Prima Secundae
Lecture 7: The End as First in Intention and Last in Execution

Transcript
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What comes first? Do I marry the woman? Or do I ask her? Which comes first, right? Do I ask her to marry me or do I marry her? Which comes first? But I wouldn't ask her unless I intended to marry her, right? Okay. So, one is before in intention, and the other is what? Excusion. Yeah, it's before in carrying out, yeah. That's fun, that's fun. Some people think of marriage that way. My wife and I joke, we were out talking about marriage with some other couple, and some, we've got marriage at a dead end, right? And the guy would say, I wonder what they're suffering from. And all he means is that we've got to say there's no way out. He said there's no way out. Okay. So he says, to the first error for it should be said at the end, although it is, what, last in execution, being carried out, right? So the chair is at the end, right, of the making, right? But it's nevertheless first in the intention of the agent. So in some way it's first, right? Which comes first? Eating my dinner or going to the restaurant, let's say. I'm not around home. Or going to McDonald's. I guess that's a restaurant, I don't know. It doesn't have that kind of title. Oh, I go to the restaurant before I eat my dinner. But I intend to eat my dinner before I intend to go to the restaurant, right? And I wouldn't go to the restaurant unless I intend to eat a dinner. And he said, and in this way, insofar as it's what? First an intention, right? It has the notion of a, what, cause. So the chair is a cause of what the carpenter does, right? Because he intended a chair, right? And because he intends a chair, he makes it this way, right? Right, okay? But the existence of the chair is not a, what, in itself. It's not a cause that's making it, right? It's having a mind, right? So Aristotle often says, you know, what's last in thought is the beginning of action, right? And what is first in thought is last in what? In things, yeah. Well, we talked about that a little bit, the order there of the Our Father and the order that Thomas gives there, or Augustine too, I guess, originally gives the Psalms, right? Because the first 50 Psalms are dealing with, what, penance, huh? Okay. Turning away from your sinful life, right? And then the second is, well, good deeds, huh? And then the third is resting in God as you're in, right? So the order of the Psalms is just the reverse of the order of the, what, Our Father, right, huh? But Our Father is in the order of, what, intention, right, huh? You intend to honor God and to be blessed in heaven, right? And therefore you're going to do God's will, right? And then avoid these other things that are opposed to his will, right, huh? But when you try to carry these things out, you've got to first stop sinning, and then you turn towards the good, right? And ultimately you get to heaven, right? Okay. Of course, purgatory, I mean, you're still in that first stage, more or less. You're being purged from sin, right, huh? So that's a very important distinction between those two orders, right? But the way it's involved in this is in seeing in what way the end is, what, first, right? And before what else you do, and before as a cause in a sense of what you do, right? Okay. So you go to college or someplace to learn, maybe, right? Or you buy a book to learn, right? Or you borrow a book to learn, right? So knowing comes after learning, right? In one way, but in another way, knowing comes before learning, right? That's the reason why you went to get that book. You wanted to know about this or that, right? Now, what about the second objection, huh? There's some actions that are not, right? For the sake of some end. To the second, it should be said, if some, what, human action is the last end, right? It's necessary for it to be, what, voluntary, right? Otherwise, it would not be human, as has been said in the body of the article, huh? But some action is said to be voluntary in one way because it is, what, commanded by the will itself, as to walk or to speak, right, huh? Another way because it is, what, by the will itself, it's an act of the will itself, right? As to will itself. It's interesting he makes that distinction there. It's like the distinction that Aristotle makes about an act of reason itself, an act that is, what, commanded or guided or directed by reason, right? Now, it's impossible that the act elicited by the will be the last, what, end, huh? Now, why is that so? For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is, what, color. Whence, just as it is impossible that the first thing visible is to see itself, because everything, every seeing is of some visible object, so it is impossible that the first thing desirable, which is the end, should be, what, the will itself, huh? Whence it remains that if some human act is the last end, that it is, what, commanded by the will. And therefore, and thus, if there is, what, some action of man, at least, right, the willing is an account of an end, huh? Because the willing is not on its own sake, right? Whatever, therefore, man does, it is true to say that man does an account of an end, even in doing the action, which is the, what, last end, huh? Because the will is doing it for the sake of itself, right? So it's doing it for the sake of a, what, end, huh? And it's not the own, the will's own act, huh? This is a question, Thomas, takes up more length, you know, but it's like saying, you know, in the case of reason itself, you see, also that the first thing we understand is our understanding. You've got to understand something before you have something to understand. I actually try to get across this approach with a kind of a homely example, right? I'd say, now, can you write a letter that's about what's in a letter? