194. Sin in Reason: Morose Delectation and Higher Reason

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Morose Delectation (Dilectatio Morosa) #

• Definition: A lingering in or dwelling upon pleasure, particularly about sensible or illicit goods
• Not measured by duration of time, but by the deliberation of reason about it
• A sin of reason because reason fails in directing interior passions
• Reason fails in two ways:
  1. By commanding illicit passions (e.g., deliberately provoking anger or concupiscence)
  2. By not repressing illicit motions of passion when they arise
• Pleasure is in the appetitive power as its proximate principle, but in reason as its first motive power
• Reason directs not only exterior acts but also interior passions; when it fails here, sin is in reason

The Distinction of Higher and Lower Reason #

• Not two different powers, but the same reason operating in two modes/considerations
• Higher reason (ratio superior): looks upon (in speculandis) and consults (in consulendis) the eternal reasons; considers the divine law; gives the ultimate judgment about human acts
• Lower reason (ratio inferior): judges about temporal matters and sensible goods; gives preliminary judgment about pleasure
• Relationship: Whatever is subject to lower reason’s judgment is also subject to higher reason’s judgment, but not vice versa
• The distinction comes from Augustine’s 12th book of the Trinity

Consent in the Act of Sin and Higher Reason #

• Consent implies a judgment about that in which one consents
• Practical reason judges about things to be done; speculative reason judges about intelligible things
• The last judgment in any judgment pertains to the supreme judging power
• In speculative matters: the last judgment resolves to first principles
• In practical matters: the last judgment is about the act itself (the final thing that occurs)
• The preambulum (what comes before) to the act is pleasure; lower reason judges about pleasure
• Consent in the act properly pertains to higher reason, which considers whether the act accords with eternal law
• When higher reason does not direct acts according to divine law, it either:
  • Actively contemns it (shows contempt when thinking of God’s law)
  • Neglects it through omission (does not think about it)
• Either way, higher reason consents in the act of sin

The Reasoning Process and Judgment #

• Reason goes from beginnings to conclusion in the via invenienti (way of finding)
• Reason goes from the thing found back to beginnings in the via iudicandi (way of judging)
• So long as there remains a higher beginning to which one can appeal, judgment is suspended
• The final sentence of judgment terminates the inquiry

Acts of Reason and Their Sins #

• Reason has two acts:
  1. Regarding its own object: knowing truth (can sin through ignorance or error about knowable things)
  2. Directing other powers: commanding or failing to repress disordered acts of lower powers
• Sin can occur in both ways
• A defect of reason about things one cannot know does not constitute sin but excuses from sin
• A defect of reason about things one is able and ought to know is imputed as sin
• The defect in directing lower powers is always imputed to reason as a voluntary defect

Key Arguments #

Against Morose Delectation Being in Reason (Objections) #

• Objection 1: Pleasure (delectatio) implies an emotion of the appetitive power; reason is a grasping (apprehensive) power, not appetitive; therefore morose pleasure is not in reason
• Objection 2: Powers are distinguished by their objects; the object of morose pleasure is sometimes sensible goods, not the goods of reason; therefore it is not in reason
• Objection 3: Morose refers to length of time, but length of time does not determine which power an act belongs to; therefore morose pleasure does not pertain to reason

Thomas’s Resolutions #

• Reason directs not only exterior acts but also interior passions; when reason fails in this direction, sin is in reason (just as when reason fails in directing exterior acts, sin is in reason)
• Reason has its own illicit action about its own object, but has direction about all objects of lower powers that can be directed by reason
• Morose (remaining/dwelling) is not said from duration of time but from reason’s deliberation about it; the dwelling persists when reason does not repel what ought to be rejected
• Augustine teaches this must be abolished by the Lord’s Prayer (regarding venial sins of thought)

Against Consent in Act Being in Higher Reason (Objections) #

• Objection 1: Consent is an act of the appetitive power; reason is apprehensive; therefore consent in act is not in higher reason
• Objection 2: Higher reason aims at eternal reasons; but sometimes one consents in act without consulting eternal reasons (not always thinking of divine things); therefore not always in higher reason
• Objection 3: Reason can regulate both exterior acts and interior pleasures by eternal reasons; but consent in pleasure without fulfillment by doing is of lower reason (Augustine); so consent in act can belong to lower reason
• Objection 4: As higher reason exceeds lower, lower reason exceeds the imaginative power; yet sometimes man proceeds to act through the imagination without deliberation of reason; so lower reason can consent in act without higher reason

