53. The Unity and Existence of Christ
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Lecture Notes
Main Topics #
The Question of Christ’s Unity (Q. 17, Art. 1) #
- Whether Christ is one or two given the union of divine and human natures
- The problem: Christ has two natures, yet the Christian faith affirms he is one person
- Heretics (Nestorians) posited two persons; the orthodox position affirms one hypostasis (ὑπόστασις)
- The key distinction: duality in nature versus unity in person/hypostasis
The Metaphysical Distinction: Suppositum and Nature #
- Suppositum (or hypostasis): that which subsists in itself; the underlying subject
- Nature: that by which something is (id quo aliquid est); signified as form
- A person is defined as a suppositum of rational nature
- In Christ: one suppositum subsists in two natures
- The predicate (which denotes nature) functions formally, like form to matter
Proper Speech About Christ #
- We cannot say Christ is “two” without qualification (simpliciter), only with qualification (secundum quid)
- We may say Christ is “two according to nature” but never “two persons” or “two supposita”
- The word “both” (utrumque) must be understood on the side of the subject, not the predicate
- This follows Augustine’s interpretation: “both God and man” refers to two natures in one subject, not two substances
The Problem of Christ’s Existence (Q. 17, Art. 2) #
- Whether Christ has one esse (existence) or two
- Objection: Things following upon nature are doubled in Christ; to be (esse) follows upon nature; therefore two beings
- Objection: The divine being is eternal; the human being is temporal; therefore two distinct existences
- The key distinction: Esse pertains to the hypostasis as “that which has existence” and to nature as “that by which something is”
The Resolution: One Esse Simply #
- Because Christ has one hypostasis, he has one esse simply (simpliciter)
- The human nature does not give Christ a new personal existence
- Rather, the pre-existing divine existence is now related to human nature through hypostatic union
- The human nature “participates” in the divine being
- Analogy: Just as the body shares the soul’s existence (the soul makes the body animated in act), the human nature shares the divine existence
The Body-Soul Analogy #
- The human soul has an existence independent of the body (demonstrated by intellection of universals)
- Yet body and soul form one thing—a human being
- The body does not have its own separate existence but shares in the soul’s existence
- Aristotle: The human soul does not come from parents but is infused by God
- Similarly, the human nature of Christ does not possess a separate personal being but is assumed by the eternal Person of the Word
Key Arguments #
For Christ’s Unity (Contra the Nestorians) #
Boethius’s principle: Every being, insofar as it is, is one (omne quod est, inquantum est, unum est)
- Being and unity are convertible (convertibilia)
- If Christ were two, he would not be one being
- If he is one being, he must be one
The logic of predication: In a proposition, the predicate relates to the subject as form to matter
- When we say “Christ is both God and man,” the predicate (the nature) is divided, not the subject
- We divide universals into particulars by placing particulars below the universal, as matter below form
- The agent acts upon the patient (matter), and gives it form
- Therefore, what is universal (like nature) must be placed above the particular, or as form
For Distinguishing Nature from Person #
Augustine’s interpretation: “Other (ἄλλο/aliud) and other (ἄλλο/aliud)” in Christ must be understood as diversity of natures, not of supposita
- The Latin word aliud (neuter: other) denotes diversity of substance
- Yet it is specifically diversity of nature, not of hypostasis
- Alios (masculine: another) would denote diversity of person—but this is false
- Therefore: Christ is “aliud et aliud” (two in nature) but not “alios et alios” (two in person)
For One Esse in Christ #
From hypostatic union: Because Christ has one hypostasis and two natures, things pertaining to nature are two, but things pertaining to the hypostasis are one only
- To be pertains to the hypostasis as that which possesses existence
- To be pertains to nature as that by which something possesses existence
- Nature is signified as form (e.g., humanity is that by which someone is human)
- Therefore, the human nature does not bring Christ a new esse, but the divine esse now subsists in both natures
The distinction of esse: Not all to-be belongs to the personal existence of the hypostasis
- To be white is a to-be of Socrates, but not his personal to-be (only insofar as he is white)
- Similarly, there can be multiple such accidental or dependent existences in one hypostasis without multiplying the personal being
- But the esse of the hypostasis itself—the personal being—cannot be multiplied in one person
The comparison to acquired perfections: If human nature came to Christ accidentally (as some heretics posited), it would require a new being
- But because human nature is hypostatically united—truly assumed by the Person of the Word—it does not give a new personal being
- It is like an organ joined to a body: when an eye is given to one born blind, this does not create a new being simply, but only a new relation to existing being
- The human nature similarly participates in the pre-existing divine being through being assumed into the unity of the divine person
Important Definitions #
Hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) / Suppositum #
- That which subsists in itself; a complete, individual substance
- That which is complete and separate from others
- The underlying subject in which natures inhere
- In the incarnation: the single hypostasis is the divine person of the Son
Nature (natura) #
- That by which something is; the essence or essential form
- Signified formaliter (as form), not as the thing possessing it
- In Christ: two natures—divine (eternal, uncreated) and human (temporal, created)
- Nature pertains to the essence; it answers the question quid est (what is it?)
