Prima Secundae
Lecture 21: Beatitude as Vision of God's Divine Essence

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Well, the beatitude of man is in the vision of the divine essence. It's got to be somewhere. Maybe that's where it is. To the eighth, one proceeds thus. It seems that the beatitude of man is not in the vision of the divine essence itself. For Dionysius says in the first chapter of mystical theology, that through that which is the highest part of his understanding, man is joined to God as to one entirely unknown. But that which is seen to its essence is not entirely unknown. Therefore, the last perfection of our understanding of the beatitude does not consist in this, that God is seen to his what? Essence. Well, you have to be careful taking Dionysius or anybody out of context. I think Dionysius is talking about our knowledge in this life. And kind of the ultimate thing is to realize that whatever we say about God in the knowledge we have of him in this life, it falls short of him, right? He remains unknown, right? Moreover, of a higher nature, higher is the what? Perfection. But this is the perfection that is proper to the divine understanding, that it sees its own what? Essence. Therefore, the last perfection of the human understanding does not arrive at this, right? But subsists below that, right? That's proper to the divine, right? But against all this is what is said in 1 John 3, 2. When he appears, we will be, what? Like him, for we'll see him as he is. That, as best of my knowledge, seems to be the most explicit statement of this, huh? I mean, sometimes we say in St. Paul, did you see God face to face, right? This, it seems, is even more precise, right? A way of saying what the beatification is. Now, Thomas says, Answer, it should be said, that the last and perfect beatitude cannot be except in the vision of the divine essence, huh? It can only be in the vision of God, right? Divine nature, divine substance. That's a conclusion, how does he get at that, right? To the first, for the evidence of this, two things should be considered. First, that man is not perfectly, I said it, when there remains something for him, what? To desire and to what? Seek, huh? And second, is that the perfection of any power is to be observed according to the ratio of its object, right? What do you mean, ratio? Now, the object of the understanding is the what it is. That is the essence of the thing, as is said in the third book about the soul. That's the object of our reason, the what it is, huh? So in the dialogue, Socrates is always asking, what is something, right? And that's why, that's one explanation they give of the word limit there is meaning definition, right? It's the limit of our knowledge, the goal of our knowledge, to know what something is. And if you know that something exists, you naturally want to know, what is it, right? So when you first see an eclipse of the sun, what is it? What is this, huh? Things are like said, that's what manna means. What is it? Yeah. So, so far, therefore, precedes the perfection of the understanding, so far as it knows the essence of some thing. If, therefore, some understanding knows the essence of some effect, to which is not able to be known the essence of the cause, that one knows through it about the cause what it is, the understanding is not said to have attained to the cause simply, although through the effect it can be known about the cause that it is, right? And, therefore, there remains naturally for a man the desire, that he knows the effect and knows it to have a cause, that he also knows about the cause what it is, huh? So the whole first book of the, what, three books about the soul, Aristotle is looking at what the Greeks before him thought about what the soul is, right? They're all convinced that there is a, the soul exists, right? There's a cause of life within living bodies, whatever that cause may be. But they don't know what it is, right? And Aristotle, in the second book, thinks out what the soul is, huh? Satisfied, huh? Well, he's got to think about the powers of the soul, but anyway. And in the, what, physics, he's got to know what motion is, right? What change is, when he goes so far as to, what, define it, right? Kind of funny, you know, Descartes, he kind of quotes in a garbled version the definition of motion and says, Now, who understands those words, he says? And, of course, you know, Aristotle defines place and what, time, right? They're always quoting Augustine, where he says, If nobody asks me, I know what time is. If they ask me what it is, I don't know. But the mind wants to know what time is, huh? Wants to know what place is, huh? The Greeks had a common opinion that whatever it is must be somewhere, someplace. They didn't know anything about anything beyond that. Aristotle says, well, that means that place seems to be the first of all things, huh? What is this place that nothing can be without place, but place apparently can be without other things? What is place? Is it the extension between the