Lecture 143

143. Whether Habits Are Distinguished by Good and Bad

Summary
Berquist addresses whether habits can be distinguished according to good and bad qualities, engaging objections from the principle that good and bad are contraries and that good is transcendental. The lecture clarifies how virtues and vices are fundamentally distinguished as species of habits according to their conformity or disconformity with human nature, and how the same operative habit can concern both good and bad acts while itself being either good or bad. This discussion prepares the foundation for understanding virtue as a good habit in the Thomistic tradition.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Problem: Can Habits Be Distinguished by Good and Bad? #

  • Initial objection: good and bad are contraries, so there cannot be contraries concerning the same habit
  • Secondary objection: good is convertible with being (transcendental), so cannot serve as a specific difference
  • Further objection: multiple bad habits exist concerning the same matter (e.g., intemperance through excess, insensibility through defect)

Resolution: Distinction According to Nature #

Habits are distinguished according to good and bad in two ways:

  1. According to agreement or disagreement with nature

    • A good habit disposes one to acts suitable to one’s nature (according to reason)
    • A bad habit disposes one to acts unsuitable to one’s nature (contrary to reason)
    • Acts of virtue are “according to reason” and thus accord with human nature
    • Acts of vice are “against reason” and thus discord with human nature
  2. According to higher and lower natures

    • Human virtue disposes for acts suitable to human nature
    • Heroic or divine virtue disposes for acts suitable to a higher nature
    • This exemplifies how virtue species can differ by the level of nature to which they are ordered

The Distinction Between Habit and Its Objects #

  • The same habit can concern (be about) both good and bad acts
  • But the same habit cannot be both good and bad in itself
  • Example: Logic concerns both correct reasoning and incorrect reasoning, yet logic itself is neither good nor bad as a habit; rather, the arguments studied may be good or bad
  • This differs from Nicomachean Ethics, which is about virtue and vice, versus a virtue which is itself good or bad

Application to Practical Examples #

  • Cooking: The same operative habit enables one to know both how to cook well and what would constitute overcooking or undercooking. The habit itself is disposed toward the good (proper preparation), but concerns knowledge of both good and bad preparation.
  • Virtues and Vices: Justice (virtue) disposes toward just acts and away from unjust acts. The same moral virtue may be aroused by injustice it encounters, yet remains itself ordered to the good.
  • Logic and Reasoning: The habit of logic is neutral as to good/bad acts, but it enables discernment of which arguments are valid and which are not.

Refinement on Contrariety #

Contrary acts can come together in one habit according as contraries unite in one substrate (object or matter). However, contrary habits cannot be one species precisely because they are contrary according to contrariety of objects (the formal principle distinguishing them).

Key Arguments #

Against Distinguishing Habits by Good and Bad (Objections) #

  • Argument 1: Good and bad are contraries; the same habit cannot have contraries

    • Response: Contraries can concern the same habit (as subject matter), but contrary habits themselves are distinct species
  • Argument 2: Good is convertible with being (transcendental) and therefore cannot serve as a specific difference

    • Response: The “good” in the definition of virtue is not transcendental good, but determined good (the good of reason according to nature)
  • Argument 3: If many bad habits and many good habits exist, they must be distinguished by good and bad, but this seems impossible if good/bad cannot serve as differences

    • Response: Habits are distinguished by their suitability or unsuitability to diverse natures or by diverse defects from what is according to nature

For Distinguishing by Good and Bad (Confirmatory) #

  • A good habit is contrary to a bad habit (as virtue to vice)
  • Contraries are diverse according to species
  • Therefore, habits must differ in species according to the difference of good and bad

Important Definitions #

Terms Clarified #

  • Good and bad habits distinguished: Not by the transcendental good/bad, but by conformity or disconformity with nature (and reason as the measure of human nature)
  • Habit about good and bad vs. Habit itself good or bad: A habit can be “about” both good and bad (as its objects of concern), while the habit itself is either good (ordered to good acts) or bad (ordered to bad acts)
  • Contrary habits: Not one species, but distinguished as species precisely by their contrary order to nature
  • Contrariety of acts within one habit: The same habit may concern contrary acts as its subject matter, but this does not make the habit itself contrary or double

