151. Moral Virtue Distinguished from Intellectual Virtue

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• The Two-Fold Division of Human Virtue: Thomas divides all human virtue into intellectual (perfecting reason) and moral (perfecting the appetitive powers). These correspond to the two fundamental principles of human action: understanding and appetite.
• The Etymology of ‘Moral’: The term moralis derives from mos, which has two meanings: (1) custom (consuetudo) or repeated acts, and (2) natural inclination or quasi-nature (inclinatio naturalis). Moral virtue is properly named from the second meaning—it is a second nature to act according to reason—not merely from custom, though custom is how it is acquired.
• Greek Linguistic Distinction: In Greek, these two meanings of mos are distinguished by accent: ethos (long eta) for custom and ethos (short epsilon) for natural inclination, whereas Latin uses the same word mos for both.
• Moral Virtue and the Appetitive Power: Only virtues in the desiring power (potentia appetitiva) are properly called moral, since moral virtue inclines one to act rightly. Intellectual virtues perfect the power of understanding but do not incline the appetite to desire the good.
• The Question of Distinction from Intellectual Virtue: Augustine’s statement that “virtue is the art of right living” initially seems to make virtue an intellectual matter, yet Thomas shows this uses ‘art’ in a broad sense. Moral virtue remains properly distinguished from intellectual virtue.
• Prudence as a Bridge: Prudence (prudentia/foresight) holds a unique position—it is essentially an intellectual virtue but materially concerns moral matters. It directs all moral virtues by determining proper means to good ends.
• The Necessity of Prudence for Moral Virtue: Moral virtue cannot exist without prudence because virtue requires right choice, which demands both proper intention of the end (moral virtue) and right deliberation about means (prudence).

Key Arguments #

Against the View That Every Virtue Is Moral #

• Objection: Since moral virtue comes from mos (custom) and all virtues are acquired through repeated acts, every virtue should be moral—including wisdom and understanding.
• Response: Aristotle explicitly says we do not call someone sophós (wise) or phronimos (understanding) because of custom (mores), but rather praos (mild) or sôphrôn (sober). Therefore, intellectual virtues like wisdom and understanding are not moral, even though they are virtues.
• Resolution: “Moral” derives from mos as natural inclination (second nature), not merely from custom. Only virtues in the appetitive power are properly moral.

Against the Distinction of Moral from Intellectual Virtue #

• Objection (from Augustine): Virtue is defined as “art of right living,” and art is an intellectual virtue; therefore, moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue.
• Objection (from definitions): Many definitions of moral virtues employ terms like scientia (knowledge)—e.g., “perseverance is the science of things in which one ought to remain.”
• Objection (from Augustine again): Virtue is “right and perfect reason” (recta et perfecta ratio), which pertains to intellectual virtue.
• Objection (from definition in Aristotle): Intellectual virtue appears in the definition of moral virtue itself—moral virtue is defined as “a habit with choice, existing in the middle towards us as determined by right reason.”
• Response: All these statements use terms in a broad or general sense. When Augustine calls virtue “art,” he is using art generically for any right reason about things to be done. Prudence specifically is the intellectual virtue that directs moral virtues; thus, right reason is presupposed in the definition of moral virtue but not constitutive of its essence.

The Role of Reason and Appetite in Human Action #

• Principle: The first beginning of all human works is reason. Whatever other principles of human action exist in some way obey reason, but in different ways.
• Despotic Rule: The body and its members obey reason automatically, without contradiction—the hand reaches out when reason commands it. This is “despotic” rule (as a master rules a servant who has no right to contradict).
• Political Rule: The appetitive powers obey reason by “political rule”—that by which one rules free persons who have some right of contradiction. The appetite can resist reason’s commands.
• The Error of Socrates: Socrates believed all virtues are prudences, thinking that the appetitive power obeys reason just as the body does—automatically and without resistance. But this is false; the appetitive power can rebel against reason.
• Conclusion: For a human to act well, both reason must be well-disposed (through intellectual virtue, especially prudence) AND the appetitive power must be well-disposed (through moral virtue). Therefore, moral virtue is genuinely distinct from intellectual virtue.

On Natural Inclination and Virtue #

• The Problem: Some people have natural inclinations toward virtue (e.g., naturally mild or temperate persons) seemingly without the need for vigorous reason or choice.
• Response: Natural inclination is only the beginning of virtue, not perfect virtue itself. Moral virtue requires choice (electio), which is an act of the appetitive part moved by reason. Natural inclination alone cannot provide choice.