walls of this room? What place is? Well, he has a whole investigation of what place is. It's a beautiful, beautiful thing in the fourth book of physics. And then he takes up time afterwards, huh? And he kind of gave the course on place and on time. He had to take two different courses, one for place and one for time. They were in a different time and a different place. So my natural ones know what these things are. One of my first great efforts was to try to find out what comedy is, right? Because Aristotle defined tragedy, but the part of comedy, where he defines comedy, has been lost, you see. So I was trying to figure out what the definition of comedy would be, right? But also, you know, Shakespeare's definition of reason, huh? I think if you understand it, it's the best definition we have of reason as reason, huh? But you want to know what this reason is, huh? Everybody talks about reason, but very few know what reason is. Or can we say clearly what it is, huh? Even something as basic as the good, right? I mean, even that first definition helps us a lot, if you understand it, huh? Then later on, we try to know what good is even better, right? That first definition is a good start for knowing what the good is, huh? But people who talk about the good without ever knowing what it is are not in a very good position to talk about it. Thank you. It takes a long time, you know, to understand what these things are. And when Aristotle talks in the Poster Analytics, he talks about the four basic questions there, right, in the looking sciences. Does it exist? And then if it does exist, what is it? And is this so? And if it is so, why is it so, right? And the two are kind of similar, right? So just as we naturally, we know that something is so, we naturally wonder why it is so, right? And so likewise, when we know that something is, we naturally wonder what it is. So it wants to know then the, what, the cause, about the cause, what it is. And this desire is, what, the desire of wonder, right? And it causes the, what, investigation, the inquiry, as is said in the beginning of the, what, metaphysics. As is someone knowing the eclipse of the sun, he considers from what cause it proceeds, huh? About which, because he doesn't know what it is, he wonders, right, huh? And in wondering, he, what, inquires, yeah. So wonder is said to be the beginning of, what, philosophy, huh? Nor does this inquiry come to rest before or until one arrives at knowing the essence of the, what, cause, huh? So, you know, in the Council of Thomas' life as a student, he was supposed to be known for flirting out in class, what is God? What is God? I mean, you always talk about God. What is God? That's that natural, what, wonder, right, huh? You know, we have a tendency, I suppose, to kind of dull the wonder of our students, huh? I wonder why. But it's partly to do with the customs that form the modern world, huh? You study those customs, you know, whether they be the democratic customs or the customs that arise from the Union of Science and Technology, right? You see, in a way, this wonder kind of disappears, huh? The only thing you wonder about is that there are artifacts, right? The new, what do you call them, Kindles and all these things. I told you a story about when William F. Buckley there was on TV there in one of these programs you're about to host and so on, and the guy's looking out the window there in New York and see the skyscrapers, you know? Oh, you know, wasn't this wonderful, hmm? Buckley says, twice. Can you explain a little bit more about that knowing of wonder and what's going on? Well, oh, the talkful in Democracy in America speaks of this as being the effect of democratic customs and turns men towards the, what, practical, huh? Oh, okay. And then, in modern science, you know, you have this union of science and technology, right? And Heisenberg, in his gift for our lectures there, talks about how this turning away from a contemplative attitude towards the world to this more practical one, huh? Okay. The interest is not what nature is, but what you can make it do. Yeah, okay. You know how to make money off it. Commercial origin of the modern city, right? Give it kind of a practical stamp as opposed to the aristocratic. I've given you those things, haven't I? The major sources of the modern world and its customs. I take those passages from the world historian there on the difference between the origin of the Greek city and the modern city, huh? Because the origin of the Greek city was aristocratic and the origin of the modern city was mercantile, commercial. And so there was a kind of a practical stamp there in the modern city from the very beginning. And then in the sciences there, you know, you have this union of science and technology, which in a way turned natural science into kind of a technical science. That's the way Heisenberg speaks about it, huh? You know, I kind of go back into a more general thing, the way that when two arts or sciences come together, which dominates? The higher or the