, ignorance is said to be, what? Voluntary. Of that which one is able to know and ought to know, right? For thus, to what? Not act and not to will is voluntary, as has been said above, huh? And in this way, it is called, it's said ignorance, right? Whether or with, when someone in act does not consider what he ought to consider, right? Okay. Which is the ignorance of a bad choice, or from passion, or from some habit, right? Just as in someone, the knowledge which he ought to have, he does not care to acquire, right? And according to this way, ignorance of the universal things of law, which one is held to know, is called voluntary, as it were, arriving through negligence, right? Ignorance of law, that's no excuse. That's right. That's the kind of law, yes. Since such ignorance is voluntary, and our witness of such ignorance, or the ignorance itself, is voluntary in one of these ways, it cannot cause simplicity, right? What do they do without those simplicity terms, they couldn't have quit, huh? Some would be a lot shorter. It cannot cause simply the involuntary, right? It causes nevertheless, they couldn't have quit in some way, right? The involuntary, insofar as it precedes emotion, the will to... doing something, right? Which would not be if the knowledge were, what, present, right? Anticidally, it even has itself to the will when it is, what, not voluntary, and nevertheless is the cause of willing something that otherwise, I guess, a man would, what, not will, right? Just as a man is ignorant of some circumstance of the act which he was not bound to know, right? And from this he would do something, right, that he would not do if he knew, right? To just excuse Oedipus there when he married his mother. That's why in the other Oedipus play, Oedipus at Colonus, you know that play? He's forgiven in a sense, right? The play is that he's kind of, he's taken to the gods, right? Because he didn't know he would do this, right? When he puts out his eyes, right? Horrible tragedy, huh? And the same way he killed his father, right? Not knowing he's just his own father, right? Shakespeare has in history plays there, you know, the war, the rules, and so on. The father is, one father is mistaken to kill his own son, right? In battle, and the other one, the son has killed the father, you know, and discovered this, and we say to the sixes, we keep over the sad state of love and war. As in someone using diligence, right? Not knowing that someone is going through the way, he shoots out an arrow, right? That's a stock example, by which he kills the one passing along, right? Remember, my teacher could start there, you know. I guess he did some hunting, you know, but he was getting kind of nervous about the free-shooting hunters, you know, who something moves, and bang, and off it goes, and it could be a man moving as well as a beast. So he's thinking, yeah, I'm going to have to stop this. And such ignorance causes the involuntary, what? Simply, right? That's the ignorance that you're not something you're not expected to know, right? We're not able to know. And to this is clear the response to the objections. For the first argument, objection, proceeds about ignorance of those things which one is what? Held to know, right? So that's an ignorance that doesn't merit forgiveness, right? Okay. The second is about the ignorance of what? Choice, right? Which in some way is voluntary as has been said, huh? And the third about the ignorance which is concomitant here, huh? Accompanying itself to the will, right? So it's involved in this question of ignorance that's caused involuntary, right? Mm-hmm. You have to see all these distinctions that Thomas makes. Can we see a tangent of another article here? Thank you. Question 7, about the circumstances of human acts, circumstantial evidence. Then we're not to consider about the circumstances of human acts. And about this are sought four things. First, what is a circumstance? Secondly, where the circumstances are about what? Human acts to be noted by the religion. Third, how many circumstances there are? And which in them are the chief ones? To the first, then, one proceeds thus. It seems that a circumstance is not an accident of what? Human acts. For Tully, that's Cicero, right? In the rhetorical, says that a circumstance is that to which, right? Speech adds authority and strength to a what? Argument, right? But speech gives strength to an argument, especially from those things which are the very substance of the thing. As a definition, genus, species. What do those three have in common? Definition, genus, and species. Yeah, they all seem to have what the thing is. The definition more distinctly than the genus of the species, huh? From which also Tully teaches the orator to what? Argue. Argue, right? Therefore, the circumstance is not an accident of the human act, huh? You know what Cicero said about Aristotle's rhetoric? It's a golden river. Like he said, you know, that's one of the tasks that Plato put his student Aristotle to work on, is to work on rhetoric, huh? Of course, you have a number of the dialogues where Socrates talks to these sophists who practice rhetoric. I guess the different sophists had different specialties, right? But rhetoric was kind of a common thing that they had, huh? And they all try to teach something about the art of persuasion, huh? It's an interesting word, persuasion, you know? Through the suite, right? I've got some notes there on the persuasion in it there in the scripture, right? Yeah, yeah. We'll talk about that, huh? Cindy, I used to say that persuasion is found first in music, huh? And then in fiction and finally in the speech. So you're moving them through the suite, right? Actually, the Greek says in the definition, you know, the fiction thing, you know, that it's in sweetened language, right? But music is even more persuasive. It's interesting, you know, how after with somebody and they're humming that melody, sometimes you'll pick it up involuntarily and so on. And so it's the Dryden's poem there, you know, where Alexander's there and they play one-time music, you know? He's like, he's back in battle, you know? And they play another music and he's putting his arm around the grill and so