Lecture 149

149. Prudence as a Necessary Virtue for Living Well

Summary
This lecture examines whether prudence (φρόνησις/prudentia) is a virtue necessary for human flourishing. Berquist defends prudence against three objections by distinguishing it from art, clarifying that prudence perfects the agent rather than external works, and explaining how practical reason achieves truth through conformity to right appetite rather than mere conformity to things. The lecture emphasizes that prudence remains necessary throughout life, not merely for acquiring virtue but for its continuous and proper exercise in particular circumstances.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

  • The Necessity of Prudence for Living Well: Whether prudence is required not only for acquiring virtue but for its continuous exercise
  • Prudence vs. Art: The fundamental distinction between making (which produces external artifacts) and doing (which perfects the agent)
  • Practical Truth and Right Appetite: How practical reason achieves truth through conformity to rectified desire rather than conformity to external things
  • Contingency and Human Action: Why prudence necessarily concerns contingent matters that fall under human will and choice

Key Arguments #

Against Prudence Being Necessary #

  • Art is not necessary after a work is made; similarly, prudence may not be necessary after virtue is acquired
  • A person can act well by following the counsel of others without possessing prudence themselves
  • Prudence cannot guarantee infallible truth in contingent matters (as speculative reason does in necessary matters), so it may not qualify as an intellectual virtue

In Favor of Prudence Being Necessary #

  • Living well consists in doing well, which requires not just performing actions but performing them according to right choice (κατὰ ὀρθὴν προαίρεσιν)
  • Right choice requires two things: (1) a suitable end (provided by moral virtue perfecting the appetitive part), and (2) suitable means ordered to that end (provided by prudence perfecting reason)
  • Even after acquiring virtue, one must continuously exercise prudence to determine particulars—how much to eat, how much to drink, given circumstances
  • Prudence perfects the agent himself, unlike art which only perfects the work; thus it is necessary for human flourishing throughout life

The Distinction Between Making and Doing #

  • Making (πρᾶξις as production): An act passing over into exterior matter; constitutes perfection of the thing made, not the maker. Examples: cooking perfects the dinner, not the cook; carpentry perfects the table, not the carpenter
  • Doing (πρᾶξις as action): An act remaining in the agent; constitutes perfection of the doer themselves. The agent is perfected by his own activity
  • Art concerns making and is not necessary for living well; prudence concerns doing and is maximally necessary for living well

Practical Truth vs. Speculative Truth #

  • Speculative truth: Conformity of the intellect to the thing. Achievable with certitude only in necessary matters (e.g., “man is a two-legged animal”)
  • Practical truth: Conformity of the intellect to rectified appetite (appetitu recto), not mere conformity to things
  • Practical truth applies only to contingent matters capable of being altered by human will—whether inward doable things or outward makeable things
  • Because contingent things can be otherwise, conformity to rectified desire (not mere conformity to what is) is the criterion of practical truth

Important Definitions #

Prudentia/Φρόνησις (Prudence or Foresight) Right reason about things to be done (recta ratio agibilium). An intellectual virtue that perfects practical reason to deliberate well about means suitable to a good end. Requires presupposition of moral virtue (rectification of appetite) and remains necessary throughout life for the continuous exercise of virtue in particular circumstances.

Ars (Art) Right reason about things to be made (recta ratio factibilium). An intellectual virtue whose good is in the external artifact produced, not in the agent. Not necessary for living well, though may be necessary or useful for producing particular works.

Appetitus Rectus (Right Appetite) The rectification of will and emotions through moral virtue. Necessary presupposition for prudence. Without right desire for the proper end, one cannot judge correctly about means. Example: without desiring the proper pleasure of wine (not soda pop), one cannot choose correct means regarding wine.

Contingentia (Contingency) Matters capable of being otherwise; within the scope of human choice and will. Prudence concerns contingent matters; speculative reason concerns necessary matters.

