Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
Lecture 48: Demonstration, Dialectic, and the Matter of the Syllogism

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One definition is in another definition, and I call those definitions, what, continuous, right? Like the definition of quadrilateral and square continuous, right? The square is defined by quadrilateral, which is defined by its own definition, right? So you have continuous, even simple geometrical theorems, you have continuous, what, syllogisms, right? Even that first one in Euclid, you had two syllogisms whose conclusions were necessary to see the minor premise in the third syllogism. In Thomas here, you had, what, a syllogism, and then a syllogism backing up the major premise, and a syllogism backing up the minor premise, right? In these other two examples from Euclid, you have an either-or syllogism, which is backed up maybe by an if-then syllogism in one of its premises, and backed up, if-then syllogism in one of its premises, by a simple syllogism, right? So those eight forms are going to be used again and again, sometimes just one, sometimes two or three, right? Go back to Socrates there in the Mino, right? You take the first argument there, the argument for virtue being able to be taught, right? The main syllogism that he gives there is an if-then syllogism. If virtue is knowledge, then virtue can be taught, right? But virtue is knowledge, therefore it can be taught, right? Now, the if-then statement is kind of obvious. If virtue is knowledge, then it can be taught, it's knowledge that is taught. The simple statement, the second statement there in the if-then one, if virtue is knowledge, he shows by a regular syllogism. Virtue directs us to the good, what directs us to the good is knowledge, therefore virtue is knowledge, right? So simple syllogism backs up the second premise of an if-then syllogism, right? You see that, huh? So you have the different kinds of syllogism sometimes, as well as the same kind of syllogism with one term backing up another one, right? So as you go through book one of Euclid, I mean, you know, there's one continuous syllogism after another, right? A is used to prove B and B, C, and, you know, right down the line, right? And it becomes a long chain there at the end, huh? Just to go through all the steps. Okay? I see the thing to do is to know this and to use it, right, huh? It's better, as Aristotle says in the logic there, to know a few basic things and to use them and to use them often, to use them well. Because it's useful for so many things, right? And you don't always stop when you analyze the argument, but you just kind of suddenly just stop. Oh, I see, and it's all put together, you know? And then, and then, I should type it down, there was an argument in the sum the other day, I think he's using all three kinds, you know? And summa tagantilis, but those would be used again and again. But it would have been everywhere from Euclid, the first science, to theology, the queen of the science, is the last one, right? It's used all the way. Those forms, huh? Now, of course, you know, in the Phaedo, you also have, of course, inductions, right? So, Socrates induces the changes between what? Contraries, right? And then he syllogizes from that to the immortality of the soul, the first argument. And with the induction example, too, sometimes we find them used in a second sense. The first meaning of induction is an argument from many singulars to, what, one universal, right? But sometimes you have something like an induction, where you proceed from many, what, less universal things to one more, what, universal thing, right? Okay. And sometimes you have a kind of philosophical example, too, instead of going from one singer to another singer of the same kind, you go from one particular kind of thing to another particular kind. So, there's other forms of argument that will be used, right, huh? And as much as Diane would often point out, Aristotle sometimes, he'll give the syllogism, then he'll give a kind of a sign, John, from one of the weaker arguments. And why does he do that, right? Well, it'll take us back to the senses, huh? The mind wants to return always to the senses, huh? And the Alpha and the Omega, right, John, I go back to your beginning. And the senses are the beginning of our knowledge, huh? Now, you have more time, or you want to stop, or do I know what your schedule is? Stop. Okay. Now, next time, maybe we should talk a little bit about the matter of the syllogism here, huh? And this is very sketchy, but it's a little bit here, huh? At least by this time, the course is over at Logic, so it's not time to go into too much, right? Okay. But that's, how many copies do you need? What do you need? You need one from me, huh? Okay. I'm going to tell you a little while, so these are run down, these supplies of these things here. So I'm touching here upon some of the more important aspects of what they call the matter of the syllogism, right? Because you can have a syllogism, you know, from statements that are known to be true, right? And known to be necessarily true. You can syllogize from statements that are only, what? Probable, right? Okay. People forget that. They forget that the rigor of the syllogism doesn't mean that the conclusion is necessarily true, see? And you can compare that to adding and subtracting, multiplying and dividing, right? Correctly adding two numbers doesn't mean the