Lecture 230

230. Law as a Rule of Reason and Its Ordering to the Common Good

Summary
This lecture examines the nature of law through a detailed analysis of Thomas Aquinas’s treatment in the Summa Theologiae. Berquist works through objections claiming law pertains to will or sensuality rather than reason, establishing that law is fundamentally a rule and measure of human acts that obligates through reason’s ordering to an end. The discussion emphasizes that reason is the first principle of human acts and that law must be ordered to the common good, not private goods, with particular attention to the linguistic and philosophical problem of how ‘beginning’ (principium/ἀρχή) operates across different domains.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Law as Rule and Measure of Acts #

  • Law is defined as a rule and measure of acts by which one is induced to act or refrain from acting
  • The word “law” derives from “binding” (ligare) because it obligates and necessitates action
  • Law must properly pertain to reason, not will or sensuality

The Equivocal Nature of “Beginning” (Principium) #

  • Aristotle distinguishes five senses of ἀρχή/principium in order of meaning:
    1. Limit of continuous thing - e.g., point is beginning of line; line of surface; surface of body (intrinsic)
    2. Fundamental part - e.g., foundation of house (intrinsic but not the thing itself)
    3. Extrinsic source - e.g., the prince/principal with P-A-L (commands and moves others)
    4. Beginning in knowledge - how we come to know something
    5. Any cause - matter, form, and especially end as beginning
  • The word “beginning” is equivocal by reason with an ordered progression of meanings
  • English translation problem: “beginning” vs. Latin “principium” vs. Greek “ἀρχή” - some meanings do not carry over naturally into English
  • When the end is called the “first beginning” (primum principium) in things to be done, this uses the most removed sense of the term
  • Translation often substitutes “principle” (from P-A-L sense) to avoid confusion with earlier senses

Reason as First Beginning of Human Acts #

  • Reason is the first principle of human acts because it orders things to their end
  • Reason looks “before and after” - it has perspective on ends and means (reference to Shakespeare)
  • In each genus, that which is the beginning is the measure and rule of all others:
    • Unity in the genus of number
    • First motion in the genus of motions
    • Therefore, law pertains to reason
  • Examples of measures in different domains:
    • Homer is the measure of all poets
    • Mozart is the measure of all musicians
    • Mary is a measure of all women
    • The virtuous man is a measure for other men

The Three Acts of Reason #

  • First act: Understanding what something is (τί ἐστι) - gives definitions (definitio)
  • Second act: Composing or dividing - gives statements/enunciations (enuntiatio/propositio)
  • Third act: Putting statements together - gives syllogisms or arguments (syllogismus)
  • Logic studies these three acts through three corresponding bodies of doctrine
  • In speculative reason: definitions, statements, and conclusions
  • In practical reason: similar structure but ordered to things to be done

Reason and Will in Action #

  • Reason has strength of moving through the will - will is a cause in the sense of mover
  • Reason commands about means to an end; will commands about the end itself
  • The prince’s will has the vigor of law only insofar as it is regulated by reason and ordered to the common good
  • Otherwise the prince’s will would be iniquity rather than law

The Nature of Speech and Name (Oratio and Nomen) #

  • Speech (oratio): vocal sound signifying by human agreement/custom, having parts that signify something by themselves
  • Name (nomen): vocal sound signifying by human agreement/custom, having no parts that signify by themselves
  • Example: “Johnson” - originally meant “son of John,” but now the whole name means the family/person, not its etymological parts
  • Example: “Berquist” (Bergquist) - from Swedish “Berg” (mountain) + “Quist” (branch), but name itself doesn’t mean “mountain branch”
  • Definition, statement, and syllogism are all speeches because they have significant parts

