Prima Secundae
Lecture 12: Beatitude and False Happiness: Riches and Honor

Transcript
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More serious things here. I suppose the ludicrous. To the eighth one proceeds thus. It seems that in the last end of man also all other things come together, right? They come together at that same end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But that which is the beginning of men, to which God, is also the beginning of all other things. Therefore, in the last end of man, all other things, what? Communicate them. God is the end of the whole universe, right? Not just of man. Moreover, Dionysius says in the book about the divine needs, that God converts all things to himself, as it were, to the last end. But he is also the last end of man, because he alone should be enjoyed, as Augustine says. So, therefore, in the last end of man, also other things come together, right? They have guided their last end, just like we do. Moreover, the last end of man is the object of the, what? Will. But the object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of all things. Therefore, it is necessary that in the last end of man, all things, what? Come together, right? But against this is that the last end of men is beatitude, which all, that is to say all men, right? Desire, as Augustine says. But it does not fall in, what, animals that are lacking in reason, right? That they should be, what, blessed, huh? As Augustine says in the book of the 83 questions. Therefore, in the last end of man, other things don't, what, come together, right? Thomas says, I answer it should be said that as the philosopher says in the second book of the physics, and in the fifth book, the end is said in two ways, huh? So distinguishing, huh? Of whom, right? And I suppose by what or how, right? That is, and it's in various ways that Thomas explains that distinction that Thomas is making, that thing itself in which the notion of the good is found, right? And then the use, or the obtaining, I suppose, of that thing, huh? Just as if we say, now in the old physics, that the motion of a heavy body, the end, is either the, what, lower place, right? As a thing. Or this which is to be in the lower place, right? As the use, huh? Or at the end of the avaricious man, it's either money, as a thing, right? Or the possession of money, huh? As a choose, right? So Romeo's end is what? Juliet, right? Or the possession of Juliet. Let's see, okay? If therefore we speak of the last end of man, as regards the very thing which is the end, right? Thus in the last end of man, all other things come together. Which is God, right? Because God is both the last end of man, and of all other, what, things, huh? If however we speak of the last end of man, as regards the acquiring of the sin, thus in this end of man, irrational creatures do not, what, come together, right? We do not communicate in this. But the angels would, right? That's what he says, irrational, irrational. For man and the other rational creatures, who are my friends, the angels here, they achieve the ultimate end by knowing and loving God. And here Thomas is speaking with less precision than you speak later on, right? Does it consist more in knowing God or in loving God, right? It's more safe to say it consists in knowing and loving God than to be more precise, huh? Which does not belong to other creatures who cannot know God or cannot love God as he is in himself, huh? Which obtain the last end insofar as they partake of some likeness of, what? God, huh? According as they are, or they, what, are alive, right? Which is even more so, like the trees out here, or even know, like even the, what, dog and the cat. No. And to this is clear the response to the objections. For beatitude names not the thing that is our end, but the obtaining of that end, right? By knowing and loving that thing, right? Clear enough? So God is the end of the whole universe, as Aristotle himself had said, huh? So on the tabernacle there, in our parish there, he's got the Alpha and the Omega, right, huh? Now sometimes in the apocalypse it says, I am the Alpha and the Omega, sometimes he says, I am the first and the last, and then sometimes I am the beginning and the, what, the end, yeah. But I suppose it's everybody in Tona Masia, right? He's the beginning of beginnings, right? He's the end of all ends, right, huh? The Lord of the Lord, huh? So he's, by Tona Masia, he's the beginning and the end of all things, huh? So for the tree then in me, God is the end of both of us? Yeah. But I obtained this end at last by knowing and loving God, right? The tree can't know and love God, huh? But it does, what, obtain this end in some way by becoming like God, right? You know, Plato, before, his student Aristotle, but Aristotle says the same thing in the second book about the soul, is that the plants in reproducing, right, are trying to be like God, right? Trying to be like the immortal, so far as possible, right? It's not possible for them to be immortal as individuals, but their kind can go on by reproduction, right? That's a beautiful thing that Plato says, I guess, in the symposium, right? And Aristotle says when he's talking about the plants all right, and so on. And there you see that they are becoming like God, huh? In the first book of the physics, Aristotle says that form is something divine, huh? This