Prima Secundae
Lecture 30: The Voluntary in Human Acts

Transcript
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It can also be considered according to what? Special considerations, either on the side of the operation itself or on the side of the operating power on the side of the what? Object. And thus a necessity the will does not what? Tend to it, huh? I first wanted to be a politician, right? A ruler, you know? I don't think I would have found happiness there. I didn't know what happiness was. I remember my brother had the basic works of Aristotle and opened up the book and the only book that interested me at first was a book called The Politics. How do I milk this for all it's worth? So when Thomas examines what the chief good of man is, he says it's got to be an operation. It's not just an ability, right? It's got to be an operation of our highest power. Well, it's got to be in regard to the highest object, too, right? So he gradually thinks out what our beatitude is. And then you want that. It's your beatitude, right? Now, the third should be said that that definition of beatitude that some lay down, that the blessed man is the one who has everything that he wants and what? To whom all things desire and succeed, right? Or come to him. In some way understood is good and sufficient. In other way, it is what? Imperfect, huh? For if we understand it simply about all things which a man wishes by his natural desire, thus it is true, right? That the man who has everything that he wants naturally, right? He is blessed, right, huh? For nothing satisfies the natural desire of man except the perfect good, which is beatitude. If I would be understood about those things which man wishes, according to the apprehension or reason, thus to have some things which man wishes does not pertain to beatitude, but more to what? Misery, right? In so far as having these things impede man, lest he have whatever things he naturally wants, huh? Just as reason sometimes takes as true, what impedes one from a knowledge of truth, huh? And according to this consideration, Augustine adds that the perfected beatitude that he wishes nothing bad. If everything you want, then you wish nothing bad, huh? So that comes up in prayer, right? Because you pray for the things you want, right? Well, sometimes you want something that's bad for you. Is God going to hear this prayer? He does if you're punished for nothing. Although the first suffices if it be rightly understood that he is blessed who has everything that he, what, wishes wants. Thomas sometimes argues from this definition of Augustine, right? To what true beatitude is, huh? But even just by itself, it's still a common notion, right? So if you say, I want everything I want, what's obvious, isn't it, right? And therefore I want the attitude, right? I can't help but want it. I can't help but want everything I want. Can you? And if I have everything I want, then I'm happy, right? Now, one of those advertisements I saw years ago on TV, there for some medicine or something like that. And of course the woman is saying, you know, and when you're at your health, you pretty much got everything. Whereas now it talks about that in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, you know. To a man who's sick, health seems to be, what? Happiness. To a man who's poor, money seems to be, what? Happiness, right? And with everything there is particularly lacking, they find that to be happiness, right? And are both the people really more happy? I don't know if they are. If they're holy, they aren't. That doesn't matter. I don't know. Today was a feast of St. Philip Neri. In the little book there, they had the quotes in Philip Neri, you know. He doesn't want any sad saints in his order, you know. He's sad people. He says, it's easier to perfect someone who's joyful, he says, than who's sad. Interesting. Doesn't St. Teresa say that a sad saint is a sorry saint? Yeah. Something like that. God loves a cheerful giver, right? You help everything and you're joyful about it, huh? Real fast, where at the end of chapter 8 in Romans, where he talks about, he says, the things that I want I don't do, and so forth. Somewhere in there, I can't find it right now, but he made this point, St. Thomas makes the point that in terms of desiring the good in a general way, everybody wants it. But when you find out particularly, maybe someone, because he says there's two ways to understand what he says here, one is in terms of a just man and one is in terms of a sinner. But even the sinner, in a general way, wants what's good. Everybody wants world peace. Everybody wants world peace. Oh, we should all just get along. Yeah, of course, sure. But when it comes out of particulars, then some want it, some don't want it. And when that's what he comments on that, I can't find the exact passage. Okay, now, we come to the end here of the fifth question here. Let's go back to this distinction that I made before and say, how would you divide the second part of the summa? I hear knowledgeable people would say, there are two ways to divide something, right? So I might say, okay, we can divide the second