199. Ignorance and Passion as Causes of Sin

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Ignorance and the Diminishment of Sin (Article 3) #

The Problem: Whether ignorance diminishes sin, or whether it actually increases sin since ignorance itself can be sinful.

Key Distinctions:

• Not all ignorance diminishes sin in the same way
• The effect depends on whether the ignorance is directly voluntary (chosen intentionally to sin more freely) or indirectly voluntary (resulting from negligence or chosen acts)
• Directly voluntary ignorance increases sin by intensifying the will’s commitment to sinning
• Indirectly voluntary ignorance (vincible ignorance arising from negligence) diminishes sin by reducing the voluntariness of the act
• Invincible ignorance totally excuses from sin by removing voluntariness entirely

Core Principle: Ignorance diminishes sin only to the extent that it diminishes the voluntary character of the act. Since sin is fundamentally voluntary, anything that reduces voluntariness reduces culpability.

Example of Drunkenness:

• A drunk person who commits sin merits “twofold maledictions”—one for drunkenness itself, one for the resulting sin
• Yet the drunkenness, by producing ignorance of the particular circumstances, diminishes the culpability of the following sin
• The legislator Pittacus punished drunkenness doubly not because drunkenness makes subsequent sins worse, but to discourage drunkenness itself through deterrence

Ignorance of Passion vs. Ignorance of Habit:

• When ignorance results from a passion (disordered emotion), the will remains intensely directed toward sin; the ignorance does not greatly reduce voluntariness
• When ignorance results from habit (settled disposition of the soul), the will is less directly oriented toward the sinful act; the ignorance more substantially reduces voluntariness
• David’s pursuit of Bathsheba illustrates how passion (lust) produces ignorance of the sinfulness of adultery, but the intensity of the passion indicates the sin may be more, not less, serious

Passion and the Will (Article 4/5) #

The Problem: Can the passion of the sense-appetite move the will, especially against the will’s own knowledge? This appears to contradict reason’s superiority over lower appetitive powers.

The Resolution: Passion cannot move the will directly, but can do so indirectly through two mechanisms:

Mechanism 1: Distraction Through Abstraction (Abstractio) #

• All powers of the soul are rooted in a single essence
• When one power is intensified in its act, others are weakened or impeded
• Example: When a musician (like Mozart) listens intently, his entire attention is absorbed by the ears; he becomes oblivious to other sensory inputs
• Example: Artists absorbed in visual perception of colors and shades; poets entirely taken up with imagination
• When passion (anger, lust, fear) becomes intense, it occupies the imagination and estimative power, preventing the rational powers from operating at full strength

Mechanism 2: Distortion of the Will’s Object #

• The will’s proper object is “the good as known by reason”
• Passion affects the internal senses (imagination and estimative power), which are necessary prerequisites for reason’s operation
• The judgment and grasping of reason depends on what the imagination and estimative power present
• When passion disorders these internal senses, the presentation of the good to reason becomes distorted
• Reason then judges based on this distorted presentation
• The will, following reason’s judgment, is thereby moved indirectly by passion
• Example: In lust, the beauty of a woman (presented through the imagination and estimative power) becomes the predominant aspect presented to reason; reason judges that pursuing the pleasure is good; the will follows

Why Not Directly?:

• Passion is a material power, rooted in bodily organs
• The will is immaterial and belongs to the rational part of the soul
• Immaterial powers are not moved directly by material powers
• The will’s object (the good as grasped by reason) is not the passion itself but the good as presented through reason

The Hierarchy of Powers:

• The will (appetite of reason) is related to the sense-appetite as a higher mover to a lower mover
• As in celestial mechanics, the higher sphere moves the lower sphere, not vice versa
• But lower powers can indirectly affect higher ones through the distraction and obscuring of their proper operations

Key Arguments #

Objection 1: Ignorance is Common to All Sin #

Premise: What is common to all sins does not diminish any particular sin Premise: Ignorance is common to every sin (Aristotle: “every bad man is ignorant”) Conclusion: Therefore, ignorance does not diminish sin

Thomas’s Response: The key is not whether ignorance is common, but whether it is voluntary. Only ignorance that does not diminish voluntariness fails to diminish sin. Ignorance can be common yet still work differently depending on its relationship to the will.

Objection 2: Ignorance Increases Sin Because It Is Itself a Sin #

Premise: Ignorance itself is a sin (vincible ignorance involving negligence) Premise: A sin added to a sin makes a greater sin Conclusion: Therefore, ignorance increases rather than diminishes the original sin

Thomas’s Response: Two sins do not always compound into a greater single sin. The drunkenness (first sin) and the resulting act (second sin) constitute two distinct sins, but the ignorance arising from drunkenness may reduce the culpability of the second sin more than the gravity of the drunkenness itself. The two sins are distinct; their relative gravity must be evaluated separately.

Objection 3: Only Total Loss of Reason Should Excuse #

Premise: If ignorance diminishes sin, then complete loss of reason (blackout, intoxication) should most greatly diminish it Premise: But complete loss of reason merits double punishment Conclusion: Therefore, ignorance does not diminish sin; rather, total ignorance increases it

Thomas’s Response: This confuses two distinct issues. The drunkenness itself merits double punishment (once for drunkenness, once for the resulting sin) because there are two sins. But the ignorance resulting from the drunkenness does diminish the culpability of the second sin. The total judgment must account for both facts: two punishable offenses, yet reduced culpability for the second due to its ignorance.