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Let's take the example of my mother, right, huh? My brothers and I, you know, we were too lazy to write each other, but we felt obligated to write Mama, you know, and tell Mama what's going on. So Mama would get a letter from one of us and tell us what's going on in our life or whatever it is. Oh, okay. And then... She, in writing another brother, would recount what so-and-so had said in his letter to her, right? Okay. So she's kind of, you know, tearing downstairs for our letters, huh? But can the first letter written be about what is in the letter? The first letter has got to be about something that is not in the letter. Right. And then, once you have, you know, a letter with something in it, then you could write about what's in the letter, right? It's a little like the will, right? The first thing willed cannot be the, what, act of the will itself, right? It's like the first thing understood cannot be the understanding itself, right? And so the act of the will is for something other than itself, right? Namely for the end. And every human act has to be one kind of commanded by the will, right? That's kind of a subtle point that Thomas is making. Yeah, it seems that, so the act of the will is for the sake of, say, a contemplating dog or something. Yeah. A contemplating dog isn't for the sake of something. No, no. So you do have an action that is in itself. Yeah, but the willing is not the end in itself. Right. Because at the end, the first act of the will must be for the end, right? But it can't be for itself. Just since the first act of the understanding has to be something other than understanding itself, right? It's like the first act. The senses can't be memory. Okay. But the first thing you see can't be seen. Now, the third objection is that these actions that you do without thinking about, they're not properly human, right? Because they do not proceed from the revelation of reason, which is the proper beginning of human acts. And therefore, they have an imagined end, right? But not an end that is, what, set forth by reason, huh? Okay? So without thinking, you scratch yourself or something like that, right? Not a fully human act. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no We'll break now. Article 2, whether to act for an end is, what, private to rational nature, right? To the second one proceeds thus, it seems that to act in account of an end is private to rational nature. For man, whom it longs to act for an end, never acts in account of an end that is, what, unknown to him. But many other things which do not know the end. Either because they altogether lack knowledge, as creatures that don't have a sensation, or because they do not grasp the definition of an end, as a brute animal, son. Therefore it seems to be private to the rational nature to act on account of a, what, end. So, you know, if you talk about nature acting for an end, they'll say this is anthropomorphic or something, you know. The projection. Yeah. Moreover, to act on account of an end is to order one's action to an end. But to order things is a work of, what, reason, huh? As Shakespeare tells us in the definition of reason, right? Therefore it does not belong to those who lack reason. Moreover, the good in the end is the object of the will. But the will is in reason, huh? The rational part of the soul. As is said in the third book about the soul. Therefore to act on account of an end is not except of a rational nature. But again, this is what the philosopher proves in the second book of natural theory, the physics. That not only the understanding, but also nature acts on account of a, what, end, huh? You know, I was watching the, I was growing, when summer I was growing these peas, you know. We call them the, snow peas, yeah, yeah. And, you know, you kind of stretch lines, you know, so they can grow up in the sky. And they keep on, you know, producing these things, they poop around, and they pull themselves up, you know. I was convinced they were acting for an end, you know. It's just like, you know, a clear example to be a client acting for an end, huh? I answer, it should be said, that all agents necessarily act for an end. For of causes that are ordered, what, to each other, if the first be taken away, it's necessary for the others to be, what, subtracted, huh? Taken away. Interesting word there, to subtract, you know. To run under. But the first among all the causes is the, what, final cause, the end. And the reason for this is because matter does not obtain form, right, unless it be, what, moved by the agent, right? For nothing reduces itself from potency or ability to, what, act, huh? That's, you know, most universally treated in the ninth book of, what, wisdom, huh? There's a former student here, right, again. Kind of interesting. He had such an amazing gift for rightly recognizing all the proper distinctions that ultimately made any issue clear. I remember one time in particular when we spoke in depth about acting potency. Understanding that one distinction with the kind of clarity he led me to have has helped me in graduate studies, in teaching, in being