part of the summa into what's called the prima secunde, right? That volume there. And then I have another volume that's called the secunda secunde, which is much thicker, right? Look at this one. Okay. Secunda, secunde, I'm probably going to say that's the division of the second part of the summa, right? But what distinction is being world looked here? Yeah. What distinction or division is this? Yeah. This is what I call the editorial or reference. So if you want to find the text in the second part, you say, was it the prima pars, I mean, prima secunde, or the secunde secunde, right? And then once you get the primus secunde, the secunde secunde, is it in question one or what question is it, right? And what are they, right? Okay. But now, the other division we call the logical, understandable, or understandable. And that's usually into two or three, as you say, right? But now, what is the actual logical or understandable division of the second part, right? Two parts and we just finish the first part? Yeah. Yeah. Now, the first part, which is question one through five, and one through five of the, what, prima secunde, right? And that's divided against the rest of the primus secunde, right? Yes. And the, secunda, secunde, right? Okay? That's the logical understandable division, right? Now, Thomas, at the beginning of the first question there, right? If you look at the Summa, question one, article one, right? He says, where first we're not to consider, or it occurs to be considered, about the last end of human life, right? And then about those things to which man is able to, what? Arrive at this end, huh? Or also he deviates on this end, right? Do you have that in the question one, article one, the premium though before that, right then? Okay? That's the logical understandable division, right? We're going to talk about the last end of man, right? And then how you get there or don't get there, right? That makes sense, right? Now, the first of those two parts is what we just finished going through, questions one through five, right? Now, at the beginning of question six, you have another premium, we call it, okay? And so now he's going to subdivide the second part, right? So he says at the beginning of question six there, before he gets into article one, because therefore to beatitude through some acts is necessary to arrive, right, huh? And this is touched upon in question five, article seven, huh? It's necessary, consequently, to consider about what? Human acts, right? That we might know by which acts one arrives at beatitude or the road to beatitude is impeded, right? Okay? Now, this is the beginning of talking about the second part here, right, huh? But because operations and acts are about, what, singular things, therefore every operative science, huh, is, what? Perfected in the consideration of particulars, right? The moral, what, therefore consideration, which is of human acts, first ought to be considered in universality, in general, right? Secondly, in particular. And that's the distinction now between the, what, rest of what? Prima secunde. Yeah. In the rest of the prima secunde, right, you're going to talk about the human acts by which you arrive at your end, that you don't, right? In universality, in general, right? And then in the secundi secunde, which is longer than the whole prima secunde, he's going to deal with this in what? In particular, right? So this is the large core of the standard of the vision. What does prima secunde secunde secunde tell you about the matter? What I understand is to give you, right? Moral matter is divided into prima secunde and secunde secunde, right? The first and the second, and the second and the second. That's very, that really enlightens your mind, doesn't it? Mm-hmm. See? No. Moral matter is divided into a consideration of the end of man, huh? And then how you get there or don't get there. Now, that's understandable, isn't it, right? Okay? Where you want to go, and how you get there. See? That enlightens your mind, huh? So that's why you need these two divisions, right? What's the editorial and reference division of the Gospels of Matthew? Or reference division, yeah. If I were to refer you to something in the Gospel of St. Matthew, right, what would I give you? I wanted to refer you to a particular... Reflecting something. Okay. The numbers, the chapter, and... And the verse, right? The verse, yeah. Yeah. So that's the reference division, right? There are 28 chapters in Matthew, right? And each chapter divided into verses, right? Now, apparently that division was made in Oasis, right? The University of Paris. Because they wanted to have a way of, you know, I want to call your attention to this, and you want to call your attention to this, and this one, too, is my point. But we've got a common way that we can, you know, refer, right? Because everybody had their own way to refer, you know? Okay? But that's... What does 28 chapters tell you about the Gospel of Matthew? Nothing. You don't understand anybody saying there's 28 chapters. But it's useful for referring to a particular passage, right? Okay? Now, if you look at