Practical Reason and Universal Propositions #

  • Practical reason uses a kind of syllogism in things to be done (following Aristotle’s Ethics, Book VII)
  • Law functions in practical reason as universal propositions do in speculative reason
  • These universal propositions of practical reason ordered to action have the character of law
  • The Decalogue (Ten Commandments) are such universal propositions sometimes actually considered, sometimes held habitually by reason
  • Just as geometry deduces conclusions from axioms and postulates, practical reason deduces what should be done from the law

Key Arguments #

Against Law Being of Reason (Objections Presented) #

  • Objection 1: Romans 7 speaks of “law in my members” (lex in membris meis), but nothing of reason is in bodily members because reason does not use a bodily organ; therefore law is not of reason
  • Objection 2: In reason there are only power (potentia), habit (habitus), and act (actus). Law is not: (a) the power of reason itself, (b) a habit of reason (since habits of reason are intellectual virtues: natural understanding, science, wisdom, art, prudence), nor (c) an act (since law would cease when act ceases, as in sleep). Therefore law is not of reason.
  • Objection 3: Law moves those subject to it to acting correctly, but moving to proper action pertains to will, not reason; Muslims would say law is assertion of divine will, not reason
  • Objection 4: What pleases the prince has the vigor of law (Ulpian) - this suggests assertion of will

Resolution of Objections #

  • The disjunctive syllogism fails because its either-or statement does not exhaust the possibilities - error lies in the premises being incomplete
  • Law is properly resolved as something of reason because:
    • To law pertains command and prohibition
    • Command is proper to reason (as established above)
    • Therefore law is of reason
    • The will is moved by reason; reason commands about means to the end
    • The prince’s will has vigor of law only insofar as regulated by reason and ordered to common good

Important Definitions #

Law (lex) #

  • A rule and measure of human acts
  • That by which one is induced or led into acting or refraining from acting
  • Derives from ligare (to bind) - it obligates and necessitates one to acting
  • Universal propositions of practical reason ordered to action
  • Something ordered to the common good

Reason (ratio) #

  • The first beginning (primum principium) of human acts because it orders things to their end
  • That which “looks before and after” - has perspective on means and ends
  • Distinguishable from will: reason commands about means; will about the end
  • Operates through three acts: understanding, composing/dividing, reasoning
  • In practical matters, uses syllogistic reasoning about things to be done

Practical Reason (ratio practica) #

  • Reason ordered to things to be done (ἐν ποιητικοῖς/in agendis)
  • Uses a kind of syllogism in concrete actions
  • Produces universal propositions that have the character of law
  • Related to the virtue of prudence (φρόνησις/prudentia)

Measure (mensura) and Rule (regula) #

  • In each genus, the beginning is the measure and rule of all others
  • Unity measures number; first motion measures other motions
  • Reason measures and rules human acts
  • The virtuous man can be a measure for others

Emotion and Self-Measurement #

  • Reason alone can measure the appropriateness of emotions
  • Example: anger - only reason can determine how much anger is suitable in different circumstances
  • How can an emotion be the measure of itself? (It cannot)
  • This principle applies to sleep, appetite, and other passions

Examples & Illustrations #

The Problem of Equivocation in Translation #

  • Principal vs. Beginning: Principal (P-A-L) refers to extrinsic authority; beginning can mean intrinsic limit. Translators use “principle” to avoid confusion.
  • Etymology vs. Current Meaning: Johnson (originally “John’s son”) now means the family name; Berquist (from “Berg” + “Quist”) now means the surname, not “mountain branch”
  • Etymology vs. Logical Function: When Carol Johnson is called “a Johnson,” it doesn’t mean she is a “son of John,” showing that current signification differs from etymological meaning

Names Without Significant Parts #

  • “Johnson” - as a family name, the whole term signifies the family, but the parts (John, son) don’t individually contribute to this meaning in current usage
  • “Berquist” - similarly, the whole signifies the surname, not its etymological components

Measure in Different Domains #

  • Homer is the measure of all poets (used as standard of excellence)
  • Mozart is the measure of all musicians
  • Mary is a measure of all women (model of virtue)
  • The virtuous man is a measure for other men
  • These illustrate how “beginning” and “measure” connect: the exemplar is the standard against which others are judged

