145. The Subject of Virtue: Powers, Understanding, and Will

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Fundamental Question: Where Does Virtue Reside? #

• Core Dispute: Does virtue exist in the soul’s essence or in its powers?
• Thomas’s Position: Virtue must reside in the powers of the soul, not its essence
• Basis: Virtue is a perfection of power; perfection exists in that which it perfects
• Virtue is an operative habit; all operations proceed from powers

Three Foundational Arguments (from Thomas) #

1. From Definition: Virtue implies perfection of power
2. From Nature of Operative Habit: Every operation proceeds from a power of the soul
3. From Function: Virtue disposes toward the best (operation or its end), which proceeds from a power

Solving Augustine’s Apparent Contradiction #

• Augustine says: “Virtue is that by which one lives rightly”
• The Equivocation: “To live” can mean existence (essence) OR operation (power)
• Resolution: When “living rightly” is understood as right operation, virtue pertains to the power, not essence
• Thomas clarifies both senses apply to God but correctly applies to humans through operation

Intellectual Virtues: Limited Subjects of Virtue #

The Secundum Quid Problem #

• Science (scientia), Art (ars), Natural Understanding (intellectus) exist in the understanding
• These are virtues only secundum quid (in a qualified sense)
• They make one good in a particular respect: “good geometer,” “good carpenter”
• But they do NOT make one simply good (simpliciter) as a human being

Why? The Distinction Between Ability and Actuality #

• A grammarian who knows grammar may still speak like a barbarian
• A cook knows when too much pepper ruins the soup but may deliberately cook poorly
• Critical Principle: Good is not attributed to what is merely in potency but to what is in act
• These intellectual habits give ability (in potency) but not inclination (in act)

The Understanding and Virtue Simpliciter #

A Surprising Claim #

• The understanding CAN be subject to virtue simpliciter in certain cases
• This occurs when the understanding is ordered to the will

Two Modes of Understanding as Subject to Virtue #

1. Secundum quid: Speculative or practical understanding perfecting knowledge (science, art)
2. Simpliciter: When understanding is moved by the will (faith, prudence)

Faith as a Case Study #

• Faith exists in the speculative understanding
• But it is virtue simpliciter because the understanding assents by command of the will
• Augustine: “No one believes unless he wills”
• The will must command; the understanding must obey
• This makes faith a virtue that makes the whole person good, not merely informed

The Critical Role of the Will #

The Will as Mover of Other Powers #

• Key Principle: The will moves all other rational powers to their acts
• One acts well in actuality (not merely in ability) because one has a good will
• Therefore, true virtue (simpliciter) must either be in the will or in a power as moved by the will

The Will Cannot Be Subject to Virtue in the Same Way as Other Powers #

• Thomas notes Plato’s framework failed here: Plato had reason (with courage and temperance) but nowhere for justice
• Thomas’s insight: Justice belongs in the will, not the irascible or concupiscible
• Aristotle recognized this by treating justice separately in his Ethics
• The will is the subject of virtue in a unique way

The Irascible and Concupiscible Appetites #

Can They Be Subjects of Virtue? #

• Yes, but with an important qualification: only insofar as they partake of reason
• By themselves (secundum se), they are common to humans and beasts—not subject to virtue
• Insofar as reason is able to rule them: They become subject to moral virtue

How This Works: Habituation to Obey Reason #

• The emotions do not obey reason “blindly” or despotically
• They resist initially, like a horse being tamed or a child learning obedience
• Through repeated acts, they become habituated to conform to reason
• Analogy: A father rules a child paternally (not despotically); the child has some say and gradually learns obedience
• The Habituation Process: If you always indulge emotions, they become uncontrollable; through discipline they learn to listen

The Example of Drinking and Temperance #

• A man with excessive desire to drink cannot judge how much is too much
• His disordered appetite clouds his reason’s judgment
• Temperance requires that the concupiscible appetite be habituated to moderation
• Only then can reason properly deliberate about the right amount
• The virtue is not reason alone but the appetitive power’s conformity to reason