lower? The lower. And I used to give the example there of opera and ballet, right? In opera you have, in a sense, the play joined with music, right? But what takes place in the opera? Is it primarily the words or the music? And Mozart, you know, said in opera, the words must be all together to be the servant of the music. And you can enjoy Mozart's opera without really knowing the words, you know? And, but the drama is a higher form in music, huh? Rationally, you might say, right? Now, in ballet, which is uniting music now with the dance, right? Well, music is higher than the dance, huh? But in the ballet, which is dominant, the dance, yeah. And kind of the, you might say, in the ballet, the music is the obedient servant of the dance, right? Makes us, what, want to dance or enjoy the dance, and it makes us enjoy the dance, right? And so, you know, Tchaikovsky's music might be quite good for ballet, right? Mozart's music would be too good for ballet. They do write a little bit of music for ballet, but the dancing would be a distraction from the music, huh? Mozart. So, you know, you're jumping around on the stage, you've got to have music, you know. It's kind of subordinated to that. So Heisenberg, that's like what Heisenberg says about modern science, huh? That the science was subordinated to the technology. It turned natural science into a kind of a technical science. And of course, you can kind of see in the experiment, huh? The experiment is something made by us, right? So it's in some sense closer to art than to the speculative sciences in that way. So the artificial existence in cities, especially when people are working in boxes and living in boxes, spend a little bit of time in these artificial environments, they have a purely materialistic view of existence and lose touch with other realities. If, therefore, the human understanding, knowing the essence of some, what, created effect, like knowing what motion is, like Aristotle does in the third book of the physics, right? It does not know about God, except that He is, right? That there's an unmoved mover, as we were saying. Now, the unmoved mover is known through motion, but not what it is, right? It's more negative, huh? So unmoved, unmoved is a negation. I don't really know this mover. I know what he's not. He's unmoved. And it remains to him the natural desire of inquiring for the, what, cause, huh? Once, not yet, is he perfectly beatified, huh? That's it. That's it. as his desire is still not satisfied. For perfect, therefore, beatitude is required that the understanding arise at the very, what it is, the very essence of the first cause and the very nature of substance of that thing. And thus it has its perfection through union to God as to an object in which alone the beatitude of man consists. This has been said also before. Now, that text from Dionysus is taken a little bit out of context. He's speaking about the knowledge of those things which are, what? In the road, in the via, at the Vedic vision. In the road where we are tending towards, what? The attitude, right? That's Thomas when he's asking in class, what is God? What is God? Now, to the second. The end can be taken in two ways. In one way, he guards the thing itself, which is desired. And in this way, the end of the, what? Higher nature. Nay, of all things, right? This has been said. That's God. In another way, the end is taken to the achievement of that end. That thing, rather. And this diverse is the end of the higher, the lower nature. According to a diverse, what? Relation to such a thing. Thus, therefore, higher is the beatitude of God. Comprehending, huh? Knowing his, what? Nature as much as it is knowable, right? Than of man, or even of an angel seeing, and not, what? Comprehending. Not knowing it as much as it's, what? Knowable. So, when I listen to a piece of Mozart, I say, what instrument is that playing? I'm not always sure, you know? So, I'm not hearing it as much as it's hearable, right? I'd say, when you played a trumpet, Mozart would faint because it's, it's here too much. But again, you know, if you get someone who's really got a good taste, I mean, by the market, a very good taste for wine, you know? And I told you the story there, I guess, where Ron McCarthy was the president, the first president of the college. Had a bunch of professors over to a dinner, and he served a different wine, and it was on the label, right? No one knew it, except for Brother Mark says, that's not bad. He's so kind of amazed, right? Well, I'm sure I would have been fooled with the other professors, right? So, if I'm, and Mark and I lived together for, I taught at St. Mary's, we had some wine left over, I'd rather than put a little bottle in the week, we'd have a little testing, you know? Well, maybe 50%, I guess, right? But when I test him, he always seems to know, right? So, was I tasting the wine as much as it is tasteable? So, I always taste, I always tasting the wine, right? But not as much as it is tasteable, right? And Brother Mark was in Detroit one