able to put into words why something wasn't quite right or why it was true, both in work and in life. And there was just one little discussion with him. Mark remains the smartest man I've ever met. Also one of the most humble and wise, huh? That's humility and wisdom go together, huh? So something can't give itself what it doesn't have, right? So potency that lacks act can't give itself what it doesn't have. Otherwise it wouldn't, what, lack? It had it, huh? And if it doesn't have it, it can't give it to itself, huh? So he says the reason for this is because matter does not achieve form except according as it is moved by the agent. For nothing reduces itself from potency to what? Act. But the agent does not move except from what? The intention of the end, huh? For if the agent was not determined to some effect, not inclined to some effect, huh? It would no more do this than that. Nor then that it produce a determined effect. It is necessary that it be determined to something certain, which has the notion, therefore, of a, what? End, huh? But this determination, just as in the rational nature, is through the rational desire, which is called the will. So in other things, it comes about by a natural inclination, huh? Which is called natural, what? Desire, huh? So sometimes you see somebody saying that the plant wants, what? Sunlight, right? Or wants water. Sunlight. Yeah, it's inclined towards that, right? So it sends its roots down, right? And grows towards the sun, huh? But nevertheless, it should be considered that something by its acting or by motion tends to an end in two ways, huh? In one way, it's moving itself to the end, as man moves himself to the end, right? But in another way, as moved towards an end by another, as the arrow tends to determine in. From this, that it is moved by the, what? How do you say that? Yeah. Arrow shooter. Arrow shooter. Who directs his action to an end, right? Right. Those things, therefore, which have reason, move themselves to the end, huh? Because they have lordship over their acts, right? By free judgment, which is a faculty of will and reason, huh? But those which lack reason, tend towards an end by a, what? Natural inclination. As it were, moved by another. Not from, what? Themselves, huh? Since they do not know the definition of end, right? And therefore, they're not able to, what? Order anything to an end, huh? But only towards an end, are they ordered by, what? Another. Another. For the whole of irrational nature is compared to God as a tool to the chief, what? Agent. And therefore, it is private to the natural, the rational nature, that it tends towards an end, as it were, acting itself or leading itself to an end. But for an irrational nature, as it were, acted. or moved by another, right, or led by another. Whether it be to an end that it apprehends, as the brute animals do, right, or in an end not apprehended, just as those which altogether, what, lack knowledge. So this goes back to the second book of natural hearing, right, where Aristotle, at greater length here, defends the idea that H is acting for an end. But that's another course, huh? But it's interesting that Thomas will bring that up here, right, huh? Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that when man, through himself, acts for an end, huh, he knows the end, huh? But when he is led by another, huh, that's when he acts at the command of another, right, or when he is moved by another, right, impelling him, it is not necessary that he know the end, right? And so also is it so in irrational creatures, huh? I always tell a story about when I was a freshman at the College of St. Thomas there, and Brother Richard had ensured that I had Kisari as my advisor. And Kisari looked at my list of courses, and he said, Dwayne, where's your Greek? I said, my Greek? And he says, yes. He says, why aren't you taking Greek? And I said, well, other things I'd rather take. He says, that's not a reason, he said. He didn't study philosophy. He said, you take Greek. What was I supposed to do? But whatever Greek I know, you know, today is due to the fact that Kisari consisted that I take at least a semester of Greek, you know, and he knew the reason why, huh, see? And so, you know, even the amount of Greek I didn't know was very valuable to me in all my, what, yeah. I see some things Thomas doesn't say because he doesn't know the Greek, you know. But I see some things in the Greek, you know, that others don't see, huh, okay? So I was led by an end without knowing the end, huh? So I took Greek for a purpose, but I didn't know what the purpose was. I remember there was some dummy there in the education department in college there, you know, arguing with one of my professors who was taught, you know, Spanish and French and so on, you know. Well, you can read it in translation, you know, all these works, you know. But if you read, you know, Dante in Italian or you read, you know, somebody else in the original language, then you realize how much you're missing in the translation. And, but you can't know that until you, what, learn that language, huh? So it's very valuable for me to know some Latin, know some Greek, you know. So in some cases, even for man to act for an end, it's not necessary that he know the, what, the end, huh? And so also, Thomas says, it is true and, what, irrational creatures, huh? So was there a purpose for my studying Greek, do you think? Was there a purpose? Yeah. Was an action done for a purpose? I said he didn't know it. Maybe. Not