167. The Intensity and Equality of Virtues

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Question of Virtue’s Capacity for More and Less #

• Whether virtue, defined as maximum good, can admit degrees of intensity
• Two ways to understand the question:
  • (1) Comparing virtues of different species (e.g., courage vs. temperance)
  • (2) Comparing virtues of the same species in different subjects (e.g., two courageous people)
• Resolution: Virtues admit degrees (1) in themselves according to the extension of their matter, and (2) in subjects according to intensity of the habit, disposition of nature, clarity of reason, or measure of grace

The Equality of Virtues in One Person #

• Whether all virtues existing in the same person are equally intense
• The apparent problem: Saints are praised especially for different virtues (Abraham for faith, Moses for mildness, Job for patience)
• Resolution through proportional equality: Virtues grow proportionally together in one person, like the fingers of a hand
  • Fingers are unequal in quantity but equal in proportion as they grow
  • All virtues increase together through their connection via prudence (for moral virtues) and charity (for infused virtues)
• Saints are more prompt in the acts of particular virtues, not that they possess one virtue more intensely than another

Moral Virtues vs. Intellectual Virtues #

• Apparent contradiction: Moral virtues seem more necessary and permanent; intellectual virtues perfect the more noble faculty (reason)
• Key distinction: Simpliciter (simply) vs. secundum quid (in a certain respect)
  • Simpliciter: According to the definition of a thing’s species, considering something in itself
  • Secundum quid: According to some particular aspect or relation, not in itself
• Resolution:
  • Intellectual virtues are superior simpliciter because reason is more noble than appetite; they grasp universals rather than particulars
  • Moral virtues are superior secundum quid because they are more necessary and permanent for human life
  • The good of reason (intellectual virtue’s object) is more noble than the good of appetite (moral virtue’s object)

Key Arguments #

Arguments that Virtue Cannot Be More or Less #

Objection 1: Equality from Scripture

• The sides of the City of Jerusalem are equal (Apocalypse 21:16), signifying the virtues
• Therefore all virtues must be equal and one virtue cannot be greater than another

Objection 2: Virtue Consists in the Maximum

• Everything whose definition consists in the most cannot be more or less
• Virtue is the “ultimate of power” (Aristotle, Physics Book 1)
• Augustine: Virtues are “maxima bona” (greatest goods) which no one can use badly
• Therefore virtue cannot be more or less

Objection 3: God’s Infinite Power

• Perfect virtues (infused virtues) come from God, whose power is uniform and infinite
• Therefore infused virtues should be uniform and admit no degrees

Arguments that Virtue Can Be More or Less #

For the position:

• Matthew 5: “Unless your justice abounds more than that of the scribes and Pharisees, do not enter into the kingdom of heaven”
• Proverbs 15: “In abundant justice, there is grace virtue”
• These passages show growth and superabundance in virtues
• By experience: one person acts in one virtue with more pleasure and promptness than in another virtue (supporting different intensities)

Resolution: Two Ways Virtue Admits Degrees #

In itself (according to the ratio/species)

• One virtue of one man is greater than another: Charity > Faith and Hope
• Cause and root of human good is reason; therefore Prudence (which perfects reason) is preferred to moral virtues
• Among moral virtues: Justice (in the will, the rational desiring power) > Fortitude (in the irascible) > Temperance (in the concupiscible)
• Among intellectual virtues: those nearer to the cause (reason) are greater

In the subject (according to intensity)

• The magnitude or smallness is attended according to the extension of the virtue
• One person may have temperance that extends to wine, beer, whiskey, food, and all matters of appetite
• Another person may have temperance that extends only partially to some of these matters
• However, whoever has a virtue has it as far as all the things to which the virtue extends (else it is imperfect)
• According to intensity: virtue can be more or less either in diverse times in the same man or in diverse men
  • Due to being accustomed to it more
  • Due to better disposition of nature
  • Due to clearer judgment of reason
  • Due to greater gift of grace (each according to the measure of the giving of Christ)

The Stoic Position and Its Defect #

• Stoics held that virtue does not receive more and less (as science or art does)
• They thought virtue must attain to right reason in the mean in something indivisible, like a point
• Thomas’s response: The mean need not be indivisible like a point; it suffices to be near the middle
• Example of archers: Some are more near the bullseye than others; there is leeway around the target, not perfect precision required
• Therefore the Stoic position is too strict

On Equality of Virtues in One Person: Detailed Arguments #

Objection 1: Different Gifts from God

• 1 Corinthians 7: “Each one has his own gift from God, right? One this, another that”
• If all virtues were equally intense, one person could not exceed another in one virtue while the other exceeds in a different virtue

