Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
Lecture 18: The Five Predicables: Definitions and Distinctions

Transcript
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Of many, what? Individuals, right? Okay? Many that differ only as individuals, not differing in kind, signify what it is. What is this? A circle. What is that? A circle. What is that? A circle. If you compare the definition of difference and the definition of what? Genus, right? With the definition of lowest species. The definition of genus shares this with lowest species definition, right? But it differs here, right? Because the genus is said of many other in kind. The difference shares many other in kind with the definition of difference, but a difference can signify how they are what they are, right? Then you see the idea that they need one-on-one difference, right, to define these things, right? Even to define genus, difference, and lowest species. Genus, difference, and lowest species have in common that they're a name said with one meaning of many, what? Things, huh? Okay? But the genus and species differ from difference because they signify what those many things are. Why difference signifies how they are what they are. But genus differs from lowest species because it's said of many other in kind and the lowest species is said only of many other individuals, right? Okay? And it has in common the difference that it's said of many other in kind and difference by that. So you need, in a sense, both this and that, right? Just like you need the definition of genus this and other in kind and in the definition of difference other in kind but how it is what it is, right? So the logician explains what a lowest species is but he leads to the geometry to determine what is a lowest species in geometry. And Euclid maybe would tell you that the circle is the lowest species and the lateral triangle is the lowest species and the square is, right? But maybe the oblong is not, huh? An isosceles triangle is not, huh? Maybe if you specify the oblong what the ratio is the longer to the shorter side, right? Like 2 to 1 or 3 to 1 or something then you have maybe a lowest species, right? Okay? The arithmetician would say that what? Even number and odd number is not a lowest species but 7 is, right? The prime and composite are both genera and the species, right? Okay? You leave now to the, what? The biologist to say, you know the natural philosopher where there man is a lowest species, right? Okay? Where the dog is or there are different kinds of dogs, right? And you leave to the poetic science, right? Is comedy a lowest species, right? Or I would say myself from my study of comedy that what I call the good-natured comedy and the satire are different forms of what comedy is. The good-natured comedy I think is much superior to the satire, right? Because the good-natured comedy expels what? Nolan Cawley, right? But the satire kind of makes you, what? Listen through, huh? What they say about Swift, right? You know, it kind of makes you Nolan Cawley reading stuff. But even Shakespeare, he has the three good-natured comedies in the West-Porn's world but then there's two satires, right? But satire sometimes gets a little bit, you know, impresity. Shakespeare's a black satire, you know, to write his impresity down. It's a shock, you know, because the Omeric heroes are not so heroic. Not so heroic. But, as I say, the logician then leaves, he explains what a lower species is and he might exemplify it, but he really leaves together science to determine what that is. But in the other direction, the logician, the master here, right? Okay. Is there a genus that is not a, what, species, right? Or does every genus have a genus above it, right? Well, if every genus had a genus above it, you have to know the genus before you can know the species. You can know what a quadrilateral is without knowing what a square is, but you can't know what a square is without knowing what a quadrilateral. So if every genus had a genus above it, how many genus would you have to know to know anything? Yeah. In which case, you should know what? Nothing. That's obviously not true, right? You couldn't even say you don't know anything, you wouldn't know what it is to know. Okay. And how many definitions would be presupposed to be a definition? Infinity definitions, right? So you wouldn't be able to do anything, right? And you couldn't begin even to define, right? Because you have to define the genus before you could use the genus, right? You have to define the genus of that before you use that and you begin, right? Okay. Another way, I don't even mention in the text, I don't know why not, but it should be if every genus had a genus above it, right? Then there'd always be a more universal name or universal word than any word you have, right? But there are most universal words. Like take the word something or the word thing or the word being, right? Can there be something that is not a being? Can there be something that isn't something? Yeah. But I mean, if it's an alien, then it's something, right? Yeah. So there can't really be something that isn't