154. Virtue, Sadness, and the Passions

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Stoic vs. Peripatetic Debate on Passions #

• Stoic Position: The wise person should be entirely free from disturbances (taraxia) of the soul. The Stoics held that nothing external to virtue is truly good, therefore nothing external can cause legitimate sadness in the virtuous person.
• Peripatetic (Aristotelian) Position: Passions can and should coexist with virtue when properly moderated by reason. Virtue moderates rather than eliminates the passions.
• Thomas’s Resolution: Christ’s perfect virtue coexisted with sadness (“My soul is sad unto death”), demonstrating that sadness is compatible with perfect virtue when it concerns appropriate objects.

Can Virtue Exist With Sadness? #

Arguments Against Sadness in Virtue #

1. Virtue is an effect of wisdom, which has no bitterness (Book of Wisdom 8)
2. Sadness impedes good operation (Nicomachean Ethics 7 and 10)
3. Sadness is a sickness of the soul, contrary to virtue as health of the soul (Cicero, Tusculan Questions 3)

Thomas’s Resolution #

• Moderate sadness about present evils is reasonable when one cannot remedy them
• Virtuous sadness concerns appropriate objects:
  • One’s own sins (venial or mortal)
  • The sins of others
  • Impediments to wisdom
  • The loss of loved ones
• In the blessed in heaven, where no impediments to wisdom exist, sadness has no place
• Distinction: Sadness about things that impede virtue is not the same as sadness about virtue itself. The wise person is not sad about wisdom, but about what prevents wisdom.

Moral Virtue and Its Objects #

Diversity of Objects in Moral Virtue #

• Passions as Matter: Some moral virtues have passions (πάθη/passiones) as their proper matter—fortitude and temperance are primary examples
• Operations as Matter: Other moral virtues concern operations rather than passions—justice is the primary example
• Key Principle: Moral virtue perfects the desiring part of the soul (appetitiva pars) by ordering it to the good of reason

The Distinction Between Will and Sensitive Appetite #

• Will (voluntas): The intellectual appetite, not subject to passion
• Sensitive Appetite: The seat of the eleven passions; subject to passions
• Importance: Not every moral virtue requires passion because reason orders both the passions and the operations of the will

Key Arguments #

Against the Stoic Position #

• The Christ Example: Christ possessed perfect virtue while experiencing sadness, fear, and weeping. This directly contradicts the Stoic claim that virtue and sadness cannot coexist.
• The Nature of Present Evil: Something bad can be present to the wise person—namely, losses of bodily goods, venial sins, or the sins of others—which reason can rightly detest and which can produce moderate sadness
• The Overflow Principle: When reason detests an evil truly present, the sensitive appetite (following reason) moderately becomes sad about this evil

For Moderated Passions in Virtue #

• Passions Aid Proper Action: Sadness about present evils more strongly moves us to flee them, just as pleasure moves us to pursue goods
• Passions Impede Contrary Actions: Sadness impedes the operation about which one is sad (a student sad about studying impedes learning), but aids the actions by which sadness is fled
• The Mean in Effect, Not in Essence: Virtue constitutes a mean among passions not by being a middle value in itself, but by producing a proportionate effect according to reason’s judgment

Important Definitions #

Passion (πάθος, passio) #

• A motion of the sensitive appetite caused by an external object
• Characterized by having its beginning in external objects and its terminus in reason
• One of eleven passions: love, hatred, desire, aversion, joy, sadness, hope, despair, fear, courage, anger

Virtue (ἀρετή, virtus) #

• A stable habit perfecting a power to its good operation
• Perfects the desiring part of the soul by ordering it to the good of reason
• Has its beginning in reason and its terminus in the appetite as moved by reason

Moderate vs. Immoderate Sadness #

• Moderate (moderata): Sadness that follows the judgment of reason about appropriate objects; this is praiseworthy and compatible with virtue
• Immoderate (immoderatus): Excessive sadness that overcomes reason’s control; this is a sickness of the soul and contrary to virtue

The Desiring Part (pars appetitiva) #

• The sensitive appetite, capable of being ordered by reason
• Subject to the passions
• Distinguished from the will, which is the intellectual appetite and not subject to passion

