147. Will as Subject of Virtue and the Three Speculative Intellectual Virtues
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Main Topics #
The Will as Subject of Virtue (Article 6) #
Natural Inclination vs. Virtue
- The will naturally tends toward good according to reason; this is its proper ratio (proper object)
- Natural inclination to one’s own good does not require virtue for the will’s own proper good
- Virtue becomes necessary only when the good exceeds the proportion of the one willing
Two Categories of Goods Requiring Virtue
- Divine good: transcends human nature entirely
- Neighbor’s good: exceeds the individual’s natural proportion
- These require charity and justice respectively
- Charity and justice exist in the will as subject
Why Children Need Education in Justice
- Children naturally desire their own good but do not naturally will the good of another
- Discipline and habituation are required, not merely intellectual instruction
- Examples: stealing toys, hoarding candy, taking the ball and going home
- Parents must enforce justice through external constraint before virtue becomes internalized
The Three Speculative Intellectual Virtues (Article 1-2) #
Understanding (Intellectus)
- Habit of first principles; the most basic intellectual virtue
- Concerned with what is known to itself and perceived immediately by the intellect
- Example: “the whole is more than its part”
- Does not require reasoning; apprehension is immediate
- At the very beginning of knowledge yet obscure to us
Science (Scientia/Ἐπιστήμη)
- Knowledge of conclusions through demonstration from principles
- Reached through investigation of reason; comes to a halt or reaches its goal (from Greek ἐπιστήμη, “to come to a stop”)
- Multiple sciences exist according to different genera of knowable things: geometry, arithmetic, natural philosophy
- Last in this or that particular genus of knowables
- Depends on understanding as its principle
Wisdom (Sapientia/Σοφία)
- Knowledge of highest causes and first causes (ἀλτίσσιμος αἰτίας)
- Universal and singular—there is only one wisdom, not multiple like sciences
- Judges and orders all things through resolution to first causes
- Last with respect to whole of human knowledge; therefore first and most knowable by nature
- Contains understanding and science within itself
- Metaphorically: God is supremely “speculabilis” (to be looked at/contemplated)
Relationship and Order of the Three
- Understanding and science are called “potential parts” of wisdom
- Cannot have perfect judgment or universal judgment except by resolution to first causes
- Wisdom contains the others within itself; all three are ordered as potential parts
Are Speculative Habits Truly Virtues? #
Two Senses of Virtue
- Incomplete sense: Makes one capable of good operation (making ability for doing well)
- Complete sense: Makes one actually use that capability well; requires perfection of appetitive power
Speculative Virtues in the Incomplete Sense
- Perfect the intellect for considering truth
- Do NOT perfect the desiring power or will
- Therefore, do not make one inclined to use knowledge well
- Use of speculative knowledge depends on will (moved by charity)
Speculative Habits and Beatitude
- Acts of speculative virtues can be meritorious if performed from charity
- Constitute a beginning of perfect beatitude (which consists in contemplation of truth)
- Will be continued and perfected in the next life
- Contemplative life superior to active life in merit
Objection: Not About Human Acts Leading to Happiness
- Speculative virtues concern necessary things and divine things, not human acts
- Response: Ordered to beatitude as objects and as acts; begin the very perfection of beatitude itself
Why Three Speculative Virtues and Not More? #
Equivocation Problem
- First objection claims wisdom is equivocal with science; therefore should not be divided against it
- Response: Wisdom is equivocal by reason (ἐquivocum per applicationem)
- Wisdom has what is common to all sciences (demonstrates conclusions from principles)
- But adds something noteworthy: judges about all things and defends first principles
- Therefore receives a new name while remaining scientia in a broader sense
Formal Objects Distinguish Habits
- Diverse habits should be distinguished by formal object, not material object
- Sight and touch both know tables, but formally differ (color vs. hardness)
- Similarly: understanding (immediate principles), science (demonstrated conclusions from principles), and wisdom (first causes of all things) have different formal objects
Division into Species and Genus
- One kind of division: equilateral triangle, isosceles, scalene (all lowest species)
- Another kind: some lowest species, one not a lowest species
- Example: animal divided into beast and man; all men same species, but beasts not
- Similarly here: understanding and wisdom are singular (not divisible into species); science divides into many according to genera of knowables
- This is not impossible and not contradictory
Key Arguments #
On the Will as Subject of Virtue #
Objection 1: Will naturally inclines toward good according to reason; therefore needs no virtue for this
- Response: Correct for the will’s own proper good. But when good exceeds human proportion (God, neighbor), virtue becomes necessary
- Examples: Child stealing, child hoarding, spoiled child with ball—all show natural inclination to own good must be habituated toward others’ good
Objection 2: All human acts are voluntary and ordered to virtues; if virtue in will, then virtue in all powers
- Response: Virtue in will required only for specific goods transcending human proportion, not for all acts
Affirmative Argument: Greater perfection required in mover than moved; will moves irascible and concupiscible
- Response: Therefore more virtue in will than in appetitive powers
On Speculative Virtues as Virtues #
Objection 1: Not virtues because not operative; do not concern human acts by which happiness is achieved
- Response: Two senses of virtue; speculative habits satisfy incomplete sense, making capable of good operation (considering truth)
Objection 2: Acts of speculative virtues not meritorious; not connected to beatitude
- Response: Acts can be meritorious through charity; constitute beginning of beatitude (contemplation of truth)
Objection 3: Science and wisdom equivocal; should not be divided against each other
- Response: Equivocal by reason (adds noteworthy feature of judging all things through first causes)
Objection 4: Opinion reached by theoretical syllogizing should be a virtue like science
- Response: Opinion lacks certainty and can be false; science is habit of conclusions from principles
Important Definitions #
Virtue (complete sense) - A habit that not only makes one capable of good operation but also makes one actually use that capability well; requires perfection of appetitive power