The Anger Example #

  • Someone accidentally bumps into you in the hallway → no anger required, just accident
  • Schoolchildren deliberately knocking people over → some anger appropriate (recognition of intentional wrong)
  • Someone using your child as target practice → significant anger required and justified
  • Point: Only reason can measure what degree of anger is suitable in each case; emotion cannot measure itself

The Potted Plant Story #

  • Anecdote about a boy in a store knocking over a potted plant
  • Illustrates need for intervention (correction/consequence)
  • Shows how reason must intervene to moderate emotional response

Notable Quotes #

“Law is a certain rule and measure of acts, by which one is induced or led into acting, or refraining from acting.”

“The rule and measure of human acts is reason, which is the first beginning of human acts.”

“In each genus, that which is the beginning, is the measure and rule of all others.”

“Reason is the ability for a large discourse.” (Shakespeare, via Berquist)

“Only reason can measure how much anger is or is not suitable.”

“How can an emotion be the measure of itself?”

“The Apostle is honored by Thomas; Augustine is honored. These are like what—fathers, right? These are fathers of the life of your mind.”

“The end, the finis, is the first beginning (primum principium) in things to be done.”

“The word beginning (principium/ἀρχή) is a word that is equivocal by reason, and there is an order of the meanings.”

Questions Addressed #

Primary Question: Is Law Something of Reason? #

  • Objections: Law is not of reason because: (1) it exists “in members” of body; (2) it is not power, habit, or act of reason; (3) it moves to action which pertains to will; (4) Muslims rightly call it assertion of divine will
  • Resolution: Law is of reason because command and prohibition pertain to reason. The disjunctive syllogism fails by not exhausting possibilities. Reason orders to ends; will executes what reason commands about means.

Secondary Question: Regarding the Nature and Translation of “Beginning” (Principium) #

  • Why do translators use “principle” rather than “beginning” in some contexts?
  • Because “beginning” has five ordered senses in Aristotle, and carrying the word through all meanings in English creates confusion
  • The end being called “first beginning” represents the most remote extension of the term
  • This explains why Thomas sometimes uses both “primum principium” (first beginning) for end and reason—reason knows the end

Tertiary Question: What Are the Three Acts of Reason and How Do They Function? #

  • Understanding (first act) produces definitions
  • Composing/dividing (second act) produces statements
  • Reasoning (third act) produces syllogisms
  • In practical reason, these same acts apply to things to be done
  • Law is related to practical reason as premises are to conclusions in speculative reason

Connections to Other Concepts #

Relation to Virtue and Emotion #

  • Reason must measure the appropriate degree of emotion (anger, fear, etc.)
  • The virtuous person develops the capacity for right emotion in right measure
  • Emotion cannot be its own measure or standard

Relation to Will #

  • Will is moved by reason; it is a cause in the sense of mover
  • Reason commands about means; will commands about end
  • The prince’s will has the force of law only when regulated by reason and ordered to common good

Relation to Logic and Discourse #

  • Logic studies three kinds of discourse: defining, stating, reasoning
  • These correspond to the three acts of reason
  • Names (without significant parts) vs. speeches (with significant parts) is fundamental to logic
  • The middle term of a syllogism tends to be a definition

Relation to Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics #

  • The concept of “beginning” (ἀρχή/principium) is equivocal and requires study in metaphysics
  • In natural philosophy (Physics), “beginning” and “cause” are studied
  • The principle that “in each genus the beginning is the measure” appears throughout Aristotle

Relation to Sacred Doctrine #

  • The division of sacred doctrine into faith, hope, and charity (following Augustine)
  • The division of sacred doctrine into law and grace (Old Testament vs. New Testament)
  • The Ten Commandments as universal propositions of practical reason held habitually
  • Grace relates to the perfection of reason and will beyond natural capacity