Lecture 202

202. Sin from Malice: The Disorder of the Will

Summary
This lecture examines malice (malitia) as the third and most serious cause of sin, representing a defect in the will itself. Berquist explores how one can knowingly choose spiritual evil to obtain temporal goods, how malice differs from ignorance and passion, and what relationship exists between habitual sin and malicious choice. The discussion includes Thomas Aquinas’s resolution of apparent contradictions with Aristotle and Dionysius regarding whether anyone can deliberately intend evil.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

  • Malice as a Defect of the Will: The third cause of sin, distinct from defects in understanding (ignorance) and sense appetite (passion)
  • The Three Types of Ignorance: Thomas’s three-fold distinction showing how even the malicious person is ignorant in a specific sense
  • Disordered Love of Goods: The will becomes disordered when it loves a lesser good more than a greater good
  • Evil as Means, Not End: How evil cannot be intended secundum se (as such) but only as a means to obtain another good
  • The Problem of Intentionality: Resolution of the apparent contradiction between Dionysius (“no one intends evil”) and Job 34:27 (“quasi de industria” - from deliberate intent)

Key Arguments #

Can One Sin from Malice? #

Objections:

  • Aristotle: “Every bad person is ignorant”
  • Proverbs 14:22: “They err who do evil” (they are mistaken)
  • Dionysius, Divine Names IV: “No one intending to evil does something”
  • Logical problem: If malice causes sin, then sin would cause sin in infinitum

Thomas’s Resolution:

  • All three authorities can be defended through a three-fold distinction of ignorance:

    1. Ignorance of what is bad simpliciter (complete ignorance of the act’s badness)
    2. Ignorance of the particular application of universal knowledge (knowing the act is bad but not applying it - as in passion)
    3. Ignorance that evil should not be sustained for the sake of obtaining another good (the malicious person’s ignorance)
  • The key text: “Sometimes [ignorance] excludes the knowledge by which someone knows this evil should not be sustained on account of the pursuit of some good. He knows, however, this simpliciter to be bad, and thus he is said to be ignorant, the one who sins from certain malice.”

The Nature of Malicious Choice #

  • Evil cannot be intended as such: “Evil is not able in itself to be intended by someone; it, however, can be intended to avoid some other evil or to achieve some other good”
  • The role of disordered will: “A will is disordered when it loves the lesser good more. Consequently it is that someone chooses to suffer loss in the good less loved that he might enjoy the good more loved”
  • Example - David and Bathsheba: Knew murder was bad, but chose it to retain Bathsheba, whom he loved more than obedience to God
  • Example - the college student: Knows abortion is evil, but chooses it to continue her education (the temporal good she loves more than the spiritual good she will lose)

The Beginnings of Human Acts #

Thomas identifies three sources of corruption in human action:

  1. Defect of understanding → sin from ignorance
  2. Defect of sense appetite → sin from passion
  3. Defect of will (disorder of will) → sin from malice

Corresponding to the “three beginnings of human acts”: understanding, rational desire (will), and sensitive desire (sensible appetite).

Important Definitions #

Malitia (Malice): Can be understood in three ways:

  1. Habitual malice (malitia habitualis): A bad habit itself, named malice just as a good habit is named virtue
  2. Actual malice (malitia actualis): A choice of evil, deliberate selection of what is bad
  3. Preceding guilt causing subsequent guilt: One sin causing another (e.g., envy causing fraternal hatred)

Industria/Industry: Deliberate intent or deliberate choice; from industria, meaning from deliberate purpose (Latin: quasi de industria)

Disordered Will (voluntas inordinata): When the will loves a lesser good more than a greater good, leading it to choose to suffer loss of the greater good to enjoy the lesser

Secundum se: “As such” or “in itself” - evil cannot be intended this way

Examples & Illustrations #

  • Hitler and the Holocaust: Described as organized, planned evil (malice) rather than passionate outburst, contrasted with abortion industry which is similarly organized and deliberate
  • Saint Paul’s persecution of Christians: Example of sin from ignorance (the first type) - he thought he was doing good, so complete ignorance of the badness of the act
  • David and Bathsheba: Knew adultery and murder were bad (second type of ignorance - passion overrode knowledge), but crucially also demonstrates malice when he deliberately chose to kill Uriah
  • The college sophomore facing abortion: Knows abortion is bad but chooses it knowing it’s the “lesser evil” compared to interrupting her education
  • Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s argument: Claims women must be able to engage in sex “freely” (as men do) without responsibility for the child, thus needing abortion - this reflects disordered willing of temporal good (sexual freedom) over spiritual good (life)
  • Don Giovanni: Operatic example of habitual sin leading to malice - he cannot repent even at the end, going down to hell
  • The Petite Steak habit: Berquist’s personal anecdote about ordering the same meal until it became automatic and connatural

Digressions on Order and Philosophy #

Berquist explores Aristotle’s five senses of “before” (prius) to clarify what disorder means in “disordered will”:

  1. Temporal priority (today before tomorrow)
  2. Existential priority (one thing cannot be without another)
  3. Priority in reasoning (premises before conclusion)
  4. Priority in perfection/goodness (better before lesser)
  5. Causality (cause before effect - Berquist notes this overlaps with #2)

The disorder in the disordered will is understood in the fourth sense: the will loves the lesser good (less perfect, less worthy) more than the greater good (more perfect, more worthy).

First Philosophy and Knowledge: Berquist notes that first philosophy is called “first” because it is better (in the fourth sense of order) than all other philosophy, not merely because it comes first in learning order. It studies the first cause (God) and first being, making it theology (theologia). Natural philosophy is called “second philosophy” not because it’s logically second, but because it’s inferior in dignity.

Questions Addressed #

Primary Question: Can One Sin from Malice? #

Resolution: Yes. One sins from malice when:

  • One knows the act is bad simpliciter
  • But one does not know it should not be pursued for the sake of obtaining another (temporal) good
  • This constitutes a specific type of ignorance (the third type) rather than complete ignorance
  • Therefore Aristotle, Proverbs, and Dionysius are all correct when properly understood

Secondary Question: What Makes the Will Disordered? #

Resolution: The natural inclination of the will is toward good. The will becomes disordered when it loves a lesser good more than a greater good, leading it to choose the loss of the greater good to obtain the lesser. This can happen through:

  • Attachment to temporal goods (wealth, pleasure, honor)
  • Over-attachment to these temporal goods compared to spiritual goods (grace, charity, obedience to divine law)

Connections to Context #

  • To sin from ignorance: Some people (Paul) sin through complete ignorance of the act’s badness
  • To sin from passion: Some people sin through temporary overriding of reason by sensible appetite
  • To sin from malice: Some people sin through deliberate choice of spiritual evil to obtain temporal good - the most grave because the will itself is corrupted
  • To Thomas’s prayer for confession: Infirmity (bodily weakness - to Father with power), ignorance (to Son with wisdom), malice (to Holy Spirit with love)
  • To contemporary issues: The abortion debate illustrates this - it’s no longer ignorance but deliberate choice, making it sin from malice rather than from passion or ignorance

Pedagogical Notes #

  • Berquist emphasizes the importance of distinguishing the three types of ignorance to understand how Thomas can say “all sinners are ignorant” while defending that some sin from malice
  • The logic of “no one intends evil as such” is reconciled with “some sin from malice” by showing that evil is always chosen as a means to obtain a good that the disordered will loves more
  • The three-fold structure (defect of understanding, appetite, will) mirrors the three hierarchies of angels and the trinitarian attribution of powers, suggesting a deep metaphysical order