required. So like the builders out here, they may or they may not know why the architect has to do it a certain way. Yeah, yeah, yeah. They don't have no, they just have to do it that way. Yeah. There's not the question why, there's what to do and die. It almost says, yeah. Now to the second, it should be said that to order to an end is of the one who, what, you know, moves himself to the end, huh? You can't use to translate it, acts himself to the end, doesn't sound right, in English. But of that which is directed towards an end, by another right, it is to be ordered to the end, right? Not to order oneself to the end. Which can be true of an irrational nature, but what? But by someone having a reason, right? Okay? You see, you run into these natural scientists nowadays who don't want to admit that nature acts for an end. Because then you're going to have to admit there's some mind behind nature. But when Aristotle argues this thing in the second book of the physics, huh? You see, it's kind of interesting, one argument in this regard, where he's saying that so much does action for an end appear in the insects, even, you know? Those little things. That some people wonder whether they have a mind. I used to say to the students, what is Aristotle saying here? He's not saying that they do have a mind, right? But the fact that people wonder whether they have a mind is because they see action for an end here. So, Aristotle is not reasoning from the insect having a mind to his acting for an end, but he's reasoning, he's acting for an end because people wonder whether they have a mind. So, I say, you can't really reason from nature having a mind or not having a mind to its acting for an end. But if you see action for an end in the case of the insect, and even in the case of the planet, right, then you can say, well, does an action for an end require a mind? Well, yes, but either in the one acting for an end or in what is directing the one that is acting for an end. And then you can go on and say, well, is it by mind or because it's what? It's directed towards an end. And I used to take, you know, some of the experiments of FOB, you know, who described the insects. And I think I've talked about those, but just recall one example there where he observed this insect, you know, would paralyze its prey or its victim. And then he would go and dig a hole, running back and forth between that and the victim, until it was big enough to hold the victim. And then he'd grab him by the antenna and pull him over and drop him into the hole and then deposit his eggs upon him, right? And then cover him up. And when the young sprouted, they had, what, fresh food there that was good, you know? But if he had killed the victim, right, then it would have corrupted and not been suitable food for the young. So our friend Fabris tried to put pressure on the insect's head in the way that the insect would do. And he found he was always killing it rather than paralyzing it, right? So it's got like a doctor's hands in a sense, right? It would squeeze the head of the victim enough to paralyze it and not to kill it, right? It's actually for an end, right, huh? You know? And, but then he noticed that he always dragged it by its antenna, right? So one time when he was over digging the hole, he cut off the antenna. And then the insect came back and, and finding frustration, filled up the hole without the victim, right? Well, if he was smart enough to figure out, you know, you don't want to kill him but just paralyze him, so he could figure out there's a million other places to drag him by. I used to say, you know, you know, that our, our forefathers, you know, they, they say, hit the woman over the head and, and then grab her by the hair and drag her back to your thing, you know, but if the hair came out, they could, you know, figure out, you could grab him by a leg as well. As slow minded as they might have been, you know. But this insect can't figure out, there's some other place to, to, to, you know. So in a sense, he's. Seeing action for an end, and it seems very intelligent. And now the next question is, is he doing this by what? Having a mind, right? And this experiment that he performed would indicate that it's not by mind, right? He had a mind, he wouldn't be smart. No, but if he had a mind, he could figure out that you want to paralyze the victim and how much you press it to paralyze him, and so on. How difficult was it to do that, right? If he had a mind to figure that out, he could figure out that there's some other place to grab it from besides the antenna, right? Find a beautiful example, you know, of what this is. But of the order, you know, that you have to proceed, right? That you don't even ask the question, does that insect have a mind or not, right? Until you see action for an end. And once you see action for an end, then you start to wonder whether it has a mind, right? And you may conclude that it doesn't have a mind, right? In which case it would be directed by another, right? But in a sense, the moderns want to begin from saying that nature, what? The insect or the tree doesn't have a mind, therefore it cannot be acting for an end. That doesn't, it's out of order the way you're thinking there, right? And you can see Aristotle's care there, right? He didn't say, you know, ah, they must have a mind because they're acting for an end. But no, he takes the fact that people wonder whether they have a mind, you know, to figure these things out. They can be intelligent