Lecture 168

168. The Hierarchy of Virtues: Justice and Wisdom

Summary
This lecture examines which moral and intellectual virtues are greatest among their respective categories. Berquist explores why justice is the chief moral virtue (being closest to reason as it exists in the will), and why wisdom is the supreme intellectual virtue (considering the highest cause, God). The lecture employs the distinction between simply (simpliciter) and in a qualified way (secundum quid) to resolve apparent contradictions about virtue rankings.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Justice as Chief Moral Virtue #

  • Object and Subject: Justice operates in the will (the rational appetite) rather than the irrational powers, making it closer to reason than temperance or fortitude
  • Operations Ordered to Another: Justice concerns acts that establish proper relationships between persons, not merely acts concerning oneself
  • Brilliance of Reason: The light of reason shines forth most clearly in justice among moral virtues, hence Aristotle calls it prae clarissima (most brilliant of the virtues)
  • Order in Ethics: Aristotle treats moral virtues affecting emotions in Books III-IV, justice in Book V, and intellectual virtues in Book VI—showing justice’s intermediate position

Wisdom as Chief Intellectual Virtue #

  • Highest Object: Wisdom considers the highest cause, which is God, and therefore has the noblest object of all intellectual virtues
  • Judging Function: Wisdom judges all other sciences and their indemonstrable principles, making it architectonic over the other intellectual virtues
  • Not Perfect Possession: While wisdom about God cannot be perfectly possessed in this life (being only God’s possession), the small knowledge attainable through wisdom is referred to and perfects all other knowledge

The Distinction: Simpliciter vs. Secundum Quid #

  • Simply (Simpliciter): A virtue is greater simply when it has a more noble object or when more of the light of reason shines through it
  • In a Qualified Way (Secundum Quid): A virtue is greater secundum quid when it serves as foundation or ornament to a principal virtue
  • Applications:
    • Justice is simply greater than liberality (being its foundation), though liberality appears greater in an immediate sense
    • Prudence commands moral virtues but is itself commanded by wisdom (prudence is the servant/minister of wisdom)
    • Patience is part of fortitude, not simply greater than it

Objections Addressed #

First Objection: Liberality (generous giving) seems greater than justice because giving one’s own is more noble than rendering what is owed.

  • Response: Liberality presupposes and depends upon justice to distinguish what is one’s own from what belongs to another. Justice is the foundation; liberality is its ornament.

Second Objection: Patience has a “perfect work” (James 1:4) and thus seems greater than justice.

  • Response: Patience is a part of fortitude, not a separate greater virtue. While patience achieves perfection in tolerating bad things, fortitude does more—it not only sustains being molested without disturbance (which patience does) but also bears at self and goes to them when needed.

Third Objection: Magnanimity seems greatest since it perfects all virtues.

  • Response: Magnanimity cannot exist without the other virtues being pre-existent. It functions as an ornament to them rather than as their superior. A magnanimous person is difficult to find.

Prudence vs. Wisdom: Does prudence, which commands moral virtues about human affairs, command wisdom?

  • Response: Prudence does not command wisdom itself but only things ordered to wisdom. Prudence is the servant or minister of wisdom, introducing to it and preparing the way—like a doorman to the king. “The spiritual one judges all things, and he is judged by no one” (1 Corinthians).

Science vs. Wisdom: We have more perfect (certain) knowledge of geometry than of God, so isn’t science greater?

  • Response: One knowledge is preferred to another either because it is about more noble things or because it is more certain. When subjects are equal in goodness, the more certain is greater. But less certain knowledge about higher things is preferred to certain knowledge about lesser things. It is better to have weak and probable knowledge of celestial things than perfect knowledge of earthly things.

Understanding vs. Wisdom: Since wisdom concludes from indemonstrable beginnings known by understanding (nous), isn’t understanding greater?

  • Response: Wisdom does not merely use indemonstrable principles (as other sciences do) but judges them and defends them against those who deny them. The wise man understands the definitions of terms better than one with mere natural understanding. Example: “The whole is greater than the part” seems violated when we say “animal includes man, dog, cat, horse”—but this confusion arises from mixing the composed whole with the universal whole. Only the wise man can properly defend and explain such principles.