Examples & Illustrations #

Biblical and Theological Examples #

• Christ Weeping Over Jerusalem: An instance of praiseworthy sadness about the sins of others, demonstrating how sadness about moral evil is compatible with perfect virtue
• Christ’s Passion: “My soul is sad unto death” (Matthew 26) shows the perfect integration of sadness with virtue
• Christ Weeping at Lazarus’s Death: “See how he loved him” (John 11:35)—sadness appropriate to the loss of a friend

Literary and Practical Examples #

• Romeo and Juliet: Their excessive sadness upon thinking the other dead shows passion overcoming reason—an immoderate rather than virtuous sadness
• The Stoic and His Dead Son: “I always knew he was mortal”—Berquist notes this response seems inhuman, contrasting with the proper sadness Christians should feel at loss
• The Bank Robbery Examples:
  • A robber sad about his failure (empty gun) rather than sad about attempting robbery shows misplaced identification
  • A robber whose hand comes out of his pocket for the bag instead of a gun and must flee—identifies more with his stupidity than his evil
• The Convenience Store Robbery: A robber who accidentally dialed 911 while robbing—illustrating how even criminals identify with their reason rather than their actions

Musical Examples #

• Mozart’s Music: Witness to how emotions can partake of reason in good compositions
• Baroque Music: Demonstrates emotions participating in reason
• Johann Sebastian Bach’s B Minor Mass: Written while Bach applied to a Catholic church position, following the Roman Mass rather than the Lutheran Mass; shows how artistic excellence can express ordered emotional and rational content
• Handel’s Messiah: Handel reported feeling inspired as if “the heavens opened”—an example of virtue’s overflow into emotional and imaginative states

Notable Quotes #

“The sadness which is according to God works penance into a stable salvation.” (Saint Paul, 2 Corinthians)

“If we say we have no sin, we seduce ourselves.” (1 John 1:8)

“See how he loved him.” (Gospel of John 11:35, regarding Christ weeping at Lazarus’s tomb)

“Perfect seeing is the act of a well-disposed sight towards the most beautiful of objects.” (Aristotle, quoted by Thomas Aquinas)

Questions Addressed #

Article 3: Can Virtue Exist With Sadness? #

The Question: Whether sadness can be found in the virtuous person or whether virtue, as associated with wisdom and good operation, is incompatible with sadness

Thomas’s Answer:

• Sadness about impediments to wisdom is compatible with virtue
• The wise person is not sad about wisdom itself, but about what prevents wisdom
• Moderate sadness about present evils is a sign of virtue, not its absence
• In heaven, where all impediments are removed, sadness will have no place

Article 4: Is Every Moral Virtue About the Passions? #

The Question: Whether all moral virtues have passions as their proper matter, or whether some virtues concern operations instead

Arguments That All Virtue Is About Passions:

• Aristotle says moral virtue is about pleasures and sadnesses
• The desiring part, which is the subject of moral virtue, is where passions reside
• Some virtues clearly concern passions (fortitude, temperance)

Thomas’s Answer:

• Not every moral virtue has passions as its proper matter
• Some virtues are about operations and do not require passions (justice)
• Passions follow upon virtuous acts as a consequence, not as the primary matter
• Justice, being in the will (intellectual appetite), can exist in God and angels without passion
• Reason orders both the passions of the sensitive appetite and the operations of the will

The Role of Pleasure and Sadness in Virtue #

Key Principle: While not every virtue is about the passions (as about its proper matter), every virtue produces pleasure or sadness following upon its acts. The virtuous person delights in virtuous acts and is saddened by contrary acts. This is a sign and consequence of virtue, not its matter.

Pedagogical Notes #

Critical Distinctions #

1. Passion About Virtue vs. Passion About What Impedes Virtue: Sadness about wisdom is contrary to virtue; sadness about obstacles to wisdom is a mark of virtue
2. Sadness as the Passion vs. Sadness as the Matter: Not all sadness is the matter of virtue, but sadness (following on virtuous acts) is always present in the virtuous
3. The Will vs. The Sensitive Appetite: The will (intellectual appetite) cannot be the subject of passion; only the sensitive appetite can. Therefore, virtues in the will (like justice) need not concern passions
4. Moderate vs. Excessive: What matters is whether sadness is moderated by reason and directed to appropriate objects

Common Errors to Avoid #

• Thinking virtue eliminates emotions (Stoic error)
• Confusing the will with emotions
• Assuming all passions are contrary to virtue
• Thinking that virtuous sadness is impossible
• Believing that perfect virtue means the absence of all sadness rather than the proper moderation of sadness