number you've got is correct, because the numbers you correctly added might have been incorrect numbers, right? And so when I define calculating as coming to know or guess a number of other numbers, how could you say that? You know, it's such a rigorous thing, adding, subtract, and multiplying and dividing. But the point is that you might not have the correct numbers to add, subtract, multiply, or divide, right? So all the rigor of adding and subtracting doesn't make necessarily that you have the right number at the end, right? And the same way with the syllogism, right? You can even syllogize from false statements, right? So if I say every man is a stone and every stone is an animal, it follows necessarily that every man is a, what? Animal. If every man is a stone and every stone is an animal, every man is an animal, right? Okay? But it's not a good argument because the premises are clearly false, right? So you can have premises all the way from, what, ones that are necessarily true and even seen as necessarily true to ones that are only probable to ones that might even be, what, simply false, right? Aristotle takes apart melesis there in the first book of the physics, right? And he says his conclusion doesn't follow. His premises aren't even true or probable, right? This is a poor guy. Aristotle, the great, he's very kind. He says, you know, that's the difficulty of the first Greeks, they didn't have logic, right? But you can see when Socrates reasons in the Mino there, he reasons that the virtue can be taught, but the virtue cannot be taught. Well, this can't be necessary reasoning when you're reasoning, but to contradict your conclusions. But dialectic enables you to do that, right? You can reason from probable opinions, right, to contradictory conclusions. In demonstration, where you reason from statements necessarily true, you never reasoned how it was at conclusions. You always reasoned to one half of a contradiction, right? So we'll talk a little bit next time, you know, just to give you a little introduction to the matter of, the difference between dialectic and demonstration and the physical argument and so on, right? Okay. We'll expand a bit upon this, you know, this is very brief. Okay. Want to exercise on critical names, huh? What's that? Where is it? I have it here. These things are around the office still. Where is it? What's the size? Is the first name being said equivocally or univocally of the second name, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. You got enough copies here? No. I'll just keep that in my shirt. Give it up to size for next time. Get up? Okay. You know, in the case of the five creditables, the Aisikoge, you have a name set of many things, significantly, right, with the same meaning in mind, right? So, but sometimes the name is set of many things with a different meaning in mind. So, see if you can figure all these out here. You also go through the dialysis? Yeah, a little bit, yeah. But I just did the main ones, you know? What you see, I do here. I just do the first one in language and the first two outside of language, right? So it's in here. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. The falcions, the accident, the falcions. But again, there are 15 falcions. Eventually, you have to learn them all, but some of them are much more important, much more common than the others, right? And the three that are most common are the fallacy of the equivocation, the fallacy of mixing up in a different sense of the same word, and the fallacy of the accidental, making up the accidental and the as such, and the fallacy of simply in some respect, right? But they also correspond to three distinctions that are not really divisions, I think, right? But are made over and over again in philosophy. These three kinds of distinctions, right? You're going to meet them again and again and again, everywhere. And if you don't understand these kinds of distinctions, you know, you have a hard time understanding them, right? And once you start to get a hold of each kind of distinction, you'll be beginning again and again. It's absolutely crucial. What's what? Your love and friendship course. Yeah. I first invented the course, see? And of course, he was saying, you have to put sex in there. I said, no, I'm going to put sex in there. Love and friendship. And so, and, you know, I was getting, you know, a couple of sections of it, you know, in the advanced course. And then one semester, I could only offer one section, what I do, see? I don't have a good demand. So I said, we'll put it, you know, 8.30 in the morning, right? It cuts down the numbers, you know? It was 9.30, 10.30, you know? But a lot of them think, you know, coming into such a course, I think it's going to be fluff, you know, and just, you know, talking about, you know, social relations, you know, and they realize it's always out and stuff. That was really good. That's really good. I got to go think about it. from stateness, or premises, we call them, necessarily true. In fact, you could add, and seen by the reason is necessarily true. And seen as necessarily true. Now, obviously, I'm going to give you a very strong argument, because being a syllogism, the conclusion will follow necessarily from the premises, and because the premises themselves are necessarily true, then the conclusion must be, what, necessarily true, right? Okay? And this word, demonstration, is a Latin word which they translate, the Greek