Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
Lecture 43: Demonstration, Necessity, and the Perfect Argument

Transcript
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You can't neglect the supernatural, right? You can't mix up the two, right? But you have to see that there's a certain harmony of the two and one can help the other in a way, right? It's helped him out because you were saying something about trusting yourself, right? Trusting in a sense of your nature, right? The old definition of theology is belief-seeking understanding, right? It's very much in harmony with the idea of wonder being natural to us, right? I love this one psalm that was in the correct number, 99, right? It actually teaches the kids in that little because it's a nice one for them. It's saying, Joy, please the Lord, all your lands, serve the Lord with gladness. Come before him with a joyful song. Know that the Lord is God, he made us, his we are, his people will flock with him. Well, no, it's the first part there. It's always saying you're going to be a joyful saint, right? You know, serve the Lord with gladness, that God will obey his commandments. Then it says, Know that the Lord is God, he made us, his we are. That's exactly what God is divine theology in the Summa Canta Gentiles. God is himself, God is a maker, God is the end of his divine providence, right? So in a sense he's saying, you know, Dwayne, saying to me in particular, right? He made the Summa Canta Gentiles in the Summa Theology of it. Summa Canta Gentiles, it's even more precisely that distinction, you know? And know that the Lord is God, right? That's book one of the Summa Canta Gentiles. He made us, his we are, right? That's the second book. The flocky guy, right? That's the third book, right? Free, you know, totally reject, right? Taken and eat. So that's the deal, it's the same way, you know? And think of what it goes on in the translation that I learned of the psalm in. Enter his gates with thanksgiving, his courts of praise, right? Thanksgiving is kind of a transition from what the more selfish, shall we say, prayer of He said, well, you're not looking for commendation for having done his will or for knowing him as God in the beginning and end of all things. You're giving thanks for God that you would have, what? Being able to do that, right? That's his help, right? But the way the psalm transition I have, it enters gates with thanksgiving, his courts with praise. Thanksgiving is kind of a transition from what the more selfish, shall we say, prayer of asking, right? What would you have to ask the things that you're taught to ask the things that they are Father, right? But thanksgiving is a little more, I wouldn't say altruistic, but it's a little more, you're not seeking something new, but you're seeking something new that you think about what you've received, right? But when you thank somebody, you're not asking for something more, right? When you go to praising God, then you seem to be wholly what? Outside of yourself, right? Just praising his excellence, right? So thanksgiving is kind of the term, right? So the way the psalm says it, enter his gates with thanksgiving, his courts with praise. Some go through the gate to get to the court, right? So at thanksgiving, you come, right? And that's the way heaven will be, right? You'll be doing the will of God, and it won't be a problem to do the will of God, but you'll be knowing him, right, as himself, and as the beginning and the end of all things. But then you just naturally go to the next thing, which is to thank him for all this, right? And then finally you forget about, you know, God, you know, what he's done for you, but just God in himself, right? And you must be praising him, and you forget yourself. Hopefully, that'll be it. You know? But notice how close it is to nature, right? Beliefs seeking understanding, right? And you actually wonder about who you believe. It's so, right? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. You know, she'd always be there in the front of the tabernacle on that side, and she'd be taking care of the flowers on the altar and so on and so on. She died finally, so she was quite good up in years. And when she did a lot, who I had for one or two courses when I was at the College of St. Thomas, he died. He was about 81, I think. So that's a pretty good age, I guess, but anyway. And then Mr. Rice there, who I met when I was going off to Rome, you know, he died. So I just stopped getting his weight on the way home. A number of these. So, just remember them a little bit. Okay. Let's say a few more words about demonstration and dialectic, and then we'll go and talk a little bit about sophistic, huh? Sophistical refutations, as Aristotle. This book is entitled About Sophistic Refutations. You get into the first book of the Posterior Analytics, which is the book on demonstration. In fact, the demonstration, which is epistagmary, or using out knowledge. Aristotle gives this definition of demonstration. I don't know if we've met this definition yet or not. But he defines demonstration as a syllogism, which is the genus of demonstration. It's a syllogism making us know the cause. Okay? And that of which it is the cause. And that it cannot be otherwise. So it's a syllogism making us know the cause. And that of which it is the cause. And that it can't be otherwise. So you're seeing a necessary connection there between the