something, right? There can't really be something that's not a being, right? There can't be a thing that's not a thing. So there are most universal names, right? Like being and something and... While if every genus had a genus above it, right? You'd never come to most universal names, right? Okay? So this is one way, another way, I should say, that we show that what? Not every genus has a genus above it. The consequence of that is that there's no most universal name. But there are most universal words and names, right? Not every genus has a genus above, right? Okay. And the other way we show it is by the fact that you have to know the genus before you can know the species, right? And therefore you have to know the infinity of things before you can know anything. In which case, you never know anything, right? And there'd be an infinity of definitions before any definition. So you never know anything by definition, right? Okay? So we don't know anything, right? So there's nothing to say. Kenny would say, I don't know anything because he doesn't know what it is to know. I don't know anything. He doesn't even know what he doesn't know. Something to say. But now, the next step is key here now. Once you realize that there are most universal names, right? There's a name that's said of everything, like the word thing or something, right? Does that mean that there's one genus of everything, right? Well, if you go back to the definition of genus now, it's a name said with one meaning of many things of any kind signifying what it is, right? Well, the question is, are those most universal names, like being or thing or something, right? Are they names said with one meaning of everything? Or are they said with more than one meaning? Are they said univocally or equivocally? If they're said equivocally, then there isn't one highest genus, right? There's going to be more than one highest genus. If they are said univocally, then you're going to have one highest genus, right? Now, what Aristotle showed, and we're going to follow in this way, is that those most universal names are not said univocally with the same meaning, that is, not said equally, right? Of everything. Therefore, there can't be one highest genus, right? But then, you have to say, well, how do we distinguish then the mini highest genus? Since Aristotle's famous both the categories developed. Now, I don't want to go further today because it's like 10 degrees to stop right there. And so, we'll start with that question, you know. It's a follow-up here of the realization that the same name can be a genus and a species, right? And that has raised in two questions. Is there a species that is not a genus, right? It's not a genus, right? It's not a genus, right? It's not a genus, right? It's not a genus, right? And then the question that concerns now, is there a genus that is not a species, right? We show that there is, but is it one or more than one, right? We'll take up with that. Last issue where the Pope speaks, you know, and this is the July-August issue. And it's kind of interesting, interesting, old I thought. The zeal, fraternal friendship, and supportive charity will enable them to turn daily social relationships into opportunities for awakening in others that thirst for truth, which is the first condition for the saving. That's interesting, right? He's saying that the thirst for truth, there is a thirst for truth, which is the first condition for the saving encounter with Christ. That's a interesting thing to think about, huh? Is that right? He had a thirst for truth, right? And eventually, that led him to Christ, huh? There's other things we think about, you know, where a man recognizes his sinfulness, and so on, or this humility that you need, right? We have a connection with truth, I think, also. There's a famous saying of St. Teresa of Avila that humility is the truth. And that's what we call in philosophy a predicatio carcausum. Humility is not truth, but its cause is truth, right? And so when a person realizes his dependence upon God and how the good that he does, God is chiefly responsible for, right? But that he is chiefly responsible for the evil he does, because that truth, in a sense, is the foundation of, what? True humility, right? You know? And likewise, I think, you know, in terms of recognizing one's sinfulness, huh? I mean, nowadays, you know, it's commonly said, you know, people don't even know what sin is, or do such a thing called sin, or, you know? But they have no desire to know the truth about the moral law, or to know the truth about their own moral condition, right? But then there's also, you know, this thirst for truth in this broader sense that leads a man, you know, to wonder about the afterlife and the universe and so on. And that, in a sense, leads him to Christ, huh? Did he do that? Oh, the one did do it. Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Let's come back now to where we were yesterday, or last class, rather. Okay, and everybody know what a genus is now? How many parts are there in the definition of genus? Five. And the first part is the genus of genus, which is? The second part is what? Said with one meaning, right? They also say said univocally, which is the meaning of one meaning, right? But said with one meaning. The third part, of many things, yeah. Okay? And the fourth part is what? Other in kind, those many things other in kind. And the fifth and last part is signifying what it is, right? Okay? Now, because it's said of many things other in kind, right, but it has only one meaning, it can only say in general what each one of those is, huh? And that's why you need this other name called the, like, difference, right? To complete, huh? Your understanding of what this or that particular kind of thing is. Now, the definition of difference, again, has five parts, right? And the first four parts are exactly the same as in the definition of what? It's a genus. It's a name said with one meaning of many things other in kind, huh? But the fifth and last part of that definition of difference separates it from what? Genus. Genus, huh? It signifies not what it is, but how it is what it is, right? And that's just how, because that might be something accidental, but how it is what it is, right? Genus, right? Now, with the word, yes? Would you say that third type, did you also mention the definition of difference? Yeah, in a sense they call it three definitions, but this last definition is defining difference as a name said of what? Many things, right? Okay? Name said with one meaning of many things, huh? Okay? That's what the five are in a sense, right? Okay? But I have to be careful with the next name here, the name species, right? Or form, right? Because it's only what Porphyry calls the lowest species, huh? And that is a, got another definition, right? Of a name said with one meaning of many things, huh? He also gave a definition of species as, you know, the name of a particular kind of thing, under a genism, okay? Now, how is that meaning of species and the other meaning of species, lowest species? So, how is that meaning of species and the other meaning of species and the other meaning of species? So, how is that meaning of species and the other meaning of species and the other meaning of species? So, how is that meaning of species and the other meaning of species and the other meaning of species? of many things, other only individually, right? Not other in kind, signifying what it is. How are those two definitions, those two senses there of species related, would you say? You could say that every lowest species is also the name of a particular kind of thing under genus, right? But not every name of a particular kind of thing under genus is a, what, lowest species. In other words, you have more general and less general, right? More particular, less particular, and you have a whole series, right? And it's only the lowest species that has nothing below it, other in kind, only other individuals, that is that second definition, right? But it and all the higher ones, right, which are species of what is above them and genus of what is below them, they're all the names of what particular kind of thing under a, what? Genus. Yeah, yeah. So when we say that the same name can be both a genus and a species, right, what do we mean by species there? Not the lowest species. A lowest species cannot ever be a, what? Genus. Because it's said of many other only individually, not other in kind, huh? But the genus is always said of many things other in kind. So no genus is a lowest species and no lowest species is a genus, right? But if you take species in this broader sense being the name of a particular kind of thing, well then there are many genera that are what? Species, right? In comparison to what is above them as opposed to what is below them, right? Except when you get to the, what, highest genus and that's a genus and not a species, huh? Okay? It's a genus that has no genus above it. Just as the lowest species is a species that is not a genus, right? And has no species, what? The Lord, right? Okay. So when you take, you know, the five, they're called often from the Latin, the five predicables, right? Genus, difference, species, property, and accident. If you take them as five names, an exhaustive division of names said with one meaning of many things, using the word species there in the sense of what? Lowest species, huh? Oh, that's a five-year predicables. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Because any species above that, right, compared to what is below it, would be what? A genus. A genus, right? Okay. So you've got to stop and think about those things, huh? Okay. Now again, just coming back and looking at it another way, there's only one difference between genus and difference. Okay? They have the same first four parts of their definition, right? But they have one difference at the end, which is that one is signifying what it is, the genus, and the difference, how it is what it is. There's also one difference between genus and lowest species, which is... Many other kind, or others. Yeah, yeah. The genus is said with one meaning of many things, other in kind, right? Signifying what it is. The lowest species is said of many things, other only individually, right? But