word, right? The Greek word is apodixisa. They do it apodictic, in a horrible way of English. But apodixis and demonstration come from the respective words in Greek and in Latin to show something, right? Right? I'm going to show you. This is true, right? And sometimes, in English, that word, to show, means, what, something that's going to be very clear, right? That it is so, right? And was it Missouri has that license plate now? I'm from Missouri, you've got to show me, right? As if you've got somebody like CBiz in the dialogue, right, who's insisting upon, you know, a necessary argument, right? You've got to show me before I'm going to accept it, right? So, that Greek word comes from that same word, showing, right? And that's why, in maybe editions, you know, of Euclid and so on, at the beginning of each demonstration, he'll propose what he's going to prove. In English, they translate it proposition, but really propose those more, the sense of it, right? It's what he proposes to demonstrate, right? And then, at the end, he indicates, kind of an epilogue, that he has demonstrated what he proposed to demonstrate, right? And so, you'll see sometimes Q, E, what? D, you see that in the text there, of Euclid? Which, I guess, you know, is the letters for Galatum. What was to be demonstrated, right? As we've now demonstrated, what was to be demonstrated in this particular proposal, right? Okay. So, sometimes you find people using the word Q, E, D, right? Remember, William F. Buckley went by using it in an ironic sense, right? You know, he's kind of recounting the bad reasoning of his opponents, right? Q, E, D, he says. That's kind of plural. But, in Euclid, of course, it's supposed to mean, what? Something that is truly a demonstration, right? Okay. And the clearest examples of demonstration are in geometry or in the science of numbers, right? And so, if you read Aristotle's book on demonstration, which is called, in English, the Posterior Analytics, there are these two books that go together, the prior and the posterior analytics. But in the prior analytics, he teaches you how to take apart an argument to see if the conclusion felt necessary from the premises, like we were doing when we went through the 48 cases of the three figures there. But in the Posterior Analytics, he teaches you how to examine the premises in which the socialism proceeds to see if they are necessarily true or not. But in that book, the Posterior Analytics, he often takes his examples from geometry or from the science of numbers, not only, but mainly, right? Because it's more clear that you have a demonstration there. Einstein is a biographical sketch. And if you look at these two volumes there that are out in the harper there, it says Einstein, scientist, philosopher, something like that. And it's actually a collection of essays by different writers, many of them scientists, some philosophers, about the work of Einstein. And there's a number of volumes in this series, you know, but there's one or two volumes that people wrote to Einstein. And then at the end of that, usually the man who's being written up has a chance to write a reply, you know, comment on these papers, you know, if he finds something he wants to criticize or reinforce in what they say. And in the Einstein volumes, there's also not a biographical sketch that I'm saying because of his life, but kind of more of his scientific inclinations. And he says in there that if Euclid did not arouse your youthful enthusiasm, you were not born to be a scientist. But, you know, he speaks of the effect of Euclid upon him as a child. But in terms of the rigor, which one thing was shown from another thing, right? Okay. So, I mean, even, you know, in our own century there, we see most clearly there, right, this rigor of reasoning. And Plato, you know, has these dialogues, which we call the Socratic conversation sometimes. Dialogue is a Greek word, a conversation. And they're called the Socratic conversations because Socrates is, in almost all of them, kind of dominates the conversation. But often the conversation is named from the other person with whom Socrates talks. Otherwise, you have to call it all Socrates, Socrates, Socrates, Socrates. But the other person that he talks with is a person with whom there'd be some reason to have a conversation about whatever the topic of their dialogue is. So there's something significant, huh, about the man with whom he speaks, huh? So you might talk to a hippias, you might talk to a protagoras, or you might talk to Gorgias or some sophist who teaches the art of rhetoric. You might talk to them about the nature of rhetoric, huh? Because here's a man who should, you know, have some acquaintance with it. He talks in the youth, for all, about piety with a man who's charged his own father for being impious, right? And some man, he should have said about piety, if you're doing something fairly impious, like charging your own father for being impious. and he talks in the Lachez, or Lachez, Lachez, Lachez, about courage, that virtue, right? But with whom does he talk? Who is Lachez, huh? Well, he's an old general. Well, presumably an old soldier would have some experience of courage and the opposite of courage, right? He's a soldier all these years, right? So here's a man who would talk to about courage, right? Well, what dialogue is about demonstration, or about episteme, which is that reason of knowledge that's an effective demonstration? Well, the dialogue