192. The Will and Other Powers as Subjects of Sin

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Will as Subject of Sin #

• Sin is a voluntary act, and therefore must have the will as its subject
• The will is the efficient cause of sin, but this does not prevent it from being the material subject (contrary to certain objections from Aristotle’s Physics)
• Key distinction: acts passing into external matter (burning, cutting, kicking) versus acts remaining in the agent (knowing, willing, desiring)
• Moral acts belong to the second category and thus have their subjects in the powers of the soul, not in external objects
• The act of kicking is in the thing kicked; the act of killing remains in the will and intellect

Powers as Subjects of Sin Beyond the Will #

• While the will is the first mover in sin, other powers can be subjects of sin insofar as they are moved by the will
• Two types of voluntary acts: (1) elicited by the will itself, and (2) commanded by the will
• Powers that can be commanded by the will—such as reason and sensuality—can be subjects of moral acts
• Exterior members (hands, feet) are tools (organa) of the soul, not true subjects of sin, because they are acted upon without acting

Sensuality as Subject of Sin #

• Sensuality (the sensitive appetite) is common to humans and animals, but in humans has special excellence from being joined to reason
• The sensitive appetite in humans is apt to obey reason, making it capable of voluntary acts
• Acts of sensuality without deliberation of reason are imperfect human acts and constitute venial sin
• Acts of sensuality with deliberation and consent of the will can constitute mortal sin

Key Arguments #

Arguments Against the Will Being Subject of Sin (with Responses) #

• Objection 1: Dionysius says evil is apart from will and intention, so sin cannot be in the will
  • Response: Evil is apart from will as an object; sin occurs when the will wills an apparent good that is not truly good
• Objection 2: The will is of the good or apparent good; defects in knowing pertain to the knowing power, not the will
  • Response: Defects in the knowing power that are subject to the will are regarded as sins (e.g., willful ignorance, willful inadvertence)
• Objection 3: The efficient cause and material subject cannot be the same; the will is the efficient cause, so it cannot be the subject
  • Response: This principle applies only to acts passing into external matter; moral acts remain in the agent

Arguments Against Other Powers Being Subjects of Sin (with Responses) #

• Objection 1: Augustine says sin is only by the will, so only the will is the subject
  • Response: The will is the first mover, but other powers are subjects insofar as they are moved by the will
• Objection 2: Good and bad pertain to reason and the will alone
  • Response: While good and bad in general pertain to the will, other powers have determined particular goods and evils
• Objection 3: If exterior members moved by the will were subjects of sin, then the hand that kills would be sinful, which is absurd
  • Response: Exterior members are tools, not beginnings of acts; they are acted upon without acting

The Nature of Voluntary Acts #

• An act is voluntary if it proceeds from the will, either elicited by the will itself or commanded by the will
• Voluntary acts are the proper subject matter of moral evaluation (virtue and vice, sin and righteousness)
• The will must move other powers to their acts; otherwise those powers could not be subjects of sin

Important Definitions #

Voluntary Act (Voluntarium) #

• An act proceeding from the will, either as elicited by the will itself or as commanded by the will
• The ground of moral responsibility and moral evaluation

Sensuality (Sensualitas) #

• The sensitive appetite; the power of desire in the sensitive part of the soul
• In humans, apt to obey reason and thus participates in the voluntary
• Distinguished from mere animal appetite by its capacity to be moved by reason

Imperfect Human Act #

• An act done without deliberation of reason
• Not perfectly a human act because it does not proceed from that which is the principle in man (reason and will)
• Constitutes venial rather than mortal sin

Grasping (Apprehensio) #

• From the Latin/metaphor of the hand; refers to the knowing power’s grasp of its object
• Simple apprehension (apprehensio simplex) is the first act of reason

Examples & Illustrations #

Two Types of Acts #

• External acts: Burning (act is in the wood), cutting (act is in what is cut), kicking (act is in the person kicked)
• Internal acts: Knowing, willing, desiring—these remain in the agent
• Moral acts: All belong to the internal category; the moral act of murder is primarily in the will and intellect, not in the hand

Willful Ignorance and Inadvertence #

• Making a judgment without considering all circumstances
• “I don’t want to see what’s over here”—willfully not applying one’s mind
• The will’s failure to direct reason toward full consideration of facts is a defect subject to the will

The Emotions and Reason #

• The hand is like a slave of the mind; emotions have a kind of life of their own
• When striking someone in anger, the emotion shares more in sinfulness than the hand
• Good music (Mozart, Baroque) disposes emotions to partake of reason without treating them as slaves

Questions Addressed #

Is the Will the Subject of Sin? #

• Question: Can sin exist in the will, or is the will only the efficient cause of sin?
• Resolution: The will is both the efficient cause and the material subject of sin. Sin is a voluntary act, and the will is the power from which voluntary acts proceed. Acts that remain in the agent (like willing and knowing) have their subject in the power from which they proceed.

Is the Will Alone the Subject of Sin? #

• Question: Can only the will be a subject of sin, or can other powers also be subjects?
• Resolution: While the will is the first mover in sin, other powers (reason, sensuality) can be subjects of sin insofar as they are moved by the will and are capable of voluntary acts. The distinction is between powers that are elicited by the will (acts of the will itself) and powers that are commanded by the will (acts of other powers moved by the will).

Can Sensuality Be a Subject of Sin? #

• Question: Since sensuality is common to humans and animals, and animals cannot sin, how can sensuality be a subject of sin in humans?
• Resolution: Sensuality in humans has a special excellence because it is joined to reason. The sensitive appetite in humans is apt to obey reason, making it capable of voluntary acts and thus a subject of sin. This distinguishes human sensuality from animal appetite.

Notable Quotes #

“The will is that by which one sins and by which one lives rightly.” - Augustine, Book on Free Will (Book on Two Souls)

“Non nisi voluntate peccatur” (One does not sin except by the will) - Augustine

“Wisely and slow, they stumble that run fast” - Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet (Friar Lawrence), used to illustrate jumping to conclusions

“For not so vile that on the earth doth live, but to the earth some special good doth give… Nor art so good, but strained from that fair use, revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse” - Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet (Friar Lawrence), used to illustrate corruption of nature