it also signifies what it is, huh? So circle said of many circles, right? Signifies what it is, right? Okay. So notice you need both of those differences of genus there to separate it from both what? Yeah. Now how many differences are there, though, between difference and lowest species? Two, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Because the difference, like the genus, is said of many things, other in kind, right? So it shares that difference, right? And it signifies how they are what they are, right? The species signifies what it is, right? So species and difference are further apart, right? In meaning. In the sense that two differences is then species and genus or difference in what? Genus, right? Okay. Species and genus have in common to signify what it is, right? Difference and genus have in common that they are said of many things other in kind, right? Difference has both of those. Difference is the, what? Lowest species, huh? You see now? Difference has distinct from lowest species and difference has distinct from genus. I'm saying there's one difference between difference and genus, right? Genus signifies what it is, difference signifies how it is what it is, right? There's one difference in the definition of genus and lowest species. The genus is said of many things, other in kind, and the lowest species of many other only individually, right? But now if you compare lowest species with difference, there's two differences, right? It shares with the genus that signifies what it is, which separates it from difference, right? And it shares with what? There's this other difference that separates both genus and difference from lowest species that set up things other in kind, right? So there's one difference that separates genus from what? From what species Yeah, another difference that separates it from difference, right? Okay. But difference is what? Two differences, right? It compares to lowest species but one comparison to genus, right? Okay. So, you know, that's what Porphyry does. He compares, you know, genus and species and difference and what they have in common and how they, what, differ, right? Okay. So, I might give sometimes a genus and answer the question what is it, right? I might also sometimes give a, what, lowest species, right? But likewise in the book called The Topics there in English Aristotle puts together the ideological problem of genus and difference, huh? Because they both signify, what, something pertaining to the nature of the thing, right? And, uh, but not in a convertible way, right? In a more general way. Um, now we mentioned how in a definition there's only going to be one genus, right? But there tends to be, what, two or more differences, right? And this is a very difficult thing, but Thomas raises a question there in the commentary on the posterior analytics, huh? that if the difference, huh, is taken from form, and the genus is taken from matter, and the unity of the thing requires the unity of form, right? Shouldn't you have a difference that is, what, yeah, like the lowest species, right? Okay. And Thomas says, well, if we didn't know the natures of things in an outward way, you might have differences that are, what, convertible, right? Okay. So, the definition of difference that is common to more than one, what, kind of thing, right? That there's no difference to speak of any, right? that is convertible with the thing being defined, right? And therefore that you need a combination of at least two differences to specify something, right? That's due, Thomas says in the commentary on the Posh Analytics, to the fact that we know the nature of things in a kind of outward way. That also fits our knowing things in a confused way before distinctly. Because if no difference is really convertible with the thing, right, then you always need a combination of differences to go from a confused knowledge to a distinct knowledge, right? See, if you had only in your definition, say, of genus, take the example of what we're using here, right? If you only had your definition of genus, the difference that it signifies what it is, you wouldn't have distinguished between genus and those species, would you? Okay? If you only had in it the other difference that's said of many other in kind, you wouldn't be separating genus and difference, would you? But you put those two together, and it separates it from both difference and from those species, huh? But the same thing you see in geometry, right? When you define the square as an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral, no word in the definition, neither the genus quadrilateral, obviously, but neither of the differences. Equilateral or right-angled fits just square, doesn't it? Because the rhombus is equilateral as well, as the square, and the oblong, huh, is right-angled just as the square, right? But the square is the only quadrilateral that is both right-angled and equilateral, right? Okay? So you go from the confused to the distinct when you put those two together, right? So that each name in the definition, even the names that are differences, right? Each name still represents