is called the Theotetus, huh? And Socrates talks with Theotetus, who's a young man at the time. He's an historical person, Theotetus, who made important contributions to Euclid's elements, you know, to the mathematics of Euclid's elements, huh? And so why would Socrates talk with a mathematician about, what, demonstration and reason of knowledge, right? He says, such a man might have some experience of this kind of thing, right? Okay? But it's not only in mathematics that you have demonstrations, right? There are some demonstrations in natural philosophy in the beginning, huh? There are demonstrations on logic itself, right? There are demonstrations of wisdom and so on. But the more obvious examples and easier to get a hold of than geometry or the science of numbers, huh? Okay? Now, that's why, you know, the customers use that there, right? Not elsewhere, but that's kind of the assignments, right? And that's why mathematics is made from learning, huh? Because the student, in a sense, most of all can learn and not simply believe the teacher, right? Because of the rigor of demonstrations and the comparative ease of wisdom demonstrations can be grasped if you go through them. Interesting. Mathematics and Sacra Doctrina, the one is named from the student, Mathetes, huh? The learner, and that is named from the teacher, Doctrina. Doctrina. Doctrina. Doctrina. Doctrina. Doctrina. doctor, teacher, right? Because in sacro-dectrina, most of all, you're dependent upon the teacher, right? Who's ultimately God himself, right? Who is our teacher, Christ, right? And most of all, you believe there, right? By geometry, you believe the least of all. Just in the initial stage there, but once you see the demonstration, you no longer believe you could, you now know yourself, right? No matter what nucleus says and then on, you know that this is to be so, right? Okay? Sometimes these teachers lose their mind, you know. In cases other, right? It's just like very strange things. So, what did I say? He seems to have lost his mind, but if you understand the demonstration yourself, then you say, no matter what he says, right? I'm going to hold on to this, right? You depend upon him. Now, the other main kind of syllogism is the dialectical syllogism. There's not one word to name the dialectical syllogism. And this is just as much a syllogism as a demonstration, but the premises are not, either they're not necessarily true, or they're not seen as necessarily true anyway. They're seen only as, what? Probable, right? Okay? So, this is a syllogism from probable statements, probable premises. Premises are what statements of which you syllogize. So, it's a syllogism from probable statements, huh? Now, in the book on this, which is the kind of translate there in English, as you usually do, the English title will be topics, right? Okay? Topika. That's not for your translation, right? That's kind of, I call it a, what? Transliteration, right? Just like when you refer to the apology of Socrates, right? The Greek word is apologia. So, apology is what? Kind of letter for letter put it into English, right? But apology in English doesn't mean what apologia means in Greek. Apologia in Greek means what? A legal defense in the courtroom, right? And so, Cardinal Newman, you know, in his kind of autobiographical defense of himself, right? You know, I think there's a Latin title there, apologia probitasua, right? Kind of justifying his leaving Anglicans and becoming a Catholic, you know, to the great scandal the Anglicans, right? And maybe enmity them in some cases, you know? Okay. But it's kind of like a legal, I mean, not legal in a strict sense, but it's not such an apology for what he did. It's a real, what, attempt to defend the reasonableness of what he did, right? Leaving Anglicans and becoming your own Catholic. So when they kind of say that apology is not really a translation, but a, more like a transliteration. Because translation means what? You keep the meaning, not necessarily the word, the form of the word, right? Okay? So, in English, you know, they translate this, the title of Estrell's work, topics, right? But the root of that word in Greek, topos, is place. and, in a sense, the Greek title is there about places, right? And, a place, you know, without saying it, to be safe to what it is, a place is where you look to find a dialectical argumentary. So, topics, I mean, let's do that at all, right? But in the so-called topics, this book about places, Aristotle defines the probable, or actually, more precisely, you might say, probable opinions, which is another way of saying it, proceeds from probable opinions. He defines probable there as the opinions of all men, right? Or most men, right? Or the opinions of all, or most men in a given, what? Art of science, when they're speaking about the matter of that art of science, right? Or the most famous and illustrious of men in that art of science, right? Notice those five things he says you could divide into two at first, huh? He said opinion is probable because of the number, the quantity of men thinking, right? Or because of the qualities of these men, right? Okay? So, it's the opinions of all, or most men, and they are simply the number of men that hold this gives a certain probability to the opinion, Or all, or most men, or the most famous, in a given art, huh? But when they're speaking, obviously, about something that contains that art, right? So, if all, or most geometries say that