Thomas’s Resolutions #

• Consent is an act of the appetitive power consequently to reason’s deliberation and judgment; the will tends to what reason judges; consent can be attributed to both will and reason
• Higher reason consents in the act of sin whether it thinks of the law of God or not; whether active contempt or negligent omission, it still fails to direct according to divine law
• The last judgment about human acts pertains to higher reason; pleasure is the preambulum; therefore higher reason properly retains consent in the act, while lower reason retains preliminary judgment about pleasure
• Higher reason can judge about pleasure (whatever is subject to lower judgment is subject to higher), but lower reason cannot judge about the act itself in the way higher reason does
• Augustine (cited via Aquinas): Sin cannot be efficaciously perpetrated without the intention of the mind (the highest power moving or prohibiting members from action)

Important Definitions #

Morosum (Morose) #

• Not said from length of time (mora temporis) but from deliberation of reason while dwelling on something
• The dwelling consists in reason deliberating about pleasure for a long time but nevertheless not repelling it

Preambulum #

• “That which walks before” or precedes
• In the context of sin: pleasure is the preambulum to the act
• Lower reason judges about the preambulum; higher reason judges about the act itself

Via Inveniendi vs. Via Iudicandi #

• Via inveniendi (way of finding): reason proceeds from beginnings to conclusions
• Via iudicandi (way of judging): reason returns from the conclusion back to the beginnings to verify and judge

In Speculandis vs. In Consulendis #

• In speculandis: “in looking upon” - higher reason considering eternal reasons in themselves
• In consulendis: “in consulting” - higher reason taking counsel from eternal reasons for action

Apprehensiva (Apprehending Power) #

• Reason as a grasping or knowing power (vis apprehensiva)
• Distinguished from appetitive power

Examples & Illustrations #

Anger and Concupiscence as Strong Emotions #

• Thomas takes anger and concupiscence as the two primary emotions requiring moderation because of their vehemence
• Temperance moderates concupiscence; mildness (mansuetudo) moderates anger
• Literary examples: Samuel Johnson’s temper; Shakespeare’s Coriolanus (once anger is provoked, he cannot master it)
• Even powerful men with authority tend to cultivate some anger to frighten subordinates

Augustine’s Allegory of Adam and Eve #

• Woman represents lower reason; man represents higher reason
• In temptation: lower reason (woman) first proposes sensible pleasure; higher reason (man) must consent or refuse
• If higher reason does not resist, sin is perpetrated
• Adam’s consent was what brought about the Fall for all humanity (per Augustine and Berquist’s bishop)

The Imaginative Power and Unpremeditated Acts #

• Sometimes a man moves his hand or foot unpremeditated (without meditating)
• This shows the imaginative power can move the body without deliberation of reason
• Bodily movements without meditation are not sins but show a distinction between faculties

Thomas Aquinas’s Contemplation #

• Berquist reflects on the famous painting of Thomas Aquinas (by a Dominican) where Thomas looks upward at the cross, seeking understanding
• Contrasted with Newman (depicted in red with aquiline nose), who is stinking/sinking in the same painting
• Illustrates the virtue of contemplation and the pursuit of wisdom

Questions Addressed #

Q: Can Morose Delectation Be in Reason? #

• Resolution: Yes. Morose delectation is in reason because reason directs interior passions. When reason fails to direct (by commanding illicit passions or by not repressing them), there is sin in reason. Pleasure inheres in the appetitive power as proximate principle but in reason as first motive power.

Q: What is the Relationship Between Higher and Lower Reason? #

• Resolution: They are not two distinct powers but the same reason considered in two modes. Higher reason consults eternal law; lower reason judges temporal matters. Higher reason has supreme authority over judgments, but lower reason has its proper preliminary role. Whatever is subject to lower reason is also subject to higher reason.

Q: Does Consent in the Act of Sin Pertain to Higher Reason? #

• Resolution: Yes, properly. Because the ultimate judgment about human acts pertains to higher reason consulting eternal law, consent in the act of sin (the last thing occurring in human action) pertains to higher reason. Lower reason gives preliminary judgment about pleasure. Higher reason consents either actively (contemning the law) or negligently (omitting to consult it).

Q: Can One Sin Through Ignorance or Error in Reason? #

• Resolution: Yes, when the ignorance or error concerns things one is able and ought to know. If the defect of reason concerns things one cannot know, it does not constitute sin but excuses from sin. Invincible ignorance excuses; vincible ignorance is imputed as sin.