cause and the effect, huh? And notice, if you've read the great dialogue there, Plato called the Mino, when he's separating knowledge and strict sense from right opinion. And he has pointed out how a man can act well sometimes, not having knowledge, but just having right opinion. And then he's asked by Mino, well, what's the difference then between knowledge and right opinion? And is knowledge any better than right opinion, as far as action is concerned? And Socrates says, well, if you hold on to the right opinion, right, you're going to be perfectly well off, right? But you might give up the right opinion, and go on and give what? Wrong opinion. Yeah, yeah. Well, in the case if you know it, what you think is tied down, huh? So it's not going to get up and go away. It's tied down, he says in the Greek there, by the logizmo, huh? By an account of the cause, huh? Okay? So you can see how the great Plato there is anticipating what Aristotle is going to say here, right? The demonstration here is a syllogism that's producing knowledge in the strict sense, and not just an opinion, right? So, but Aristotle is anticipated here by Plato to see the cause as what enables you to see that it must be so and cannot be otherwise. Okay? You see that also in the great dialogue called the Phaedo, right? Because in the Phaedo, Socrates is reasoning that the human soul is immortal, and Sibes thinks that some of the arguments are good, but not necessary, right? And he's kind of pressuring Socrates to come up with an argument that is altogether necessary. And the final argument that Socrates gives seems to satisfy, at least for the time being, Sibes, right? One could examine the argument to see if it really is as necessary as it appears to be. But when Socrates is being pressured to do that, he says, well, you're asking for a lot, right? And then he goes back and recalls his days as a natural philosopher, as if the natural philosopher would most of all know about causes, right? And so why is Socrates going back to his experience as a natural philosopher in order to find a reason why the soul must be what? Immortal, right? And not just, you know, a probable argument that he is. Well, because the natural philosopher most of all seems to know about causes. And he has to know the reason why. He's going to give the reason why the soul must be immortal. It must be in terms of the cause, right? Okay? So there you see, in both the Mino and the Phaedo, that Plato sees, or Socrates, maybe Phaedo more, sees a connection between being sure about something, right? And something being necessary, and what? Cause. Do you see that? Okay? And sometimes, you know, I'll touch upon this to students, and I'll say, you know, you can give me any reasons for something, right? Because I think I might have said last time, what is the best reason you can give for a statement? See? And they go, well, you could say the best reason for a statement is is the reason why it must be so. That's the best reason you can give, isn't it? You can't always give that kind of reason for everything, but the best kind of reason you can give for a statement is the reason it must be so. Now notice when you use the word why there, as I do, you're touching upon the what? Cause. Cause answers the question why. And also the question what for that matter too, but for obvious that answers the question why. And you see again that connection with what? Necessity, right? Okay. So in geometry, when straight lines intersect, these opposite angles will be what? Equal. And these two for the same reason. Now I say to students, what's the reason for saying those angles will be equal, right? Well, they look equal, well. But that's not the best reason you can give, right? Okay. Well, you two cents are equal. Well, that's the reason. But is that the best reason you can give? What if you measured these two and they're equal, right? Well, that would be reason to think that they're equal, right? Well, that would tell you universally that they're always equal, because this particular one is equal, right? Well, let's measure a few more. Okay. But even so, that's not the best reason you can give, right? Euclid gives the best reason for those being equal. The reason why they must be equal, right? And that reason is that because, and because means the cause being, because this is a straight line, A plus X must either be two right angles or B equal to two right angles. Okay? And because this is a straight line, and this is a straight line, meaning it, because, huh, B plus X must equal two right angles. And the rest is those axioms that are obvious to everybody, right? Quantities equal to the same equal to each other. And quantities equal such a fraction equals to the result, so equal, right? But notice, the basic reason why comes from the fact that these lines are straight, right? Because this is a straight line, meaning a straight line, because of that, these two angles have got to be either two right angles or equal to a few right angles, huh? Okay? That's something you see earlier, of course, in geometry. So that's the best reason you can give, the reason why it must be so. So the demonstration is that kind of a syllogism that makes known the cause, right? And that which is a cause, you cannot be otherwise. So in this demonstration, Euclid makes known the cause, the lines intersecting is the cause of there being angles, right? But the straightness of the