158. Cardinal Virtues: Division, Distinction, and Overflow

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Formal Principle of Virtue #

Virtue’s good is found in reason, which can be considered in two ways:

1. According to the act of reason itself: This yields prudence (foresight), the very consideration of reason
2. According as reason lays down order: This yields three virtues concerned with order:
   • Justice: Order regarding operations and what is owed
   • Temperance: Order regarding the concupiscible appetite (desires for sensible pleasures)
   • Fortitude: Order regarding the irascible appetite (fear and difficulty)

The Two Appetites and Their Corresponding Virtues #

The Concupiscible Appetite (ἐπιθυμία - epithumia)

• Concerned with desires for pleasure (especially of touch: food, drink, sexual pleasure)
• Subject of temperance
• Requires moderation rather than suppression
• Virtue lies between two vices: intemperance (excess) and deficiency (rare, unnamed)

The Irascible Appetite (θυμός - thumos)

• Concerned with fear, danger, and labor
• Subject of fortitude
• Requires firmness and strengthening
• Virtue lies between cowardice and foolhardiness
• Makes the soul firm in reason against impulse of passion

Two Ways of Understanding Cardinal Virtues #

First Way: General Conditions (not distinct habits)

• Cardinal virtues represent general qualities found in all virtues
• Prudence = rightness of discretion
• Justice = rightness of soul in doing what is owed
• Temperance = proper mode placed on passions or operations
• Fortitude = firmness of soul against passion
• All moral virtues share these conditions by virtue of being virtues
• According to this understanding, only prudence is truly distinct (being of reason by essence), while the other three are not distinct from each other

Second Way: Special Virtues (distinct habits)

• Cardinal virtues as determined to special matters
• Distinguished by their formal objects and subject matter
• Prudence perfects reason itself
• Justice perfects the will regarding what is owed
• Temperance perfects the concupiscible appetite
• Fortitude perfects the irascible appetite
• According to this understanding, all four are truly distinct

The Overflow (Redundancy) of Virtues #

• Virtues are interconnected through their common ordering to reason
• One who can restrain the most difficult passion (pleasure of touch) can more easily restrain others
• “Who can do what is more difficult, is able also to do what is less difficult”
• Fortitude “overflows” into temperance: the firm soul more easily retains firmness against pleasure
• Temperance “overflows” into fortitude: the temperate soul more easily observes proper mode in all things
• All virtues denominate each other through this overflow, though each is chiefly found in its proper matter

The Problem of Virtue in Divine Reality #

• Aristotle says it is ridiculous to attribute justice, fortitude, and temperance to God
• However, prudence and justice can be said of God more properly
• God’s prudence: More universal foresight than human prudence
• God’s justice: Observance of order in His works
• God’s fortitude: God’s immutability (metaphorically)
• God’s temperance: Cannot be said even metaphorically of God, since God has no desires to moderate
• The reason: God has no emotions or irascible/concupiscible appetites
• Thus only prudence and justice are truly found in God; fortitude and temperance apply only metaphorically if at all

Four Kinds of Cardinal Virtues (Macrobius/Plotinus Division) #

Political Virtues (ἀρετὰι πολιτικαί - aretai politikai)

• Virtues of man living according to his nature
• Concerned with human things in the city
• The ordinary moral virtues as understood by Aristotle and natural philosophy
• Man is a political animal; these virtues perfect his natural social nature

Purging Virtues (ἀρετὰι καθάρσεως - aretai katharseōs)

• Virtues of those passing over and tending toward divine likeness
• Flight from earthly things toward divine things
• Not a vice despite appearance: to desert human things when necessary is virtuous
• Differ from political virtues by their end and intention
• All thinking directed toward God alone
• Leaving aside natural necessities insofar as nature allows
• Soul does not fear excess in body
• Whole soul consents to divine way proposed

Virtues of the Purged Soul (ἀρετὰι ψυχῆς καθαρθείσης - aretai psychēs kathartheisēs)

• Virtues of those now attaining divine similitude
• Virtues of the blessed or those most perfect in this life
• Prudence looks only upon divine things
• Temperance does not know earthly desires (forgets them rather than represses them)
• Fortitude ignores the passions (ignores rather than conquers)
• Justice makes perpetual covenant with God
• Without passions, not because insensitive, but because perfectly ordered to divine union

Exemplar Virtues (ἀρετὰι παραδείγματα - aretai paradeigmata)

• Virtues in the divine mind
• The eternal pattern and exemplar for all created virtues
• Not attributed to God in the same sense as moral virtues in us
• God’s virtues are formally His own divine attributes or operations

Key Arguments #

Argument: Virtues Are Distinct by Their Formal Principles #

• Premise 1: Things are distinguished by their formal objects or formal principles
• Premise 2: The four cardinal virtues have different formal principles:
  • Prudence: the very act and consideration of reason
  • Justice: order regarding operations and what is owed
  • Temperance: restraint of concupiscible passions
  • Fortitude: firmness of soul against irascible passions
• Conclusion: The four cardinal virtues are distinguished from each other as special virtues

Argument: Virtues Are Not Distinct (Socratic Position) #

• Premise 1: Gregory says each cardinal virtue contains the others (prudence in fortitude, etc.)
• Premise 2: Diverse species of the same genus do not denominate one another
• Conclusion: If virtues contained one another, they would not be distinct; therefore, they are not distinct
• Response: This argument applies to cardinal virtues understood as general conditions, not as special virtues. The overflow explains the apparent containment.