Thomas' commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, right, huh? He says that among the four Gospels, Matthew especially emphasizes the human nature of Christ. That's why he's represented by the man, right? The four animals, huh? And he says, now, as a man, he came into this world, right? And he proceeded through this world, sermonizing, right? Telling parables and giving sermons and so on, and healing people. And then he went out of this world, right? By his death and resurrection, huh? So the Gospel of Matthew is divided into three parts. His first few chapters deal with what? He's coming into the world, right? And then the second thing is proceeding through the world. And then finally, he's what? Leaving the world, right? That makes some sense, right? Okay? And it's division into three, right? Well, that's what we call the logical, understandable division, right? Okay? And then, you know, he'll subdivide those, right? Coming into the world, dealing with his birth, right? Of the Blessed Virgin. And then the manifestation of his birth, you know? The Magi and so on. So, actually, let's subdivide, right? So, this is important thing to realize that we need this division here in order to refer to things, right? And, you know, I did a myriad addition here. It's very nice to often, you know, refer you to the other passages, you know, where the thing is talked about. So that's a very useful thing, right? But as far as understanding is concerned, you have to have a second, what? Division, right? So it's more or less than our range, huh? For us to arrive at the division, the end of the first part, right? The division of the, what? That's understandable, logical, right? I mean, if we had not gotten to the end of Question 5, we would have been in suspense for the rest of the summer if the habit doesn't last. Okay? You see the importance of that, right? I'm surprised. I never heard people, you know, especially make that distinction right now. But it's kind of obvious when you start to think about it. But you don't really, for the most part, you know, do that. And most people only have the editorial division in mind, right? You know? In fact, we probably don't even know that. There's 28 chapters in Matthew. But that's kind of arbitrary, right? How many chapters you have and so on, right? So is the other going to teach you anymore or not? Or we're silenced you? We'll have to. Yeah, no, as I say, next Thursday, we're going away to California for this wedding. So James is getting married there to Lisa. Did he meet her at school? Yeah. With the property, you see? Yeah. Yeah, a lot is going on. They just go to school there. And it won't be out there, out there, that long. Oh, wow. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand the Lord, Shoebrite, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. Did you have Michael, Gabriel, and Rayfield today? That was our feast day. We do the same, Syriacus. We did the angels, so we... You're way up there. If you recall, we were at the beginning of question six, huh? Okay. And let's just recall the division of the second part of Summa, right? You might recall that the distinction that I've pointed out many times between the editorial and reference division, right? And the what? So if you look at the perineum there to question one, just for a second, where he gives the division of the second part of Summa, right? Ubi primo considerandum, huh? Where first should be considered, there occurs about the last end, right? Of human life. And that's what we did before the break, right? Questions one through five. Then about those things which man is able to arrive at this end, right? Or to what? And deviate from it, huh? Remind me a bit of our Father, right, huh? Because the first two petitions held, Be thy name, thy kingdom come, refer to the end. And then they will be done, and the help there give us this day, our daily bread, to the, what? Second thing he mentions here. Those to which man arise at this end, right? Not everyone who says, Lord, Lord, but he who does the will of my Father in heaven, right? Again, the King of heaven. And then the last petitions, where you have to be forgiving your sins, and avoid being led into temptation, and so on, and into the power of the evil one. Or from it to, what, deviate, right, huh? Okay? So the first of those things, then we've taken up already, right? And now in question six, huh? You get the division of the, what? Not only the rest of the prima secunde, but also the secunde secunde, right? So look at the premium here to question six. Because, therefore, to beatitude, through some acts, it is necessary to, what? Arrive, right? Is necessary, consequently, to consider about human acts. That we might know by what acts one arrives at beatitude, huh? Or that one is impeded, huh? On the road to what? The attitude, huh? Thomas sometimes says, even in ethics, huh, that virtue is the road to happiness. And vice is the road to misery, right? And every time you read about some miserable guy in the newspaper, knowing them, it's some vice, right, huh? That they've gone down the road of some vice, or vices, and they predictably ended up