Examples & Illustrations #

Pork Loin Cooking #

  • The virtue of cooking enables one to know: proper temperature, proper seasoning, proper moisture
  • The same habit enables recognition of what would be wrong (overcooking, underseasoning, drying out)
  • The habit itself is ordered to good preparation, but concerns understanding of both good and bad execution
  • Requires proper habituation: “wisely and slow they stumble, and run fast”

Logic and Argumentation #

  • The pedagogical example: presenting four rows on a board with premises “If A is so, B is so” and variations (A is so, B is so / A is not so, B is so / etc.)
  • Student task: determine which arguments are valid and which invalid
  • Logic as a habit concerns both good reasoning and bad reasoning
  • The habit of logic itself is neither good nor bad; rather, it enables discernment between them
  • This demonstrates “the need for logic”

Examples of Contrary Acts from Same Matter #

  • Concupiscence (concerning food and drink):
    • Intemperance: excessive desire (contrary to reason through excess)
    • Insensibility: defective desire (contrary to reason through defect)
    • Both are vicious habits concerning the same matter but ordered differently from reason
  • Courage (concerning fear):
    • Cowardice: opposed to reason through excessive fear
    • Foolhardiness: opposed to reason through deficient fear

Shakespeare on Nature and Stumbling #

  • Romeo and Juliet: “Wisely and slow, they stumble and run fast” — illustrating gradual, careful acquisition of virtue
  • Measure for Measure: “Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse” — habit formation leads to addiction when one departs from one’s true nature
  • Berquist emphasizes Shakespeare’s mastery in using “stumble” (from Greek skandalon, obstacle) to capture both the literal and spiritual sense of departing from virtue
  • Gospel usage: “If your hand causes you to stumble” (not “sin” but the more accurate Greek term for causing one to fall away)

Questions Addressed #

Article 3, Question 1: Objection #

Q: If good and bad are contraries, can the same habit have contraries? A: Yes, according to the subject matter or object (contraries can concern the same habit), but contrary habits are distinct species because the contrariety of habits follows the contrariety of their formal principles (their order to nature).

Article 3, Question 2: Objection #

Q: Doesn’t the transcendental good (convertible with being) prevent good and bad from being differences distinguishing species? A: The good operative in virtue’s definition is not transcendental good, but the determined good proper to human nature (acting according to reason). This determined good can indeed serve as a difference.

Article 3, Question 3: Objection #

Q: Many different bad habits exist (intemperance and insensibility); how are these distinguished if not by good/bad? A: Multiple vicious habits are distinguished according to diverse repugnancies to what is according to nature — different ways of departing from reason. Similarly, multiple virtues are distinguished by diverse suitabilities to nature.

Article 3, Clarification: Same Habit About Good and Bad #

Q: Can the same habit concern both good acts and bad acts? A: Yes. Logic concerns both valid and invalid arguments. Cooking concerns both proper and improper preparation. The habit itself has an orientation (toward good), but its subject matter includes both correct and incorrect applications.

Notable Quotes #

“Habits and species are distinguished not only according to objects and active principles, but also in order to nature, which happens in two ways.” — Thomas Aquinas (from the lecture’s key resolution)

“By a good habit, one is said to be disposed to an act suitable to the nature of the one acting; but by a bad habit, one is said to be disposed to an act that is not suitable to nature.” — Thomas Aquinas (core principle of the resolution)

“The frustration of nature as such is what it is.” — Berquist’s gloss, emphasizing that vice is a departure from natural order

“Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse.” — Shakespeare (cited by Berquist as exemplifying how habits departing from nature lead to addiction)

“Wisely and slow, they stumble and run fast.” — Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet (cited for the principle that virtue is acquired gradually, not hastily)