Objection 2: Saints Known for Particular Virtues

• Abraham especially praised for faith
• Moses for mildness
• Job for patience
• Each confessor in the Church has some prerogative of some virtue
• Therefore not all virtues are equal in one person

Objection 3: Experience of Differential Promptness

• The more intense a habit is, the more readily and pleasantly one acts according to it
• By experience, one person acts with more pleasure and promptness in one virtue than in another
• Therefore virtues are not equal in one person

Augustine’s Counter-Position (from On the Trinity, Book 6):

• “Whoever are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance. And that about the rest”
• This suggests all virtues of one person must be equal
• This would follow from the fact that virtues are connected through prudence and charity

Resolution: Proportional Equality Through Connection of Virtues #

Two reasons for the connection of virtues:

1. According to four general conditions of virtues (Augustine’s way)

   • Each virtue must have: prudence, moderation, fortitude, and justice
   • One cannot be truly virtuous in any matter unless all four conditions are equal in that virtue
   • Example: One’s fortitude is deficient if it lacks prudence; therefore if one person’s fortitude is more prudent than another’s, they are not equal in fortitude

2. According to virtues with determined matters (Aquinas’s way)

   • For moral virtues: connection through Prudence (which takes counsel about all things to be done)
   • For infused virtues: connection through Charity (the form of all infused virtues)
   • Not on the part of the inclination (which is on the side of the subject)

How Equality Works:

• In the formal element (right reason): If reason is equally perfect in one person, then the middle constituted in each matter according to right reason must be proportionally equal
• In the material element (inclination to act): One person can be more prompt to the act of one virtue than to the act of another, due to:
  • Nature
  • Custom/habit
  • Gift of grace

Proportional Equality Illustrated:

• Like the fingers of the hand: unequal in absolute quantity but equal in proportion as they grow
• Legs and arms grow proportionally even though legs are longer
• All virtues grow proportionally together in one person

On Gifts of Grace: Gratia Gratis Data vs. Gratia Gratum Faciens #

Two kinds of grace:

• Gratia gratis data (freely given grace): Gifts like miracles, speaking in tongues, healing—not common to all, nor equal in one person
• Gratia gratum faciens (grace making acceptable): Sanctifying grace that makes one pleasing to God; freely given but with the additional character of making one God’s favorite

Application to the objection from 1 Corinthians 7:

• Can be understood of gifts of gratia gratis data, which vary by person
• Or understood of different measures of gratia gratum faciens, according to which one person abounds in all virtues more than another, due to:
  • Greater abundance of prudence
  • Greater abundance of charity (in which all infused virtues are connected)

Graded distribution by role:

• God does not act according to necessity of nature but according to the order of his wisdom
• Greater measure of virtue given to those with more important roles
• Example: Apostles receive more grace than ordinary faithful, because the Church is founded on them
• Example: Mary receives virtue in greater degree than the apostles (“full of grace”)
• The fruit of her womb is the greatest fruit possible

On Founders of Religious Orders #

• Question: Do all members of a religious order have as much grace as the founder?
• Probable view: The founder would have virtue in excellence, being the founder
• Example: Would any Dominican have as much grace as St. Dominic (founder)?
• Counter-example: The Legionaries of Christ had defects requiring re-founding, despite claims about the founder’s grace

Important Definitions #

Simpliciter (Latin: simply, absolutely)

• According to the very definition of a thing’s species
• Considering something in itself, without relation to particular circumstances
• Example: Intellectual virtues are superior simpliciter because they perfect the more noble faculty

Secundum quid (Latin: in a certain respect)

• According to some particular aspect, relation, or circumstance
• Not in itself, but under some qualification
• Example: Moral virtues are superior secundum quid for human life, because they are more necessary
• Note: Nothing prevents something from being better simpliciter while being worse secundum quid (Aristotle’s example: philosophizing is better simpliciter than making money, but making money is better secundum quid for one under necessity)

Proportional Equality

• Equality not in absolute quantity but in proportion
• The virtues increase proportionally together in one person
• Illustrated by fingers of a hand: unequal in length but equal in proportion

Maxima bona (Latin: greatest goods)

• Augustine’s term for virtues
• Goods that no one can use badly
• Therefore cannot admit imperfection in themselves

Ratio of a virtue

• The defining characteristic or essence of a virtue
• Virtues differ in ratio/species according to their objects
• The ratio consists in attaining a mean according to right reason