Examples & Illustrations #

Right Appetite in Art and Consumption #

  • Wine tasting: One seeking the pleasure of soda pop in wine (e.g., pink zinfandel) rather than the proper pleasure of wine itself demonstrates wrong desire and cannot judge rightly about wine
  • Filet mignon with vanilla ice cream: Seeking the pleasure of dessert in a main course represents confusion about what pleasure is proper to each thing
  • Candy-flavored lipstick: A boyfriend desiring his girlfriend to wear candy-flavored lipstick seeks the pleasure of candy rather than the proper pleasure suited to the relationship
  • Ketchup on everything: Someone putting ketchup on all foods seeks the pleasure of ketchup rather than the distinct, proper pleasures of various dishes

Architecture and Design #

  • Thomas Aquinas College chapel: Well-planned for prayer; disposes the soul toward worship
  • Modern church with coffee machines: Poorly designed; disposes people toward seeking coffee after Mass rather than lingering in prayer
  • Abstract windows in modern churches: Fail to serve the end of sacred space; do not dispose people to prayer (contrast with representational sacred art that aids contemplation)
  • Glass houses: Provide no privacy; fail to achieve the proper end of domestic architecture
  • Freeman’s bordello (Minnesota State Capitol addition): Out of place architecturally; wrong aesthetic appetite for the building’s context

Shakespeare and Literary Pleasure #

  • Tragic pleasure vs. comedic pleasure: Different genres aim at different proper pleasures. One must desire the pleasure proper to tragedy (not comedy’s pleasure) to judge well about tragic works
  • Altered King Lear endings: 17th-18th century adaptations giving the play a happy ending with Cordelia marrying represent wrong desire—seeking comic pleasure in tragedy
  • High school students and Shakespeare: Students accustomed to comedies find tragedy’s pleasure unfamiliar and must develop the right appetite to appreciate tragic works properly

Homer and Plot Structure #

  • Aristotle on Homer: Homer taught the Greeks how to construct a good plot, understanding that a plot concerns a complete action with beginning, middle, and end—not episodic events of a single person

Notable Quotes #

“To live well consists in doing well. For this, that someone do well, it is not only required what he does, but also in what way he does it, that to it, he works or does it according to right choice.”

“The good of art is considered as not in the artist himself, but more in the thing made by the art… For making, going out a transit, you know, passing over to an exterior matter, is not a perfection of the one making, but of the thing made.”

“The truth of the practical understanding is taken by conformity to rectified appetite. To right desire… So it’s not to the thing, right? Which conformity in necessary things has no place, because they do not come to be by the human will.”

“When man does the good, not by his own reason, right? But moved from the counsel another, huh? He is not yet, right, altogether perfect in his operation.”

“My Father’s house is a house of prayer… if you’re not disposed to pray when you go into these churches, right, you want to linger there and say prayers, right? Well, then, you don’t really know what kind of a building you should have been making.”

Questions Addressed #

Is Prudence Necessary After Acquiring Virtue? #

Resolution: Yes, absolutely. While moral virtue establishes right appetite toward the good end, prudence remains necessary to determine how to achieve that end in particular circumstances. Even a virtuous person must deliberate: How much should I eat now? Have I had enough? These determinations require prudence throughout life.

Why Is Following Another’s Counsel Imperfect? #

Resolution: When a person acts well only by following another’s counsel (e.g., a child following parental guidance about candy consumption), he lacks perfection in his own operation. He achieves good action secundum quid (in a qualified sense) but not simpliciter (absolutely). Perfect human operation requires acting from one’s own prudence, not merely from external direction.

How Does Practical Reason Achieve Truth Differently Than Speculative Reason? #

Resolution: Speculative reason achieves truth through conformity of intellect to thing; this is infallible only in necessary matters. Practical reason achieves truth through conformity to rectified appetite; this applies only to contingent, chosen matters. A person seeking the wrong pleasure in wine cannot judge truly about wine, even if he perfectly understands the nature of wine objectively.