Person (persona) #
- A suppositum of rational nature (Boethian definition)
- In the incarnation: there is one person—the divine Word
- The human nature does not constitute a separate person because it does not subsist by itself (per se) but in and through the divine person
Esse (εἶναι in Greek, esse in Latin) #
- Existence; to be; the act of being
- Pertains to the hypostasis as that which possesses existence (id quod est)
- Pertains to nature as that by which something possesses existence (id quo est)
- In Christ: one divine esse, not multiplied despite the two natures
Convertible (convertibilia) #
- Predicates that can be turned around in definition
- Being and one are convertible: every being is one; every one is a being
- Like square and equilateral-right-angled-quadrilateral
- Aristotle teaches this in Metaphysics IV (the book on wisdom)
Examples & Illustrations #
The Tower and the Child #
Berquist recalls watching his nephew: when shown a small tower, the child would knock it over. But when Berquist built a tower taller than the child, the child looked up in wonder and did not disturb it.
- Point: Why? Because a lower agent can act on a higher patient, but a lower patient cannot easily act on a higher agent.
- Application to logic: This is why we place the particular under the universal, the agent above the patient—it reflects the structure of action and passion (ἐνέργεια/πάσχειν)
The Whiteness Analogy #
To be white is a being of Socrates, but not Socrates’ personal being—only “insofar as he is white.”
- Multiple such dependent existences (to be white, to be musical) do not multiply the one personal being
- But the being of the hypostasis itself cannot be multiplied
- Application: Similarly, the human nature’s relation to existence does not create a new personal being in Christ, but shares the pre-existing divine being
The Soul Giving Being to the Body #
The body shares in the existence given by the soul.
- The soul animates the body; by the soul, the body is animated in act
- Yet there is one human being, not two
- Application: The human nature of Christ, assumed by the divine person, similarly shares in divine existence; the divine being now subsists in both natures
The Blind Man Receiving Eyes #
When one born blind receives eyes, this does not create a new being simply (simpliciter).
- The person’s being is not newly constituted
- Rather, a new relation to pre-existing being is established
- Application: The assumption of human nature by Christ similarly establishes a new relation (the divine person now subsists in human nature) but does not create a new personal being
Notable Quotes #
“Every thing, according as it is said to be being, is said to be one.” (From Aristotle, applied by Thomas)
“One and being are convertible” (omne quod est, inquantum est, unum est)
“To be follows upon nature, not as having to be, but as that by which something is; but it follows upon the person or hypostasis as the one having existence.” (Thomas, in response to the first objection)
“The human nature in Christ was a tool of the divinity.” (Referenced as Thomas’s teaching in Summa Contra Gentiles)
“The soul gives to be or existence to the body insofar as it makes it to be animated in act.” (Thomas, on the analogy of incarnation)
Questions Addressed #
Q1: Is Christ one or two? #
Position: Christ is one person (one hypostasis/suppositum) but two natures.
Resolution:
- The duality pertains to nature; the unity pertains to person
- When we say Christ is “both God and man,” we refer to two natures in one subject
- We cannot say simply “Christ is two” (that would imply two persons)
- We can say “Christ is two according to nature” (secundum quid, with qualification)
- The heretical error was to affirm two persons (Nestorianism)
Q2: Does Christ have one or two existences (esse)? #
Position: Christ has one existence simply (simpliciter)—the divine esse.
Resolution:
- The human nature does not confer a new personal existence on Christ
- Rather, through hypostatic union, the human nature participates in the eternal divine being
- The divine existence is now related to human nature, but no new being is created
- This parallels how the body shares in the soul’s existence: one human being, not two
- The error would be to treat the human nature as accidentally assumed, which would require two existences
Q3: Why must we say Christ has one esse and not two? #
Answer: Because one and being are convertible. If Christ had two existences, he would be two beings, and therefore not one. But we know by faith that Christ is one. Therefore, he has one being.
Connections to Prior Topics #
Logical Distinctions #
- The lecture relies on proper understanding of predication: subject vs. predicate, and how the predicate functions as form
- Uses the categories of substance and accident
- Applies the principle of distinction: “never affirm, seldom deny, always distinguish”
Metaphysical Principles #
- The convertibility of being and unity (drawn from Aristotle’s Metaphysics IV)
- The distinction between essence (nature) and existence (esse)
- The structure of form and matter applied to hypostasis and nature
The Soul and Body #
- Aristotle’s teaching that the human soul has an independent existence (shown by intellection)
- The unity of body and soul despite this independence
- The infusion of the soul from God, not from parents