in what? Misery, right, huh? Okay. So that's what he's going to take up in the rest of the prima secunde, and the secunde secunde, right, huh? But now in the next sentence, he points out the distinction between the rest of the prima secunde here, starting with question six to the end, and the secunde secunde, right, huh? But because operations and acts are about, what, singulars, huh? Therefore, every, what, practical science, or doing science, right, operativa, as Jensei calls it, is perfected in a consideration of particular, right? It's interesting, Aristotle, there, in the politics, where he talks about, you know, Socrates was always talking about virtue in a very general way. It would be much better if you talked about in particular, you know, what's the virtue of a woman? What's the virtue of a man? You know, these are the particulars, huh? And this is what Thomas is making here, right? So he says, moral consideration, which is about human acts, first, therefore, ought to be considered or treated in, what, universale, in the universal, and that's going to be the rest of, what, the prima secunde, right? Secondly, in particular, and that's going to be the whole, what's, the thicker, that's separate font, the thicker font for the second secunde, right? So you see that distinction, huh? Okay. Now, how does he divide the rest of the prima secunde here, beginning with question six? Well, about the universal consideration of human acts. First, we're not to consider about the acts themselves. Secondly, about their, what, principles, huh? Okay. Now, what does he mean by the principles? Well, if you look just very quickly at question 49, you'll see the way he takes that up. The very beginning, the preening to question 49. After the acts and passions, we're not to consider about the principles, the causes, so to speak, of human acts, right? And first, about the intrinsic principles, right? Secondly, about the extrinsic principles. And the intrinsic principle is the power and the habits, right? And because we spoke about the powers in the first part, right? That's more remote from what Clint speak about. It remains to treat about the, what, habits, right? Okay. And then the extrinsic ones, huh? Well, these are the ones that come from God, right? Namely, what, grace and the law, right? And so, in question 90, we'll talk about the extrinsic, huh? Principles, huh? We look at the framing to question 90. Consequently, we're not to consider about the exterior beginnings of human acts. Now, the principle inclining to evil, the extrinsic one, is the, what? The devil, right? And that's at the end, maybe, the Our Father. About whose temptation, or the temptation of which one was treated in the first part. But the exterior principle moving to the good is God who instructs us through the law and in aids us by grace. Whence, first, we ought to consider law, secondly, grace, right? Okay. So, we don't have ourselves there, but, so that's going to be the second part of the, what? Rest of, we deal with the principles, right? Intrinsic, like the habits, namely, and the extrinsic one, which is God and the devil, but the devil has been taken up earlier. And then God through his grace and through his law and through his grace, huh? The famous treatise on law there, right? To find out what law is. So let's go back now to the premium of question six, huh? Notice he begins with question 49, the considerations of principles. So he's dividing now six through 48, huh? 49 is seven times seven, right? Yes? Okay. He brought a mnemonic device on to remember, huh? He begins talking about the intellect and, what, the seventh reading of the third book of the Deuteronomy. Okay. Now, of human acts, some are, what, private or proper to man, right? Some are common to man and to the other animals, right? So sometimes Thomas calls the first. human acts right in the second they'll call them acts of man but radically kind of way he speaks of it and because beatitude is the what private good of man right it's not shared by the other animals cat can't really be happy right you think you can on on tv when they talk about this about dog food or cat food or something but but uh so more nearly have themselves to beatitude the acts which are properly human right then the acts which are common to man and their animals right first therefore we're not to consider about the acts which are proper to man or private to man secondly about the acts which to men and to other animals are common which are called the what passions of the soul or you could call them the emotions right so um the animals have anger and fear and desire and so on right okay so he's going to consider those two huh thomas you know his tweet is on the on the passions on the emotions when i was first interested in in poetics of aristotle and so on and then the music of mozart and so on reading his treatise on the passions is really a what foundation for understanding better emotions that mozart was imitating and uh i remember one time making a tape recording with warren murray you know different emotions about start you know just to show it to one of our friends so he would