time, the friend there, and we had a lot of friends who were artists, right, then? And he describes the, these people, you know, they come into a room like this, you know, and they, you know, Well, I've never seen a shade of blue like, exactly like that. They're all in their eyes, right? So, maybe they, they see gradations of color, you know, and, you know, and usually women are better than men, you know. Well, this is aqua, this is, you know, they've got names for all, all different kinds, yeah. They call those female color names, they're just, men just don't see them. They don't know what they are. Teal. Tope. Tope. And, you know, I had a professor who comes from, you know, he taught, you know, one semester at the Institut Catholique in Paris, you know, he lived in Paris, and then he'd teach a semester at Laval, huh? And he'd show up with, you know, a jacket and a, you know, a pants and so on, but, uh, I don't think they really were matched, you know. It didn't bother me at all, you know. I wanted my wife or something, but it was, you know, what's wrong with that man? You just don't know how to dress. You put on a tie, you know, you must have to consult our wife to see which tie you wear on this jacket, you know. So, so there's, we're seeing the color, but not as much as it is seeable, right? You know, we're tasting the wine, but not as much as it's, so we're never going to see God, um, know God as much as he's knowable, right? But that's not opposed to seeing him as he is, huh? And the custom says, seeing him as he is in any grade, it's a great, great positive reading about Thomas there, and he said, you'll see God in the grade of clarity to which he's predestined you, or he's predestined us, huh? It's an actual desire to see God. How would you reconcile that in many places? I think he's trying to show the, the, the, uh, the harmony of the supernatural with the natural, right? Like I was mentioning earlier, text there where Thomas was talking about the angels, right? And that their natural, um, um, desire is not contrary to the supernatural desire, right? And Thomas was pointing out that, uh, we naturally, um, love God more than ourselves, right? It's kind of strange you would say that, you know, but he's saying that because the, the part not necessarily loves the whole more than itself, huh? He sees that. But, uh, but, uh, if this was not so, then the, uh, supernatural desire for God, and some of them would not be, uh, uh, affecting nature, but, uh, but contrary to it, huh? But our mind might have a hard time, you know, being sure that it's going to see God as he is without revelation, huh? Mm-hmm. But it certainly does make sense in terms of our natural desire to know what a thing is, and to know what the cause is of an effect that we do know of, and, uh, you can see that, you know? And you can see how, how, how, therefore, um, how reasonable is what we're saying is the final end, right? Mm-hmm. Is there also the problem that, um, how do you, how can you desire something that is in fact impossible in nature? Yeah, yeah. It's something beyond nature, so how can you desire something impossible? But if you have a natural desire to know what a thing is, and, uh, if it's the cause that we know is, right, if you have a natural desire to know what that is, how can you deny this in regard to God, right, if you have a natural desire to know what God is? And, uh, if we have a natural desire to see God as He is, right? Mm-hmm. Even though we can't arrive at this through our natural powers, right, huh? At best we can merit it in some sense, right? But even that, it's, uh, more than we deserve. So what if you'd like my natural desire to fly? Mm-hmm. Or it's beyond my natural power to fly, but I can say, can you desire it? Mm-hmm. Yeah, I suppose that's in your, kind of in your, what, imagination, right, huh? But again, that pertains to the body, right, rather than to the soul itself, huh? When we say to the, uh, kid who wants his pet to be in Heaven, I could never be happy without Tabitha being there, you know, I'd never be happy without Rover, whoever he is. You'd say, well, if that's, if you would not be happy without Rover, Rover will be there. Mm-hmm. It's not to admit that Rover will be there. Because he won't be there. But in a sense, you will be able to fly in Heaven, right, the gift of agility, huh? Mm-hmm. That's right, that's right, that's right. So you see the desire to... That's why it's supernatural, in a certain way. Well, no, it's a perfect harmony. Again, there you go. It's a harmony between nature and nature. But you already excluded, you know, the act of the body, right, from being a happiness, right? So running or jumping, you can't find happiness in those things. You might like to jump and run and exercise. You were chasing that dog out there, weren't you? Was it you out there? No, I could never see me catching up. Yeah, you exercise all kind of. Exercise is for people who will go to purview. Rest is for the souls of heaven. Okay, last suggestion. Finish