Objection 4: Passion Cannot Move the Will #

Premise: No passive power is moved except by its proper object Premise: The will is passive (in one respect) but its object is the good as known by reason, not passion Conclusion: Therefore, passion (a movement of the sense-appetite) cannot move the will

**Objection 5: Higher Powers Are Not Moved by Lower Powers Premise: The will is the appetite of reason; the sense-appetite is lower Premise: In the hierarchy of beings, the higher is not moved by the lower (the soul does not move the body; the higher celestial sphere is not moved by the lower) Conclusion: Therefore, passion of the sense-appetite cannot move the will

**Objection 6: Material Cannot Move Immaterial Premise: The sense-appetite is a material power (uses bodily organs) Premise: The will is immaterial (does not use a bodily organ; belongs to reason) Premise: Material things cannot move immaterial things Conclusion: Therefore, passion cannot move the will

Thomas’s Response to All Three: Passion cannot move the will directly, but can do so indirectly through the two mechanisms of abstraction and distortion of the object.

Important Definitions #

Vincible Ignorance (ἄγνοια vincibilis): Ignorance that can be overcome through reasonable effort and study; may be voluntary (directly or indirectly) and may constitute sin.

Invincible Ignorance (ἄγνοια invincibilis): Ignorance that cannot be overcome despite reasonable effort; not voluntary in nature; does not constitute sin and may totally excuse culpability.

Directly Voluntary (voluntarium directum): Chosen intentionally for its own sake; acts performed with full knowledge and deliberate will to achieve them.

Indirectly Voluntary (voluntarium indirectum/per accidens): Not chosen for itself but resulting from a chosen act; example: drunkenness resulting from choosing to drink.

Passion/Emotion (passio animae): A motion of the sense-appetite involving both a movement of the soul and bodily change; includes anger, lust, fear, joy, etc.

Abstraction (abstractio): The process by which intense activity in one power weakens or prevents operation in other powers; the focusing of attention on one object to the exclusion of others.

Estimative Power (vis aestimativa): An internal sense that judges the significance or relevance of perceived things; distinct from mere sense perception (that food is pleasant) by grasping meaning (that this is dangerous, or beneficial, or shameful).

Imagination (phantasia): The internal sense that retains and reproduces images of sensible things; necessary for reason’s operation since reason works with phantasms (images).

Examples & Illustrations #

Bathsheba (Biblical): David’s lust for Bathsheba illustrates how passion affects judgment. The beauty perceived through the senses occupies his imagination and estimative power. His reason, working with this distorted presentation, judges that pursuing her is good. The passion does not directly override his will, but indirectly moves it by clouding the judgment of the particular good.

Drunkenness: A man who becomes drunk and then commits another sin (e.g., assault while drunk) commits two sins. He merits “double maledictions”—punishment for drunkenness and punishment for the assault. Yet the drunkenness diminishes culpability for the assault by reducing his knowledge of what he was doing. The legislator Pittacus punished drunkenness doubly not because it increases subsequent sins, but to deter the drunkenness itself through threat of double punishment.

Mozart and Baroque Music: Berquist’s cousin listened to Baroque music as background while studying; he didn’t truly appreciate it. When he shifted to Mozart, he realized he had to give his full attention. This illustrates the principle of abstraction—when one power (reason studying) is intensified, others (the sensory appreciation of music) are weakened. Conversely, when full attention is given to music, it can move one in ways that background listening cannot.

Artists and Visual Perception: Artists absorbed in observing colors and shades become entirely taken up by their eyes. They enter a room and notice subtle variations in green or red that ordinary people overlook. This intensity of one power (visual sensation) impedes other operations (general awareness of surroundings).

Poets and Imagination: Poets are sometimes wholly absorbed in imagination, oblivious to practical matters. The Welsh mountain where if one sleeps at its foot, one wakes either mad or a poet—illustrating how intense imaginative activity can separate one from ordinary reason.

Don Giovanni (Mozart’s Opera): The character Don Giovanni exemplifies how habit and passion obscure moral judgment. Through habit of pursuing every woman, especially young ones, he has developed a disordered estimative power. At the moment of each new pursuit, the beauty presented to his imagination makes the act appear good; he does not see it as sinful. This is not merely ignorance of the universal principle (that seduction is wrong) but ignorance of the particular circumstance (that this particular act is seduction and thus sin).

Questions Addressed #

Article 3: Does Ignorance Diminish Sin? #

Question: If ignorance is common to all sins and is itself a sin, how can it diminish sin?

Answer: Ignorance diminishes sin only insofar as it diminishes voluntariness. Three cases arise:

1. Ignorance that totally excuses (invincible ignorance): Removes voluntariness entirely; excuses from sin completely
2. Ignorance that is directly voluntary: Chosen to sin more freely; increases sin by intensifying the will’s commitment
3. Ignorance that is indirectly voluntary (from negligence): Diminishes sin by reducing the direct engagement of the will

Article 4: Can Passion Move the Will? #

Question: How can passion move the will if passion is a lower power and the will is higher, and if immaterial powers cannot be moved by material causes?

Answer: Passion cannot move the will directly, but moves it indirectly through two mechanisms:

1. Distraction: When passion is intense, it occupies attention and weakens other powers, including reason’s ability to consider what it knows
2. Distortion of the Object: Passion affects the imagination and estimative power, which are prerequisites for reason’s operation, thereby distorting the presentation of the good to reason and consequently affecting reason’s judgment and the will’s choice

Notable Quotes #

“Every bad man is ignorant.” — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III

“Concupiscence subverts your heart.” — Book of Daniel 13 (cited as scriptural confirmation that passion moves will)

“I achieved mercy because I persecuted the church in ignorance.” — St. Paul, 1 Timothy (cited as example of ignorance diminishing sin/culpability)