lines is the cause of the angles being, what? Equal, right? Okay? So you see the cause, the straightness of the lines, that of which is a cause, the equality of these angles, and they cannot be, what? Otherwise, it's impossible for it to be otherwise. Okay? So you're the man from Missouri there, right? Missouri, you've got to show it to me, right? Well, this comes to that word to show it. You've really shown that, right? Okay. Now, when you study the fifth book of wisdom, the fifth book of metaphysics, Aristotle, in that whole book, he takes up the words, right, that are used most of all in wisdom, but these are also the words that are used in the axioms. And these are also the words that to some extent are used everywhere. Okay? And the first group of words he takes up are words that pertain to cause in some way. And so he takes up the word beginning, the word cause, the word element, and we can begin in the very first sentence of the thoughts of nature. The word nature, right? And these are all, in some way, names of causes, but he attaches to them the word necessary. Okay? And Thomas says, he attaches the word necessary to the words for cause, because it causes that to which something else necessarily follows. Just like it necessarily follows upon those lines being straight, that those angles will be equal, right? It follows necessarily upon a number being two, that it's half of four, and a third of six, and the other things follow necessarily. So you see, there's an intimate connection between cause and what? Necessary, right? And so, sometimes we define, as I defined it here, as I established it, a demonstration there with emphasis upon making known the cause, but sometimes we say that a demonstration is a syllogism from premises that are necessarily true, right? And are seen as necessarily true, right? Okay? So there's a connection, then, between cause and necessarily true, right? And cause and necessary. So those are two key words, right? Now, later on, when Aristotle is talking about the properties, the words that pertain to the properties of being as being, in the middle, he talks about being and one and their parts, but the first word he takes up is perfect, huh? And, it's kind of interesting what he does. He explains the three basic meanings of perfect, right? And then he distinguishes the sense of which God is said to be perfect and preachers are said to be perfect. But, after he gets through the word perfect, then he takes up three words that are related to perfect, huh? It's very unusual what he does here. The first word he takes up is limit or in, you can translate if you put it by. The second word he takes up is through itself, huh? Per se and the last this is a perfect argument, right? okay? Now, you say, why is the demonstration the perfect argument? Well, because of two things. because the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises and because the premises themselves are necessarily true. In other kinds of arguments, either the conclusion doesn't follow necessarily, right? Or the premises are not necessarily true, right? In some cases, maybe both, right? In some cases, they fall away from the perfection of demonstration. So, demonstration in a way is to measure all other arguments. And you can see how they kind of have sometimes something of demonstration, like the dialectical syllogism, the conclusion follows necessarily, but the premises are not necessarily true, right? So, the conclusion is only probable, right? But in this most perfect argument, both the form and the matter, you might say, are perfect, right? But what could you ask in an argument, as far as the form is concerned, than that the conclusion should follow necessarily from the premises? What more could you demand in the premises? Well, obviously you want them to be true and not false, right? And that they be necessarily true, right? Seen as necessarily true, right? But then, Aristotle will reason that the demonstration is about premises that are what? Cacalto, per se, to itself. That's interesting. He sees through itself truth, and the as a word that retains the perfection of things, huh? And you see that if you study love and friendship, for example, that if I love you because you're useful to me, or I love you even because you please me, right? I'm not loving you to yourself, right? I'm not loving you for what you are in yourself, right? Or in the highest and the best and the most perfect kind of friendship, I love you to yourself, huh? Not to what you do for me. Okay? It may do a lot for me, but that's not the primary basis in the highest friendship for my loving you, right? Okay? So Aristotle goes on and he talks about the various senses of to itself, right? And he talks about how the premises in a demonstration involve to itself, right? So in that simple example I gave you before, I think, you say, man is an animal with reason, and because he's an animal with reason, he's capable of laughter, right? Okay? Well, to be an animal with reason belongs to man through being a man, right? It belongs to man as such, right? And to be capable of laughter belongs to a rational animal as such, through itself, huh? So it's a connection between through itself and what? Necessary, right? And through itself and what? Cause, huh? The reason you say two is what? Half a four, taking a very simple example. But why is two half a four? It just happens to be half a four? Like a triangle