The Relationship Between Moral Virtue and Reason #

Two Requirements for Moral Virtue #

1. The appetitive power must be capable of being habituated to obey reason
2. The will must command this habituation

Moral Virtue: Not Purely Rational, But Reason-Participative #

• Moral virtue is in the irascible and concupiscible (appetitive powers)
• But it exists there insofar as they partake of reason (secundum quod rationis participia)
• They are perfected “in the mode of reason”—ordered by reason but not identical with reason

Interior Sensitive Powers and Virtue #

Why Memory, Imagination, and Cogitation Are NOT Subjects of Virtue #

• These powers are preparatory to knowledge, not consummating it
• Knowledge is completed in the understanding/reason, not in the sensitive powers
• Analogy: Images relate to the understanding soul as colors relate to sight
• Colors are necessary for sight but don’t complete the act of seeing
• Similarly, images are necessary for thought but don’t complete the act of understanding

A Clarification on Custom vs. Virtue #

• While habits can exist in these powers through custom, they are not virtues per se
• Memory is presupposed to prudence and acts as a foundational condition
• But memory itself is not a virtue; it is an instrument for virtue

Key Arguments #

Against Virtue Residing in Soul’s Essence #

Objection from Augustine:

• “Virtue is that by which one lives rightly”
• “To live” pertains to the essence of the soul
• Therefore, virtue should be in the essence, not the power

Response:

• “To live” has two meanings: existence (essence) or operation (power)
• Virtue makes one live rightly in the sense of right operation
• Therefore, virtue resides in the power, which is the principle of operation

Objection from Categories:

• One accident cannot be in multiple subjects equally
• Virtue is an accident (quality); the soul’s essence is a substance
• Therefore, virtue cannot be “in” the essence as a subject

Against Virtue Being Only in Reason #

Aristotle’s Explicit Teaching:

• The Nicomachean Ethics places courage and temperance in the irrational parts (irascible and concupiscible)
• These are distinct from reason but capable of obeying reason

Augustine’s Understanding:

• Virtue is fundamentally the order of love
• Love (caritas) involves the will and affective powers, not reason alone

Practical Necessity:

• Reason alone cannot move one to good action
• The will must be engaged; the appetites must be ordered
• Therefore, moral virtue must involve the appetitive powers

The Problem of “Divided Against” Language #

Thomas’s Point on Equivocation:

• Sometimes virtues are said to be divided against one another (justice vs. courage)
• But this is an equivocation arising from the fact that different virtues perfect different powers
• In reality, they work together—one cannot truly have courage without justice, etc.
• The division is in our naming, not in the reality of virtue

Important Definitions #

Virtue (Virtus) #

• A habit that perfects a power for its proper operation
• Must make both the agent and their action good in act, not merely in ability
• Can be distinguished into intellectual virtues (in reason/understanding) and moral virtues (in will and appetitive powers)

Operative Habit (Habitus Operativus) #

• A stable disposition ordered to right action
• Differs from a merely speculative habit by inclining one to act well, not merely enabling one to act well
• Example: Justice not only makes one able to act justly but inclines one to actually do so

Secundum Quid (In a Qualified Sense) #

• Good in a particular respect or account (in a certain way)
• Applied to intellectual virtues: one is a “good geometer” or “good carpenter” but not simply “good”
• These virtues do not make the whole person simply good

Simpliciter (Simply, Without Qualification) #

• Good absolutely, without qualification or limitation
• Applied to moral virtues: they make one simply good as a human being
• They perfect not just a particular faculty but the whole person’s orientation to action

Partaking of Reason (Rationis Particeps) #

• The appetitive powers’ capacity to obey reason
• Not identical with reason but capable of being ordered by reason
• Moral virtue consists in this: the habituation of appetitive powers to obey reason

Examples & Illustrations #

The Grammarian and Barbarism #

• A man with knowledge of grammar may nonetheless speak like a barbarian
• Grammar gives him ability to speak correctly but not inclination
• Therefore, grammar is not a virtue simpliciter; the man is not simply good from knowing grammar
• He is good only secundum quid: a good grammarian

The Carpenter and Deliberate Poor Work #

• A carpenter with knowledge of his art may deliberately build poorly
• Art gives the faculty but not the will to use it rightly
• Contrast: The virtuous man not only can act justly but is inclined to do so