Important Definitions #

• Moral Virtue (virtus moralis): A habit in the appetitive power that inclines one to act according to reason. Derived from mos understood as natural inclination or second nature, acquired through repeated acts.
• Intellectual Virtue (virtus intellectualis): A habit perfecting the intellect in knowing truth, whether speculative or practical.
• Prudence (prudentia, foresight): Right reason about things to be done; the intellectual virtue that directs all moral virtues by determining the proper means to good ends. Essentially intellectual but materially concerned with moral matters.
• Choice (electio): An act of the appetitive part moved by reason; it concerns means to an end already desired. Essential to moral virtue.
• Right Reason (recta ratio): Reason conformed to virtue and to the natural law; it determines the mean in moral matters and directs the appetitive power.
• Natural Inclination (inclinatio naturalis): An inborn tendency toward good that serves as the foundation but not the completion of moral virtue. Dangerous without reason’s guidance.
• Mos: Derived from custom (consuetudo) when understood as repeated acts, but more properly derived from natural inclination (inclinatio naturalis) or quasi-nature when understood as second nature.

Examples & Illustrations #

Prudence and Anger #

Berquist asks: “Does anger know how much anger you should get?” The answer is no—only reason can determine appropriateness. If someone accidentally bumps you, anger is unwarranted. If someone is careless and repeatedly bumps others, some anger may be warranted. If someone deliberately harms another, stronger anger may be justified. Only prudence can judge these circumstances.

Bodily Obedience vs. Appetitive Obedience #

When reason commands, the hand reaches out (despotic rule—automatic obedience). But the appetitive power can resist reason’s commands, requiring political rule and habituation to establish virtue.

Custom and Repetition in Vice #

Berquist notes high school students saying “let’s get drunk this weekend” without thinking—they have become accustomed to vice. By contrast, a virtuous person developed through habituation does not have to think about whether to get drunk; it has become a second nature to them not to.

Demonstration vs. Habit #

Given an example from Euclid: you can see a mathematical demonstration once and understand it immediately. But moral virtue requires repeated acts to form the habit—it is not a single insight but an inclination that becomes second nature.

The Blind Horse #

A horse with naturally strong speed but no sight will run faster and more dangerously; similarly, strong natural inclination without reason’s guidance becomes more dangerous, not safer.

Notable Quotes #

“Virtue is a habit, right? In the manner of nature, right? It’s like a second nature, we say.” — From Cicero (cited by Berquist), explaining how moral virtue becomes second nature through habituation.

“The good of man is to be according to reason, as Dionysius says.” — Used to establish why every human virtue must be in accord with reason.

“The soul rules the body by despotic principality. That is, as a lord or master rules his servant, right, huh? Who has no right of contradicting him.” — Thomas Aquinas (via Aristotle), on how reason rules the body.

“Reason commands the appetitive, right, by a political rule by which one rules the free. We have some work or some right in what? In it of contradicting, right?” — Thomas Aquinas, on how reason rules the appetitive power differently from the body.

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Is Every Virtue Moral? #

• Objection: All virtues derive from custom and repeated acts, so all should be moral.
• Resolution: Moral virtue properly derives from mos as natural inclination (second nature), not from custom per se. Only virtues in the appetitive power are properly called moral; intellectual virtues (like wisdom and understanding) are not.

Q2: Is Moral Virtue Distinguished from Intellectual Virtue? #

• Objections: Augustine calls virtue “art of right living” (intellectual); definitions of moral virtues use “science” or “knowledge”; virtue is defined as “right and perfect reason.”
• Resolution: These statements use such terms in broad, generalized senses. Prudence (an intellectual virtue) is the directing principle of moral virtues, not constitutive of their essence. Moral virtue is properly in the appetitive power, perfecting it to desire and act according to reason.

Q3: The Necessity of Both Powers Being Well-Disposed #

• Principle: For right human action, both reason and appetite must be well-disposed—reason through intellectual virtue (especially prudence) and appetite through moral virtue. The appetitive power obeys reason only by “political rule,” not despotically; therefore, it requires habituation into virtue.

Q4: Does Natural Inclination Suffice for Virtue? #

• Answer: No. Natural inclination is the beginning of virtue but not virtue itself. Virtue requires choice, which is an act of the appetitive part moved by reason. Natural inclination alone cannot guarantee right choice in particular circumstances.