on. And, you know, people get, you know, how Hitler was so taken up with Wagner, you know? And he was moved by him, huh? So they didn't, you know, for years they wouldn't allow Wagner to be performed in Israel, right? Yeah. You know, because he was so associated with Hitler and so on. During the, was it during the Revolutionary War? But they'd have a little band come in and play these melodies, you know, these kind of string melodies. I'd volunteer, you know, to fight, you know? Yeah, yeah. Put the drums, yeah. When I was a little boy, I used to be looking for marches on the radio, you know? Even now, I still like some of these good marches and the good ones. Have my delusions of grandeur, you know? My dad, when he had a computer, he used to have the Marine Corps. And, you know, when he started, I was like, dun, dun, dun! And he just loved it! He just thought it was a great thing. It was very stirring. Well, some people in the parish there, you know, would go down to see the Holy Cross and they'd play, you know, West Point, you know? And if it was a good day, you know, on a Saturday, then they'd have the cadets marching out, huh? Of course, I don't know if you've ever seen them march on West Point or something, they'd come out, you know, one after another, one of these companies after another, you know? And they'd march around, you know? Oh, they'd just get carried away, you know? These civilians, you know? But it was, I would say, everyone doesn't pray. That was, you know, they all say, you know, these things. Okay. Further, it's, what, proper to accident to be in something, right? It's a subject. But what stands around something is not in it. What's more outside, right? It's starting from the word here. Therefore, circumstances are not accidents of what human acts. Moreover, of an accident, there is not an accident. But human acts themselves are certain accidents, huh? Therefore, circumstances are not accidents of acts, huh? Against this, huh? The particular conditions of any singular thing are said to be accidents, individuating, what? Yet. But the philosopher, who's this philosopher he's always talking about? But the philosopher in the third book, when he comes back in Ethics, huh? Causes circumstances, what? Particularia. Particularia. Particularis. That is, particular conditions of singular acts. Therefore, circumstances are, what? Yeah. Well, it's Tom's going to say, huh? The answer should be said that because names, according to the philosopher, are signs of, what? Things understood, right? It is necessary that according to the proceeding of our intellectual knowledge, there be also a, what? Proceeding and naming, right? But our knowledge, our intellectual knowledge, proceeds from things that are more known to things that are, what? Less known, huh? And therefore, among us, or with us, from more known things, names are carried over, right? To signifying things less known, right? That's the word transferunto, right? Sometimes Thomas would use the noun called, you see the expression, translatio nominis. Now, you know, the word translation in us, and the word metaphor, right? They both have exactly the same etymology. They both come from what? Carryover? But, in English, metaphor, you carry over the name, but not the meaning. So, if I call my wife honey, I'm carrying over the name honey, but not the exact meaning, right? But, translation, you're not carrying over the name, but you're carrying over the meaning, right? But that's kind of arbitrary, the ones that have been used for carrying over the name, and the others for carrying over the, what, meaning of the name, but not the name. Okay? Here you see that transferunto, right? He's talking about carrying over the name, right? So, translatio nominis will mean carrying over, obviously, the name. That's what you're talking about. And therefore, hence it is, that as is said in the tenth book of the metaphysics, tenth book of wisdom, from those things which are according to place, local, proceeds the name of what? Distance to all contraries. You see, what are contraries, huh? Well, contraries are the species, particular forms, right? That are furthest apart, right? Most distant, right? And so, like in the genus of color, white and black are the contraries. They're being furthest apart, right? In the genus of habit, it's virtue and what? Vice, right? Like continence and incontinence are in between, right? Okay? So, in the incarnate man. There's some conflict, huh? Quarantine Giovanni, who's got the vice, right? There's no conflict, right? He does these things, right? So, that idea of being most distant is taken from what? Place, huh? And in Greek, you know, you say, what's a diaphora? Latin, what is the difference, right? What means what? To carry apart. So, but in logic, a difference, or diaphora, is what separates species under the same genus, right? But the actual origin of the word is what carries them apart. And that's taken from locus, which means what place there, right? A lot of these things are named, right? Just like this idea of going forward, right? It's originally taken from locomotion. My face went from what? White to red when I got embarrassed. It went. Yeah, see? Someone dies, he's gone. He's gone. Where? That's right, you say. You mean he's dead? But no, we do say he's gone, right? He's gone, yeah. So, he's taken from these things, huh? Okay. And likewise, right? Names pertaining to what? Locomotion, huh? We use to signify other notions, right? In that bodies, huh? Which are what? Circumscribed, right? In place. In place. Are most of all, what? Known to us, huh? So, when you say the early Greek philosophers, they seem to speak as if change of place is the only, what? Change, right? And if these changes that seem to be a change of, what? Quality, right, huh? Is really a, what? Yeah, that's you disguised, right, huh? And, you know, I used to give them a classic example, you know, Berkowitz, they give Berkowitz a cup of coffee, right, huh? And Berkowitz takes a sip and says, this is really bitter, you know? And then he gets distracted and so on, so he puts some sugar in there, right? And Berkowitz says, oh my goodness, the coffee has changed from one quality of being bitter to now it's