is common to him in Plato, which he's arguing against. So he takes an opinion that's common to them. And when Thomas comments on that, he says the reason why we say that form is something divine is that form is act, right? By matter is ability, huh? Passive ability. God is pure act, right? So every form, insofar as it's an act, is like, what, God, huh? And so when nature forms something, right, huh? It's in a way pursuing God, right? So far as possible for it, right? Because it's making something that is like God, right, huh? So far as possible, huh? Because every form is like God. That's profound. Aristotle's arguing there that Plato should distinguish between matter and lack of form, right, huh? But he argues against Plato from something that the two of them accept, that form is something God-like. Then he speaks of matter that desires form, right? Because it's perfected by form. But privation seems to be something bad, right? It's opposed to form. The lack of form, huh? Therefore, Plato should distinguish these two, right? He doesn't do, huh? The lack of form, right? So in this sense, all things share the same end with man, right? In one sense. They're all striving to achieve the God-like in some way, right? But of course, in Scripture it says, you know, we shall know even as we are known. That's kind of a striking way of putting it. When God knows us by knowing himself, right? So we're going to know God as he is. So in this first question, you're speaking about the final end. And then at the end here, he brings in the term of the attitude, happiness. Now that's the name that he's using here for you. It's christened by the name, blessed. Yeah. And then that's... That term would only be used in a rational preacher, right? Yeah. I was thinking of that today. You know, the 133rd Psalm? And that's the one that comes after when I was quoting it the day before. The one before is the one that talks about the unity, right? But the 132nd one is talking about, you know, blessing God and then God blessing you, right? Well, you're blessing God in a sense is what? Praising him, right? But God's blessing you in a sense is making you what? Blessed, right? Yeah. And so we speak of the heavenly saints and so on. It's a blessed, right? And I think that's a word, that's related to beatitude, I think. I mean, it's the English word for beatitude, huh? The priest gives the people a blessing, right, huh? So I think beatitude is related to that, isn't it? What do we say? Do they beatify somebody? What is that? He is the most blessed. Yeah. But he's in heaven, right? Yeah. It doesn't make him blessed. No, no, no. It's a declaration and sort of a judgment. Yeah, yeah. But that's the term we use in beatified, right? Okay. We proclaim him in a sense. Blessed, right, huh? He's possessed in beatitude, right? But he has beatitude. And his term here, adeption, adeption. It's the attaining, I guess, in a sense. Yeah, that's what it has. Attaining, attainment, achievement. You see, somebody's adept at something. Yeah. He's reached in some way, right? He's achieved it, yeah. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Okay, so now we begin question two. Then we're not to consider about beatitude. Now we're going to get more precise as to what this last end of man is. And first, in what things it is. Secondly, what it is. And that's in question, what, three, right? And four. And third, in what way we can, what, obtain it, right? That's going to set the stage for the rest of the second part, right? That's in question five. And notice how slowly Thomas goes, huh? Gradually, huh? Use the expression, like, in there, paulaktam, huh? Which we used to translate bit by bit. The way the mind comes to see something, huh? But you start off from the general and the confused that's more known and certain, and then you gradually fill it in, huh? Now, about the first, he asks eight things, huh? First, where the beatitude consists in divities. In what? Riches. Riches, huh? Some things in the gospel there. The rich man is sometimes called divas, right? Yeah. But it's from this word, right, huh? The kind of giving him a name, he doesn't mean to him. Remember, he told his name it, right? It's called divas, huh? The rich man. Secondly, wither in, what? Honors, huh? Third, wither in fame or in, what? Glory, huh? Clear knowledge with praise, huh? We call that, you're clearly known with praise. That's glory, huh? Fourth, wither in, what? Power, right, huh? Fifth, wither in some good of the, what? Body. Like health or strength, you know? You know? Like my boxing friend there. My wife and I are visiting a former neighbor there, is in the rest home there, and they're trying to, you know, get her functioning again, you know? She had these two little, you know, bells. So I'll go to the lunch and see. Yeah, that's what they do, you know? And then they turn us in the way. Then six, wither in, what? Pleasure, right, huh? Seven, wither in some good of the, what? So. And eight, wither in some created good, huh? It's a very general question, huh? Now, the first six articles, almost, correspond almost to this, what, false happiness that Boethius has in the first book of the Consolation of Philosophy, huh? Where Boethius is going to consider happiness, but he's going to consider false happiness before, what, true happiness, on the grounds that false happiness is more