Lecture 229

229. Venial Sin, the Use of Reason, and the Nature of Law

Summary
This lecture addresses whether venial sin can exist in someone with original sin alone (Q. 89, Art. 6), establishing that the first moral act upon gaining the use of reason must be either one that removes original sin or constitutes mortal sin through omission. Berquist then transitions to the treatise on law (Q. 90, Art. 1), arguing that law is fundamentally something of reason, not will, and establishing law as a rule and measure of human acts. The lecture emphasizes the importance of distinguishing equivocal terms—particularly in axioms and fundamental philosophical vocabulary—as essential to defending rational foundations against sophistic arguments.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Venial Sin with Original Sin Only (Q. 89, Art. 6) #

The Central Question: Can venial sin exist in someone who has only original sin, without any mortal sin?

The Theological Problem:

  • Those with only original sin merit punishment in limbo
  • Those with mortal sin merit punishment in hell
  • There appears to be no third place for those with both original and venial sin
  • This creates an apparent impossibility

Thomas’s Resolution: It is impossible for venial sin to exist with original sin alone.

The Development of Moral Culpability #

Before the Use of Reason:

  • A child is excused from both venial and mortal sin
  • The defect of age, which prevents the use of reason, excuses one from guilt

Upon Gaining the Use of Reason:

  • The very first thing that occurs to man having discretion is that “he thinks about himself” (thinking about himself is an obligation)
  • This constitutes the beginning of deliberation about how to order one’s life
  • This obligation flows from an affirmative precept of God: “Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you”

The First Moral Act:

  • If one orders himself to a suitable end through grace, original sin is remitted
  • If one does not order himself to a suitable end, he sins mortally through this omission
  • Therefore, the first actual moral act must be either: (1) one that removes original sin, or (2) a mortal sin
  • This leaves no space for venial sin to occur prior to either outcome

The Transition to the Treatise on Law (Q. 90) #

Structure of the Inquiry:

  • First part: law in general (three aspects: essence/nature, differences between laws, effects)
  • Second part: particular kinds of law (eternal, natural, human, divine)

Extrinsic Principles of Human Action:

  • Inward beginnings: Powers and habits (already treated)
  • Extrinsic beginnings:
    • Moving to evil: the devil (diabolus = slanderer)
    • Moving to good: God (through law and grace)

Key Arguments #

Against Venial Sin with Original Sin Alone #

Objection 1: Venial sin is merely a disposition for mortal sin (like labor disposes for fever). Therefore one can have venial sin without mortal sin.

  • Thomas’s Reply: Venial sin is a contingent (not necessary) disposition for mortal sin, unlike heat’s necessary disposition to fire’s form.

Objection 2: One can commit one mortal sin without committing another mortal sin. Therefore one can commit venial sin without mortal sin (as the lesser act).

  • Thomas’s Reply: What prevents venial sin from occurring with original sin is not a lack of connection or distance between them, but rather the defect of the use of reason.

Objection 3: There is a brief time when a child first gains the use of reason but before committing mortal sin. In that space, one could commit venial sin.

  • Thomas’s Reply: From other mortal sins one can abstain for a time, but from the sin of omission (failing to turn to God) one cannot abstain. The obligation to order oneself to God is immediate upon gaining reason.

Law is Something of Reason (Q. 90, Art. 1) #

Definition of Law:

  • Law is “a certain rule and measure of acts by which one is induced to act or refrain from acting”
  • The word derives from “binding” (ligare) — it obligates and necessitates

Reason as the Measure:

  • Reason is the first beginning of human acts
  • Just as unity measures all things in the genus of number, and the first motion measures all motions, so reason measures all human acts
  • It belongs to reason to order things to their end

Against the Objection that Law is in the Will:

  • While the will is the executor of law, reason is what commands
  • The will of the prince has the vigor of law only insofar as it is ordered by reason to the common good
  • To command and prohibit pertains to reason, not will

Law and Practical Reason:

  • Universal propositions of practical reason ordered to action have the notion of law
  • These may be actually considered (deliberated) or held habitually (as in the Ten Commandments)

Important Definitions #

Diabolus (Greek: διάβολος)

  • Means “slanderer” or “accuser”
  • Exemplified by Satan’s slander against God to Eve: claiming God withholds good from her
  • Functions as an extrinsic principle moving human acts toward evil

Law (Latin: lex)