a confused and somewhat indistinct now to the thing you define, right? So when you bring them together, then it comes into, to borrow a metaphor from the eyes, into focus, right? And now it's, what, distinct, right? You see that? Thomas raises a problem because of the things Aristotle says in the metaphysics about, you know, how genus is to difference like matter is to form and talk about the unity of form. But when Aristotle is exemplifying, defining there in the post-analytics, he takes difference that is not, what, convertible, right? Okay? And so, you'll see that, there's a rule anyway, that you need a combination of differences, huh? Okay? Now, notice, once you understand these five names, then you can see sometimes how, when we don't have a name for a thing, sometimes we don't have a name for a thing, huh? And then, instead of a name, we use a, what, speech, right? Give an example of what I mean, huh? The names, we have names for the species of quadrilara, square, oblong, rhombus, rhomboi, right? And trapezium, huh? These are regular ones. The first four, actually, parallelograms, we also have a word for parallelogram, right? Okay? But now, do we have names for the species of triangle? Like, scalene, and isosceles, and equilateral triangle, do we have a name for that? Does equilateral triangle have a name? Yeah, that's not really, right. It's, it's really, what? Two noms. It's speech, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Okay? But nevertheless, we could say, huh, that equilateral triangle is one species of triangle, and isosceles is another one, right? Okay? Because it's, it plays, it has the same, what, role, you might say, that square has for quadrilateral. Okay? Our rhombus, our rhomboid, right? Okay? So, don't be tied, necessarily, to always, right, having one name. Sometimes, a thing doesn't have a name, right? When Aristotle gets into the virtues and the vices, right, huh, he says that some vices don't have a name. And one place it comes up, for example, is when you're talking about the moral virtues, and the moral virtues are in between two extremes, right? And so temperance, or moderation, is in between the man who goes to excess and sends pleasure, right? And the man doesn't enjoy these things at all, right? But Aristotle says, the man doesn't enjoy these things at all. He's such a rarity, that doesn't come into our experience, and so we don't really have any name for the vices, see? And we could name it, like, intemperance, or, you know, platanina. You know, these things are common things, right? You know, platanine, drunkard, you know? So, so Aristotle, so we can coin a word if you want to, and he coins a word, you know, I mean, the guy is without sensation, it seems. He doesn't enjoy such flesh at all, right? Doesn't enjoy his food at all, doesn't enjoy these things. He seems to be lacking sensation, right? But I mean, there's no name for it, right? It'd be a common speech, huh? So either you have to use a speech or try to coin a name, right? I don't know if there's any point for us now at this late stage to coin a name for that little triangle, do you? Call it equitriangle or something if you want to try to make it. You see? Okay. And sometimes, later on, we don't have a genus in the strict sense, we might have a word that's equivocal by reason, right? But it's kind of functioning as a, what, first part of the definition. We'll see examples of that. Okay? That's like somebody was defining looking as trying to see, right? And somebody might say, well, to see has many, what, meanings, right? So in a way, looking has three meanings, right? Because to see has three meanings. So we've got one definition there or not? Okay? So sometimes we use a speech in place of a name where you don't have a name for something, right? And sometimes we, you know, like there's a problem with drama, right? There seem to be some kind of drama in between tragedy and comedy, and in the Renaissance they would call it tragedy-esque comedy, you know? And now they sometimes use the word romance, right? But it has many meanings, too, right? That's common now, you'll see, in addition to Shakespeare, the last plays are called the romances, right? But not in the romantic sense, in a different sense. So, I mean, but in the original edition of Shakespeare, they didn't have a name for it, right? Okay? But you recognize this. Okay? So, the differences that are in one definition would be related as to themselves, as matter and form? The genuses formed a matter, huh? To each other, how? Well, sometimes there's an order among them, right? Because one tends to be made a little more general or something than the other. So, I mean, you have to pay attention to why we put these things, like when you define a genus, right? You see, it's a name set with one meaning, right? Of many things, right? Other in kind, seem like what it is, right? And there's a reason for that order among the differences, huh? Some seem to be more gentle than the others, right? But you have to be careful, huh? One thing I noticed, for example, like in the Poetics of Aristotle, in the beginning of the Poetics, he