54. Christ's Will: Divine and Human in the Incarnation

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Question of Two Wills in Christ #

• Whether Christ possesses one will or two wills (divine and human)
• Historical context: several major heresies denied Christ’s human will
• Theological necessity: if Christ assumed a perfect human nature, He must have assumed a human will as part of that perfection
• The Council of Constantinople III (Sixth Ecumenical Council) definitively settled this question, defining that Christ must have two wills and two operations

Heretical Positions #

• Apollinaris: Denied that Christ had a rational soul; claimed the Word replaced the human intellect or soul entirely
• Eutyches and Monophysites: Posited only one nature in Christ (fusion of divine and human), making one will necessary
• Sergius of Constantinople and the Monothelites: Admitted two natures but claimed only one will, arguing the human nature was never moved by its own motion but only by the divinity

The Relationship Between Divine and Human Wills #

• The divine will is the first mover; the human will is the second mover
• The divine will does not eliminate or negate the human will but moves it freely
• God moves the human will inwardly (as only God can), while creatures can only tempt externally
• The human will of Christ was always determined toward the good; it could not sin
• Yet the human will retained its own motion and proper act, following the divine will voluntarily

The Will as a Perfection of Nature #

• Thomas argues that to assume a perfect human nature requires assuming the human will as a natural power
• The will belongs to the rational part of the soul (ψυχή, anima)
• Just as the body shares in the soul’s existence without becoming divine, the human will participates in the divine will without becoming identical to it
• The human will in Christ has a determinate mode from its union with the divine hypostasis

Sensual Appetite vs. Rational Will #

• The distinction between voluntas sensualitatis (sense appetite/sensual will) and voluntas rationis (rational will)
• Sense appetite naturally obeys reason and can be called will by participation (voluntas per participationem)
• Sensuality in this context means the sensitive appetite, not vice or excess
• Christ must have possessed sense appetite as part of His perfect animal nature

The Principle of Motion #

• The will as natural motion (simplex voluntas): the will’s inclination toward happiness and being
• The will as rational motion (voluntas ut ratio): the will’s choice among means to an end through judgment of reason
• Christ possessed both: His will naturally inclines to the good (cannot sin), yet His rational will freely judges and chooses

Key Arguments #

Arguments Against Two Wills #

1. The First Mover Argument: The will is the first mover and commander in each being. Christ’s divine will is the first mover, so there need be only one will.
2. The Instrument Argument: Human nature is a tool of divinity. Tools are moved by another’s will, not their own.
3. The Nature Argument: The will does not pertain to nature but to person. Will pertains to what is voluntary and not necessary. Since nature is determined to one thing, will belongs to person alone. There is only one person in Christ, therefore only one will.
4. The Person Argument: A will is something very personal. There is only one person in Christ, therefore only one will.

Thomas’s Resolution #

1. The Perfection Argument: The Son of God assumed a perfect human nature. Perfection of human nature includes the will as a natural power, just as it includes reason and intellect. Therefore, the human will must be assumed.
2. The Non-Diminishment Argument: Assuming human nature does not diminish the divine nature or divine will. The divine will remains divine; the human will becomes part of the incarnate person but does not become divine.
3. The Motion Argument: The divine will as first mover does not eliminate the human will’s proper motion. God moves the human will to freely choose the good—not violently or coercively, but by an inner motion that only God can effect.
4. The Willing Analogy: Just as the wills of saints are moved by God’s will (“He works in us both to will and to perfect”), so Christ’s human will is moved by the divine will while retaining its own proper act.
5. The Tool Analogy Refined: An animated tool moved by reason (e.g., a servant) is moved through its own will by command of the master. The human nature in Christ was moved through its own will, not without it.

Important Definitions #

Voluntas (Will) #

• Voluntas as potentia (power): The faculty of will as a natural power of the rational soul
• Voluntas as actus (act): The exercise of willing something
• Voluntas simplex (simple will): The natural inclination of the will toward happiness and being; not chosen but natural
• Voluntas per participationem (will by participation): The sensitive appetite, which can be called will because it naturally obeys reason
• Voluntas rationis (will as reason/rational will): The will exercised through the judgment of reason in choosing among goods

Sensualitas #

• The sensitive appetite or sense desire
• In Latin, carries no pejorative connotation (unlike English “sensuality”)
• Includes the concupiscible appetite (desires for agreeable/disagreeable sense objects) and irascible appetite (responses to difficulty in obtaining or avoiding goods)
• Naturally apt to obey reason; therefore reasonable by participation

The Appetites #

• Concupiscible (ἐπιθυμία, epithumia): Six emotions—love, desire, pleasure/joy (toward agreeable objects); hate, aversion, sadness/pain (toward disagreeable objects)
• Irascible (θυμός, thumos): Five emotions—hope, despair (toward difficult goods); fear, boldness (toward difficult evils); anger (when evil is inflicted)

Hypostasis #

• The individual subsisting subject or person
• In Christ, one hypostasis (the divine person of the Word) subsists in two natures

Examples & Illustrations #

The Analogy of Soul and Body #

• The human body does not have its own separate existence; it shares the soul’s existence
• Similarly, the human nature of Christ does not have a separate divine existence; it shares in the divine existence through hypostatic union
• The soul is the form of the body; the divine person is the form (in a higher sense) of the human nature