a square on the side opposite the right angle is equal to the squares on the sides containing the right angle, then that's probable, right? Because all, or most geometries are saying this, right? Okay? Or if Einstein says that a scientific hypothesis is freely imagined, that statement is now probable, right? Because this most famous scientist who in one year had three papers for the Nobel Prize, right? He says that these scientific hypotheses are not reasoned out, but they are freely imagined, huh? Okay. Shakespeare, right? It says, Or step not the modesty of nature, for anything that's overdone is from the purpose of playing, who's in, both in the beginning and now, is as for to hold the mirror up to nature, to show a virtue on the face for an own image, and the very age and body that time is formed in pressure. Well, Shakespeare says that the purpose of what? To hold the mirror up to nature, right? And that's probable, Shakespeare is such an illustrious but grammatist, right? Mozart in his letter to his father there on the representation of anger, right? In the aria of Osman there in the touching from the Sarabra, right? He says how the music has to imitate the anger of Osman and is losing kind of control of himself, right? But now he says in a way he's displeasing to the ear, or in other words ceasing to be music. So Mozart the most illustrious and famous to be the composers, he says that music must be pleasing to the ear, or if not music, that's it. That's certainly a very probable opinion, right? That's it. Okay. And especially men are apt to follow the advice of all or most men that give an art or science, the most famous of them, especially if it's not contrary to what all most men are thinking, right? Okay. But sometimes the most famous men in art or science are saying something different from most men in that art or science. Sometimes, you know, the most illustrious men are ahead of the other men, They see more, I see examples of this, right? Okay. So it's possible that the opinions of most men and the opinions of even all or most men in a given art of science or the most famous of them, they might not be the same, right? They might have opposite opinions, right? So most men, for example, might think that sense pleasure is the greatest thing in life, right? But maybe most moral philosophers would not think so, right? Or the most famous ones like Aristotle and so on would not think this is the best thing in life, right? So there's some probability in saying the sense of pleasure is the best thing in life and some probability in saying it is a fact. But if a statement is necessarily true, then its contradictory is necessarily what? Yeah, yeah. If you go back to our logic of the second act there when we talked about contradictory statements, right? They have statements with the same subject and predicate, right? One affirmative, one negative. and oppose such that both cannot be true. Both cannot be false. One must be true and the other must be false, regardless of whether you know which is the true or which is the false. So if you see one half of a contradiction necessarily true, you must at the same time, as it were, see the opposite side as necessarily false. But if you see one side of a contradiction as probable right, well then the opposite side need not be what? Manifestly false. Because if the contradictory was manifestly clearly false, or necessarily false in any sense, then the side you work would be more than just probable. So there is that ambiguity, right, in the mind there in probable things, right? It can be probability to some extent on both what? the sides, right? Okay? It might be, you know, that we might use the word probable for what is more probable, right? Especially if it's very probable, and it's not very probable at all, right? But there's some fear that the other side might have something in it too, right? Okay? Now sometimes Aristotle will speak a deletical reasoning then, as reasoning from probable opinions to contradictory conclusions. Since you can have even opposite sides of the contradiction have some probability, it's possible from probable opinions to reason to contradictory conclusions. Not necessarily as strong on one side as the other, right? But it is, to some extent, on both, right? But in the case of demonstration, one never reasons to contradictory conclusions. Inclusion that follows necessarily from such premises that are seen to be necessarily true is seen to be necessarily true itself, right? And therefore its opposite is necessarily false. So you never demonstrate, truly, demonstrate contradictory statements, huh? But you can reason dialectically, right? To contradictory statements, huh? And you people read some of the Mino, right? Yeah. Well, the third part of the Mino, Mino still wants to know whether virtue can be taught, although he doesn't know too well what virtue is. And Socrates said, well, we should really find out what virtue is first before we try to, you know, show that it's one or the other. But if you want to, I'll try to think about it, right? And so he looks and says, is there any reason to think that virtue can be taught, right? And he works out an argument, right? That virtue can be taught. And then he reasons on the contradictory side, right? That virtue can not be taught, right? Okay. Now, of course, the mind can't accept a contradiction, right? And so after Socrates has reasoned that virtue can be taught, virtue can be taught, and