Key Arguments #

On Justice as Chief Moral Virtue #

  1. The good of reason shines forth more clearly in some virtues than others
  2. Justice exists in the will (the rational appetite), closer to reason than appetites concerning emotions
  3. Justice concerns operations ordered to another person, not merely to oneself
  4. Therefore, justice prae clarissima excels among moral virtues

On Wisdom as Chief Intellectual Virtue #

  1. Intellectual virtues are greater than moral virtues simply (though moral virtues are greater secundum quid)
  2. Among intellectual virtues, the one with the noblest object is greatest
  3. Wisdom has the noblest object: the highest cause, which is God
  4. Wisdom judges all other sciences and their principles
  5. Therefore, wisdom is the head of all intellectual virtues

On Knowledge of Higher Things #

  1. One knowledge is preferred to another if it concerns more noble objects OR is more certain
  2. When nobility differs, the more noble is preferred even if less certain
  3. Wisdom concerns God (supremely noble) though imperfectly known
  4. Geometry concerns eternal, necessary objects (more certain) but lesser things
  5. Therefore, wisdom is simply greater than geometry, though geometry is greater secundum quid

Important Definitions #

Virtue (Virtus) #

  • The perfection of a power or ability to act well
  • Not merely that something good comes about, but that it comes about well (with right intention, proper manner)

Justice (Iustitia) #

  • The virtue that exists in the will and orders operations between persons
  • Establishes proper relations of giving and receiving what is owed
  • Most brilliant (prae clarissima) among moral virtues because reason shines most clearly in it

Wisdom (Sapientia) #

  • From sapere = to taste, knowledge with savor/flavor
  • Knowledge of the highest cause (God)
  • Judges all other sciences and their indemonstrable principles
  • Head (caput) of all intellectual virtues

Prudence (Prudentia/Foresight) #

  • Right reason about things to be done (human affairs)
  • Directs moral virtues in choosing means to the end
  • Also puts forward the end itself by determining the mean in each matter
  • Servant or minister to wisdom, preparing the way for contemplation

Examples & Illustrations #

On the Distinction of Wholes #

When a student objects that “animal includes more than man” (so the whole isn’t greater than the part), the wise man must distinguish between:

  • Composed whole: One composed of its parts (man = animal + rationality; animal is less than the whole definition)
  • Universal whole: A set of its parts (animal = man, dog, cat, horse; animal is more extensive) Confusing these senses leads to apparent paradox. Only the wise man can defend the principle properly.

On Justice’s Foundation #

Liberality appears to give more (one’s own goods) than justice gives (what is owed), yet justice is greater because one cannot know what is one’s own without justice first determining possession from non-possession.

On the Worth of Imperfect Knowledge #

Arystotle compares: “A glimpse of someone we love is worth more than a long view of someone we don’t care about.”

  • Better to read Homer in English translation (imperfectly) than to read a lesser poet perfectly
  • Better to have weak, probable knowledge of celestial things than perfect knowledge of earthly things

On the Wise Man’s Function #

The wise man can defend even basic principles against sophistic objections. A person with mere natural understanding cannot defend “the whole is greater than the part” against someone who plays with different senses of whole and part; only the wise man understands the definitions precisely enough to resolve the confusion.

Questions Addressed #

Q: Is Justice Simply Greater Than All Other Moral Virtues? A: Yes, because the light of reason shines forth most clearly in justice. It exists in the will (rational appetite) and concerns operations ordered to another, making it nearer to reason than temperance or fortitude, which concern emotions about self-preservation.

Q: Does Prudence Command Wisdom? A: No. Prudence commands about things ordered to wisdom but does not command wisdom itself. Prudence is the minister or servant of wisdom, preparing the way as a doorman prepares the way to the king.

Q: Is Geometry Greater Than Wisdom Because We Know It More Certainly? A: No. While geometry is more certain, wisdom is simply greater because it concerns more noble objects (God and divine things). Certain knowledge of lesser things is secundum quid greater than uncertain knowledge of greater things, but simply the greater object makes the knowledge greater.

Q: Can the Wise Man Defend Indemonstrable Principles Better Than One with Natural Understanding? A: Yes. Natural understanding grasps first principles (nous), but the wise man not only uses them as conclusions from them (like other sciences do), but judges them and can defend them against those who deny them by understanding the definitions of terms more precisely.

Q: Why Does Aristotle Treat Virtues in the Order: Emotions, Then Justice, Then Intellectual Virtues? A: This order reflects the hierarchy: emotional virtues are furthest from reason; justice, existing in the will, is closer to reason; intellectual virtues operate in reason itself. Justice forms a bridge between the emotional and rational domains.

Notable Quotes #

“Justice is prae clarissima—the most brilliant of the virtues.” — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics V, cited by Berquist to explain why justice excels among moral virtues

“The spiritual one judges all things, and he is judged by no one.” — 1 Corinthians 2:15, applied to wisdom’s function in judging all other intellectual virtues

“Mary hath chosen the better part, and it shall not be taken away from her.” — Christ (Luke 10:42), cited to show that contemplative wisdom (possessed by Mary) will endure eternally, unlike the active life (Martha’s)

“Wisdom is the knowledge of God in both senses: knowledge about God and the knowledge which God has.” — Berquist, explicating the doubling meaning of wisdom and its divine character