Lecture 292

292. Grace as Quality and Its Distinction from Virtue

Summary
This lecture completes Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of grace by examining whether grace is a quality (Article 3) and determining its proper subject as the essence rather than the powers of the soul (Article 4). Berquist explains how grace differs fundamentally from virtue through proportional reasoning, showing that grace is to infused virtue as the natural light of reason is to acquired virtue. The lecture emphasizes that grace is a supernatural disposition presupposed to the virtues, not identical with them, and resides in the soul’s essence because it precedes virtue as cause precedes effect.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Grace as a Quality (Article 3) #

  • Grace is established as a quality in Aristotle’s categories, specifically in the first species (habit or disposition)
  • Grace is not identical to virtue but rather a disposition presupposed to infused virtues
  • The objection that grace and virtue are the same thing (differing only in definition) is refuted through analysis of Aristotle’s definition of virtue
  • Grace is compared to the light of the soul, a supernatural quality that perfects the soul itself rather than its powers

The Critical Distinction: Grace vs. Virtue #

  • Virtue is defined as “a disposition of the perfect” according to its nature (Aristotle, Physics VII)
  • Grace is not ordered to human nature but to participation in divine nature
  • The good attributed to virtue is according to agreement with pre-existing nature
  • The good of grace is not according to agreement with human nature but as an expression of participation in divine nature (consortes divinae naturae)
  • Grace is to infused virtue as natural light of reason is to acquired virtue: both are presupposed to their respective virtues

The Proportion: Essence to Powers as Grace to Virtue #

  • Just as the soul’s essence flows into its powers (naturally)
  • So also grace flows into the infused virtues in the powers of the soul
  • Just as the powers of the soul are properties of the soul (not accidents)
  • So the infused virtues are derived from and ordered to grace
  • This is a beautiful proportion showing how supernatural grace works analogously to natural principles

Grace in the Essence vs. Powers (Article 4) #

  • The first objection proposes that grace must be in a power (like the will), since Augustine compares grace to the will as “the rider to the horse”
  • Thomas’s response: Augustine’s comparison is analogical, not indicating that grace is literally a quality in the will
  • Grace is compared to the will as mover to moved, not as accident to subject
  • Since grace comes before virtue (as cause before effect), and virtue resides in powers, grace must reside in something prior to the powers: the essence of the soul
  • The axiom “nothing is before or after itself” (Augustine) confirms this: grace cannot be in virtue, and virtue is in powers; therefore grace must be in the essence

Why Grace is in the Essence #

  • Causality principle: Grace is the beginning (principium) of meritorious action through the virtues
  • Just as the soul’s essence is the beginning of life’s operations through its powers
  • So grace is the beginning of supernatural acts through the infused virtues
  • Merit requires action from a power, but the source of that action is the grace in the essence

Key Arguments #

Against the Claim That Grace is Simply Virtue (Article 3) #

First Objection - Definitional

  • The definitions of virtue fit grace: virtue makes the bearer good and makes activity good (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II)
  • Therefore grace seems to be virtue
  • Response: The good in virtue’s definition is according to agreement with pre-existing nature; grace’s goodness is according to participation in divine nature, not natural human nature

Second Objection - Species of Quality

  • Grace cannot be in the fourth species of quality (form/figure) because it does not pertain to the body
  • Grace cannot be in the third species (sensible qualities like warmth) because it is principally in the mind (mens), not in the body
  • Grace cannot be in the second species (natural power/inability) because grace is above nature
  • Therefore by elimination, grace must be in the first species (habit/disposition), where virtues are
  • Therefore grace is virtue
  • Response: Grace is in the first species not because it is a habit or disposition identical to virtue, but because it is like (habitudo) the first species; it is a unique supernatural disposition of the soul presupposed to infused virtues, not identical with them

Third Objection - Priority of Grace

  • The Objection cites Augustine from On the Predestination of Saints: “grace comes before charity”
  • Nothing is before itself
  • Therefore if grace comes before charity (a virtue), grace cannot be the same as virtue
  • Response: This confirms the distinction; grace is indeed before virtue as cause before effect

Against Grace Being in the Powers (Article 4) #

First Objection - Augustine’s Analogy

  • Augustine compares grace to the will as the rider to the horse
  • The will is a power of the soul
  • Therefore grace seems to be in the power of the soul as its subject
  • Response: Grace is compared to the will as mover to moved, showing efficient causality, not as an accident to its subject. The comparison is analogical, not literal about grace’s location.

