Lecture 111

111. The Soul's Suffering and the Beatific Vision in Christ

Summary
This lecture examines whether Christ suffered according to his whole soul and explores the apparent paradox of Christ experiencing both the beatific vision and intense suffering simultaneously. Berquist analyzes Thomas Aquinas’s distinctions between suffering according to the soul’s essence versus its powers, and how the soul as form of the body can undergo passion even though some powers like the intellect are not acts of the body. The discussion clarifies how Christ prevented the natural ‘redundancy’ or overflow of passion from lower to higher powers, allowing perfect joy in the superior reason while the soul’s essence suffered from bodily torment.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Question 7: Whether Christ Suffered According to His Whole Soul #

  • The central question asks if Christ’s suffering extended to his entire soul or only certain parts
  • Thomas makes crucial distinctions between different meanings of “whole” as applied to the soul
  • The paradox: if the soul is the form of the body and the body suffered, did the whole soul suffer?

The Three Types of Wholes #

Integral or Composed Whole (totum integrale): A whole made from parts that compose it (e.g., a book from pages)

Universal Whole (totum universale): A genus containing species as particulars (e.g., animal containing man, horse, etc.)

Potestative Whole (totum potestativum): The powers of the soul—called “parts” not because they compose the soul but because they are capacities rooted in the soul’s essence. Aristotle uses this term in discussing the soul.

Two Ways the Soul Suffers #

According to essence/substance: The whole soul suffers insofar as the entire soul is joined to the body as its form. When the body undergoes passion and approaches death, the whole soul necessarily suffers because it is the act of that body.

According to all its powers: This is more restricted. Not all powers of the soul are in every part of the body—the soul is in the eye according to the power of seeing, in the stomach according to digestion, etc. Some powers like reason and will are not acts of the body at all.

Proper vs. Accidental Suffering #

Thomas distinguishes two modes by which a power undergoes:

  1. Proper undergoing (passio propria): A power suffers from its own proper object (e.g., sight suffers from excessive visible light)
  2. Accidental undergoing (passio accidentalis): A power suffers from the subject to which it is rooted (e.g., sight suffers when the eye is pricked, though this is not proper to sight)

The Soul in the Body: Augustine’s Principle #

“The whole is in the whole, and the whole in each part” (tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte). The soul is not in the body as something located in a place (which would mean it couldn’t be in head and foot simultaneously), but as form is in matter.

The Superior Reason’s Exception #

The superior reason of Christ did not suffer from its proper object—God, the eternal reasons. These are objects of joy and perfection, not pain. However, the superior reason does root in the soul’s essence, so insofar as the soul suffered from bodily passion, even the superior reason was affected on the side of the subject, though not from its own object.

Pro-passio: Passion Without Disturbance #

The technical term pro-passio (diminished passion) denotes a qualified form of undergoing emotions without the disturbance of reason that characterizes complete passion (passio). Christ experienced emotions like anger at the Pharisees’ hardness of heart, but these never disturbed the use of his reason. He remained in complete control—what the lecture calls “cool.”

Key Arguments #

Objections to Christ Suffering According to His Whole Soul #

First Objection: The understanding is not the act of any body; therefore the whole soul cannot suffer when the body suffers.

  • Response: While the intellect itself is not the act of the body, the essence of the soul is the act of the body. All powers are rooted in this essence, so when the body suffers, the whole soul suffers according to its essence, even if not according to all its powers.

Second Objection: The superior reason’s object is the eternal reasons, which are delightful and in no way harmful; therefore Christ could not suffer according to the whole soul.

  • Response: This argument concerns suffering from a power’s proper object. Insofar as the superior reason might suffer, it would be from the side of its subject (the soul’s essence affected by bodily suffering), not from its own object.

Third Objection: Perfect passion requires disturbance of reason; Jerome and Dionysius say Christ’s passions were only pro-passio, not complete passions.

  • Response: Pro-passio is indeed the case—emotions present but not disturbing reason. However, the soul’s essence still suffered from bodily torment, achieving the sense in which the whole soul suffered.

Fourth Objection: There is no pain in the speculative intellect; therefore Christ could not suffer according to his whole soul.