distinguishes among the imitative arts, right? And he says that they differ by that in which they imitate, right? Or what they imitate, right? Or how they imitate, right? Okay? But the most basic differences are in that in which they imitate and what they imitate, right? Okay? So the painter might represent a happy man, the poet might represent him in words, right? And the painter would represent him in line and what? Color, right? Okay? And you have to say, well, what is he representing, though? Is it a happy man or a sad man, a courageous man or a coward or whatever it might be, right? Okay? Now, why does Aristotle give the difference of that in which they imitate, before what they imitate, and before how they imitate? He says how they imitate, he's thinking of the difference in fiction between epic and drama, you know, where you act it out or you narrate it, right? Shakespeare's Venus and Adonis and his Rape of Lucrece, they're called narrative poems, right? They're not considered to be dramas, huh? Or plays, right? Okay? But Aristotle puts that kind of difference, huh? Between whether you, you know, you act it out on the stage and so on, or you narrate, right? There's how they imitate, right? He puts that third and last, right? But why does he put first that in which they imitate, before what they imitate? Well, he's distinguishing the imitative arts. It's the same order as the predicables things, too. What it is first. Yeah? And when you distinguish the imitative arts, is the first distinction you make, by what they imitate, or by that in which they imitate? Oh, on the subject, I'm sorry. Well, what do you mean by imitative arts? In other words, Mozart, huh, can represent sadness in the melody, right? Right? And Shakespeare can represent, what, sadness in the words of his character, right? Okay? And is it going to be the same art that's going to be about representation of sad things? Would it be in harmony and rhythm and so on, or would it be in words? No. But the same art, like Mozart's art, will write happy melodies, joyful melodies, and what? Sad melodies, right? The major key and the minor key and so on, huh? And Shakespeare will write both tragedies and, what? Comedies, right, huh? So the unity of the arts, the distinction of them, is first in that in which they imitate, right? They see something like that in mechanical arts, huh? Is there one art of making chairs? This room is well set up for what I wanted to, because would one art make this chair here, which is a metal chair, and those wooden chairs over there, see? And then another art would make a metal table and a wooden table. No. But rather, we know from experience, right, that the carpenter will make both wooden chairs and wooden tables and wooden houses and wooden bookcases, right? And so on. And the metal worker will make metal chairs and metal tables, and the plastic workers will make plastic chairs and plastic tables, and so on, right, huh? So that what he's making is a chair, a table, or a door. It's not the first way you distinguish these arts, but by the matter in which they do it, right? And that's found also in the imitative arts, huh? The first distinction is whether they make in words, or they make in line and color, or they make in melody and sound, and so on, right? Okay. And then the second difference, really, is what? What. What, you see? Now, to some extent, you might find a poet who can write, as Aristotle says, tragedies, but not comedies, or vice versa, right? But nevertheless, you're going to be more able to have a man unite the writing of tragedy and comedies and a man who writes tragedies and requiems and so on, right? You see? Okay. That's going to be the same art, doesn't it? But now, when Aristotle defines tragedy, right? It gets down to define another thing made by the poetic art tragedy. He defines tragedy as an imitation or a likeness, right? Of a course of action that is serious of some magnitude, right? And so on. And then he says in sweetened language, and so on, right? There he gives what it imitates before that in which it imitates, right? And see, why does he do that? But that's the reverse order of the order in which he gives them when he distinguishes the imitative arts. We saw the reason why we distinguish the imitative arts, right? That in which imitate is a more basic distinction. Shakespeare could write sad and joyful plays, right? And Mozart could write sad and joyful melodies. You don't have one man who writes sad plays and sad melodies, and another guy writes joyful plays and joyful melodies, right? See? Okay. But when you talk about the thing made here, and it's an imitation or likeness or something, then why does he reverse the order? Imitation, isn't it? Yeah, yeah. In other words, the genus in tragedy or in any of these works of the imitative arts is imitation, or in English they often say likeness now, because imitation has suffered a diminution in dignity as a word, right? You know, because of our commercial customs, right? Imitation means a cheap or inferior likeness, right? But I often use the word likeness, right? Okay? But an imitation is a likeness, huh? So