known to us than true happiness, and to clear away the, you know, mistakes about it, huh? So it's kind of a beautiful order, it seems to me, that the great Boethius, huh? I often say, you know, in my experience, you know, Boethius is the greatest mind between Augustine and Thomas. I don't know if that's true, but, I mean, it certainly is one of the greatest there between these two great minds, huh? And Thomas often refers to this. Now, this fifth one is kind of stuck in there, right? You know, it's an extra thing there. But I suppose if you think of pleasure there, you're thinking of maybe the pleasures of the body, so we'll see how he handles that. But there are higher pleasures, too. I think I mentioned that thing there about the English philosopher there. No, Mill, Mill, you know? But he kind of sums up, you know, that line of thinking, you know, that the end is pleasure, right, huh? And, of course, he has to reply to the objection. The objection is saying, well, you're reducing man to the lovable beast, you know, where he pursues pleasure. And he says, kind of, well, in reply he says, well, you're the beast, he says, because you think the only pleasures that man can pursue are those between the ones that he shares with the beast, right? But there are higher pleasures, right, huh? Okay. And I mentioned before, I think, you know, I think I kind of liked in the essay by Austerly, right? You know, among many things in the essay by Austerly and towards an evaluation of music, right, huh? He makes the point that the pleasures of the fine arts, huh, are too high for the beast and too low for the angels, huh? And so the angels, you know, because you don't have senses, right, you won't take the same interest in paintings and statues and the music of Mozart that I would take, right? And, but the beasts don't take any interest in this, right? I used to play Mozart for the cat all the time, and I pretend that she is enjoying the music because she's curling up, you know, in front of the thing, but I don't think she really paid attention to music, right? But if I left her sleeping in the living room and went out in the kitchen to get some sandwich meat or something, you know, that crinkle should be right there next to me. So, kind of, I used to say, you know, you've got to go from the pleasures of eating and drinking and reproducing to the pleasures of the fine arts, right? And then from those to the pleasures of what? Of Euclid and higher up things, right? So the pleasures of understanding, which is the pleasure of Euclid, the pleasure of understanding, pleasures of philosophy, those we share at the angels, right? But they have them more, what, fully than we do, right? The pleasures of eating we share at the beasts, although we have more refinement in our, you know, preparation of our food and so on, right? So it's kind of just the opposite there, right? You have those pleasures in a higher way than the beast has, right? And the pleasures of understanding we don't understand very much or very well. So you have that less than the angels, right? But in the middle there, you have the pleasures of the fine arts, which seem to be the human pleasures, right? In the sense that they're, you know, what Oswald says there, right? They're too high for the beast, but too low for the, what, angels, right? But as if you have to go through those, right, huh? To get to the, what, be disposed for the higher ones, huh? And we used to say, you know, that people who go into the fine arts in that sense and enjoy them but go no further, right? Well, they're up above the beast, you know, but they haven't gone all the way, right? They don't realize this is to prepare, you know, something higher. To the, first it should proceed. It seems that the attitude of man consists in what? Riches, huh? He's going to argue this way, huh? Amazing the value, huh? Hmm, since beatitude is the last end of man, it consists in that which most of all dominates in the affections of man, huh? But of this sort our wealth, for it's said in Ecclesiasticus, all things obey money. So the devil can quote scripture even now. Therefore, in wealth, the beatitude of man consists, huh? That's pretty convincing, huh? Moreover, according to Boethius in the third book of the Consolation, beatitude is a state made perfect by the bringing together of all goods, huh? But in monies, all things seem to be possessed. What it isn't, it'll buy. Because, as the philosopher says in the fifth book of the Ethics, for this, coins are invented, right, huh? That there might be more, what, trust, right? For whatever men want to, what? Buy, you might say, right? Therefore, in which his beatitude consists, huh? Moreover, the desire of the highest good, since it never fails, would seem to be, what? Infinite, right? But this, most of all, is found in wealth. For the avaricious man is not filled by money, right? He always wants more, huh? For the avaricious man is not filled by money, right? For the avaricious man is filled by money, right? For the avaricious man is filled by money, right? As I said in the Ecclesiasticals 5.9. Therefore, in riches, beatitude consists. That's what that guy, Sam Walton, or wherever they were, they invented Walmart, they came up with Walmart in his old age. They said to him, Sam Walton, they said, you know, you've made umpteen bazillion dollars. What do you want now? I want