like we are, you know? They wonder because they see this action for an end, something that's obviously directed towards an end. But if nature is not directed towards an end, then it would be simply by chance that it reaches this end, and therefore it would reach the end, what? Rarely. That's, they don't reach this end rarely, but almost all the time, right? So therefore they are acting for an end. And then the question arises, is it by, now if action for an end requires a mind, it seems to in some way, right? Then the question is, do they have a mind, or are they directed by a mind? That's a question that doesn't even arise until you see action for an end. Beings, you know, still peas. That's kind of remarkable, the way they would do it for hours, you know, seeking to draw themselves up into the sky and get the sun and, you know, amazing. See, with all those vines, you know, the squash and everything, and they put out those little curly-cubes. Didn't they make some horror movie about that? I mean, people would get wrapped up with these plants. Some people come there. Some insects are caught by these plants. I mean, they're designed to catch insects. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And they digest them. That's kind of interesting. To the third, it should be said, that the object of the will is the end and the good in what? In general end. Whence there is not able to be a will except in those things, in those things which lack reason and understanding, right? Since they cannot, what, apprehend the universal. But there is in them either an actual desire or a sense desire, which are both determined to some, what, particular good. When you say, when you make the act of contrition there, right? The loss of heaven, you know, and so on. But most of all, because they offend me, my God, for it's all good, serving all my love. Well, the act of a will and the reason to be penitent in this way. And Brother Mark used to talk about that, you know. You know, about the damned souls, right? You know, how they had rejected, you know. What is the reason for everything else being good? That God's goodness was the reason for everything being desirable, that is desirable. Why did I reject that? You know? I mean, how could I have been so? You know, St. Thomas takes that in Romans, and he talks about how all men want the good in general. Well, that's what he said, and that's where the mistake always is. But it manifests that particular causes are moved by a universal cause, right? Just as the ruler of the city, who intends the common good, right, moves by his command all the particular, what, offices of the city. And therefore it is necessary that all things which lack reason are moved to their particular ends by some, what, rational will, which extends to the universal good, to wit, the divine will. Eventually you've got to go back to the second book of physics, I want to see that more fully, right? Ahem. Okay, we'll go on to the third article here. To the third one proceeds thus, it seems that human acts do not receive their, what, species from the end. For the end is an extrinsic cause, huh? So when you divide it to four causes, we say matter and form are intrinsic to the thing, right? But the end and the mover or maker are extrinsic, huh? For the end is an extrinsic cause, but each thing has its species from some, what, intrinsic principle. Like this is a chair because of the form that's in the chair, right? Therefore, human acts do not receive their species from the end, but from their form. Moreover, that which gives a species is necessarily before, but the end is, yeah, after in being, posterior in being. Therefore, human acts do not have their species from the end. That would be preposterous, huh? It's used as a sign, you know, that reason is what looks before and after, right? That the preposterous is something very much opposed to reason, right? It's out of order, right? Put the cart before the horse, huh? Used to have a pun there in Descartes' name, you know? Put the cart before the horse. Moreover, the same cannot be except in one species, huh? It can't be two species at the same time. It can't be a dog and a cat, can it? It can be a dog or a cat, but not both. But the same in number act can be ordered two diverse, what? Ends, huh? Therefore, the end does not give the species to human acts, huh? Against this is what Augustine says in the book on the morals of the Church and the Manichaeans, huh? The superiority of the morals of the Church or those of the Manichaeans. But according to what? The end, as the end is guilty or praiseworthy, according to this, are our works, what? Culpable or praiseworthy, huh? What are all that Tom's going to say about this? I answer it should be said that each thing obtains its, what, species according to its act and not according to its, what, potency or ability. Whence those things which are composed from matter and form are constituted in their species through their forms, huh? If you take the cat and the dog and you eventually break them down into the same, what matter, right? So one is a dog and one is a cat by its, what, form, huh? Maybe this table and this chair to break them down, you get the same matter, right? So they differ specifically because of their, what, form, right? And form is act, right? Opposed to the matter, which is able to be formed in different ways, right? And this also should be considered in, what, their motions, huh? For since motion is in some way distinguished by, what, acting