know that mozart was imitating the different emotions mozart even has a kind of a plot there in the emotions pieces and there's a change and other things may go from the major key to the minor key and hope is replaced by despair and very interesting he does now about the first two things occur to be considered huh first about the what condition of human acts huh secondly about the what distinction of them huh and according to my texture it's not down until question 18 that you get to the distinction of them right but what the heck does he mean by the condition of human acts huh explain yourself thomas huh since human acts are properly called what those which are voluntary right huh in that the will is the reasonable what desire desiring power which is proper to man right not to the animals on the will is necessary to consider about these acts insofar as they are what voluntary right yeah first therefore we're not to consider about the voluntary and the involuntary in community in general right secondly about the acts which are voluntary as it were elicited from the will itself right as being immediately existing of the will itself an act of the will third about the acts which are voluntary as as it were being commanded by the will which are acts of the will by means of the other what power so when uh charity the act of love is what an act of the will itself right but it commands all the other what powers right so they can be acts of charity in a way too right acts of love but they're what commanded you know because they're moved in a sense by the will okay and because the acts of the will will have certain what circumstances by which they are to be what judged huh first one ought to consider about the voluntary and involuntary and consequently about the circumstances of the acts in which the voluntary or involuntary is what found huh so that's going to be starting with question seven that second thing huh okay so so question six then is about the voluntary and involuntary and about the first eight things are asked huh maybe not by you but by thomas okay first whether in human acts is found the voluntary huh the honest huh secondly in contrast with it is found in the brute animals huh some people think that they are we have these two cats in the house you know and after breakfast they both you know like their breakfast but then tablet would go right out you know want to go out the doorway and go down the block and into this wooded area there to go hunting and moppet would want to go to the window and sit in the window there and watch the world go back more philosophically so not another doer right yeah what is that is that is that a choice that they made those two cats third whether the voluntary is able to be without any act huh sins of omission you know that if they're sins you must be voluntary right but there's no act there if it's a sin of omission right yeah fourth whether violence huh can be inferred to the will right or imposed upon the will you do a violence to the will you force the will i'll give somebody enough beer i was reading your style in the dianima there where he's talking about the imagination right huh and he's distinguishing between imagination opinion and so on right and then he's talking about what the imagination is and how it's comes from the senses in a way but the senses move something inside us and so on and then how sometimes uh manual animals act to imagination right uh rather than to reason right some because they don't have any reason like the dog or the cat right i was like men because the reason is is covered over right huh either by what some passion he says right or by some disease like you know the bad man right or by sleep huh and the imagination kind of dominates you know but it gives those three things huh and uh thomas kind of you know sits a little more fully but aristotle gives those three reasons why the man is moved by the imagination huh and what this guy was moved by he wanted to blow up the pentagon again i don't know but they uh you read about these people all the time you know that madmen they do they take their gun they go and they shoot a bunch of people you know particular reason it seems they could do this for doing this uh whether violence causes the involuntary right huh that's related to the fourth article right whether meters i guess that's a kind of fear huh causes the involuntary right huh whether concupiscence causes the involuntary right and whether ignorance causes them to be involuntary i didn't know the gun was loaded right yes yeah i'm so sorry you know because song isn't there a song about that so let's look at article one here now within human acts there's found involuntary so let's look at article one here so let's look at article one here so let's look at article one here so let's look at article one here so let's look at article one here so let's look at article one here To the first, one goes forward thus. It seems that in human acts is not found the, what, voluntary, huh? I was talking to a young lady the other day who had gone to TAC, right? And, of course, they have kind of the policy there, you know, let the author