happens to be green? Huh? No, no. Two is half a four because it is two, right? Okay? You have the word cause, right? But you could say also that to be half a four belongs to two as such. Or it belongs to two through itself, huh? What does that mean? It belongs to two through being two, right? Okay? Why it doesn't belong to what? A triangle because it is a triangle to be green, right? Does it? It doesn't belong to a triangle through being a triangle to be green, right? Okay? It doesn't belong to a triangle as triangle to be green, right? That's something that happens to it, right? See? So you see the connection between as such and through itself with both cause and what? Necessary, right? It's necessary for two to be what? Half a four, right? And that's tied up with the fact that two as two is half a four. Two through being two is half a four, right? But it isn't necessary that triangle be green because it's not green through being a triangle. It's not as triangle as green, right? That's something accidental that happens. So could you say truly then that through itself or as such could be expressed in another way by its very nature? Just saying that instead of saying through itself or it is by its very nature... what is in the definition of a thing instead of that thing, right? Okay? So square as such is equilateral or square as such is a quadrilateral, right? Okay? And then what belongs to something like a property, right? Those are the two basic ones, huh? There's another sense of through itself, which in Greek, you know, is more idiomatic than ours. It means by yourself, right? So if you're in your room by yourself, you're... top out, though, right? By yourself, right? Okay? And then sometimes you apply it to the other causes. They move in the end, too. Yeah? Maybe I missed something. You mentioned that Aristotle, I guess, in the posterior analytics, makes a distinction between necessary and the as-such in and through itself. Yeah, but they're connected. They're connected, yeah. Yeah, right. Okay. So then while we can say it is necessary that two is a number, it is also necessary that two is half a four? Yeah. Even though you could also say, too, through itself is half a four? Yeah, yeah. Okay, so... But two different senses of through itself, right? Okay? When you talk about the property, you're talking about the definition of some part of it, right? So, Aristotle takes up this phrase, if you want to call it that, through itself, both in the fifth book of wisdom and in the first book of the posterior analytics, huh? It's relevant to both, right? He takes it up in the fifth book of wisdom because it's something that follows, or is connected with the word perfect, right? He takes it up in the posterior analytics because it's connected with necessary, right? Okay? But, as I say, if you realize that demonstration is the perfect argument, right, one should not be surprised that two itself and as such should be very important in demonstration, huh? Okay? Now, this word limit or end is very interesting, huh? A lot of people think of the, you know, opening up people's, you know, horizons and all this sort of stuff, you know, kind of, you know? And I used to joke up and write a book entitled How to Limit Your Thinking. How to Perfect Your Thinking, right? But notice, huh, the importance for demonstration of definition, right? And how definition enables one to, what, have certitude, right? To see something as being necessarily so, right? Okay? Now, one of the meanings of limit is definition. If you look at the Latin word definition, it comes from the Latin word finis, huh? Meaning, what, end or limit, huh? Okay? So one should not be surprised to see that definition is an extremely important thing in demonstration. In fact, the middle term of a demonstration would tend to be a, what, definition, right? Okay? And there's other ways in which you could see limit or end, huh? You know, we spoke about the square of opposition and statements that are contradictorily opposed, right? Okay? And how we sometimes, as Aristotle does in the prior analytics, he distinguishes between the demonstrator and the dialectician by the fact that the demonstrator takes one half of a contradiction and lays it down, you know, and excludes and throws away, so to speak, the other half. But the dialectician says, which do you think? You know? Okay? And although you might incline to one more than the other, there's a little bit of what? Fear you might, you know, a little bit of... Sinat is a word determined to one half of the contradiction. So when they ask Socrates, you know, can virtue be taught? And Socrates says, well, we haven't defined yet virtue, right? He doesn't think he can know for sure yet whether virtue can or cannot be taught, right? Okay? But then he argues that virtue can be taught, right? Then he argues that virtue cannot be taught, right? There's a kind of, what? Lack of determination, right? In the dialectician, huh? And so sometimes Aristotle says, dialectic is reasoning for probable opinions even to contradictory conclusions. And that's what Socrates does in the third part of the Mino, right? He reasons that virtue can be taught with probability, and he reasons that probability cannot be taught, right? Okay? Thomas does that in the questionis disputate, right? And he had 15 arguments. Yes and 10 no, right? And then finally he will start to resolve it, right? But notice, huh? That's