14. The Definition of Faith: Substance and Conviction

Summary

This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s defense of the Pauline definition of faith from Hebrews 11:1 as “the substance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.” Berquist systematically addresses five objections to this definition, clarifying how “substance” should be understood analogically rather than as a categorical term, why “things hoped for” is referenced rather than “things loved,” and how “conviction” (argumentum) operates through divine authority rather than evident demonstration. The lecture demonstrates how all essential elements of faith as a theological virtue are contained within Scripture’s concise formulation.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Pauline Definition of Faith: Analysis of Hebrews 11:1 as a suitable definition despite not following strict grammatical form
“Substance” as “Foundation”: Understanding substantia etymologically as “standing under” rather than as the metaphysical category
The Relationship of Faith to Hope and Charity: Why the definition references things hoped for rather than things loved
Faith as Intellectual Conviction: How argumentum (conviction) through divine authority produces firm assent without evident demonstration
Objections and Replies: Systematic refutation of five philosophical objections to the Pauline definition

Key Arguments #

The “Substance” Objection #

Objection: Faith is a quality (a virtue/habit), not a substance, so the definition commits a categorical error
Thomas’s Reply: “Substance” (substantia) is used analogically to mean the first beginning or foundation of something, not the categorical genus. In any genus, what is first and contains others in power is called the “substance” of them
Etymological Support: Latin substantia means “standing under” (sub + stantia), paralleling how a foundation stands under a house
Scientific Analogy: First indemonstrable principles are called the “substance” of science because the whole science is contained in power within them

Why “Things Hoped For” Rather Than “Things Loved” #

Objection: Charity is more perfect than hope, so the definition should reference res diligenda (things to be loved) rather than res speranda (things to be hoped for)
Thomas’s Reply: Love (amor/caritas) can concern things both present and absent, seen and unseen. Hope (spes) always concerns things absent and not yet possessed. Since faith concerns what is not seen and not had, it shares this characteristic with hope more properly than with love
The Principle: Faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by the will; therefore it must be ordered to the object of those virtues perfecting the will, among which hope is more apt since its object is not had

The Argumentum (Conviction) Objection #

Objection: Argument makes truth apparent, but faith concerns things not apparent—this is a contradiction
Thomas’s Reply: Argumentum (conviction) here means firm adherence produced by divine authority, not demonstration from evident principles. The divine authority convinces the intellect to assent to things not seen in themselves. This is distinct from argumentum in the strict sense of logical demonstration
The Key Distinction: Argumentum from proper principles makes things apparent; argumentum from divine authority does not make things apparent in themselves but produces conviction through God’s authority

The Generic Diversity Objection #

Objection: Substance and argumentum are diverse genera with one not subordinate to the other; calling faith both is like calling something both a dog and a cat
Thomas’s Reply: In the definition of faith, substance and argumentum do not imply diverse genera or diverse acts of faith, but rather diverse relations of one act to its diverse objects: substance refers to the relation to the object of hope (the will); argumentum refers to the relation to the object of truth (the intellect)

Important Definitions #

Substantia: Etymologically “standing under” (sub + stare); the first beginning of something, especially when the whole following is contained in the power of that beginning
Argumentum: In this context, not logical argument but conviction or firm adherence of the intellect produced through divine authority
Res speranda: Things hoped for; objects that are absent and not yet possessed
Res diligenda: Things to be loved; objects that can be present or absent
Per se nota: Statements known through themselves; self-evident principles

Examples & Illustrations #

Geometric First Principles #

First principles in geometry (“the whole is greater than the part,” or “no odd number is even”) are the “substance” of the science
All subsequent theorems are contained in power within these principles
Example of vertical angles: To prove vertical angles are equal, one traces back through definitions (right angles, acute angles) and axioms (equals from equals are equal) to foundational concepts
The foundation stands under; everything built upon it depends on it

The House Foundation Metaphor #

A house’s foundation is the first beginning that stands under the entire structure
Everything following is built upon and contained in power within the foundation
Faith similarly is the foundation upon which all things hoped for are built

Distinction from Opinion and Knowledge #

Opinion: “I believe it will rain tomorrow”—a guess with some basis but not ordered to beatitude
Human Faith: Believing the pharmacist is a pharmacist based on human witness
Knowledge: Mathematical or demonstrated truths where the thing is apparent or proven from what is apparent
Divine Faith: Firm assent to divine revelation concerning what is not seen, through divine authority

Notable Quotes #

“All the things of which faith is able to be defined are touched upon in the foregoing description.” — Thomas Aquinas, replying to the definition from Hebrews 11:1

“To see truth is to have it. But one does not hope for something that he already has.” — Berquist, emphasizing why hope’s object (the unseen) matches faith’s nature

“Substance is accustomed to be called what is the first beginning of something, and most of all, when the whole thing following is contained in the power of the first beginning.”

“Through the authority, the divine authority, the intellect of the one believing is convinced to assenting to those things which he does not see.” — On how argumentum functions in faith

Questions Addressed #

Is the Pauline definition actually a proper definition? Yes. Although not in strict grammatical or syllogistic form, all elements by which faith can be defined are present in the description.
How can faith be a quality yet be called a “substance”? “Substance” is used analogically to mean “foundation” or “first beginning,” not as the categorical genus of substance.
Why “things hoped for” rather than “things loved” in the definition? Because hope, like faith, concerns what is absent and not possessed, whereas love can concern what is present. Faith’s object shares more in common with hope’s object.
Doesn’t “argument” (argumentum) contradict “not appearing” (non apparent)? No. Argumentum here means conviction through authority, not demonstration through evident principles. Divine authority produces conviction without making the thing evident in itself.
How does faith relate to the intellect and will? Faith is an act of the intellect (assenting to divine truth) that is commanded by the will. The will, moved by grace, determines the intellect to assent to one part of a contradiction.

Connections to Broader Thomistic Framework #

To Aristotle: Use of Aristotelian categories; reference to Aristotle’s Ethics Book VI on intellectual virtues; use of first principles in science as analogy
To Scripture: Central reliance on Hebrews 11:1 and Romans 8:25
To Augustine: Citation of Augustine’s complementary definition: “Faith is a virtue by which are believed things that are not seen”
To Medieval Tradition: References to John Damascene, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Hugo of St. Victor’s definitions
To Earlier Questions: References back to discussions of beatitude, theological virtues (hope, charity), and virtue as habit