he's reasoned that virtue cannot be taught. And in both cases, there's some probability of what he's saying, right? He argues that virtue is knowledge, then it can be taught, which seems reasonable, right? And then he gives an argument to say that virtue is, in fact, knowledge, right? And this goes something like, you know, virtue directs us to the good, and that sounds probable, right? And what directs us to the good would seem to be some, what, knowledge, right? Therefore, virtue is knowledge, right? So that sounds reasonable, right? But then he argues on the other side and says that virtue can be taught, there will be teachers of it, right? Given the immense, what, importance of virtue for civic life and living together, right? But then Mina himself admits there doesn't seem to be any teachers of it, right? Except those sophists whom you know what to trust, right? His son, what? I mean, he's got a very low opinion of the sophists, right? On their charlatans, on their quacks, you know? So, I mean, people had their opinion about the sophists, huh? Maybe they were. Quacks. So, it seems then that's not the sort of thing that can be taught, right? When Socrates comes back and he says, well, is one of these sides stronger than the other, right? Another way of looking at it is there are weaknesses on one of these sides rather than the other, right? And then he goes back and he says, well, his thought that virtue is knowledge, let's go back to that, huh? The backup for that, you know? And he says, virtue directs us to the good, what directs us to the good is knowledge. What is that major premise? What directs us to the good is knowledge. Is that necessarily true? Aren't people directed to the good also by having the right opinion? True opinion, right? Even the correct times, right? You see? So, you know, my simple example that I give of the man going down the road, he comes to the fork in the road, right? He wants to go to Boston. Which one goes to Boston? Which one goes to Providence, right? Okay? And if he knows that the right fork is the road to Boston, he would take that and get to Boston like he wants to, right? But if he doesn't know that that's the way to Boston, but he thinks that it's the way to Boston, even though he doesn't know, he's thinking correctly, right? But he doesn't know. He's going to take that. He thinks that's the road to take, right? So he can get there by right opinion as well as by knowledge, right? So maybe the great men of Athens did not direct Athens to the good, what was good for Athens because they knew what was good for Athens, but because they had the right opinion about what was good for Athens, right? And it's not so clear in these human affairs, you know, whether the man really knew what was good for the country or he had the right opinion, right? Could MacArthur, you know, my favorite example there, could MacArthur really have known that the Inchon landing would succeed? He had contingent plans in case he didn't, right? He could really maybe know with all the factors involved, and that's why the Navy and the Chief of Staff were opposed to it, right? As a matter of fact, MacArthur had the right opinion at least, right? But whether he knew, I don't know how great his mind was or not, whether he knew or made the right opinion, he led us to something good, right? You see the idea? Now, in another dialogue, I guess I think it's in the Protagoras, you see a weakness on the other side, right? You know, that there are no teachers of virtue, right? And I think Protagoras says, Well, you know, it's like saying there's no teachers of Greek, right? You see? I mean, I can name the man who first taught me French, let's say, right? You know? But who was my teacher of English? Well, my mother to some extent, my father, my older brother, my older brother, my uncles, my aunts, right? You see? They all taught me how to speak English, right? You know? So it's kind of diffused there, right? But I can't, you know, point to a, you know, whom did I hire to teach my children to speak English? I didn't hire anybody. It must be that nobody teaches English to my children, right? See, I hired somebody to teach them piano, right? And I can point to that person, right? I can point to that person, right? I didn't hire anybody to teach them English. Must not be teachable, right? See? You see? So Socrates, you know, or Plato at least, huh? In another dialogue, this comes back, right? And there you see a weakness on the other side, right? So this is logical reasoning, huh? Reasoning from probable opinions to what? Contradictory conclusions even sometimes, huh? But, you know, if one side is really true and the other is false, maybe you can find more probability on one side than the other, right? But, as Thomas says in the major premium to wisdom there, but with formidity, you know, with fear of the opposite, right? There might be something, right? You see? Just like McCartney was convinced, huh, that we should do the Inchon landing, but there was still some fear in his mind, right? And I mentioned how when he was going there, he called his civilian officer up, and he went over the whole thing, you know. That's the thing to do then, he said, you know? And he can, you know, think he out loud again, you know? And then he went and read his Bible, you know, and waited to see if it worked out, you see? So there's that, you know, certain fear that this could fail, right? All kinds of things that happen, right?