it's natural in starting with saying it's a likeness to say what is a likeness of what? Oh, yeah. It's a likeness of this in this matter, right? So when I define a Shakespearean sonnet, I say it's a likeness of thought and feeling, right? In 14 lines of amic pentameter, divided into three quatrains of alternate rhyming, and completed by rhyming public. That's my definition of Shakespearean sonnet, huh? But I begin by saying it's a likeness of thought and feeling, right? And then in 14 lines of amic pentameter, et cetera. In the same way, when Aristotle, we define comedy, huh? We begin by saying it's a likeness of the, what? Of a course of action that is laughable, right? Okay? As opposed to the tragedies of the likeness of the serious, right? And then we go on to say, in sweetened languages, Aristotle says, right? Okay? Languages sweetened by meter and metaphor and images and so on. But when you're distinguishing the imitative arts, you're talking now about the ability to make something, right? And the ability to make, one ability to make is first distinguished from another ability to make by the matter in which it makes, right? See? And you're more able to make, in this matter, different things, like a chair, a table, and a door, in wood, right? The carpenter. And if you want to make a metal chair, you have to acquire a whole different set of tools, right? A whole different way of working with this, what? This matter, right? Okay. It's a little bit tricky when you talk about exactly what is the order of differences, right? I mean, a good example of that, right? How careful Aristotle is there in the poetics, huh? Well, what is the genus of the pedophiles? It's a name. Now, what? A bit more you can say than that. You can say, it's name said univocally, right? With one meaning, of many things, right? Yes, so that. I mentioned how Thomas Aquinas, because you're kind of a clue to this, because in the Summa Contra Gentilis, in the first book there, first volume, he's taking up whether any name is said univocally of God and of creatures, right? And he's reasoning that no name is said univocally of God and what? Creatures, right? He's going to eliminate that. He's going to eliminate the other extreme position that says every name said of God and creatures is purely equivocal. Quilical by chance, right? Yeah. He's going to come to the middle position, right? That there are some names said of God and creatures that are equivocal by reason, right? Okay. But anyway, when he's eliminating... There's any name said univocally with the same meaning of God and creatures. He gives many arguments for this, right? But one of them is an either-or argument, right? If every name said univocally of many things is either a genus, or a difference, or a species, or a property, or an accident. And then he goes and eliminates each one of those five, right? And therefore there's no name said univocally of God and creatures, right? But no, so an argument to be good, that has to be what? It has to be exhaustive, right? So that's what gave me the clue, right? That, in a sense, what he's done for us in the Isilogai, right? Is to give us a complete division, you might say, right? Of name said with one meaning, or name said univocally, of many things, right? And that's kind of a clue, right? Mm-hmm, okay. Yeah, otherwise, such as I grant money. Yeah. Now, you can see that division is exhaustive because either it signifies something inside the nature, or something outside the nature, right? There's no what? There's no what? There's no what? There's no what? There's no what? criss-crossing divisions, right? And you could say, signifying what it is, or signifying how it is, it appears. Now, is there any possibility besides those two? If a name signifies something inside the nature, right? By the nature of the thing, you mean what it is, right? So either it's got to signify what it is, or at least how it is what it is, right? If it signifies either what it is, nor how it is what it is, how does it signify something pertaining to what it is? Those seem to be the only two possibilities, right? Okay? Now, of many things, other in kind, many things, okay? Or in other words, saying that only individually, right? Okay, not stating that. I mean, firmly, right? Only individually. I guess any other possibility besides those two? Now, if it signifies what it is, of many things other in kind, that gives you the genius, right? Okay? If it signifies what it is, of many things not other in kind, that gives you the lowest species, right? Okay? If it signifies how it is what it is, of many things other in kind, right? Then you have quite a difference. Now, why isn't there a fourth thing? Remember, we saw before sometimes, right? Criss-cross divisions, the parts of a play, before, not before, after, not after. You get only three and not four things. Because it can't be any part of a plot that is either before anything or after anything, because I have no connection with anything, right? Okay? This is more difficult to see. Why isn't there a difference here, which in a way is convertible with a, what? Lois species, right? Like, rational