Lecture 133

133. Bodily Dispositions, Habits, and the Soul's Powers

Summary
This lecture examines whether bodily dispositions like health and beauty constitute true habits, and whether habits inhere in the soul’s essence or in its powers. Berquist discusses the distinction between dispositions ordered to form versus operation, addresses the special case of sanctifying grace, and explores how the sensitive powers (emotions and sense faculties) can acquire habits through obedience to reason.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Bodily Dispositions vs. True Habits #

  • Health, strength, and beauty are called “habitual dispositions” but do not perfectly possess the ratio of habits
  • These bodily dispositions are easily changeable because their causes are naturally mutable (unlike habits which are difficultly changeable)
  • Distinction between simpliciter difficile immobiles (strictly difficult to change) and secundum quid difficile immobiles (difficult to change with respect to the subject)
  • Bodily dispositions are ordered to form rather than to operation, which distinguishes them from true habits
  • The example of strength vs. health: one can be strong but not healthy; these represent different dispositions of the body

Habits in the Soul’s Essence vs. Powers #

  • The primary question: when habit is ordered to operation, it belongs in the soul’s powers, not its essence
  • The soul’s essence is the form that completes human nature; dispositions to the body belong to the body, not the soul’s essence
  • Exception: Sanctifying grace is a habit in the soul’s essence itself, because it disposes the soul to participate in a superior nature (the divine nature)
  • Most virtues and sciences are properly in the soul’s powers because powers are the principles of operation
  • The distinction: accent, per se, cannot be the subject of another accident; however, accidents can be subjects of other accidents when ordered properly

Sensitive Powers and Habituation #

  • The nutritive powers (those governing nutrition and reproduction) cannot obey reason, so they cannot possess habits
  • The sensitive powers can obey reason’s command, unlike nutritive powers, and therefore can acquire habits
  • Rational by participation: Sensitive appetites are called “rational” not by essence but by their ability to partake of reason (like a tamed horse)
  • Interior sense powers (imagination, memory, cogitative power) can develop habits through custom and practice
  • Exterior sense powers (sight, hearing, etc.) operate determinately from nature and do not develop habits

Alexander of Aphrodisias’s Position and Its Refutation #

  • Alexander argues that the first species of quality pertains only to the soul, not the body
  • He treats bodily health and sickness merely as exemplifications of how habits work, not as true habits themselves
  • This position is against Aristotle’s intention, as Aristotle explicitly includes health and beauty among habits in the Physics Book VII
  • Simplicius correctly notes that health and sickness can serve both as genuine instances and as exemplifications

Key Arguments #

Against Bodily Habits (Objections) #

  1. From Will: Habits are that by which something is done when there is need; bodily actions arise from nature, not from will; therefore no habits in the body
  2. From Changeability: All bodily dispositions are easily changeable; habits are difficultly changeable; therefore no bodily habits
  3. From Species of Quality: Bodily dispositions undergo alteration (third species of quality); habits belong to the first species and are divided against alteration; therefore no bodily habits

Thomas’s Resolution on Bodily Dispositions #

  • The distinction between acts “of nature” and acts “from the soul” whose source is the will
  • Bodily dispositions are called “habits” only imperfectly and by comparison to the soul as form
  • Body dispositions are difficultly changeable secundum quid (with respect to their subject remaining stable), not simpliciter
  • Bodily dispositions in the first species of quality differ from undergoing qualities (third species) because they represent a perfected state, not motion toward that state
  • The intensity and remission of qualities reflects diverse participation of a form by the subject, not diversity of form itself

On Habits in the Soul’s Powers #

  • Objection: Nature belongs more to the soul’s essence than to its powers; therefore habits ordered to nature belong to the essence
    • Answer: The soul’s essence is the form of the body; dispositions to form belong more to the body than to the soul’s essence
  • Objection: Accident cannot be subject of accident; powers are accidents; therefore habits cannot be in powers
    • Answer: While per se an accident cannot be subject to another, accidents ordered rightly can be subjects of other accidents (e.g., surface is subject of color)
  • Objection: Habit is placed before power in the order of priority; therefore habit is not in power
    • Answer: Habit is prior to power as act is prior to potency (in perfection), though potency may be temporally prior in generation