speak for himself, right? So they get thrown some of the summa or something at them, right? And nobody is even explaining the way Thomas proceeds, right? He seems all good stuff, but first he's saying, it isn't so, and now it's so. It took a while to realize his style, you know. It's kind of funny, though, you know. It's kind of a, sometimes, you know, they kind of throw these things too much at you, you know, and you're supposed to figure out what the author's trying to do on your own, yeah. For the voluntary is that who's what? Beginning is in oneself, right? As is clear through Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene, right? And even Aristotle, he got into that, pagan, right? Okay. And Aristotle discusses the voluntary in the beginning of the, what, third book, right? Because in the second book he's defining virtue as involving choice, right? It's a habit with choice, right? Existing in the middle towards us is determined for the right reason, right? But, so that the choice and the voluntary is in there. So in the beginning of the third book, before he takes up the virtues, he takes up choice and the voluntary and so on. But Gregory Nyssa, my text refers to the Natura Hominyssa, the work of his. And, of course, the one, the Damascene, the famous one, the Orthodox faith. But the beginning of human acts is not in man himself, but is what? Outside of man, right? For the desire or the appetite of man is moved to doing something from the desirable, which is outside, which is like a mover not moved, right? So dinner on the table there, not moving, right? Moves me, you know, to sit down and jump. Yeah, yeah. So I'm not really free. The source of what I'm doing is that meal on the table there, right? Right. You know, it's outside of me. Not good to me. Aristotle talks about in the third book of the soul, he talks about the moving power, right? The desirable moves both the, what? The knowing power, which knows the desirable, and the, what? Desiring power itself, which is moved by that, huh? Therefore, human acts is not found involuntary. That's pretty convincing, huh? Morer, the philosopher in the eighth book of the physics, proves that there is not found in animals any, what? New motion, right? Which is not preceded by some other, what? Exterior motion, huh? But all human acts are, what? New, huh? For no act of man is eternal, huh? Therefore, the beginning of all human acts is from the outside. Therefore, there is not found in them the voluntary. This is serious, isn't it, huh? That sounds like a bunch of animals. Yeah, yeah, that's interesting, isn't it? Yeah. This is Thomas' pessimistic, period. Moreover, who acts voluntarily, through himself is able to act, right? But this does not belong to man. For it is said in the Gospel of John, chapter 15, without me, you are not able to do anything, right? Nothing are you able to do without me. If you don't have a linear power, then do something and not do it, right? That's where Calvin would include God as the author of sin, right? Therefore, the voluntary is not found in human acts. But against this is what Damascene says in the second book, that the voluntary is the act which is a, what? Reasonable operation, right? But such are human acts. Therefore, in these lines of acts is found, the, what? Voluntary, right? So the authority of Damascene, staying against this. And apparently Gregory would say that, too. And Aristotle, right? So there's some pretty big, big minds there, huh? I assume he would say this, too, and many others, right? But it's interesting, he takes these guys. I don't know how Thomas is going to get out of this knot that he's tied himself into. He must have had all the answers to this. He had teaching magicians. Well, there's gripe Thomas sometimes of being, you know, stumped, you know, and falling on the ground and praying, you know, and then getting up and off. I should have done that when I was in grade school. I answer, it should be said that it's necessary for there to be the voluntary inhuman acts. That's the conclusion, right? That's not a reason. To the evidence of this order, huh? It should be considered, huh? That of some acts or motions, the beginning, their source, that beginning means, right? Origin. Is in the agent, right? Or in that which is, what? Moved, huh? But of some motions or acts, the beginning is, what? Outside, huh? For when the stone is moved, what? Up. The beginning or source or the origin of this motion is outside the, what? Stone. Stone for the man. Thawking the stone up. Left to itself in one glove probably, huh? But when it is moved downward, right, the beginning or source of this motion is in the, what? Stone, huh? Okay? Left to itself. But now of those which are moved by a beginning or source or origin that's inside them, right, intrinsic, some move themselves and some, what? Do not. Do not, huh? For since every agent or thing moved, right, acts or is moved on account of some, what? End, huh? As it's had above, right? Those are perfectly moved by inward source or origin or beginning in which, what? There is some intrinsic beginning, not only that they might be moved, but that