sweet, you know? So now I've discovered another kind of change besides change of place, huh? Well, as some of the fragments say, you know, short-sighted, you know? What has taken place, actually, is just a change of place. The sugar that was in the sugar bowl has now, it's down inside the, you know, well, I would see it, yeah, but it's so small you can't see it, right? And so there's really not that, huh? And Einstein, you know, in his book there, The Evolution of Physics, huh? Which is kind of the nearest thing to a history of physics, but some of the main things. He talks about the early theorems about heat, right? And if you put a, you know, cold body and a hot body together in the same room, and leave them there together for a while, the hot body would not be so hot, and the cold body would be a little warmer, right? And of course the idea was that there was a substance, caloric, that flowed from the hot body into the cold body, right? So was there a change of quality? We're just, and that's just a dumb name for what is a kind of a hidden change of what? Place, right? And so the oldest part, even of modern science, is about change of place on mechanics, huh? And then when they started to deal with heat and so on, they tried to understand it as being a kind of a disguised form of change of what? Place, right? So it's that well known, right? And so they graduated, they came to, you know, force by the truth itself, to see there's some other kind of change besides change of place, huh? That's the first kind of change Aristotle takes up in particular, though he studies it in general. So when Aristotle takes up, say, like in the fourth book of the physics, the name, the words in and out, right, huh? And then Thomas orders them the way Aristotle taught us to order them, but the first meaning of in is in place, huh? In this room, huh? And you order them from that. And hence it is that the name, the circumstances, from those things which are in place are derived to human acts, right, huh? Now those things are said in places to stand around something, right, which is extrinsic from the thing, right, but nevertheless touches it or approaches it according to what? Place. And therefore whatever conditions are outside the very substance of the act, huh, but nevertheless attain to it in some way, in some way to the human act, are called what? Circumstance. Circumstances. Circumstances. I'm sorry. I'm in the wrong sentence. Okay. But what is outside the substance of the thing, but pertaining to that thing is what? It's accident, right? Whence the circumstances of human acts should be called their what? Accidents, right? Whence the circumstances of human acts should be called their what? Accidents. Accidents, right? Accidents, right? They affect them in some way, huh? Now what about this firming, this argument from Tully, right? To the first therefore it should be said that speech gives strength to an argument first from the substance of the act, right? But secondarily from those things which, what? Secondarily. Yeah. So you hear that in the courtroom a lot, right? That these circumstances, what? Make it less severe. Sometimes they augment, right? But sometimes they tend to, what? Make it less severe, right? Just as first someone is rendered, what? Accusable. From what? The fact that he is, what? Killed a man, right? But secondly from this that he did it, what? By deceit. Yeah. Or an account of? Money. Money. Or in a time or in a? Sacred place. Yeah, sacred time or place, right? Or something else of this sort, huh? Okay. I guess if you rob and you have a gun, that's... That's worse. Yeah, than if you, you know... You steal. That's circumstance, right? Robbery is robbery, you know? Yeah. But the circumstance is going to make it robbed. You know, it's called, you know? You kill... Armed robbery, you know? You kill a man, it's bad. You kill your father, it's worse. Yeah, yeah. And therefore, significantly, he says that through circumstance, speech joins, what? Or adds some strength or firmness to the argument, as it were, secondarily, right? Yeah? To second... The second argument was the one about the accident being in the thing and nothing outside it, which the word circumstance seemed to say, right? To second, it should be said that something is said to be an accident of something in two ways. In one way, because it is in it, right? As white is said to be an accident of Socrates, right? In another way, because together with it, it is in the same, what? Subject, right? So if you say, I'm a white philosopher, right? Does my whiteness reside in my philosophy? No, but they're in the same subject, right? Okay. And that's the example Thomas gives, just as white happens to what? Being a musician, right? Insofar as they belong to one, right? And in some way, what? Touches the other in one subject. And through this way, circumstances are said to be accidents of the acts, huh? Not as existing, what? In the other, right? But as existing with it in the same, what? Subject, right? To the third, it should be said that an accident is said to happen to an accident on account of their coming together in a subject. But this happens in two ways. In one way, according to two accidents, they're compared to one subject without any order, right? Like being white and being a musician, right? And just as white and musician to, what, Socrates, right? Another way, with some order, right? That is when a subject receives one by means of, what, another, right? Just as a body receives, what, color by means of the surface, right? It's the surface of the body, it's color. So there's some connection between having a surface and having a color, right? And having a surface is more fundamental, right, than the color you have. And in that way, one accident is said also to be in the other, right? For we say that color is in the, what, surface, right? But in both ways, circumstances have themselves to the act. For some circumstance, they're ordered to the act because they pertain, what, to the agent, not by means of the act. As, for example, place in the condition of the, what, person. Others, because, what, by means of the act, as the way of, what, acting. I think, time for one more or not? With your...