Argument: Cardinal Virtues Cannot Be Said of God #

• Premise 1: Aristotle teaches it is ridiculous to attribute justice, fortitude, and temperance to God
• Premise 2: If these virtues were said of God, it would not be ridiculous
• Conclusion: These virtues are not truly said of God
• Resolution: These virtues, as understood by Aristotle in the Ethics, are about human affairs (buying, selling, fear, sensible pleasure). God, having no emotions or bodily nature, does not have these virtues in the same sense. God is beyond such virtues; He can have prudence and justice more properly.

Important Definitions #

Cardinal Virtue (ἀρετὰι καρδινάλιοι - aretai kardinaloi)

• From cardina (hinge): virtues upon which the whole structure of moral life turns
• Also called principal virtues (principales)
• The four: prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance

Prudence (φρόνησις - phronēsis; Latin prudentia or foresight)

• The intellectual virtue of right reason about things to be done
• Concerned with the command of reason (not merely counsel or judgment)
• Perfects reason by essence
• The virtue of discretion in particular acts and matters

Justice (δικαιοσύνη - dikaiosynē; Latin iustitia)

• The virtue concerned with operations and what is owed to another
• Involves order and equality (proportionality)
• Divided into commutative justice (exchanges between equals) and distributive justice (distribution according to rank or merit)
• The rightness of soul in rendering what is due

Fortitude (ἀνδρεία - andreia; Latin fortitudo)

• The virtue of the irascible appetite making the soul firm
• Chiefly concerned with fear of dangers, especially death
• Enables standing firm in reason against impulse of passion
• Virtue of strengthening or making firm

Temperance (σωφροσύνη - sōphrosynē; Latin temperantia)

• The virtue of the concupiscible appetite restraining desires
• Chiefly concerned with pleasures of touch (food, drink, sexual pleasure)
• Involves proper moderation and mode
• Also called moderation (moderatio)

Overflow (Latin redundantia)

• The way virtues interpenetrate and denominate one another
• One virtue is found in another through their common ordering to reason
• One who masters a more difficult matter is more able to master an easier matter

Concupiscible Appetite (ἐπιθυμία - epithumia)

• The rational appetite concerned with desires for sensible goods and pleasures
• Subject of temperance
• Connected to the bodily senses, especially touch

Irascible Appetite (θυμός - thumos or θυμικόν - thymikon)

• The rational appetite concerned with difficult goods and obstacles
• Subject of fortitude
• Responsive to difficulty, danger, and struggle

Formal Principle (Latin principium formale)

• That aspect of a thing which formally constitutes it
• For virtue: the good of reason, which can be considered as the act of reason itself or as establishing order

Examples & Illustrations #

The American Revolutionary War #

• American soldiers, unused to battle, scattered when British soldiers formed ranks to shoot
• Washington threw his hat down in frustration: “How am I supposed to fight with this kind of army?”
• Contrast with trained soldiers: not naturally cowardly, but lack training and habituation in courage
• Illustration: Fortitude must be acquired through practice; natural fear must be overcome

The Officer’s Position #

• “I’ll be behind you” — Officer does not stay behind; he leads from the front
• Contrast with the next rank of soldiers
• Shows true fortitude vs. mere appearance

Mozart’s Musical Keys and Emotions #

• Mozart is highly sensitive to key selection as expression of emotional states
• G major or B-flat major: Represent concupiscible emotions (pleasures, desire)
• D major or C major: Represent irascible emotions (magnanimity, hope, great deeds)
• Symphonies 36 and 41 (both C major): Represent magnanimity—great soul, hope, doing great things
• Symphony 39 (E-flat major): Middle position, kind of relaxed but magnanimous
• Last five symphonies: Include these different keys in various movements as loveurs
• Contrast with Haydn: Haydn changes keys for variety; Mozart changes keys only when emotions significantly change
• Illustration: Even in art, structure mirrors the structure of the soul and its appetites

Temperance and Intemperance #

• Desire for pleasure of food or drink must be moderated
• Intemperance: excess in such desires
• Deficiency (not enjoying food/drink at all): So rare Aristotle does not name it; called “puritanism”
• Illustration: The virtuous mean is not equally distant from both extremes in naming

Plato’s Republic: The Three-Part Soul #

• Socrates uses enlarged comparison in Republic Book II
• Rulers (reason), soldiers (irascible), common people/laborers (concupiscible)
• Three virtues corresponding to three parts: wisdom, courage, temperance
• Problem: Plato does not distinguish the will from the irascible appetite
• Thomas’s distinction: If will is separated from irascible appetite, there are four parts, not three
• Illustration: Different frameworks for understanding the soul and its virtues