that, okay. Thus, therefore, higher is the beatitude of God, comprehending his own essence, right, than of man or of an angel seeing and not comprehending, right? Not knowing it as much as it's no, right? So even St. Therese of the Sue can't love God as much as he's lovable. And even Mary, I guess, can't love God as much as he's lovable. Maybe even Christ in his human nature can't love God as much as he's lovable. Well, doesn't he get up to that, Francis de Sales? You want someone who can really love God as much as he's lovable, right? Yeah. He talks about it and he makes it compare. And sometimes, you know, you think about somebody, you know, who's being kind of neglected. Why doesn't somebody, you know, love her? She'd be a nice lady, you know, huh? You know? And she's not loved as much as she's lovable, right? I mean, if I'm sorry about God, right? You kind of understand that, right? So we're happy that God is able to love himself and to know himself. They can appreciate himself, right? We're happy that God is able to love himself as much as he's lovable, right? To love himself as much as he's lovable. And we're just knowing him as much and loving him as much as we've been destined to know and love him. Got a chance for the article here? Yeah. Okay, now there's a new question here. Then we're not to consider about those things which are, what, required or necessary, right, for a beatitude, huh? And about this, eight things are asked. My goodness. First, whether pleasure is required for, what, beatitude, huh? And I think I mentioned before, in the 10th book of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle takes, gives his final consideration of what happiness is, right, and he also had a long section there on dilictatio, right, because some people, like the Epicureans, thought this is what happiness consists in. So that's a good question. The dilictatio is required for beatitude, huh? Must you enjoy it? And dialectically, huh, it's a probable opinion that, what, pleasure is, what, beatitude, huh? So, when Aristotle is talking about a probable opinion, he says, the opinion of all men, or of most men, right, or the, what, people who learn it in the science that's about those matters, right, that they hold, or what the most of them hold, or the most famous of them hold, right, huh? Okay. So it's a scientific hypothesis, I guess. That's what Einstein says. Well, it's probable, because Einstein said so, right? Um, and after, should, uh, uh, the words be all together, the obedient servant of the music, or should the words be like, well, Mozart, you know, says this, right? Okay. But, you know, if something is the opinion of most men, like, most men think of pleasure as being the best thing in life, right, well, then it's probably because of the number of men holding it, right? So if the number of men or the quality of men holding it can make something be considered as probable, according to Aristotle's definition of that. Second, which is more chief or principle in Beatitude? Pleasure or division, right? He's going to see some truth in pleasure, right? Otherwise he wouldn't have this order, the two articles, wouldn't he? Okay. In some way, um, pleasure is required in Beatitude, right? Third, with it requires comprehension, right? Well, if you take comprehension and stick sense, you know, then that would lead us all out, right? Yeah, well, yeah. That's it. Yeah. But Thomas, you know, it's kind of beautiful at the end of the first book of the Summa Congentiles, where he takes up God's Beatitude, right, and shows how it's superior to that of anybody else, right? Beautiful, beautiful treatment there. Fourth, with it requires the, what, rectitude of the will. That's going to close the door to most of us, huh? That's, uh, it makes you very nervous, that dark book. Five, whether for the Beatitude of man is required, what? The body, right? Nobody bless it until their resurrection, or what? Because there's imperfection, you know, without the body, right? You're partial in some way. You only part you there. Even though the most important part of you is there, and the part which we'll see God. And six, whether it requires the perfection of the body, huh? So if I've lost an arm or a leg or something, huh? Or I'm fat or something. Is this going to impede my attitude, huh? Or if one was a midget or something like that, right? Didn't have the proper size, or... See the way these articles are ordered, right? Because the body, these two articles on the body there are, what, place-tact, these ones talking about what's in the, what, soul, the will, and patient pleasure. Because you're talking about pleasure there in the act of seeing, right? Not the body of pleasure there. Then it gets to something less than the body, which is the exterior goods, right? Where there's some exterior goods, huh? I was thinking, you know, gee, why don't we put these books in my... I think you guys get some of them, you know? But anyway, you know, I was coming back from Mass this morning, and the public sticker, and the person