upon and undergoing, right? That's my translation. Both of these obtain their, what, species from act. For action or acting upon is from some act, which is the principle of, what, acting upon something. And passion from the act, which is the, what, term of the motion, right? So if the fire heats the, what, water, right, huh? The fire is able to heat the water because it actually has heat, huh? So its activity proceeds from its form, which in this case is heat, right? But the water is, what, being heated, right? And you talk about what it's undergoing by the result of its undergoing, which would be to be hot itself, huh? So in both cases you're knowing what the acting upon is by the act that's able, from which it's able to act upon something in some way, right? And the one that undergoes by what it undergoes, right? Okay? So the guy that was teaching me Greek, the Father Peter, taught Greek a lot, didn't he? First explained to me what P.A. Pelikani meant in Thomas' prayer, you know? Father Peter, you know? I didn't know the history of the pelican, that type of life. But he's able to, what, act upon me, right? Because of the knowledge he actually has of Greek, right? And this is a kind of what? form or act, right? Okay? But I'm undergoing this, right, process of acquiring some Greek, right? Which is going to be, what, a certain formation of my mind, or affirmation of my mind, okay? So acting upon, undergoing are specified by some act. In one case, that's the source of the acting upon, right? And the other, which is the end, or limit, of the undergoing, right? Undergo this entire mouth over the Greek, right? I shouldn't undergo entire mouth over the Greek, right? Yeah, you're suffering Greek. Yeah, yeah. I told you, this guy who's teaching philosophy, but talking about the students, you know, they seem to be saying, you know, why are you doing this to me, you know? Yeah, exactly, Paul. In the Dianima there, the book on the soul of Aristotle, you know, well, one of the places where he distinguishes the various senses of undergoing and acting upon. Watching Irving calls you at a school, that purgatory of childhood, you know? Beat it out of it, man. Beat the ignorance out of it. I remember, you know, Johnson is advising, what's his name? Boswell. Boswell, yeah. He was defending some teachers who's being, you know, tried for beating the kids, right? Well, of course, for Johnson, the rule is, you know, if there's no permanent damage, you know, there's no case against the teacher. If he's missing an eye or a leg or something, he's missing a waterboard, it's no problem. There's no permanent damage. When's califaxio, right, which is heating something up, right, is nothing other than a certain motion proceeding from heat, right? Califaxio, vero, the passion, is nothing other than a motion to heat, right? Okay? And the definition makes known the, what? Definition of species, huh? Ratio of species. It is. And in both ways, human acts, whether they're considered per modem axionum, or per modem passionum, right? From the end, they gain their species, huh? For in both ways, we can consider human acts, in that man moves himself, and he's moved by, what? Himself. For it has been said above, that acts are called human, insofar as they proceed from deliberate, what? Will. Will is grounded on deliberation of reason, right? But the object of the will is the good and the, what? End. And therefore, it is manifest that the beginning of human acts, insofar as they are human, is in fact the, what? End. And likewise, the end of them, for that to which human act, term, is it, ends act, you might say, is what the will intends as an end, huh? Just as in natural agents, the form of the one generated is conformed to the form of the one, what? Generated. Now, that's kind of interesting, he says that, because you, Talk about a natural thing there. Aristotle will sometimes speak of the form as being an end, huh? Because the form is the end of what? Generation, right? So the form of the chair is what? The end of the generation of the chair, right? So you might say that the generation of the chair is the wood of the chair being reduced to act, right? Being reduced to this what? Form, right? So the form can be in one way considered as being an end, right? And so that the form gives you the species, right? And because, as Ambrose says upon Luke, that mores properly are called human, right? Moral acts properly obtain their species for the end. For the same thing are moral acts and human acts. That's kind of interesting there for the use of the word moris, huh? Got to be kind of careful about that, I think, a little bit. Because moris means what? Custom, yeah, yeah. It was custom to something the same thing, you know? It always has that sense. It's curious, huh, because sometimes Aristotle will even speak of nature's custom, right? Although custom is sometimes, you know, divided against nature, right? But nature's customary way. Kind of extension of the word, right? It was about the importance of traditions and moris for this type of democratic republic. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, they were always talking about the distinction of these two books in Tocqueville, you know? What the French means and what the English means and so on. Manners and moris and so on. But I suppose there's a way in which you could say that you can accustom men to many different things, right? In a way you can't do with maybe the dog, huh? Although there's something of that in the dog, right? In the cat and they can have certain things, but there's a limit there, right? But, you know, you think of all the occupations of men and how men are accustomed to this or that for their occupation and they do these things without thinking, you know? Why don't you drive someplace at a distance and say, gee, what have I been doing? Or I get married and I shave, you know, and sometimes I think about what I'm doing and sometimes I don't, you know? I get shaved in both ways, both. I think about what I'm doing and I'm not thinking, you know, what I'm doing. I don't cut my throat, I do. And I'm not thinking about what I'm doing. In fact, things go faster, you know? My brother-in-law said that when he joined the Marines in the first morning, you know, they get in at three o'clock and they do this and they scare the heck out of everybody and then they go to bed. And, of course, like an hour and a half later, they wake them all up with, you know, big noise and everybody's just totally discombobulated, everybody's disoriented. And he said he has a very, very heavy beard. Later in this military, he was only there for a year or so, haven't he? But they used to make him shave three times a day because his beard was so fast. It grew so fast. He used to have to shave. Well, his first morning there, they woke him all up and he scared the heck out of everybody. And so he was 18. He says he had one of those straight razors in the old kind. Not the straight, but the kind you drop in, you know, the top open, the old fat guy. He said he was so scared. He said, well, I said he was going to be shaved. He never had a razor in there. He didn't even notice until the commanding officer told him, well, I got ashamed. He said, I did. Well, my cousin was a flossy major, you know. He was in the Navy. This officer doesn't keep the thing, you know. The mustache, right? And so the one time they were being expected by our officer coming down the room. What's this man doing with it? Oh, he was a flossy major. Oh. Can't do that. See, we don't know what to do, you know. He said, we don't know what to do. Oh, he was a monk. Understanding moral acts, either as actions or passions, it's kind of opaque to my mind. You know how an act of justice or an act of courage or temperance can be considered as an action or considered as a passion. How could you explain that act in terms of being an action? How can you explain it in terms of a passion? Is he saying that you can understand it? Well, he's saying in a sense that the rational creature is moving itself to its own, what? In it. In it. So it's both, what, mover and moved, right? Would it be, one part would be moving, another part? Yeah. But he's saying, yeah. But you're starting from the idea that you're responsible for what you do, right? You move yourself to do this, right? And so you're, you're, you're, what you do is, in a way, moving in a big move, right? Yeah. Yeah. And can you understand the whole act in either way, as an action or as a passion? Well, Thomas doesn't seem to be getting into that, that kind of distinction right now, well, you know, I mean, in the strict sense of this, the idea of acting upon undergoing is tied up with motion in the, in the natural philosophy, right? But, and with what motion is in natural philosophy, right? And there, the mover and the move do not read the same thing, you know? But when, when they distinguish between this and another kind of activity that we have, like understanding, let's say, or willing, probably the simplest way that Aristotle would distinguish between the two is by saying the one is an imperfect act, right? And the other is a perfect act, right? What does this mean, huh? Well, when I'm walking home, right? Have I walked home? And when I'm making a chair, have I made a chair? So when I'm making a chair, I haven't made the chair. And when I've made the chair, I'm not making it. But now what about seeing the pietas or seeing a painting, right? When I'm seeing the painting, have I seen it yet? So he calls that a perfect act, right? Now, it's interesting that if you look at our grammar, right, you know, you'd say, I have walked home is perfect, right? And so you're kind of thinking of the kind of activity that is really an imperfect act, right? And that exists when it's been, what? Exists when it's not complete, and when it's complete, it doesn't exist, you know? And he contrasts that with this operation of understanding or sensing or even willing, right? I used to take an example for the ladies, especially in my class. When you're loving somebody, have you loved them yet? Yeah. You're drinking your glass of water, whatever it is. Have you drunk it yet? So the kind of difference between these two activities, right? So Aristotle kind of stops there when he distinguishes these two kinds in the ninth book there, that the happiness has to be in what? So Aristotle kind of stops there when he comes to the ninth book, right? The activity that is perfect, right? It can't be in walking home, that kind of activity. Or in making a chair, right? Because those acts are always imperfect when they are, right? And when they're completed, they don't exist anymore. So often that could be the end, right? So it must be an activity like either sensing or understanding or loving or something of that sort, right? I don't think he's trying to get into that distinction so much at this point. He's just trying to bring out kind of a likeness to what you have in the more known act, right? Where