The Military Base Student #

• Student going out to military base reported: soldiers said, “I’m telling you, you’re killing somebody with your own hands”
• Scared the student
• But soldiers themselves are not cowards; they have been trained in fortitude
• Illustration: Fear is natural; fortitude habituates one to face fear while remaining rational

Plato on Genuine Conviction vs. Mere Appearance #

• In Republic Book I, Socrates convinces men of truth
• In Book II, someone asks: “Socrates, did you want to appear to have convinced us or to really have convinced us?”
• They answer: “Really convinced us”
• Socrates responds: “Then I’m going to blow it up big” (enlarge the analogy)
• Illustration: The need for deep understanding, not mere appearance

Gymnastics and Music in Plato #

• Gymnastics: Makes men gun-ho, aggressive (perfects irascible appetite)
• Music: Tames the savage beast, makes one a gentleman (perfects concupiscible appetite)
• Not just an officer, but an officer and a gentleman
• Illustration: Different disciplines perfect different parts of the soul

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Are the four cardinal virtues truly distinct from each other? #

Objection (Socratic position via Gregory):

• Gregory says each virtue contains the others
• Prudence is in fortitude, temperance in justice, etc.
• If they contain one another, they cannot be distinct

Resolution:

• Two ways to understand the cardinal virtues:
  1. As general conditions found in all virtues (not distinct habits)
  2. As special virtues determined to special matters (distinct habits)
• Gregory speaks of them in the first way: as general conditions
• Each cardinal virtue, as a general condition, “overflows” into the others
• When understood as special virtues (second way), they are truly distinct by their objects and subject matters
• The overflow explains why they denominate one another without ceasing to be distinct

Q2: Can cardinal virtues be said of God? #

Objection:

• Aristotle says it is ridiculous to attribute justice, fortitude, and temperance to God
• These virtues cannot be said of God

Resolution:

• Aristotle speaks of virtues insofar as they are about human things (buying/selling, fear, sensible pleasure)
• God, having no emotions or bodily nature, does not have these virtues in that sense
• More properly, God can be said to have:
  • Prudence: Universal foresight far exceeding human prudence
  • Justice: Observance of order in His works
  • Fortitude: God’s immutability (metaphorically)
  • Temperance: Cannot be said even metaphorically, since God has no desires to moderate
• The virtues are ordered differently in Thomas’s treatment of theology: prudence and justice first (found in God), then fortitude and temperance (found only in creatures with appetites)
• This differs from Aristotle’s order in the Ethics, which follows the natural human condition

Q3: Why are cardinal virtues divided into four kinds (political, purging, purged, exemplar)? #

Objection (First):

• Exemplar virtues are in God’s mind, not in us
• We cannot have virtues like God’s

Response:

• The division concerns degrees of the same virtues ordered to different ends
• Political virtues: ordered to human life in the city (natural end)
• Purging virtues: ordered to transition toward divine likeness (supernatural aspiration)
• Purged virtues: ordered to actual divine similitude (blessed or most perfect in this life)
• Exemplar virtues: the divine pattern in God’s mind
• Each is a real virtue, but progressively more perfect in its ordering to God

Objection (Second):

• Virtues of the purged soul are without passions
• But virtues require passions to act on

Response:

• The virtues of the purged soul are not insensitive (not Stoic)
• Rather, the passions are so perfectly ordered to God that they are “forgotten” (no longer disordered)
• Not by deadening sensation, but by transforming desire into union with God
• Distinction from Stoicism: the Christian does not make flesh insensible like stone; the blessed simply have no disordered passions

Objection (Third):

• To desert human things seems vicious, contrary to Cicero who says those who despise human duties commit vice

Response:

• To desert human things where necessity is laid down is vicious
• Otherwise, it is virtuous
• Necessity for human life in the city: justice, courage, temperance in human affairs
• But man can also be ordered to divine things insofar as possible
• Matthew 5:48: “Be perfect even as your heavenly Father is perfect”
• The purging virtues direct the soul toward this higher end while still respecting natural necessity
• Virtue lies in proper ordering, not in absolute withdrawal

Notable Quotes #

“And thus, many people speak about these virtues, both the sacred Doctors, the Fathers in the Church, and also the Philosophers. They quote Seneca down here, but also Cicero, right?” — Berquist, on the convergence of Christian and pagan traditions on cardinal virtues

“Most men are, to some extent, cowards, right? You naturally tend to refuse that.” — Berquist, on the natural difficulty of fortitude

“Your desire for the pleasure of food or a drink or something like that, you tend to what? Yeah, yeah. Okay. So you need to mainly be, what? Moderated, right?” — Berquist, on temperance as moderation

“If you study these different powers… then you kind of see the significance of this argument.” — Berquist, on the importance of understanding the irascible and concupiscible appetites