The Cook and Seasoning #

• A cook knows when too much pepper ruins a dish
• But this knowledge does not incline him to cook well
• He may use his knowledge to cook well or poorly depending on his will

The Philosopher and the Car Accident #

• Berquist’s anecdote: A car hit his on a Quebec road
• Rather than becoming angry, he said, “I’m a philosopher, what do I care?”
• This illustrates reason governing the irascible appetite through established virtue

The Taming of a Horse #

• A wild horse resists the rider; through habituation it becomes obedient
• The horse does not obey despotically but through trained habituation
• Similarly, the emotions resist reason but through moral virtue become habituated to conform

The Father and Child #

• A father rules a child not despotically but paternally
• The child has some say in obedience; it is not blind submission
• If never disciplined, the child becomes uncontrollable
• So too with emotions: without habituation to virtue, they become tyrannical

The Drinker Who Cannot Judge Moderation #

• A man with excessive desire to drink cannot accurately judge how much is too much
• His disordered appetite clouds his practical reason
• Temperance must first order the concupiscible appetite
• Only then can he reason well about the mean in drinking

Mozart’s Music and Reasonable Emotion #

• Mozart’s compositions (e.g., Symphony No. 36 in C major) represent emotions in harmony with reason
• The Baroque generally shows emotions ordered by reason
• The Romantic period shows a “revolt” against reason’s ordering of emotion
• Later composers (e.g., Prokofiev in some contexts) become increasingly chaotic, without reason’s ordering
• This illustrates how emotions can either partake of reason or rebel against it

Geometry and the Imagination #

• When learning geometry, one must visualize figures (imagination and memory at work)
• Colored diagrams aid the visual imagination
• But the virtue of geometry (scientia) resides in the understanding, not the imagination
• The imagination is preparatory; understanding is consummating

Shakespeare on Reason and Emotion #

• Shakespeare’s plays illustrate the ordering of virtue
• In Cymbeline, the character learns “Who can read a woman?"—echoing the Latin interlegere (to read within, understand)
• This reflects the difficulty of grasping the inner truth of character and emotion

Padre Pio and Reading Hearts #

• Stories of Padre Pio’s ability to read confessants’ hearts during confession
• He could discern hidden sins and respond with severity when needed
• This illustrates a supernatural perfection of understanding beyond natural virtue

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Does virtue reside in the soul’s essence or its powers? #

A: Virtue resides in the powers of the soul. Virtue is a perfection of power; perfection exists in that which it perfects. Since virtue is operative (pertaining to action), and all operations proceed from powers, virtue must be in the powers.

Q2: How can the understanding be subject to virtue if virtue requires inclination to act? #

A: The understanding is subject to virtue simpliciter when it is ordered to and moved by the will. In faith, for example, the understanding assents to truths of faith by the command of the will. In this case, virtue perfects not just the faculty’s ability but its actual operation.

Q3: Are intellectual virtues (science, art) true virtues? #

A: They are virtues only secundum quid (in a qualified sense). They give ability to act or understand well but do not incline one to use that ability rightly. They make one good in a particular respect (“good geometer”) but not simply good as a human being. True virtue must make both the agent and their action good in act.

Q4: Can the irascible and concupiscible appetites be subjects of virtue? #

A: Yes, but only insofar as they partake of reason. By themselves, they are common to humans and beasts and not subject to virtue. But insofar as they are capable of being habituated to obey reason’s direction, they become subject to moral virtue (courage and temperance respectively).

Q5: How do the appetitive powers obey reason if they naturally resist it? #

A: They do not obey reason “blindly” or despotically. Rather, through repeated acts, they become habituated to conform to reason—like a horse gradually tamed by a rider or a child learning obedience from a father. The emotion retains its natural character but is ordered by reason.

Q6: Why is the will the subject of virtue in a special way? #

A: Because the will moves all other rational powers to their acts. For one to act well in actuality (not merely in ability), the will must be good. Therefore, moral virtue—which makes one simply good through making one act well—must reside in the will or in a power as moved by the will.

Q7: Are memory and imagination subjects of virtue? #

A: No. While habits can exist in these powers through custom, they are not virtues. These powers are preparatory to knowledge, not consummating it. Knowledge is completed in the understanding/reason. Memory is a presupposition for prudence but is not itself a virtue.