On Sensitive Powers and Habits #

  • Objection: Sensitive powers are like nutritive powers in being irrational; no habits in nutritive powers; therefore none in sensitive powers
    • Answer: Nutritive powers cannot obey reason; sensitive powers can, unlike nutritive powers
  • Objection: Brutes have sensitive powers but no habits (lacking will); therefore no habits in sensitive powers
    • Answer: Brute animals operate from nature’s instinct alone; but domesticated animals can be disposed by the reason of man to custom, so habits exist imperfectly in them
  • Objection: Habits are sciences and virtues; science pertains to universal grasping powers; senses grasp singulars; therefore no habits in sensitive powers
    • Answer: Virtue belongs to the desiring power; the desiring sensitive power can be commanded by rational desire (will), while the apprehensive powers receive from senses

Important Definitions #

Habit (Habitus) vs. Disposition (Dispositio) #

  • Habit: A quality of the first species that is difficultly changeable (difficile mobile)
  • Disposition: A quality easily changeable (facile mobile), lacking the stability of habit
  • Both imply an order to nature or to operation
  • Habitual disposition in the body: ordered to form and relatively stable with respect to the subject, though not strictly stable simpliciter

Species of Quality (in Aristotle’s Categories) #

  • First species: Habit and disposition (ordered to form and operation, with relative stability)
  • Third species: Passible qualities or passions (heat, cold, wet, dry—those in motion/alteration)
  • The transition from third to first species: when alteration regarding passible qualities reaches perfection as to its species, it enters the first species

Potency and Act (Potentia and Actus) #

  • Potency: The capacity to be or act; indeterminate with respect to many things
  • Act: The realization or perfection of potency; the form received by potency
  • Habit: A middle state (first act) between pure potency and perfect act (second act)
  • Act is naturally prior to potency in perfection, though potency may be prior in time and generation

Rational by Essence vs. by Participation #

  • Rational by essence (Rationalie per se): The intellect and will, which are naturally rational
  • Rational by participation (Rationalie per participationem): Sensitive appetites that can obey reason without possessing reason themselves

Examples & Illustrations #

Bodily Dispositions #

  • Strength vs. Health: A person can possess strength (golden gloves boxer) without health; these are different bodily dispositions
  • Acid destroying beauty: The Phantom of the Opera example—throwing acid in one’s face destroys beauty immediately, showing the easy changeability of bodily dispositions
  • Children prone to illness: Some children frequently get colds; they seem to have something more stable (a disposition to health-loss), but this is not a true habit and can still be disrupted by exposure to new pathogens

Emotional Habituation #

  • Taming a horse: The sensitive appetite is like a wild horse that becomes docile through repeated obedience to reason, acquiring the habit of responding well to rational command
  • Baby emotions from nature: Newborns exhibit emotions (clinging, crying) from natural instinct alone, without habit
  • Parental training: As children age, reason (first from parents, then from their own) can command emotions, leading to habituation

Interior Sense Powers #

  • Memory and custom: Through custom and practice, one develops the habit of remembering well
  • Tricks for calculation: Berquist’s example of quickly calculating by grouping (64 + 10 + 3 rather than 64 + 13) shows how interior sense powers develop habits through repeated practice
  • Imagination in geometry and poetry: Euclid perfects the imagination in one way (structured, rational); Homer in another (creative, universal singularization)

Notable Quotes #

“Courage is obviously strength” and “beauty is what? Temperance” —Berquist, noting the analogy between bodily virtues and moral virtues

“Grace is not the substance of the soul, but by grace your soul is well disposed towards God” —Berquist, explaining how sanctifying grace as a habit differs from substance

“The soul is the nature of such a body” —Thomas Aquinas (cited by Berquist), explaining the soul’s relationship to human nature

“Nature not being able to be more than one thing” —Berquist, citing Shakespeare on why natural powers require no habits

Questions Addressed #

Question 1: Are there habits in the body? #

  • Resolution: Bodily dispositions (health, beauty) are called “habitual” but do not perfectly possess the ratio of habits. They are ordered to form rather than operation, and their causes are easily changeable. They are difficile mobile only secundum quid (with respect to their subject), not simpliciter.

Question 2: Are habits in the soul’s essence or in its powers? #

  • Resolution: Habits ordered to operation belong in the soul’s powers because powers are principles of operation. Habits ordered to nature can be in the essence (notably, sanctifying grace disposing the soul to divine nature). Most virtues and sciences are in the powers.

Question 3: Can the sensitive part (emotions and senses) have habits? #

  • Resolution: Yes, but with important distinctions:
    • Sensitive appetites (emotions) can have habits because they obey reason’s command
    • Nutritive powers cannot have habits because they cannot obey reason
    • Interior sense powers (imagination, memory, cogitative power) can develop habits through custom
    • Exterior sense powers (sight, hearing) operate determinately from nature and do not develop habits