Gratia gratis data (Latin: freely given grace)

• Graces given freely for the good of others (gifts, miracles, healing, tongues)
• Not necessarily sanctifying; not common to all
• Can vary among those who possess them

Gratia gratum faciens (Latin: grace making acceptable)

• Sanctifying grace that makes one acceptable/pleasing to God
• Forms the basis for virtues
• Can be distributed in different measures according to God’s wisdom

Examples & Illustrations #

The City of Jerusalem’s Sides #

• Apocalypse 21:16 describes a square city with equal sides
• Spiritually interpreted as representing virtues
• Illustration of proportional equality: though materially square and solid, the sides are equal in proportion (unlike a sphere)

Archers and the Target #

• Archers shooting at a target
• Some are more near the bullseye than others
• There is leeway around the target (not an indivisible point)
• Shows that virtue admits degrees: one can be more or less well-disposed to hitting the mean
• Rejects Stoic view that the mean must be indivisible like a point

Geometry and Extension of Knowledge #

• Two people both knowledgeable in geometry
• One’s knowledge extends to more conclusions than the other’s
• Euclid extends to even more conclusions
• Shows how a virtue/science can be greater in the same person according to extension of matter

Temperance and Diet #

• Can one be temperate if:
  • Drinks wine moderately but not beer moderately?
  • Drinks beer moderately but not whiskey moderately?
  • Eats chicken in moderation but not steak?
  • Eats steak in moderation but not cake?
  • Eats cake in moderation but not candy?
• Answer: Temperance must extend to all things to which it applies, else it is imperfect
• Contrast with science/art: Not every grammarian knows all things pertaining to grammar

Fingers of the Hand #

• Fingers unequal in quantity (some longer than others)
• Yet equal in proportion (grow proportionally as hand develops)
• Legs and arms: legs longer than arms, yet grow proportionally
• Illustrates how virtues can be unequal in intensity while equal in proportion

Different Saints’ Excellences #

• Abraham: especially praised for faith
• Moses: especially praised for mildness
• Job: especially praised for patience
• Each confessor: “there is not found anyone like him, who can serve the law of the Most High”
• Shows that different people are more prompt in different virtues
• Yet this does not mean they possess different virtues unequally

Medal of Honor for Courage #

• Berquist notes: When Medal of Honor is given for courage, it’s because of “more” courage
• Yet he expected that when you grow in courage you grow in all the virtues
• Illustrates the dialectical tension that gets resolved through proportional equality

Mozart’s Piano Concertos #

• Berquist mentions insights from Mozart’s piano concertos
• They deal with the irascible power to some extent
• Illustrates how different forms of human excellence can be manifested

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Can virtue be more or less? #

A: Yes, in two distinct ways:

1. In itself (comparing virtues of different species): Virtues differ in nobility according to their objects and how close they are to reason as their source. Prudence > Justice > Fortitude > Temperance in the moral virtues.
2. In the subject (comparing virtues of the same species in different people): Virtues admit degrees according to intensity of habit, disposition of nature, clarity of reason, or measure of grace given. One person can have fuller temperance than another.

Q2: Are all virtues in one person equal? #

A: Yes, by a proportional equality. They grow proportionally together through their connection via prudence (for moral virtues) and charity (for infused virtues). Though saints are more prompt in acts of particular virtues, they possess all virtues proportionally. The formal element (right reason) is equal in one person; the material element (inclination to act) can vary by nature, custom, or grace, making one more prompt in particular acts.

Q3: How do we resolve the apparent contradiction between different gifts from God (1 Cor 7) and Augustine’s claim that those equal in fortitude are equal in other virtues? #

A: The Corinthians text can be understood in two ways:

1. It refers to gratia gratis data (freely given grace like miracles and healing), which are not common to all and vary unequally
2. Or it refers to different measures of gratia gratum faciens (sanctifying grace), where God gives different measures according to his wisdom and the role of the person, not that the virtues are unequal in the same person

Q4: Why do saints seem to excel in different virtues if all virtues should be equal? #

A: Saints are more prompt in the acts of particular virtues, not that they possess those virtues more intensely. The promptness varies according to nature, custom, or special gift of grace. The formal equality (right reason) remains the same; only the inclination and readiness to act differs.

Q5: Are intellectual virtues or moral virtues superior? #

A: Intellectual virtues are superior simpliciter (in themselves) because they perfect reason, which is more noble than appetite and grasps universals rather than particulars. However, moral virtues are superior secundum quid (in a certain respect) because they are more necessary and permanent for human life. This distinction resolves the apparent contradiction.