it. That's what he said. Wow. That's a compliment. I was in a company of poor trustees, you know. This one guy who had a lot of money, you know, he was trying to pull off another thing there. And someone else was opposing him, right? He had the guy in tears. I went home and I said, what does he get tears for? He doesn't need this, you know, one more killing, you know. But against this, the good of man consists more in keeping beatitude than in what? Sending it out. Yeah. Giving out. But as Boethius says in the second book of the Consolation there, that by what? Spending or flowing out our wealth more than in conserving it, we are what? We are better, right? We are reliant. We are strong. Now, you might say the good of money consists in being used, right? And therefore given up, right? So if that were the best thing, you wouldn't want to give it up, right? Okay. But avarice always makes men, what, odious, right? But largitas, largesia, makes them, what, lustrous, huh? So if wealth was, what, beatitude, it wouldn't, what, be most praiseworthy than being given up, right? The answer should be said that it's impossible that the beatitude of man consists in riches, huh? For there are two-fold riches, as the philosopher says in the first book of the Politics, some natural and some, what, artificial. For natural riches are those by which, what, men are aided, right, to taking away natural defects, huh? Just as, what, food, drink, vestibents, huh? Vehicles, habitations, and others of this sort, huh? Okay, so notice, you've got to be careful when you say natural there because in what sense they're vestibenta, vehicula, habitacula, but they're serving a, what, a natural, what, need, right? Okay, that's what he means here, but it doesn't mean that they're all natural, right? Because clothing is not natural. Sometimes it is natural, right? Especially in the winter. Okay, and vehicula, right? Artificial wealths are those which, by their nature, do not aid, like the denarius, huh? The dollar bill, right? So when they had that inflation there in Germany, you know, and they were using it, the wallpaper, that's all it were. Don't worry. But human art invented them, you might say, right? Or found them for the, what, easing of exchange, right? So they are, as a very measure of, what, common things. Okay? Now it's manifest that in natural riches, the beatitude of man cannot be because these riches are what sought an account of something other, right? To it, to sustaining the nature of man, right? So they're ordered to something else. How can they be the last end, huh? So the food and the drink preserving the life of the man, right? The strength and the clothing, you know, preserving him from the cold and so on. And therefore, they are not able to be the last end of man, but rather, they are more ordered to man himself as to a, what, end. Whence in the order of nature all things of this sort are, what, below man and made for the sake of man, according to that of Psalm 8 that all these things are subject unto your feet, huh? Now, artificial riches are not sought except on account of the natural ones. So I want money so I can buy food, clothing, house, my car out there. For they are not sought except because through them one buys things necessary for the use of, what, life. Whence, much more do they, what, much less do they have the notion of the last end. It is impossible, therefore, the beatitude, which is the last end of man, to be in, what, what? And the Summa Gange and Tila's Tamas were, you know, were not disdained to argue against wealth. Now, to the first it should be said that all bodily things obey money as regards the multitude of the stupid. Who know only bodily goods, right, huh? Which are able to be acquired by, what, money, huh? but the judgment about human goods ought not to be taken from the stupid but from the, what, wise. Notice he goes back to his comparison. Just as a judgment about flavors, right, by those who have a tongue, well, what, disposed, right, huh? Okay. So my mother told me, you know, eat your orange before you eat your candy, right? So if you eat your candy, the orange might taste, what, bitter, right? So I'd have a tongue ill-disposed, right, to taste the fruit, huh? And you can find that, you know, it takes some strong foods, you know, I mean, hot sausages or, you know, things that sort of can interfere with your taste of other things, right? So not disposed. The number of fools is infinite, as Scripture says, right? So it's a lot of truth to say, pecuniae, obedient hominiae, right? Somebody's talking to me about the candidation of saints, you know, and money, I said, you do with this, right? You know, to organize this, you know, to get your saint considered, right? Yeah. I guess Dominicans are not bothering you this most of the time, you know, so they should have many more than they say than they do, but... That's what they say. They want to get the money. The OFM stands out for money. But you see this kind of corruption in the church there, you know, where you get bishops, you know, who are more concerned about raising the money, you know, and they get into that kind of a situation, I suppose, that's a necessity, too, you know, but... One bishop and the priest that was here from Klein, Edmund Klein, he was from Wichita, Kansas, he was a former bishop, I think he's dead now, but he had enough savvy with