they might be moved towards an end, huh? And in order that something come about for the sake of an end, there is required in some way knowledge of that, what? End, huh? So whatever is thus acts or is moved from an intrinsic beginning, whatever therefore thus acts or is moved by an intrinsic beginning that has some, what? Knowledge of the end, has in itself a beginning of its act, not only that it act, but also that it act on account of that, what? End. But what has no knowledge of the end, huh? Has in itself a beginning of an action or a motion, right? But not over of what it is to act or to move to an account of an end is the beginning in it, but it's in another, right, who knows the end and directs it, huh? From whom or by whom there is impressed upon it a beginning of its motion towards the end, huh? Okay? So the tree produces, what, acorns or something, right? And reproduces itself, right? Is it acting for an end? Not an end they didn't know. But it's impressed upon it, right? I mean, this is true about the animals, too. Whence things of this sort are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others, right? But the things that have a now to the end are said to move themselves, because in them there is a beginning or source, not only that they act or do, but also that they act on account of a what? In it. And therefore, since both are from an intrinsic source, to wit that they act, and that they act on account of an end, the motion and acts of these things are said to be voluntary. For this, the name of voluntary implies that the motion and the act is from one's own what? Inclination. And hence it is that the voluntary is said to be, according to the definition of these three guys, the same three guys we met in the beginning of the article, but now it comes first. Yeah. And then Gregory is second, and Damascene is what? Yeah, he's Aristotle first now, right? What's the significance of that? Not only whose beginning or source is within, but with the addition of what? Knowledge, right? When since man most of all knows the end of his, what? Doing or work, and moves himself, in his acts, in his acts most of all, the voluntary is what? Found, huh? What do you think about that? The body of the article, right? You dissect that body, huh? He said, that most perfectly moves itself, that also knows the, what? End for which it is acting, right? Or that which moves itself, not knowing the end for which it acts, is certainly less voluntary, right? What do you mean that the animals are voluntary? Because they have knowledge? Well, what do you mean by voluntary, right? If you mean by voluntary, that which has its source within itself, then they have something of the voluntary, right? But to say something is fully voluntary, only if it has the element, not only that, but knows the end for which it acts, right? But the dog, in the sense of he knows the food, which is, what's the end of the trip? What's the end of eating though? Does he know the end? No, he doesn't know the end. He knows he's hungry. Yeah. He knows the food. Is hunger the end of eating? He knows his food, and he... He knows that's not the end. He knows he's hungry, knows that's food. Okay. So, in other words, there's knowledge. Yeah, sense knowledge, but it's not knowledge the end. That's his knowledge. Does he know it as an end, right? No, not as an end, but he knows the end. See, so... But there's still a knowledge of the end, even if he doesn't know it as an end. Yeah. So animals have knowledge of the end. He doesn't know it as an end. No. Yeah. But he doesn't make that distinction here, right? Well, maybe that's implied in what he's saying about knowing the end. Could be enough. He can probably make a distinction in the end. But, you know, it's voluntary here in a somewhat broader meaning than the idea of being free, right? As Thomas is saying, you know, is man free? Is that the meaning of the article? It doesn't seem to be, right? And, you know, usually they'll speak, you know, if man has vibrium arbitrium, that's free judgment, right? But he doesn't seem to be, you know, taking voluntary in that sense of being free and offensive, you might say. Let's see how he answers the objections, because sometimes that casts some light upon these things. Or many times it does. Most often it does. Now, the first objection was that one is moved by something outside of oneself, right? Namely the desirable, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that not every beginning is a first beginning. Thus, although is of the, what? Meaning of the voluntary, and that the beginning of it be, what? Within. Then, it is not over against the notion of the voluntary, that the intrinsic beginning be caused or moved by some, what? Extrinsic beginning. Exterior beginning. Because it is not of the notion of the voluntary that the inward beginning be the first beginning, huh? Okay? But nevertheless, it should be known that it can happen that some, the beginning of some motion to be first first in its own, what? Genus, huh? Which is nevertheless not first simply, right? Just as in the genera of alterable things, the first thing that alters