  • Response: Correct that the speculative intellect has no pain from its proper object (truth considered in itself has no opposing pain, unlike eating which has hunger). But again, suffering can occur from the subject’s side.

Thomas’s Resolution #

When “whole soul” is understood according to the soul’s essence or substance—not according to all its powers—it is manifest that the whole soul of Christ suffered. The soul as the form of the body is necessarily affected when the body undergoes passion and approaches death.

However, when considering suffering according to all the powers:

  • The lower powers (sensory, appetitive) suffered both from their proper objects and from the subject
  • The superior reason did not suffer from its proper object (God, eternal reasons) which caused joy, not pain
  • But the superior reason did suffer from the side of the subject insofar as all powers are rooted in the soul’s essence

Important Definitions #

Organic body (corpus organicum): A body equipped with tools/organs (ὄργανα, organa). The soul is defined as the first act of a natural body equipped with tools/organs—pointing to a teleological order inherent in bodily structure.

Whole (totum): Can mean three different things depending on context—integral whole, universal whole, or potestative whole (powers).

Form (forma): The principle by which matter becomes a unified substance. The soul relates to body as form to matter, not as one thing in a place relates to another.

Passion/Suffering (passio): An undergoing or being affected. Can be proper (from a power’s own object) or accidental (from the subject to which a power is rooted).

Pro-passio: A diminished or qualified passion where emotions/passions are present but do not disturb or overcome reason.

Radix (radix): Root. All powers of the soul are rooted in its essence; this rooting explains how the essence can suffer even if not all powers suffer from their proper objects.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Soul’s Presence in the Body #

The soul is not in the body “as in a place”—for if it were, it could only be in one location (e.g., the head) and could not be in the foot simultaneously. Rather, the soul is in the body as form is in matter: the entire soul is the form of the entire body, and the whole is present in each part according to that part’s function.

Powers in Different Bodily Parts #

The soul is in the eye according to the power of seeing, in the stomach according to the power of digesting. Each power is present in the organ proper to its function, yet all powers remain rooted in the soul’s single essence.

Proper vs. Accidental Suffering of Sight #

Proper suffering of sight: When excessive visible light causes the eye to suffer from too much brightness (e.g., snow blindness when climbing mountains, or the Spanish practice of torture by intense light exposure).

Accidental suffering of sight: When a pin is driven through the eye, the eye suffers not from what is proper to sight (visible things) but from bodily injury through the sense of touch, which ultimately underlies all sensation.

The Speculative Intellect and Pleasure #

The pleasure of understanding a theorem of Euclid has no opposing pain. Unlike eating (which has hunger as its opposite pain), or sleeping (which has the discomfort of being tired), understanding truth has no natural contrary. This shows why the speculative intellect cannot suffer from its proper object.

The Man and the Horse: Reason and Passion #

When a man rides a horse well, reason guides the passions. But when a man is thrown off the horse and dragged through the mud by it, the emotions have overcome reason. Christ, by contrast, was never thrown from the horse—his emotions never dragged him through the mud of irrational action.

Notable Quotes #

“The whole soul can be understood in two ways: according to its essence or nature, and according to all its powers.”

“Although the understanding, according as it is a certain power, is not an act of the body, the essence nevertheless of the soul is an act of the body.”

“The whole is in the whole, and the whole in each part.” (Augustine, quoted by Thomas)

“In the speculative intellect, there is no pain…the pleasure which is in considering something has no sadness opposed to it, as the philosopher says.” (Reference to Aristotle)

Questions Addressed #

Did Christ suffer according to his whole soul? #

Answer: Yes, according to the soul’s essence/substance. When understood in this way, it is manifest that the whole soul suffered, since the soul is the form of the body and must be affected when the body undergoes passion and approaches death. However, the soul did not suffer according to all its powers in the same way—the superior reason did not suffer from its proper object (God).

How can powers root in one essence yet not all suffer in the same way? #

Answer: Through the distinction between proper and accidental suffering. All powers are rooted in the soul’s essence (radices in essence), and thus when the essence suffers from bodily passion, all powers are affected on the side of the subject. But powers can differ in whether they suffer from their own proper objects—sight suffers from excessive light (proper) but can also suffer when the eye is pricked (accidental, through touch).