Creatures Cannot Move the Will Inwardly #

• The devil tempts but cannot move the will inwardly (coercively)
• Only God can move the will inwardly, and He does so in a way that preserves and perfects freedom
• This is why God’s moving of the will is not violent but freely accepted

The Father and Son Analogy for Ruling #

• A master rules a slave for the master’s benefit and the slave has no say in what he does
• A father rules a son for the son’s benefit and the son has something to say about what he should do
• Similarly, the divine will rules the human will of Christ for the perfection of Christ’s humanity, and the human will retains its own motion and judgment

Moses and the Serpent #

• Augustine: sensuality (as the serpent with poison) is likened to the serpent without poison in Christ
• Christ’s human nature includes sensuality but without the corruption that comes from sin
• Reference to Moses raising up the serpent as a figure of the Cross

Augustine on the Act of Contrition #

• The Act of Contrition moves from lesser to greater reasons: fear of punishment, hope of reward, love of God
• This progression mirrors the movement from lower to higher motivations in willing

Notable Quotes #

“Just as he took on my will, he took on my sadness.” — Ambrose (on Christ’s human will and emotions)

“Father, not my will, but thine be done.” — Christ in Luke 22:42 (evidence of Christ’s human will distinct from divine will)

“He always does his will.” — Christ, paraphrased from Gospel (on Christ’s conformity to the Father’s will)

“I might do your will, my God, I will.” — Psalm 39, cited by Thomas

“Not me, but the grace in me.” — St. Paul, cited on God’s movement of the human will

“The human nature in Christ was a tool of the divinity so that it be moved through its own will.” — Thomas Aquinas

“Reason should rule the emotions as the father rules the son.” — Aristotle, cited on the proper ordering of soul

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Does Christ Have Two Wills—One Divine and One Human? #

Resolution: Yes. Christ necessarily possesses two wills because:

• He assumed a perfect human nature, and the will is a perfection of human nature
• Denying the human will entails denying either the rational soul (Apollinaris) or the true humanity (Monophysites)
• The Council of Constantinople III defined this as doctrine
• The divine will moves the human will as first mover, but the human will retains its own proper motion and act

Q2: How Can Christ Have One Person But Two Wills? #

Resolution: The will pertains to nature (as a power) more fundamentally than to person. In creatures, we say “I will” (the person wills), but the will itself is a natural faculty. In Christ:

• The divine will belongs to the divine nature
• The human will belongs to the human nature
• Both wills belong to the one divine person who subsists in both natures
• Just as Christ is “two in nature” (but one person), so He is “two in will” (but one person)

Q3: Is the Human Will in Christ a True Will, or Merely the Divine Will Acting Through the Body? #

Resolution: The human will is a true will with its own proper motion:

• It is moved by the divine will as first mover, not eliminated by it
• God moves it inwardly to freely choose the good (not coercively)
• Saints’ wills are also moved by God’s will while retaining their own proper act (Philippians 2:13)
• The human will in Christ is like an animated tool moved by reason (a servant by command), not an inanimate tool moved by force (an axe by a craftsman)

Q4: Does the Sensitive Appetite (Sensuality) Give Christ a Second Will? #

Resolution: No. The sensitive appetite is not properly called a separate “will” but rather:

• It is naturally apt to obey reason
• It can be called will by participation (participatione)
• It is one sensitive faculty with multiple emotions (concupiscible and irascible)
• Christ’s sensuality can be distinguished from His rational will but not as two separate wills
• The distinction is between the mode of appetite in the sensitive part vs. the rational part, not between two wills

Digressions and Contextual Material #

Translation Issues #

• Discussion of Vatican II translations of Thomas (Baum vs. Flannery vs. Abbott editions)
• The Latin term “proemium” (introduction) and its English translation
• Berquist’s personal anecdote about leaving the priesthood and monastery in Nova Scotia

Philosophical Context on Emotions and Arts #

• Mozart’s representation of emotions as reasonable (in harmony with reason), contrasted with Romantic composers like Tchaikovsky
• The role of emotions (irascible and concupiscible) in poetry, rhetoric, music, and moral virtue
• Aristotle’s teaching that reason should rule emotions as a father rules a son (not as master rules slave)
• Personal anecdotes about his father’s business philosophy and avoiding forcing children into predetermined paths

Literary References #

• Shakespeare’s definition of reason as “the ability for large discourse, looking before and after”
• Shakespeare’s metaphors (“the very wrath of love,” “drunk with anger”) showing transfer of emotional terms across categories
• Homer’s Odyssey and Sophocles’s Electra as examples of revenge narratives

Structural Progression #

The lecture follows Thomas’s own structure in Question 18:

1. Objections against two wills: Arguments that only one will exists in Christ
2. Scriptural authority: Counter-examples from Scripture (esp. Luke 22:42) showing Christ’s human will
3. Historical context: Survey of heretical denials and their theological errors
4. Thomas’s positive resolution: Why two wills are necessary and metaphysically coherent
5. Responses to objections: How each objection is answered by proper distinctions
6. Related question (Article 2): The distinction between sensual appetite and rational will