tied up with the perfection of demonstration that the mind is determined, or limited, you might say, to one half of a contradiction, both in the premises and in the, what? Conclusion, right? So one never demonstrates the contradictory of what's been demonstrated. It's impossible. Okay? And the demonstrator never reasons from both sides of the contradiction. But dialectically, he can. Thank you. Thank you. Because sometimes both sides have some probability. Do you see that? So again, you see in many ways the connection of demonstration with limit, huh? Limit in the sense of definition. Definition tends to be the middle term in a demonstration. And also you see that the mind in demonstration is limited to one half of a contradiction, both in the premises and in the conclusion. While in dialectic it's kind of unlimited, right? You're being inclined more to one than the other, but it's not firm in there. So in demonstration you have the truth, right? In dialectic you're still what? Guessing the truth, right? You may have a reasonable guess, right? But you don't really have the truth yet, huh? And I may affirm why you don't have a hold of it, right? Okay? You're not right? You're not just or something, right? I got you. No way out. You can go on, right? I got you, huh? So it's interesting to see how those words that pertain to perfect can be applied, among other perfect things, to what? Demonstration, right? I was thinking about this again, though. When Aristotle takes up the word limit, or end, he says, sometimes we contrast the end with the beginning, right? We've got a line here, and you begin here, see this is the beginning, and you call that over here the what? The end, right? But then he says sometimes we call both the beginning and the end, and end, right? We speak of the end points of the line, right? Right, huh? Okay? That's interesting, huh? God's the most perfect thing there is, right? And he's what? The beginning and the end of all things, right? But more like a circle, as they say, right? You know? The beginning and the end of the same, right? But he's the beginning and the end of all things, huh? And interestingly, Aristotle saw limit, or end, huh? As a name associated with, what? Perfect, right? And pertains away to perfection of God. Not that he has a limit, right? But that he's the limit of all things, both in the sense of the beginning and the end, and the up, and the leg, the beginning and the end, huh? That's kind of amazing, right, huh? And God is being through himself, right? He's good through himself, right, huh? He has everything, right, huh? The problem about the euthyphro, right? How can you give God something? You've got everything, right? You know, you see, it's at Christmas time, you know, what do you give the man? He has everything, right? You know, you're trying to find a gift for somebody, right? But how can you give God a gift, right? He does, in the full sense, have everything, right, huh? You know? He has it all. You know, Thomas explains, you know, the way of speaking there in Scripture, where God says to, was it Abraham or Moses, you know, follow me, and I will show you every good. Thomas says, that is myself. He has everything, right, huh? You know, when Aristotle is, what, contrasting the sense of which God is perfect from the sense of which a creature can be perfect. A creature can be perfect in its kind, right? It has all that its kind requires, right? But it doesn't have the perfection of other genera, right? Right, God is everything. He has perfections of every genus, every kind of thing, without the imperfections, of course, right? But to have an imperfection is not really to have something. It's not to have something, right? It's a metaphor, right? Like to say, I have, what, blindness, or I have poverty, or I have ignorance. I have a lot of ignorance. Well, that's really not having, strictly speaking, right? Not having knowledge, yeah. I'm very pleased to have that. Would you say that comparing, say, speculative theology with, say, moral theology or something, or formal theology, that you would encounter a greater use of demonstration, in a certain sense, in sacred doctrine or pragmatics, as distinct, maybe you would encounter more dialectical syllogism and practical, moral theology? But as you descend to the particular, right, you get less, what? Sort of certainty, yeah. There's so many more things to be considered, right? Okay? And in some cases, you know, it becomes very hard to give a necessary reason, right? You see? How many bites of steaks I have? Well, I had two bites, see? You know? It's hard to give a precise reason there, right? Yeah, okay. Like the moral manuals and things like that, probable opinions about such and such, you know, very probable. Yeah. There's a difference, say, if you look at the summa, the secundi secundi of the summa theologia, right? It gives you, you know, the common principles there in ethics, right? In moral theology, but you have to go to maybe St. Alphonsus de Goury, right, to get the proper ones and more particular ones, right? You see? And I haven't read that much of St. Alphonsus de Goury, but he was made the patron saint of all moral theologians and of all confessors, right? Okay? Now, why was that, right? Because he's descending more to the particular, and sometimes I can solve it on certain sins, right? And you can see maybe that if you were a confessor, you might have to have