things is the heavenly, what? Body. I'm speaking of kind of the old understanding. which nevertheless is not the first, what? Mover simply, but it's moved by a local motion, by a superior, what? Mover, right? Thus, therefore, the intrinsic beginning of a voluntary act, which is the knowing power and the appetite, both of them, right? is the first beginning in the genus of the, what? Petitive motion, right? Although it is moved by something outside according to other, what? Kinds of motion, right? Does it satisfy you? Now, what about the second objection here? The motion of the animals there is always, what? Preceded by some exterior motion, right? It was the same thing for man. He's an animal too, right? To the second, it should be said that the new motion of an animal is preceded by some outside motion as regards to things here. In one way, insofar as through some outside motion is presented to the sense of the animal something, what? Sensible. Which, apprehended, grasped by its annoying power, moves the, what? Desire, right? Just as the lion seeing the stag, I guess on, is that the one you have in the Psalms there? The one that's thirsty? Yeah. The one that's thirsty. The one that's thirsty. It's fun to keep you seated. Mm-hmm. It's like a chair of that fun and a quarrel. Yeah. Just as the lion seeing the stag approaching to its motion, right, begins to, what? Be moved towards it, right? In another way, insofar as through some outside motion, he begins in some way to be changed by a natural change, right? The body of the animal being changed by natural motion. As through cold or through, what? Hot. Hot, huh? So sometimes animals get out of the hot heat, don't they, go under the tree? Mm-hmm. And sometimes they go in, you know, out of the cold and get into a warm place, huh? Okay. First cat we had would always go to the old, the old stove, you know, that had the open space underneath rather than all these tall drawers. That's how the cat liked to go and lay under the stove and the... Okay, so sometimes it's cold or hot, right, but the body being changed through the motion of an exterior body that's eating it or cooling it, then also accidentally the sense desire is what? Changed, okay, which is a power of a body organ, right? Just as from some alteration of the body, the desire is moved to the desire of some what thing, but this is not against the notion of the voluntary, as has been said, for these motions from the outside source are of another, what, genus of motion, so is the desire to go into the warm place, right, out of the cold. That's a different kind of activity than the, what, chilling of the body, right? That's what he's saying, right? So that desire to go in is still from the intrinsic, but beginning, yeah. What about this God here, the rejection? To the third, it should be said that God moves man to acting, not only as proposing something desirable to the sense, right, or as, what, changing the body, right, these two ways that the animal is being influenced, but also as moving the will itself. Thomas would deny that the angel, even Michael and Gabriel and Raphael, can move the will immediately. They can move it, you know, by way of persuasion, right? And even the devil can try to persuade, right? That's not to move the will intrinsically. God is that small that he can move the will intrinsically, right? Because he's a source of the will. Because every motion, both of the will and of nature, proceeds from him as from the first, what, mover, right? And Thomas develops that some link there in the third part of the Summa Contagentilas, right? And the first part of the Summa. And just as it is not against the notion of nature, that the motion of nature be from, what, God is from a first, what, mover. In so far as nature is a certain tool of God, what, moving, huh? So it is not against the notion of an act of the will, that it be from God, in so far as the will is moved by, what, God, huh? It is, however, commonly of the notion of the natural and voluntary motion, that they are from a, what, intrinsic principle, right? So what's the definition of nature in natural philosophy? Anybody know that or remember it? Yeah. But inside it is intrinsic, right? It's a beginning and cause of motion rest in that in which it is, right? First as such and not happening, right? But inside it being an intrinsic, what, and so on. It's interesting that the word nature comes from, what, the word birth, right, huh? Because birth is from, what, within, huh? It's the idea that the source of the baby is within the woman, right, within the animal that gives birth, huh? Every time you get your medicine, they say, what's your date of birth? I guess the way they have to check it. I came until January 18th, 1936. But actually, I existed before January 18th, 1936 in my mother's womb, right? Yeah. So I came from within, huh? So nature, as well as the will, voluntary, the source is, what, within, right? Even though in both cases, they are, what, dependent upon God. It's hard to understand, but that's something that's taken up in other parts of theology, huh? 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