169. Charity as the Greatest Theological Virtue

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• The Apparent Analogy: Whether faith relates to hope and charity as intellectual virtues relate to moral virtues, since faith is in the understanding while hope and charity are in the desiring power
• The Slipperiness of Likeness: Following Plato’s insight that likeness is a most slippery thing, how apparent similarities can deceive when not carefully analyzed
• The Nature of the Theological Virtues’ Object: All three theological virtues have God as their proper object, yet differ in their mode of relation to that object
• Distance vs. Union: The distinction between faith (things not seen), hope (things not had), and charity (things already loved and in union with the lover)
• Love of Wanting vs. Love of Friendship: The crucial distinction between amor concupiscentiae (love of wanting) and amor amicitiae (love of friendship/wishing well)
• Virtues After Death: How the formal aspect of virtues remains in the separated soul while the material aspect does not

Key Arguments #

On Why the Analogy Fails #

• Objection: Faith (understanding) to hope and charity (desiring power) should relate like intellectual virtues to moral virtues, making faith superior
• Berquist’s Warning: Likeness is slippery (Platonic insight); apparent similarities require careful analysis of what ways things truly resemble and differ
• Critical Response: The analogy fails because theological virtues operate in a fundamentally different domain than moral and intellectual virtues

On Why Charity is Greatest #

• The Object is the Same: All three theological virtues have God as their proper object, so one cannot be greater by having a greater object
• Proximity to the Object Matters: Charity is greater because it is nearest to its object:
  • Faith: about things not seen (distance of knowledge)
  • Hope: about things not had (distance of possession)
  • Charity: about things already had and in union (the lover possesses the beloved in some way)
• In Things Above Man, Love is More Noble than Knowledge: For objects transcending human nature, the desiring power achieves what knowledge cannot—union with the object
• The Thing Loved is in the Lover: When one loves something, that thing is impressed upon one’s heart; the lover is drawn to union with the beloved
• Charity Persists Beyond This Life: Faith and hope disappear at the beatific vision, but charity is perfected there because union is already complete in this life

On the Types of Love #

• Love of Wanting (amor concupiscentiae): Love of something as a good for oneself; the beloved is the good one desires for oneself (e.g., desiring a teacher for his teaching, desiring a woman for her beauty/companionship)
• Love of Friendship (amor amicitiae): Love of wishing good to the other; genuine love consists in desiring the welfare of the beloved for their own sake, not for what one gains
• Hope Presupposes Love of Wanting: One must first love oneself and desire good for oneself; hope then adds the motion of extending toward the thing loved
• Charity is Love of Friendship: Charity toward God is the ultimate expression of friendship-love, wishing good to God (which is impossible in the ordinary sense) or equivalently, desiring union with Him

On the Formal vs. Material in Virtue #

• What is Formal: The ordering imposed by reason upon the desiring powers
• What is Material: The particular inclinations, emotions, and operations (concupiscence, fear, boldness, distributions of goods)
• After Death: The formal aspect of moral virtues remains in the separated soul, perfected; the material aspect does not (no hunger, lust, fear of death)
• Justice Remains in Act: Unlike temperance and fortitude, justice (in the will) remains in act even before the resurrection, because the will is incorruptible

Important Definitions #

• Amor concupiscentiae: Love of wanting; love of something as a good for oneself. The object of such love is the good one desires for oneself.
• Amor amicitiae: Love of friendship; love of wishing good to the other; genuine love that desires the beloved’s welfare for their own sake.
• Vis apprehensiva: The grasping power; the knowing power that contains things known within itself.
• Simplex apprehensio: Simple apprehension; the first act of reason, preceding judgment.
• Causa disponens: A disposing cause; causes that prepare the way rather than perfect an effect (contrasted with causa perficiens).
• Seminalia: Seed-like things; the virtues existing in root form in reason and will before the resurrection.