Virtue (incomplete sense) - A habit that makes one capable of good operation without making one use it well; applies to speculative virtues and art
Intellectus (Understanding) - The habit of first principles; immediate apprehension of what is known to itself; what can be perceived at once by the understanding
Scientia (Science/Ἐπιστήμη) - Reasoned-out knowledge; demonstration of conclusions from principles; knowledge reached through investigation of reason; from Greek meaning “to come to a stop” or reach a goal
Sapientia (Wisdom/Σοφία) - Knowledge of the highest causes (ἀλτίσσιμος αἰτίας); judges and orders all things through resolution to first causes; the one universal virtue of reason
Speculabilis - That which is to be looked at or contemplated; God is supremely speculabilis, the supreme object of contemplation
Formal Object - The characteristic under which a power or habit knows its material object; e.g., eye sees formally through color, not through materiality of what is colored
Equivocum per applicationem - Equivocal by reason; a term applied to diverse things that share something common but one adds something noteworthy
Examples & Illustrations #
On Natural Inclination and Virtue in the Will #
- Child stealing toy: Parent asks “Whose toy is this?” Child answers “Johnny’s.” Parent asks “Did Johnny say you could take it?” demonstrating need for justice through external constraint
- Child with toys going inside: Spoiled child takes ball and goes inside; mother must throw ball out and force child back to game, gradually learning fairness
- Candy sharing: Parent encourages child to share candy with siblings and father; child naturally thinks of own good first; discipline creates habituation
- Monastic example: Berquist notes he ended up in monastery partly due to candy hoarding as child; discipline shapes affections over time
On Speculative Virtues and Use of Knowledge #
- Reading and thinking: Colleague reading book with wife; wife knows not to interrupt during reading, but waits until he leans back (when thinking about what he read). Shows interior work of understanding continues when exterior activity ceases
- Deceiving students: Can use speculative knowledge (geometry, syllogism) to deceive or convince of falsehood; knowledge itself does not make one use it well
- Hegelian method lecture: Berquist lectured showing Hegelian method superior to Aristotelian syllogism; student believed it until reminded that contradiction showed fallacy. Demonstrates knowledge can be used badly without charity directing it
On Formal Objects #
- Vision and touch: Both can know a table, but vision knows it formally through color, touch through hardness; distinct formal objects ground distinct powers
- Recognition by sight vs. voice: Recognize person by sight through form/color; recognize by phone through voice. Same material object (person) but different formal objects (visible form vs. audible sound)
- Sheep in bookstore: Looking at boxes shaped like books but containing drinks or money; material object appears same but formally different
On the Unity of Wisdom Despite Multiple Sciences #
- Euclid’s geometry: Plane geometry (simple figures: point, line, angle) followed by solid geometry (composed figures: sphere from circle rotated around diameter, cube from six squares). Shows geometry proceeds from simple to composed, not from general to particular
- Equilateral vs. isosceles triangles: Equilateral triangles all same shape; isosceles triangles vary infinitely by proportions of sides. Division can have both lowest species (all equilateral same) and non-lowest species (infinite isosceles variations)
Questions Addressed #
Does the will need virtue for its own proper good?
- No. The will naturally tends toward good according to reason. Virtue required only when good exceeds human proportion (divine good or neighbor’s good).
Why do children need discipline to learn justice?
- Children naturally will their own good but not others’ good. Education alone insufficient; discipline and habituation through external constraint necessary to internalize justice.
Are speculative intellectual virtues truly virtues?
- Yes, in incomplete sense. They make one capable of good operation (considering truth) but do not make one use that knowledge well without charity moving the will.
Why are there three speculative virtues (understanding, science, wisdom) and not more?
- Because truth is considered in two ways: (1) what is known to itself (understanding); (2) what is known through another. The latter divides into particular genera (sciences) and highest causes (wisdom).
How do understanding, science, and wisdom relate to each other?
- Science depends on understanding as its principle; wisdom contains both within itself as potential parts. Wisdom judges all things by resolution to first causes.
If speculative virtues do not concern human acts, how are they ordered to beatitude?
- As objects (their object is God who is supremely speculabilis) and as acts (their acts constitute the very beginning of perfect beatitude which consists in contemplation of truth).
Can speculative knowledge be used badly?
- Yes. One can use geometry or syllogistic logic to deceive. Use of speculative knowledge depends on will; without charity, knowledge is used without rectitude.
Connections and Context #
Relationship to Natural Philosophy
- Contrasts speculative reason with practical reason
- Notes that even natural philosophy (book 8 of Physics) moves toward the immaterial (unmoved mover) and thus toward divine philosophy
- Speculative virtues ascend from particular to universal; natural philosophy descends from universal to particular matter
Contrast with Platonic Division
- Plato divides soul into reason, spirited, appetitive with virtues in each
- No separate place for justice or prudence in Plato; justice is ordering of three together
- Thomas follows Aristotle, expanding rational appetite (will) as distinct power with its own virtues
Role of Charity
- Charity moves will to use speculative knowledge well
- Without charity, speculative acts meritorious but not virtuously used
- Charity perfects will toward goods exceeding human proportion
Pedagogical Notes #
On Equivocation: Berquist emphasizes this as source of confusion; students often get “hung up” on word problems without understanding equivocation by reason (adding noteworthy feature vs. complete name change)
On Division: Shows students that divisions need not have all parts as lowest species; some divisions have one genus-like part alongside multiple species-like parts (example: animal genus divided into beast and man)
On Will vs. Intellect: Emphasizes that using knowledge well is function of will, not intellect; intellect makes one capable, but only rectified will makes one actually use knowledge well.