13. Merit of Faith and the Necessity of Confession

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Whether Reason Diminishes Merit of Faith (Article 10) #

• The objection from Gregory the Great: faith lacks merit when human reason gives direct experience
• Two distinct ways reason can relate to the will’s act of believing
• The principle that external impediments (prohibiting causes) differ from per se causes
• Distinction between reason that precedes faith versus reason that follows from faith

The Threefold Meaning of Confession #

• Confession of faith: the proper exterior act of faith, ordered to signify interior belief
• Confession of thanksgiving or prayer: an act of latria (the virtue of religion), ordered to honor God externally
• Confession of sins: an act of penance, ordered to the remission of sin
• The danger of equivocation in terminology (e.g., confessor applying to persons of different statuses)

Necessity of Confession for Salvation #

• Confession as an affirmative precept, not an absolute obligation
• Circumstances determining when confession becomes obligatory: when honor due to God or utility to neighbor is at stake
• The role of place, time, and due circumstances in determining obligation
• When scandal or disturbance justifies withholding public confession

Key Arguments #

On Reason and Merit of Faith #

Objection: Whatever diminishes the nature of virtue diminishes merit. Reason would seem to diminish faith because faith consists in things not appearing. As reasons are introduced, things appear less. Therefore reason diminishes merit.

Response: Reasons brought to support faith are not demonstrations that make things appear intelligibly. Rather, they remove impediments to faith by showing the proposed truths are not impossible (e.g., that the Trinity is not self-contradictory). Such removing of impediments does not diminish the ratio of faith because:

• The things remain “not appearing” even after such arguments
• The ratio of faith depends on the will’s promptitude in believing, not on absence of rational support
• When reason is consequent upon faith (following from a prompt will to believe), it actually increases merit by showing greater firmness and love of truth

Two ways reason relates to willing to believe:

1. Preceding (antecedent): Someone lacks will or prompt will to believe except through reason. Here reason diminishes merit.
2. Consequent: Someone has prompt will to believe and seeks reasons to strengthen understanding. Here reason does not exclude merit but is a sign of greater merit.

On Confession as Act of Faith #

Objection: Confession pertains to penance as its part, not faith. Therefore it is not an act of faith.

Response: Exterior acts of virtue are properly acts of that virtue according to their species, ordered to the end of that virtue. Confession of faith, according to its species, is ordered to the end of faith (signifying what is interiorly believed in the mind), just as exterior speech naturally signifies interior conception. Thus it is the proper exterior act of faith.

On Necessity of Confession #

Objection: The end of faith (conjunction of mind to divine truth) can occur without exterior confession. Therefore confession is not necessary for salvation.

Response: The end of faith must be referred to the end of charity (love of God and neighbor). When honor of God or utility to neighbor requires confession, one must not remain content with interior faith alone. Affirmative precepts do not always obligate, but obligate according to place, time, and due circumstances. Confession becomes necessary when its omission would:

• Subtract honor due to God
• Harm the utility or instruction of neighbor
• Allow faith to be believed non-existent or false through taciturnity

Important Definitions #

Ratio of faith: The formal character or defining nature of faith (that interior assent to divine truth)

Impediments to faith: Obstacles (like apparent contradictions) that reason can remove without itself proving faith

Affirmative precept: A precept commanding something to be done (unlike negative precepts forbidding what is contrary to virtue)

Per se cause vs. prächitans cause (prohibiting cause): A per se cause directly produces an effect; a prohibiting cause simply removes an obstacle. Fortitude removes the impediment of fear to confession; fear is not the per se cause of confession.

Exterior act of a virtue: An action ordered by its very nature (κατὰ τὸ εἶδος) to the end proper to that virtue

Examples & Illustrations #

The Young Christian and Learned Arguments #

Berquist recounts a Frenchman reading philosophical objections to faith to young Christians to embarrass them. Thomas praises early Church fathers for maintaining faith firmly even when unable to answer such arguments, showing their merit was great through the firmness of their will despite hostile rational arguments.

Euthanasia and Moral Virtues #

Example of a doctor proposing suicide as compassion: people supporting this appeal to pity (a passion) rather than to judgment of reason. One ought to exercise moral virtues “according to judgment of reason, not according to passions.”

Hugo and Public Witness #

Berquist recounts St. Hugo singing hymns to the Virgin in dangerous parts of town, ultimately martyred. His exterior acts of devotion served as powerful witness to faith through the seriousness and holiness evident in his life.

John Paul II and Holiness as Sign #

The example of John Paul II: people believed not primarily through hearing proofs, but through witnessing his intelligence, holiness, and goodness. This is how “most people” are moved to faith—through miracles and the lives of the saints.

Names and Equivocation: Confusion of Winston Churchills #

Berquist describes accidentally conflating two different Winston Churchills (statesman and novelist) in biographies. Medieval scholars similarly confused different philosophers bearing the same name, thinking them one person. This illustrates why equivocation of terms in theological language causes great confusion.

Notable Quotes #

“Faith does not have merit to which human reason gives us experience as if we know it directly.” — Gregory the Great (cited by Thomas Aquinas)

“I think I can prove that God exists, but I would not be so presumptuous as to say so.” — Charles DeConnick (cited by Berquist, referring to intellectual humility in matters of faith)

“Be always prepared to give a reason to everyone asking you for a reason of those things which are in you, by faith and hope.” — 1 Peter 3:15 (cited as divine authority supporting necessity of being able to confess faith)

“By the heart one believes to justice, and by the mouth confession comes to be for salvation.” — Romans 10:10 (cited as authority for confession’s salvific necessity)

Questions Addressed #

Does introducing human reason into matters of faith diminish merit? #

Resolution: No, if the reason is consequent upon faith (following from a prompt will to believe). Yes, if reason precedes faith as its efficient cause. Reason that merely removes impediments to faith (showing it not impossible) does not diminish merit, because the truths of faith remain “not appearing” even after such argument.

Is confession of faith properly an act of faith? #

Resolution: Yes. Confession of faith, according to its species, is ordered to the end of faith (signifying interior belief), just as exterior speech naturally signifies what is interiorly conceived. It is the proper exterior act of faith, distinct from confession of thanksgiving (act of latria) and confession of sins (act of penance).

Is confession of faith necessary for salvation? #

Resolution: As an affirmative precept, confession does not always obligate. However, it becomes necessary when circumstances (place, time, due circumstances) require it—specifically when omitting confession would subtract honor due to God or harm utility to neighbor. One need not confess if it would cause scandal without corresponding benefit to faith.