money that he set up the whole diocese so that all the Catholic schools would be paid for so that nobody has to pay tuition. And he went to the diocese. And it's still true today. Anybody can go in and pay any tuition. Somehow he was able to do that. I don't know how he did it, but he did it. What did he say? He said, God is not somebody. Yeah, yeah. The second should be said that by money one is able to have all what? That means I sell viable things. Yeah. But not spiritual things which are not able to be what? Sold about. Sold about. Once it is said, Proverbs 17, verse 16, what does it benefit the stupid man to have wealth since he's not able to buy what? That's a beautiful quote, isn't it? Yeah. Nice to say there's a kind of distinction between the kind of in the ability to make money, right? And then to know what to spend it for, right? And so some people who know how to make money don't know what to spend it for, right? Those are the pleasure seekers and not the pleasure finders. Yeah, yeah. But sometimes they're just simply foolish with their money, right? They don't even know how to preserve it, huh? Anyway. To the third, it should be said that the desire for natural riches is not infinite, right? Because according to the certain measure of nature, they suffice, huh? So you don't want to eat food forever, right? But the desire of artificial riches is infinite, because it serves disordered concupiscence, huh? Which is not, what, modified, as is clear to the philosopher in the first book of politics, right? Christel talks about this, right? The art of making money, right? Infinity right there. But other nevertheless is the infinite desire of riches and the desire of the highest good, huh? For the highest good, the more perfectly it is possessed, the more it itself is, what? Loved. And other things are, what? Yeah, what is St. Paul saying? It's a kind of strong language, right? About other things. Yeah. Because the more it is had, the more it is known, right? And therefore it is said in Ecclesiasticus, chapter 24, who eat me, I guess, will still, what? Hunger, right? But in the desire of wealth, riches, and of other temporal goods, it is reversed. Because when they are had, then they are, what? Condemned, huh? And others are desired. According as, it was signified in John 4, when the Lord says, who drinks from this water, by which I signified, what? Temporal things to the lady at the thing at the, the phone, yeah. Will thirst again, right? And this is because their insufficiency is more known when they are, what? Had, huh? So Romeo might not have been perfectly happy, even marrying Juliet. And this shows their imperfection, and that in them, the highest good does not consist, huh? There was Vanity Fair there by Thackeray the novel, and the time with Thackeray and Dickens, you know, competing for being the most popular novelist, right? Thackeray came out with, you know, Vanity Fair, you know, and Dickens, I guess, came out with, you know, the David Coverfield. But anyway, seeing one could excel at the other, right? Of course, there's a funny story told of Thackeray's daughter, you know, saying to him, Daddy, why don't you write more like Mr. Dickens? You were the poor man. Probably not innocent, you say this, but how could you, you know, out of the mouths of babes, I mean. Oh, yeah. But anyway, you know, the Vanity Fair is about the vanity of men to pursuing wealth and other things. But at the end, it said, but who in this world ever gets what he wants? Yes. Having gotten it is satisfied, right? So you find out that these things that you think are going to satisfy you, they don't, huh? you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, Okay, you got 10 of that article? Sure, there's 10 of that one. The second one proceeds thus, it seems that the beatitude of man consists in honors, right? For beatitude, or happiness, is the reward of virtue, right? Unless you use the word phrychitas there, right? He's talking about phrychitas comes from, what? Fruitful, right? So, and fruit is the end of a natural process, right? And so in human affairs, you say it's like the natural result of what? Virtuous behavior, right? Phrychitas. It's the reward of virtue, as the philosopher says in the first book of ethics. He used to say when I was little, you know, virtue is its own reward. Well, it's not its own reward, but the reward is happiness, right? So you don't think it's something else for that. But honor, most of all, seems to be what is the reward of what? The virtue. As the philosopher says in the fourth book of ethics. So we call the man officer, your honor, the judge, your honor. Therefore, the attitude consists most of all in what? Honor, right? So when Aristotle talks about virtue at the end of the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, he kind of has the idea that virtue is a praise for the equality, right? And so that's kind of how you recognize the virtue. It's kind of an honor thing, right? So the coward is not praised, but the foolhardy man is not praised either, right? And so it's the man, the mean, who's praised, right? The man who won't touch wine or like that, you know. Puritan is not praised, right? He's criticized. But the drunkard is even more criticized, right? So it's kind of like you think of this as praiseworthy or honorable thing, right? That seems to be. Moreover, that which