131. The Four Species of Quality and the Priority of Habit

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Aristotle’s Four Species of Quality #

Following Aristotle’s Categories, Thomas distinguishes four species of quality:

1. Habit and Disposition (first species) - qualities ordered to the nature of a thing
2. Ability and Inability (second species) - natural capacities and potencies
3. Sensible or Undergoing Qualities (third species) - qualities like heat, cold, color experienced through passion
4. Figure and Form (fourth species) - shape and configuration of bodies

Thomas argues that habit must be first because nature is what is first to be considered in a thing.

The Problem of Classification #

Simplicius distinguishes adventitious (acquired) qualities into:

• Natural qualities - unchanging, according to nature
• Adventitious qualities - coming from outside, able to be lost
  • Some are easily lost (dispositions)
  • Some are difficult to lose (habits)

Thomas critiques this approach: many figures and undergoing qualities are adventitious but not habits, and many dispositions (like health and beauty) are natural. The distinction cannot rest on the natural/adventitious dichotomy.

The Proper Distinction: Mode and Determination #

Quality implies a certain modus (mode) or determination of substance according to measure. This determination can occur in three primary ways:

1. In order to the nature itself → First species (habit and disposition)

   • Considers the form and nature as the end of a thing
   • Admits of well and badly (bene vel male)
   • Admits of easily or difficultly moved/lost

2. According to action and passion → Second and third species (ability and sensible qualities)

   • Follows upon the principles of nature (matter and form)
   • Admits of easily or difficultly moved/lost
   • Does NOT admit of well or badly (motion and passion lack the notion of an end)

3. According to quantity → Fourth species (figure and form)

   • Without motion, without notion of good and bad
   • The geometries are certain but say nothing of good or bad

Why Habit is First #

Since nature is the end (that for the sake of which a thing exists), and since the nature of a thing is what is first in consideration, habit—which pertains to the disposition of a subject toward its nature—must be the first species of quality.

Distinguishing Habit from Disposition #

Thomas refines Simplicius’s approach by offering two distinct ways to divide habit from disposition within the first species of quality:

1. Perfect and Imperfect in the Same Species

• A disposition is an imperfect possession of what becomes a habit when perfected
• Example: A student beginning geometry has a disposition easily lost; the established geometer has a habit difficult to lose
• The distinction is one of degree and stability, not kind
• Disposition becomes habit as the boy becomes man—through increasing perfection in the same genus

2. Diverse Species of a Subalternate Genus

• Dispositions are defined intrinsically by having easily changeable causes
  • Example: sickness (can arise suddenly, can be lost suddenly)
• Habits are defined intrinsically by having immobile causes
  • Example: sciences and virtues (stable, resistant to change)
• Under this distinction, disposition does NOT become habit; they remain distinct species
• This aligns better with Aristotle’s intention

Common Usage: When a quality that is easily changeable by its nature (like sickness) becomes difficult to change through some accident, it is called a habit. Conversely, when a quality difficult to change by nature (like knowledge) is imperfectly possessed and easily lost, it is called a disposition relative to habit.

The Subtlety of “Well or Badly” #

Thomas makes a crucial point: figure and sensible qualities (heat, cold, color) are said to be well or badly only insofar as they relate to the nature of the thing. When so related, they pertain to the first species:

• Figure insofar as it fits nature pertains to beauty (a virtue of the body)
• Heat and cold insofar as they suit nature pertain to health (a virtue of the body)
• When considered absolutely, figure and heat/cold do not admit of well or badly

Three Ways of Dividing Four into Fewer #

Berquist illustrates Thomas’s subtle logical method:

1. Two twos crisscrossed → Can yield four or three

   • Example from anti-predicaments: universal/particular crossed with substance/accident yields four
   • Example from Trinity: proceeds/does not proceed crossed with has procession/does not have procession yields three (not four, since the fourth possibility is impossible)

2. Two into three with subdivision

   • First divide into two (order made by reason vs. not made by reason)
   • Then subdivide the larger group into three
   • Example: Shakespeare’s plays divide into tragedies, comedies, and middle plays; the middle group subdivides into love/friendship plays and mercy/forgiveness plays

3. One, two, one structure

   • Divide into four, but recognize the structure as really 2+2 or 1+2+1
   • Thomas uses this for the four kinds of order considered by reason: starting with order not made by reason, then dividing order made by reason into three (in reason itself, in the will’s acts, in exterior matter)

Key Arguments #

Why Habit Cannot Be Distinguished by Natural/Adventitious #

The Problem:

• Some figures and sensible qualities are adventitious but are not habits
• Some dispositions (health, beauty) are natural, contradicting the adventitious classification
• This distinction does not respect the proper order of species (simpler/more natural things come before complex ones)

The Solution: The distinction must be based on what each species primarily regards (its formal object), not on natural vs. adventitious:

• Habit regards nature as its end
• Ability regards potency
• Sensible qualities regard passion/motion
• Figure regards quantity

Why Good and Bad Belong Only to Habit and Sensible Qualities (When Related to Nature) #

The Argument:

• Good and bad are said with respect to the end
• Only the first species (habit/disposition) primarily considers nature as the end
• Motion and passion lack the notion of an end, so abilities and sensible qualities (in themselves) admit no good or bad
• Figure, being merely quantitative, admits no good or bad

Exception: When sensible qualities or figures are related to the nature of the thing as suitable or unsuitable, they then pertain to the first species and do admit of good or bad.

Why Habit and Disposition Are Called “Dispositions of the Perfect to the Best” #

From Aristotle’s Physics, Book 7:

• Habits of both soul and body are “dispositions of the perfect to the best”
• This indicates they concern the perfection of a nature toward its proper operation (its best state)
• Unlike mere potency or mere motion, habit implies a subject already perfected in being that is now well-disposed toward operation

Important Definitions #

Modus (Mode) #

Following Augustine on Genesis ad litteram: a mode is a measure prefixed. It implies that something is determined according to some measure or standard. Quality is thus a modus substantiae—a way of determining the potency of matter in accidental being.

Qualitas (Quality) #

A mode of substance. Specifically, that by which the potency of a subject is determined according to accidental being. Just as substantial difference determines matter to substantial being, accidental quality determines the subject to accidental being.

Habitus (Habit) #

A disposition by which something is disposed well or badly (bene vel male) toward its nature, or in order to an end. Characterized by:

• Immobile (difficult to change) causes
• Reference to nature as end
• Capacity to admit both good and bad
• Both ease/difficulty of being moved and notions of good/bad pertain to it

Dispositio (Disposition) #

In the narrow sense (as divided against habit):

• An imperfect or easily lost quality
• Characterized by easily changeable causes
• Still ordered to something beyond itself
• Can become a habit through perfection and stabilization

The first species of quality as a whole includes both habits (perfect, immobile) and dispositions (imperfect, mobile).

Examples & Illustrations #

Health and Beauty #

Thomas uses these as paradigmatic examples of habits in the body:

• Health: a disposition of the body toward its natural operations (digestion, movement, sensation)
• Beauty: a disposition of the body toward beauty (connected to its natural end of reproduction)
• Both are easily lost in their incipient stages but can become more stable
• Both involve the coming together of many factors (proper temperature, humors, proportions)
• When heat and cold suit the nature of the thing, they pertain to health; when figures suit nature, they pertain to beauty

Knowledge and the Student #

Berquist illustrates the perfect/imperfect distinction:

• A student completing freshman year may have learned philosophy but “disposed to philosophy” rather than possessing the habit
• If asked to apply freshman knowledge three years later, the student has often forgotten—the disposition was easily lost
• By contrast, the established scholar has mastered the science and possesses the difficult-to-lose habit
• The student began with a disposition; with continued study and perfection, disposition becomes habit

The Boy Becoming a Man #

Thomas uses this striking analogy: “As the boy becomes a man, so disposition becomes habit.” This illustrates:

• The process is one of increasing perfection in the same being
• The transformation is not instantaneous but gradual
• At each stage, the subject truly is what it is (boy, man; disposition, habit) yet there is continuity

Virtue and Vice #

Berquist emphasizes the moral application:

• Cowardice: being disposed badly toward the passion of fear
• Courage: being disposed well toward fear (the virtue)
• Temperance: being disposed well toward concupiscence
• Intemperance: being disposed badly toward concupiscence

Moral development consists of acquiring habits that dispose us well toward our passions.