in front of me said, I love my library. And it's, you know, propaganda for the public library there. But I said, I kind of love my library. I mean, it's good. I'm only separated from those books, you know. I wouldn't need them in heaven. So the exterior goods, I need them. Do I need my garden? Do I need my car? The man asked me once he'd like to drive, and he said, do you think we'll have the pleasure of driving when we're in heaven? I don't think we're going to care. I don't think that's going to attract our kids. But the eighth article is very interesting, I think. Whether it requires the society of friends, right? In a sense, a friend is an exterior, what? Good, right? I don't know, a very unusual exterior good, huh? But I guess that's why it's put down there, right? At last, because it's coming under exterior goods, in a sense. The Quakers are the society of friends, yeah. I didn't put the two together. The society of friends. So he's asking whether Quakers are going to be there, or if they're going to be there. Well, look at Frantzell's paintings, and then you'll find out who's there. Okay. Now, Augustine says, this is a quote I was referring to one time earlier. For Augustine says in the first book about the Trinity, that the vision is the whole, what? Word of faith, right? Of course, faith is in reason, right? But that which is the reward, and what? It's a reward, too. Yeah, of virtue, is beatitude, right? As is clear through the philosopher in the first book of the ethics, huh? And Thomas was quoting that in the article in whether the angels merit the vision, right? He quotes Aristotle, and Aristotle saw that as kind of the reward. Happiness is the reward of virtue. Virtue is his own reward. I don't know what they say, but that's in a sense what it means. Therefore, nothing others require for beatitude except the vision alone. It's a whole reward of faith. Okay, interesting. The reward of beatitude is, through itself, the most sufficient good, as the philosopher says in the first book of the ethics. But what needs something else is not, through itself, enough. Since, therefore, the essence of beatitude consists in the vision of God, it seems that beatitude does not require, what? Pleasure, right? You'll see God, but you won't enjoy it. Sounds kind of strange, right? Something's wrong with that, right? However, the operation of happiness or beatitude must be not impeded, as is clear in the seventh book of the ethics. But pleasure impedes the action of the understanding, for it corrupts the estimation of foresight or prudence. Therefore, pleasure is not required for beatitude. But that's more like the pleasure of the body is probably thinking of there. But against this is what Augustine says in the tenth book of the Confession. This is another beautiful quote from him. The attitude is Gaudium, huh? Joy over the truth. Gaudium de Veritate. What a guy Augustine was. I answer it should be said that in four ways something is required for something. I'm going to do that. In one way as a, what, preamble or preparatory thing for it, huh? Just as learning is required for, what, science, huh? Another way as perfecting something, right? Just as the soul is required for the life of the body. Third, as aiding in an extrinsic way, as friends are required for doing something. Fourth way, as something, what? Going along with it, if we say that heat is required for fire, it's something that follows upon fire. And in this way, this fourth way, pleasure is required for beatitude. For pleasure is caused from this, that the appetite, the desiring power, rests in the good obtained. Since beatitude is nothing other than the attaining of the highest good, it is not able to be beatitude without pleasure following upon it. Narastal talks about this in the ethics there. He talks about certain pleasure that follows upon perfect operation. So if beatitude is this perfect activity, it's naturally what? Pleasant, right? The pleasure falls upon perfection of the act. The better I hear the music of Mozart, the more joy I have. It falls upon perfection, right? To the first therefore it should be said, from this very fact that a reward is rented to someone, the will of the one meriting, what? Rests, huh? Which is the same thing as to be, what? Pleased, huh? This way, desire is often spoke of, or wanting is a kind of motion, right? Towards the thing desired, huh? And pleasure is the, what? Resting in the good desired being possessed now. It was desired. Whence in the very, what? Reward. Excuse me. Being rendered, yeah. Yeah. Delight is, what? Included, right? So he's referring to the text of Death and where he says, this is the whole reward, right? Well, you wouldn't. When it's rewarded, when it's naturally pleased. That's what he's saying, basically, huh? He's going to, in the next article, be more precise about what is principally consistent, right? Okay. The second, it should be said that from the vision itself of God is caused, what? Delight, pleasure, huh? Whence the one who sees God is not able