belongs to God and to the most excellent, most of all seems to be the attitude, which is the perfect good. But of this sort is honor, as the philosopher says in the fourth book of the Ethics. So you have two virtues there of concern with honor, huh? Magnanimity, right? There's great things in all the virtues. So Mozart's last symphony is a representation of magnanimity. And the 36th symphony, too. The Lenz symphony, Jupiter. A representation of magnanimity. Earlier symphonies represent other virtues. Yeah, yeah. So the 38th and the 40th are courage, yeah? According to its two acts. Now, you know, the first virtue our style talks about is courage, right? And courage especially seems to be known as a virtue, right? And to be honorable, right? So as I always say, you know, there's a medal of honor, right? Which is a great honor. But don't get a medal of honor for being just and paying your bills all your life. Or for eating mildly all your life, right? But for one glorious afternoon in the battlefield, you can get the medal of honor, right? Being an account there today of the soldiers, the Marine Corps fighting there in Afghanistan, you know, really a close-up, you know, presentation of it, right? You know, and the guy saying, you know, not so many guys are going back without an arm or a leg, you know, and so on. God lets you get through this, you know. They just throw out tough, you know, these guys. It's really amazing, amazing to see that, you know. I wasn't willing to put up with that kind of a thing, you know. So, this is most honorable, right, when a man does these things, huh? Courageous things. More of that which is most of all desired by men is beatitude, huh? But nothing seems to be more desirable by men, desired by men than honor, right, huh? Because men will, what? What's that, yeah? Marker, maybe. Marker, I don't know. No other things. Let's say, what? Suffer some detriment of their honor, right? Some loss. Yeah. Loss, yeah. Therefore, in honor, beatitude consists, right? Death. Which is, I think, a quote from one of the great poets, one of the great classical authors. The Pledge of Sacred Honor, right, our forefathers here. But against this, beatitude is in the one who is blessed, right? But honor is not in the one who is honored, but more in the one honoring you, who shows reverence to the one honored, right? As the philosopher says in the first book of the ethics. Therefore, beatitude does not consist in what? Honor. Honor, right? Okay. Like, it reminds me of the thing there about this. Friendship consists more in loving or being loved, right? Well, being loved does not mean something in you. It's something the one who's loving you. It may be a sign of something good in you, but loving is by perfection of you. So honor is something extrinsic, right? So how can that be the end? I answer you, it should be said, that it's impossible that beatitude consists in what? Honor. For honor is shown to someone on account of some excellence of that person. And thus it is a sign and a testimony of that excellence, which is in the one honored. But the excellence of man is most of all to be noted in his beatitude, which is the perfect good of what? That is according to those goods by which something of beatitude is partaken of. And therefore, honor can, what? Follow upon beatitude, but it can't be that chiefly in what beatitude consists, right? It's like you can't be, your chief good can't be that you are loved, but if anything, what you are loved for. And what you are loved for is your chief good, right? And this is something kind of secondary, right? The fact that you are loved for your good. Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said, that as the philosopher says there in the first book of the Ethics, honor is not the reward of virtue on account of which the virtuous act, right? But they take honor from what? Men. In place of reward, right? As it were, they're not having something better to give, right? That's kind of marvelous, right? So I used to take the example there in class, when you say they give the Medal of Honor, you know, and sometimes give them to the parents because their son has died, right? And it's not the equivalent of what they lost, but what can we do? We figure we should honor them, right? But we realize that getting that Medal of Honor is not replacing their son. Well, it's not equal, right? What can we do? The true reward of virtue is beatitude itself, on account of which the virtuous act. If for an account of honor one acted, it would not be virtue, but more ambition in the name of a place, right? You know, if you read Shakespeare's Henry IV, you get real good sense of these men who are after honor, you know. Hotspur, you know. He more is pained by his honor being lost now to Prince Hale, right? Than he is with his death, right? And of course, Prince Hale later on, he's over there in France, you know, getting the great glory, right? You know, he admits that his love of honor is sin. That's what he has, you know. And he just... It's a beautiful, beautiful representation of this son. Heraclitus, you know, says, you know, most men are like beasts, you know, pursuing their places, but the best of men, they seek honor, right? Okay. Right. What's the motive? Not the motive, but the motto of the West Point? Yeah, yeah. So you get honor there, right? Okay. Okay. Okay. Let's go. Let's go.