Shakespeare’s Plays #

Berquist uses Shakespeare classification as a model of sophisticated division:

• 37 plays total; 10 history plays set aside (special problems)
• Remaining 27 divided into: tragedies (10), comedies (5), middle plays (12)
• Middle plays subdivide into love/friendship plays (6) and mercy/forgiveness plays (6)
• This 1-2-1 structure mirrors Thomas’s logical method
• Illustrates how tragedy and comedy are distinguished by movement (happiness to misery vs. misery to happiness) but some plays are serious without being tragic

The Porphyrian Tree and Univocal Names #

Berquist recounts discovering Thomas’s insight at Laval:

• Thomas shows that no name is said univocally of God and creatures
• His proof uses an either-or syllogism: every univocal name must be either genus, species, difference, property, or accident
• Thomas eliminates each of these five possibilities for God/creature terms
• This demonstrates the value of bringing together distinctions from Porphyry’s Isagoge (genus, species, difference, property, accident)
• Though Porphyry doesn’t explicitly state this, the logical framework reveals that these are distinctions among names said univocally of many things

Questions Addressed #

Why Cannot Habit Be Distinguished from Other Species by the Natural/Adventitious Distinction? #

Problem: Simplicius proposes that natural qualities are unchanging while adventitious (acquired) qualities are changeable, with the latter dividing into dispositions (easily lost) and habits (difficultly lost).

Response:

• Many figures and sensible qualities are adventitious but are not habits (e.g., a temporary scar or flush)
• Many dispositions are natural, not adventitious (e.g., health and beauty)
• Moreover, this classification fails to respect the proper ordering of species
• The correct distinction must rest on what each species formally regards: its primary object

What is the Proper Way to Distinguish the Four Species? #

Thomas’s Answer: Each species is distinguished by what it primarily regards according to how quality determines a subject:

1. Habit/Disposition - regards nature as end
2. Ability/Inability - regards potency
3. Sensible qualities - regards passion/motion
4. Figure/Form - regards quantity

This distinction respects both the metaphysical priority of nature and the proper structure of the categories.

Can Figure and Heat/Cold Be Well or Badly Disposed? #

The Subtlety: Yes, but only insofar as they relate to nature.

Explanation:

• Figure and sensible qualities, considered absolutely (in themselves), admit no well or badly
• But when considered as suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing, they pertain to the first species (beauty, health) and thus admit good or bad
• Example: The same figure can be beautiful (well-disposed to nature) or ugly (badly-disposed) depending on the organism
• The geometers, however, speak truly without reference to good or bad because they abstract from nature

How Can Disposition Become Habit? #

Two Views Thomas Presents:

View 1 (Perfect/Imperfect in Same Species):

• Disposition is an imperfect possession of the same quality that becomes perfect as a habit
• Example: beginning knowledge vs. established knowledge
• Disposition continuously becomes habit through practice and repetition
• Both remain in the first species of quality

View 2 (Diverse Species of Subalternate Genus):

• Dispositions are defined by easily changeable causes; habits by immobile causes
• These are intrinsically different species
• Disposition does not become habit in this view; rather, the subject loses its disposition and acquires a habit

Aristotelian Intent: Thomas suggests the second view accords better with Aristotle’s intention, though both have validity.

Why Do Geometers Not Speak of Good and Bad? #

The Reason: Geometry concerns itself with figure, which belongs to the fourth species of quality. Quantity, by its definition, is:

• Without motion
• Without the notion of good and bad

Geometrical propositions achieve certainty precisely because they abstract from nature and the ends toward which things tend. A geometric proposition is neither good nor bad—it is simply true or false. This is why geometry excels in certainty among the sciences: it operates apart from the realm of ends and thus avoids the complexity of evaluating actions toward ends.

Why Must We Use Accidental Differences to Define Substances and Qualities? #

The Problem: We often cannot access essential differences directly.

The Solution: We use accidental differences as signs and indices of essential differences.

Examples:

• We distinguish dogs from cats as “four-footed animals that bark” vs. “four-footed animals that meow” (accidental properties)
• We distinguish dispositions from habits by “easily changeable” vs. “difficultly changeable” (accidental properties related to motion)
• These accidental markers work because they properly designate the essential differences, even though they are not the essential differences themselves

This practice is not improper if understood correctly: the accidental differences serve as proper signs (παραcιδένσα) of the essential principles.

Notable Quotes #

“Nature is that which is first to be considered in a thing; therefore, habit is laid down as the first species of quality.” — Thomas Aquinas (Berquist’s paraphrase)

This encapsulates Thomas’s fundamental insight: the ordering of the species reflects the metaphysical ordering of what is prior and posterior in a thing.

“As the boy becomes a man, so disposition becomes habit.” — Thomas Aquinas

Illustrates the gradual perfection of disposition into habit through continuous development.

“Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse.” — William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Friar Lawrence

Berquist uses this to show that Shakespeare understood nature (true birth) as the measure of good and bad: to depart from one’s nature is to stumble into abuse.

“This above all: to thine own self be true.” — William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Polonius

Interpreted by Berquist as “be true to your nature”—a practical expression of the philosophical principle that nature is the measure of virtue.