Examples & Illustrations #

• The Rock Metaphor: “The Lord is my rock”—a distant likeness (proportion of ratios) between God and a rock. In many ways they are unlike, yet the proportion holds in a certain respect. This illustrates how likeness can be slippery and require careful discernment.
• The Mixer Scenario: A young man sees a girl at a mixer and has love of wanting (desiring her as a good for himself). He is not thinking “I am good for her; therefore I should approach her.” True love would involve wishing good to her, not merely desiring her for himself.
• The Good Teacher: Students initially love a good teacher with love of wanting (the teacher is a good they desire for themselves—his teaching benefits them). Only later might they come to love him for his own sake.
• Wine vs. People: One can only love wine with love of wanting (you do not wish wine well except insofar as you want to enjoy it). With people, one can progress to genuine friendship-love.
• The Businessman and Friend: A businessman may initially have love of wanting for a useful associate, but if they become true friends, the businessman might come to wish good to his friend apart from any business benefit—a transition to friendship-love.
• The Priest’s Observation: A priest marrying couples had the sense that some would last and some would not, based on whether the couple seemed to wish good to each other or merely sought their own enjoyment.
• San Francisco Heart: “I left my heart in San Francisco”—illustrating how the beloved is in the lover; one is drawn to union with what is loved.
• Union Already Complete: St. Thérèse of Lisieux said, “I don’t see what I can have in heaven that I don’t have now. Our union is already complete.” This shows how charity achieves present union even in this life.
• The Separated Soul’s Experience: After death but before resurrection, the soul has no hunger, thirst, sexual desire, anger, or fear of death, yet the formal aspects of virtue remain—the will’s orientation toward God is not lost.

Notable Quotes #

• “Likeness is a most slippery thing” (Plato, Sophist): Used to warn against uncritical acceptance of apparent analogies; one must ask in what ways things are like and in what ways they differ.
• “The order of reason”: The formal aspect of all virtue; what persists in the separated soul.
• “There can be a great difference” in things that are proportionally alike: Illustrating the subtlety required when dealing with analogous terms.
• “Whoever remains in charity remains in God and God in him” (1 John 4:16): The scriptural foundation for charity’s unique mode of union.
• “Mary has chosen the better part, and it shall not be taken away from her” (Luke 10:42): The contemplative life (union through charity) persists beyond this life, while the active life passes away.
• “That which is above man is more noble in itself than as it is in man”: Why love is more perfect than knowledge when the object transcends human nature.
• “The excelling science, the charity of Christ” (Ephesians 3:19): Charity exceeds knowledge in its power to unite the soul to God.

Questions Addressed #

Is charity the greatest among the theological virtues? #

Yes. Although all three virtues have God as their object, charity is greatest because:

• It achieves union with the object, while faith and hope maintain distance
• Love (desiring power) is more noble than knowledge (knowing power) when the object transcends human nature
• The lover possesses the beloved in a real sense; the thing loved is impressed upon the heart
• Faith and hope cease at the beatific vision, but charity is perfected there

Does the analogy with intellectual and moral virtues hold? #

No, and here is why the analogy is slippery:

• Intellectual virtues (in understanding) and moral virtues (in desiring power) differ fundamentally in object and mode
• Theological virtues, however, all have the same object (God) and differ only in mode of relation to that object
• Therefore, one cannot rank them by comparing knowing vs. desiring powers, since both faith and hope already include a desiring component (the hope that extends toward God, the trust that comes with faith)

What is the difference between love of wanting and love of friendship? #

• Love of Wanting: The object is good for the subject; one seeks benefit for oneself. This is always the starting point in human relations.
• Love of Friendship: One wishes good to the other for the other’s sake, not for one’s own benefit. This is true love and the perfection of charity.
• Progression: One typically begins with love of wanting and, if grace and understanding grow, progresses to genuine friendship-love.

Do moral virtues remain after death? #

• Formally, yes: The ordering imposed by reason—the formal aspect—remains in the separated soul, perfected by the rectitude of reason about one’s state
• Materially, no: Temperance and fortitude, insofar as they concern particular emotions and bodily passions, do not remain before the resurrection (no concupiscence, no fear of death)
• Exception—Justice: Justice remains in act because it exists in the will, which is incorruptible; it pertains to being subject to God
• After the Resurrection: All moral virtues can exist again in act, since the irrational powers will again inhabit bodily organs and be perfectly disposed to obey reason