you have acting upon and undergoing, right? These two different categories, right? And the likeness there consists in the fact that in some way a man is said to move himself towards what he does. And therefore, you see, the act is in there as either the beginning of it or as the what? The end, right? It's the beginning of it insofar as it's like a moving, and it's in there as an end, and it's like being moved, right? And so one, in a sense, is choosing this act, right? The choice is always for the sake of a what? The end, right? So the end is, seems to be specifying the act, right? So that's what you have in mind when you do this, right? And so it's the source of your act, right? But it's also what you're trying to, what, achieve, right? So you're trying to show in that way that there's truth to saying that the end specifies the act, right? But I think you've got to be kind of careful, because Thomas later on will come back and say, you know, well, if you do an act for the sake of something else, it kind of takes on that other thing, right? So, you know, when one virtue can command, or another virtue, or one vice, another vice, right? Thomas also gives an example of adultery, right? If you commit adultery in order to rob somebody, well, is this an act of injustice or an act of intemperance? Well, it's a bit of both, right? But it's more an act of injustice, right? I mean, a stealing, right? Because the one is being, what, formed by the other, right? Okay. But then in the case of the virtues, you know, they speak of charity as being the form of all the virtues, right? Okay. So, if you do something out of love for somebody, right, now, is this an act of love, or what is it? If I teach you out of love. If I teach you out of love, is this an act of love, or an act of teaching? Yeah. But which is more the form of my act? Yeah, yeah. So the end there seems, in some sense, to be more formal, right? It's an act of love. If a mother feeds your baby, is this an act of love, or is it an act of feeding? Why, if in the old days, you know, when the child was let out to be fed by some other woman, right? Maybe that's the way she makes her living, you know? Is that a different act, in a sense? It's kind of surprising that he has this particular article. Well, that's why I say it kind of stands by itself, this article, right? But going back again to that last text about moreism, I actually think a lot about this term moral philosophy and so on, and ethics, you know. But ethics comes in the word for ethos, custom, right? Well, why is the science named from a word that seems to mean, what, custom, right? I don't know if you'd say this is customary philosophy to speak in English. It's an English word for customary. So, if you've caught ethical philosophy from the Greek, I guess, and moral philosophy from the, what, Latin, what would be the English translation of this? Customary philosophy? I used to wonder, why wasn't this named more from, what, choice, right? Is this philosophy about things that are by choice? I choose to drink too much, or I choose to drink in moderation or something? I choose to pay my debts. I choose not to pay them. You know? Why not, why isn't this named from choice? Isn't choice kind of more central to what this science is about? Now, when Aristotle defines moral virtue, he says it's a habit, huh? By choice, right? He puts choice in the definition of it, right? So, isn't ethics about things over which you have some choice? Yeah, yeah. And Aristotle would talk about that, right? That the habits that you have by custom, you know, as you're accustomed, to kind of influence your, what? Choices, yeah. But is custom more central, you know, than the word choice? Why is this science being named from custom rather than from choice? You're not choosy philosophers. You know? It's like a second nature. What? Yeah. But, I mean, it certainly gives a greater prominence to custom and what it comes from. Now, you see, when he divides human virtue, you have the moral virtues and the virtues of reason. But the moral virtues seem to be named from, what? Custom, right? And it's because you become temperate, right? By repeated acts, you know, if you, or you become intemperate by repeated acts, right? Of one kind. And so your customs, they're kind of are what give rise to this virtue or to this, what? Vice, huh? I had a friend who would go to the bar every Friday night, every Saturday night, he and his brother, and drink until closing time. I think a little bit, you know, a little bit, you know, like you drink a little too much sometimes, you know, and so on. But, you get a certain virtue or vice from custom, right? So, a lot of ethics is taken up with describing these moral virtues, these customary virtues, customary vices, huh? Does that justify calling it, you know, customary philosophy? I think it's curious, because that's what St. Benedict, when he speaks about the vows, that's benedictive traditions, one of the vows is a converse, a conversion, moral, versus the moral. And they all, at least all the translations, they all give these long explanations of why they translate it a certain way. Like this is a conversion of manner, a conversion of life, well, it has a moral connotation, obviously, it's referring to choices. Well, Aristotle talked very much about how custom influences, what, choice, right? Okay. So, what do you choose to eat or drink even, you know? It seems to be what you're accustomed to, right? I mean, people, you know, different nationalities.