  • A rule and measure of acts
  • Something pertaining to reason, specifically to practical reason
  • Obligates through the binding nature of reason’s ordering to the common good

The Use of Reason (Latin: usus rationis)

  • The capacity to deliberate about means to ends
  • Develops gradually in childhood
  • Creates immediate moral obligation to order oneself to God

Affirmative Precept

  • A command that requires positive action (as opposed to prohibition)
  • The obligation to convert to God is such a precept
  • Arises immediately upon the capacity for moral deliberation

Examples & Illustrations #

The Problem of Equivocation: Whole and Part #

The Axiom: “The whole is greater than the part”

The Confusion:

  • Berquist uses the example of “animal” as a universal whole that includes man, dog, cat, horse, and elephant
  • Man is a part of this universal, yet the definition of man (animal + reason) contains more than just “animal”
  • Therefore, a part (man’s definition) sometimes contains more than the whole (animal alone)
  • This appears to refute the axiom

The Resolution:

  • One must distinguish between different senses of “whole” and “part”
  • Integral (composed) whole: Parts make up a single thing; the name is not said of the parts (arm ≠ chair)
  • Universal whole: Said of its parts but not composed of them (animal is said of man, dog, etc.)
  • The axiom holds when properly stated: a whole is greater than a part of itself

Further Examples:

  • New England is a part of the United States but larger than the whole of Massachusetts (because Massachusetts is a different whole)
  • The wooden chair: wood and shape are not two things like chair and table; shape is the actuality of the wood’s potential

The Soul-Body Distinction #

The Confusing Argument:

  • I have a soul and I have a body
  • They are not the same thing
  • Therefore they are two different things
  • So which one am I? (Conclusion: I am the soul)

The Error:

  • This treats soul and body as two things in the same way that a man and dog are two things
  • But they form a substantial unity through matter and form
  • The distinction between soul and body is different from the distinction between two separate substances

The Implication for Thomistic Anthropology:

  • Thomas says “St. Peter is in heaven” (not merely “the soul of St. Peter”)
  • Just as “the Word was made flesh” means the Word was made man (using synecdoche)
  • The soul and body together constitute one substantial being

Questions Addressed #

Q. 89, Art. 6: Can venial sin exist in someone with only original sin? #

Thomas’s Answer: No, it is impossible.

Reasoning:

  1. Before the use of reason, one is excused from all actual sin (both venial and mortal)
  2. Upon gaining reason, the first moral obligation is to order oneself to God
  3. If one succeeds (through grace), original sin is remitted
  4. If one fails, one commits mortal sin through omission
  5. Therefore, there is no temporal space in which venial sin alone can exist with original sin

Q. 90, Art. 1: Is law something of reason? #

Thomas’s Answer: Yes, law is something of reason.

Supporting Arguments:

  1. Law is a rule and measure of acts; reason rules and measures all human action
  2. To command and prohibit (proper to law) pertains to reason, not will or emotion
  3. The will carries out law, but only insofar as reason directs the will to the common good
  4. Universal propositions of practical reason ordered to action constitute law
  5. In each genus, the first principle is the measure of all things in that genus; reason is the first principle in human acts

Notable Quotes #

“The very first thing that occurs to a man having discretion is that he thinks about himself… to which other things are ordered as to an end.”

“Law is a certain rule and measure of acts by which one is induced to act or refrain from acting.”

“To command and prohibit pertains to reason.”

“These fundamental words… especially in the axioms… these words are all equivocal by reason.”

“Only the man who distinguishes in order the senses of these words equivocal by reason, the axioms, can defend them from the most common arguments against them.”

“The soul and the body are one thing, right? And how the soul is the first act of a natural body composed of tools and how matter and form are one.”

Pedagogical Observations #

Berquist’s Emphasis on Equivocation:

  • The ability to distinguish the multiple meanings of fundamental terms—particularly those in axioms—is essential to wisdom
  • The wise man differs from one with merely natural understanding not in knowing different truths, but in understanding why the apparently contradictory objections fail
  • Aristotle is praised for recognizing that fundamental words are “equivocal by reason” (not by chance)

The Structure of Thomas’s Thought:

  • Thomas “looks before and after”—considering both the state of innocence and the fallen state
  • The transition from the discussion of sin to the treatise on law reflects a fundamental ordering: law addresses our weakness, grace strengthens us to follow it
  • The extrinsic principles of human action (Q. 90) prepare for the specific treatments of divine law and grace (Q. 109+)