Second Objection - Merit and Action

  • Augustine says “from grace begin the merits of man”
  • Merit consists in an act which proceeds from some power
  • Therefore grace must be a perfection of some power
  • Response: Grace is the beginning of meritorious action by means of the virtues (mediante virtute), just as the soul’s essence is the beginning of life’s operations by means of the powers (mediante potentia)

Important Definitions #

Aristotle’s Species of Quality (from Categories) #

  • First species: Habit or disposition (habitus) - virtues, knowledge
  • Second species: Natural power or inability (potentia naturalis) - capacity for health/sickness
  • Third species: Sensible qualities (qualitates sensibiles) - warm, sweet, bitter
  • Fourth species: Form and figure (forma et figura) - shape, size

Key Thomistic Terms #

  • Habitus: A disposition, particularly a stable quality that perfects a power
  • Habitudo: A way of having oneself; a relation or likeness; how grace is like the first species without being identical to it
  • Consortes divinae naturae: Partakers of divine nature; the supernatural elevation effected by grace
  • Potentia: Power; a native faculty of the soul (intellect, will, sense powers, etc.)

Grace vs. Virtue (Definitions from Thomas) #

  • Grace: A supernatural quality of the soul’s essence; a disposition presupposed to infused virtues; participation in divine nature
  • Virtue: A disposition of a perfect thing according to its nature; that which perfects a power toward its proper operation
  • Infused Virtue: A supernatural virtue given by God, perfecting a power ordered to a supernatural end
  • Acquired Virtue: A virtue developed through human acts, perfecting natural powers

Examples & Illustrations #

The Proportion of Essence-to-Powers and Grace-to-Virtue #

Berquist emphasizes this beautiful proportional relationship:

  • From the soul’s essence, its powers flow naturally
  • From grace, the infused virtues flow supernaturally into the powers
  • Just as the powers are properties naturally following the soul’s nature
  • So the infused virtues follow supernaturally from grace’s elevation of the soul
  • This shows how grace works analogously to natural principles

The Hand Growing #

  • All fingers grow proportionally, not equally in absolute size
  • Each finger grows according to its function and nature
  • Similarly, virtues are equal proportionally: faith, hope, and charity grow together according to their role in the spiritual life
  • One cannot be “up here in your prayer life” while “patience is way down here”

The Rider and the Horse #

  • Grace is to the will as the rider is to the horse
  • The rider moves the horse (shows efficient causality)
  • But the rider is not an accident in the horse; the comparison is analogical only
  • If the horse runs away, the rider loses control (analogy to loss of grace through sin)
  • This illustrates Augustine’s teaching without suggesting grace literally inheres in the will

Nature and Regeneration #

  • The natural soul comes from parents through generation
  • The rational soul is created immediately by God
  • Through grace, we are regenerated as sons of God
  • This is not natural generation but a supernatural transformation making us partakers of divine nature
  • This shows why grace requires a supernatural subject (the essence elevated beyond natural condition)

Questions Addressed #

Article 3: Is Grace the Same as Virtue? #

  • Objection: The definitions of virtue seem to apply to grace
  • Central Issue: Are grace and virtue identical in essence, differing only in our understanding of them?
  • Answer: No. Grace is a distinct reality presupposed to virtue, as the soul’s essence is distinct from and presupposed to its powers. While they may work together, they are fundamentally different: grace perfects the soul itself according to divine nature, while virtue perfects a power according to human nature (in the case of infused virtues, according to that nature elevated by grace)
  • Key Insight: The proportional argument shows that grace is to virtue what essence is to power: prior, causal, and distinct

Article 4: In What Subject Does Grace Inhere? #

  • Objection: Augustine’s analogy of rider and horse suggests grace is in the will (a power)
  • Central Issue: Should grace be located in the essence of the soul or in one of its powers?
  • Answer: Grace is in the essence of the soul, not primarily in its powers
  • Key Reasoning: Since grace is before virtue (as cause before effect), and virtue is in powers, grace must be in something prior to the powers. The only thing prior to powers is the soul’s essence
  • Confirmation: Augustine’s axiom “nothing is before or after itself” rules out grace being in virtue, and Augustine’s own analogy (rider/horse) shows efficient causality, not literal location in a power

Notable Quotes #

“Grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved, which is a comparison of the rider to the horse, not however as an accident to its subject.” — Thomas Aquinas

“Virtue is a disposition of the perfect. I call perfect what is disposed according to its nature.” — Aristotle, Physics VII (cited by Thomas)

“Nothing is before or after itself.” — Augustine, On the Predestination of Saints (cited by Thomas)

“Just as the natural light of reason is something apart from the acquired virtues, which are said in order to this natural light, so also the light of grace, which is a partaking of the divine nature, is something apart from the infused virtues, which are derived from that light and are ordered to that light.” — Thomas Aquinas

“You were once darkness, but now you are light in the Lord. Walk therefore as sons of the light.” — Paul, Epistle to the Ephesians (cited by Thomas)

“He gave us the greatest and most precious promises, that through these we might be made partakers of the divine nature.” — Peter, 2 Peter 1:4 (cited as consortes divinae naturae)

“From grace begin the merits of man.” — Augustine (cited as Objection in Article 4)