to, what? Need pleasure, right, huh? Okay. Aristotle talks about that in the ethics, right, too. He talks about even the human happiness there. He's talking about the ethics there. In that, what the virtuous man does, huh? He takes delight, right? So the courageous man takes delight in doing a courageous deed, right? The temperate man takes delight in eating and drinking moderately, right? If you're not pleased with moderate eating and drinking, then you don't have temperance, right? That's a sign that you don't have it. You're not pleased with this, right? The just man is pleased in paying his debts and so on, right? Paying what he owes somebody, huh? And so on. And why he says the man who's not involved in these virtuous deeds, he doesn't have pleasure in the very things he's doing, so he's got to go outside of this and get entertained, as they say. He gets some pleasure, right, huh? Because, you know, his activity itself is not, what, pleasing, right? Once the one who sees God, it is not possible that he would, what, need some pleasure outside of this. Let's go and get entertained, you know. Let's go and paint the town red tonight or something, you know. Get a little, you know, a pleasure in our life, you know. A friend of mine was working one summer, you know, in a printing thing where you have to set the type, you know. You're doing that all day long, you know, and you're going to go crazy. So one day just to be, you know, friendly with his associates, workers, you know, he started to accompany them when they were Saturday night out, right? All they're doing is rushing from one place to another to get a little pleasure, one little pleasure. It's like to eat or drink and do it again. Send you for our mouth. But, you know, there was no pleasure in activities they were doing all during the week, right? So they're rushing out to get pleasure somewhere else because they took no pleasure in what they were doing, you know, during the week. Now, to the theory it should be said that the pleasure accompanying the operation of the understanding does not impede it but more, what? Strengthen. Yeah. So if I take delight in that theorem of Euclid, I'm really excited, you know, I'll do it more intensely, right, huh? But if you take delight in this theorem, you're not going to be applying your mind much to this, right, huh? Okay? So it does not impede it, the pleasure that you take in understanding something, but it more, what, strengthens you, right? If I take pleasure in hearing the music of Mozart, I'm going to listen to it more carefully, right? If I take pleasure in the taste of some wine or food or something like that, I'm going to savor it more, right, huh? Therefore, I'll taste it better, right? For those things that we, what, delectability terifacimus, that we do with pleasure, right, more attentively, right, and more persevering do we do, right, huh? But delectatio extrania, this is the point, right? That's what Aristotle was talking about in the text quoted, right? Delectatio ultima extrania impedes the, what, operation, right, huh? Okay? My brother Mark was at Leval there, you know, he'd go to the library to study, you know, but there was some girl with long hair that he thought kind of looked attractive, you know? So it was distracting because he had to go to some other place to go study, right? Well, that's extraneous delectatio, right, huh? Okay? Sometimes you have, you know, I go to your class, you see, you know, the guy's looking at the girl over there. So he's getting extraneous pleasure to the pleasure of my lecture. My first year of law school, there was this exceptionally beautiful woman with this long, thick black hair who sat down in the front of the class and wore a big section in it, so everybody kind of sees her because he's right in front of the professor. She's always just toying with her hair. Her hair is a woman's glory, it says in the Bible, right? She should have been sitting in the back in a burka. It's like you'd be sitting with my habits, right? Yes. So, delectatio extrania impedes the operation, right, huh? In some ways, sometimes from the, what, distraction of the intention because, as has been said, to those things in which we delight, we are more, what, intent on our intention is to live. And when to, what, we pay attention to one thing vehemently, right, it's necessary that from something else, our intention be, what, withdrawn, right, huh? So they speak of Mozart, you know, when he's listening to music, his whole soul is in his ear, you know, huh? And for that painter, the whole soul would be in the eye, right? Um, but sometimes also from contrariety. Just as the pleasure of the sense is contrary to reason, huh? It impedes the estimate of prudence, huh? Uh, uh, more than the, what, estimation of the speculative intellect, huh? So Neistatio's talking about hitting the mean there. You know, that's one of the rules he gives about watching out for what? Pleasure, right, huh? Easily beat you out of the middle. Okay, so you got to stop right now? Yeah, I know.