seems to be with man, right? I see Porphyry, when he gives examples, he's using platonic examples, right? Because he's in the neoplatonic school, right? And the Platonists thought that there were, what? Immortal, rational animals. Okay? So they defined man as a mortal, rational animal. And then there were these kind of air-like spirits, like Shakespeare has, and Ariel there, and the Tempest. And they were, what? Immortal, rational animals, right? So neither, what? Rational, right? Or mortal would be convertible with man, right? You have to see both, right? Now, though the example might be false in the sense that there are no, what? Well, it exemplifies the definition of difference, right? As being said of many other in kind, right? Now, Thomas, when Aristotle explains, you know, how definition is a beginning of demonstration, right? The middle term of demonstration, in a way. In Aristotle, in the second book of the Post-Analytics, he talks about how to investigate a definition and so on. But he speaks there as if the, you know, one way of doing it is to start with the genus, and then try to add the differences, right? And Aristotle seems to be speaking there as if you need a combination of differences, right? That are convertible to the thing being defined, right? And that Aristotle seems to be speaking as if differences are as poor for you as to say it in your own, right? Say that many things are other in kind, right? And only a combination of differences, right? Okay? And Thomas raises a question about that in the Post-Analytics, because, as we learn in wisdom and metaphysics, the genus is taken more from what is material, like animal and man, right? And the difference is more from the form. But if the thing really is one thing, it's got to have one, what, form. So why shouldn't there be a difference that corresponds to that, right? Well, the answer Thomas gives to that question in the Post-Analytics is that we don't know things inwardly very much, and we know things outwardly because our knowledge is our senses. And that's why we have to do what? I was using the English phrase there, think about something, right? Okay? And when you're trying to define something, you're thinking about the thing, right? And you're trying to get inside to the nature of the thing, what it is, and we'll speak of the definition as bringing out what the thing is, right? Why do we use that phrase to bring out what the thing is? Because the nature is inside and hidden to us, right? The central thinker in philosophy there, human talk, the Heraclitus said, nature loves to hide. That's his famous saying, nature loves to hide. And the main reason, the first reason why nature loves to hide is because it's something within, right? And we know things through our senses and therefore the outside of things. Okay? And so to a certain extent, we tend to what? To guess at the interior from the what? Outside, right? You know, we often guess about people, right? From the outside. In times of the case, there's a reason why we don't have differences that are what? Convertible, right? You know, thinking in a kind of outward way. But this also, I think you could also say, it also fits the third thing we're saying there. Remember? The order in knowing the same thing, remember? In an actual road. The thing is singular with sense, universal and understood. And we know things in an outward way before inwardly. And in English, outward is always a synonym for sensible, right? The outward appearance of something. And then we know things in a confused way before distinctly. Yeah. It also fits our knowing things in a confused way that no part of the definition is really a, what, altogether distinct knowledge of species. No part of the definition is convertible with the species, right? Every part of the definition in some way is common to the species you're trying to define. And, at least one other thing, right? And only a combination of the differences brings you from a confused knowledge to a, what, distinct knowledge, right? If you had a difference in there that was already peculiar to the species, you'd already arrived before you had gone from the confused to the distinct, right? So by definition, definition is a way of going from a confused or indistinct knowledge of what something is to a, what, distinct knowledge, right? And sometimes I ask my colleagues, my colleagues, what is reasoning? And I say, don't you reason in your class? You know, what is reasoning? I think that's defining what reasoning is, right? Now, I define reasoning as coming to know or guess a statement through other statements, right? That tells you more distinctly what reasoning is than the word reasoning does, right? But it's calculating. It's coming to know or guess a number through other numbers, right? Okay? So, it's only the definition as a whole that gives you a distinct knowledge of what the thing is. But each part of the definition corresponds to a confused knowledge in some way of the thing. When you bring it together, it enables the mind to go and diffuse to distinct knowledge to bring the thing into fullness in the sense of distinct, right?