something more particular than the summa theologia, or the secundi secundi, right? The secundi secundi is much larger than, probably larger than the rest of the summa together, almost, right? You see? Because you have to descend to the particular, right, to perfect these things. Now, let me mention something else that comes up in the first book of the Postal Litics, right? Aristotle speaks of another kind of demonstration that goes from the effect towards the cause, right? Okay? And sometimes, you know, you see, at least referred to from the Latin, the demonstration we've just spoken about is sometimes called demonstration procterquid. But that procterquid means on account of what, right? Okay? It's a demonstration who's going from the cause to the effect, right? But sometimes you see what is called demonstration quia, demonstration that it is so. And this is a syllogism going from the effect to the, what? The cause, right? And we tend to use that more in natural philosophy than we do, let's say, in geometry, right? Because usually the effect is more known to us than the cause, right? And in geometry, everything's on the surface so you can go from the cause to the effect, right? Now, when Aristotle gets to the second book of the Postal Litics, he begins by discussing the four questions, right? In speculative knowledge. And there are the questions, does it exist? And what is it? And is this that? And if this is that, why is this that? And he talks about the order of his questions, right? The question, does it exist, comes before the question, what is it, huh? And the question, is this that, comes before the question, why is this that, right? Okay? So if you ask me, do unicorns exist? And the answer is no, you don't really ask what is a unicorn. You talk about what the word means, but there's no such thing there to be known, right? Okay? And you might say, is the light of the sun eclipsed? If the light of the sun is eclipsed, then you ask why is the light of the sun eclipsed, right? Okay? Does snow melt? The answer is yes. Then why does snow melt, right? Okay? Now, Aristotle shows how these questions are very closely connected really and you can almost change one into the other and he takes an example of the eclipse of the sun he says, if I ask what is an eclipse of the sun, right? I'm asking a question of that type, what is something? If I ask why is the light of the sun eclipsed I'm asking a question of the second time, right? But in either case, I would answer the question really by the cause. If you want to really define what an eclipse of the sun is, right? You'd have to say it's a cutting off of the light of the sun by the moon coming between the sun and the earth. But if you ask, why is the light of the sun being eclipsed in the middle of the day? Because the moon is coming between the sun and the earth, right? Okay? So he points out that the questions what and why are both answered by the cause. And you ask me, what is a sacrament, right? You say, well, a sacrament is an outward sign instituted by Christ to give grace, right? I'm giving really the causes of the sacrament, aren't I? Instituted by Christ, the maker, to give grace, the end or purpose. These are different kinds of causes, huh? Outward, huh? That's the matter of the sacrament, huh? The sensible matter. Sign. You know, the words and so on, right? Okay? Twinkle, twinkle, little star. How I wonder what you are, right? But you want to know what the star is made out of, right? And so on. And those are the causes of the star, right? Okay? So, on the very beginning of natural philosophy, Aristotle referred to understanding, meaning understanding what? Knowing what, right? And how they're both answered by knowing beginnings and causes and elements, right? Okay? And to some extent, you can say that that second book of the posture analytics is kind of the centerpiece of logic, because logic is the tool of the man who wonders. Wonders is the beginning of philosophy, right? And wonder is a natural desire to know the cause, or you could define it as a natural desire to know what and why, huh? In that reading I gave you from Plato's Theotelos, right? You have mention of what and why, right? But you see that in the childhood saying, at least our childhood saying, Twinkle, twinkle, little star, how I wonder what you are. Okay? Notice that's in Torquete Media, right? The kind of what the unusual is like to wonder about, huh? Like the witches, huh? In Shakespeare. Hair is foul, and foul is fair. Hover through the fog and fill the air. Twinkle, twinkle, little star, how I wonder. Fault in the first syllable, twinkle, twinkle, little star. But they always cut it short, so they get into the accent, huh? So, that's really kind of the key thing, you know? And only Aristotle, when he does logic, talks about those things, right? And what's the other guys are talking about, you know? What's this for? The stuff that they got, right? One of the University of Minnesota logicians said to one of my professors, you know, it's about logic, it's useless for knowing reality. What are you studying it for? You know? Yeah? It's because you wonder about things, right? You wonder what and why. It's interested in what definition and demonstration, right? You want to answer the questions, what and why. And they're both answered in a way by knowing the thoughts. Thank you, sir. Thank you, sir. Thank you, sir. Thank you, sir. Thank you, sir.