128. Habit as Quality and the Category of Having

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Premium and Its Pedagogical Function #

• The premium (προοίμιον) is distinct from an introduction (isagoge): it establishes the order and aim of inquiry
• Teachability involves two dimensions:
  • Intellectual: understanding the order of material (seeing what comes before and after)
  • Volitional: willingness to learn from another who knows better
• Thomas structures Question 49 on habits following the general-to-particular method of Aristotle

The Four-Part Structure of Question 49 #

1. Whether habit is a quality
2. The subject of habit (Question 50)
3. The generation, growth, and corruption of habits (Questions 51-53)
4. The distinction of habits (Question 54)

The Equivocal Word “To Have” (Habere) #

• “To have” corresponds to multiple senses with different categories:
  • Subject having accidents (substance with quality, quantity, etc.)
  • Genus having species in plural; species having a genus in singular
  • External possession (I have a car)
  • Internal possession (I have knowledge, I have a soul)
  • Agent’s power over patient (I have you in my power)
  • Relation (I have a friend, a companion)
• The word is equivocal by reason (aequivocatio per rationem), not by chance
• Aristotle addresses this in the post-Predicamenta of the Categories, treating “to have” alongside opposites, before/after, and together

The Category of Having (Echin) as Distinguished from Habit as Quality #

• As a tenth category: “to have” refers to external relations like wearing clothing
  • Between the wearer and the garment there is a middle: the habit of wearing
  • This is a supreme genus (predicamentum) distinct from quality
• As a quality: habit is an internal disposition perfecting a power
  • A stable, not easily removed state
  • Contrasts with temporary dispositions (moods)

The Three Senses of Disposition (Dispositio) #

Disposition always implies order of something having parts, occurring in three ways:

1. According to place (locus): order of parts in space → pertains to position (situs)
2. According to potency (potentia): preparations and suitability not yet perfect → imperfect dispositions, easily changed
3. According to species (species): perfect dispositions → habit as quality (scientia, virtus)

The Problem of Naming and the New Name Doctrine #

When a word applies to two things, one having the full meaning and another having it imperfectly or derivatively, the one with the full meaning often keeps the original name, while the other receives a new name:

• Example: “disposition” vs. “habit” (habitus) — habit adds stability and permanence
• Example: “knowledge” (scientia) vs. “wisdom” (sapientia) — wisdom is knowledge of first causes
• Example: “man” vs. “boy” — the boy has imperfectly what defines a man
• Example: “animal” when divided against “man” — man as a type of animal receives a new name emphasizing reason

Key Arguments #

First Objection: Habit Cannot Be a Quality #

Argument (from Augustine):

• “Habit” derives from “to have,” which applies to all categories
• Therefore, habit is not restricted to quality

Response:

• The word “to have” is equivocal; Augustine’s argument proceeds from “to have” taken commonly across all genera
• When discussing habit as a principle of human action, we mean habit precisely as a quality

Second Objection: Habit Is Listed as a Separate Category #

Argument:

• In the Categories, habitus is listed as one of the ten predicamenta
• Therefore, habit cannot be a quality but must be a separate supreme genus

Response:

• This objection confuses habit as an external relation (the tenth category) with habit as a quality
• The category called “to have” (echin) refers to wearing or possessing something external
• Habit as a quality of the soul is what we discuss regarding virtues and vices

Third Objection: Disposition Belongs to Position, Not Quality #

Argument:

• Disposition implies order of parts having position
• Position is a category distinct from quality
• Therefore, disposition/habit cannot be a quality

Response:

• Disposition has three meanings, only one of which pertains to position
• According to place: pertains to situs (position)
• According to potency: imperfect dispositions in preparation (belong to quality as incomplete)
• According to species: perfect dispositions called habits (belong to quality as complete)

Important Definitions #

Habit (Habitus) as Quality #

“A disposition according to which one is disposed either well or badly, either according to oneself or to another”

• Example: health is a habit of the body
• Characterized by relative permanence and resistance to change
• Perfects a power with respect to act, enabling action to be performed well, easily, and perfectly

Disposition (Dispositio) #

• An ordering of parts or potencies
• Can be temporary or permanent
• When easily changeable: called by its own name (mood, passio)
• When difficult to remove: receives the new name “habit”

Category/Predicament (Praedicamentum; Greek: kategoria) #

• One of ten highest genera
• Distinguished by how something can be predicated of individual substances
• Literally: “supreme accusations” (from Greek kategoria, used in law courts)
• Aristotle’s ten: substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, when, where, position, to have

Equivocation by Reason (Aequivocatio per Rationem) #

• A word applied to multiple things where:
  • One thing has the full and perfect meaning
  • Other things have the meaning imperfectly or derivatively
  • Both uses are linked by intelligible relation, not by chance

Amphiboly (Amphibolia) #

• Equivocal speech arising from a single phrase having two meanings
• Contrasts with equivocation of a single word
• Example: “knowledge of God” can mean knowledge God has (possessive genitive) or knowledge whereby God is known (objective genitive)

Examples & Illustrations #

The Word “To Have” Across Contexts #

• “I have a car” — external possession, not part of me
• “I have knowledge” — internal quality, constituting part of my actual being
• “I have a soul” — essential possession, more truly mine than external things
• “I have a son” — relation of fatherhood
• “I have you in my power” — agent’s dominance over another
• “The cat has you” — ironic inversion: being possessed by what one thinks one possesses

Difference Between Position and Habit (as Category) #

• Position (situs): order of body parts in relation to external reference
  • Sitting: requires a chair; parts arranged in specific order relative to ground
  • Standing: different arrangement relative to ground
  • Jumping from airplane: body in standing position, but not standing (lacks ground)
• Habit (as category): wearing or possessing something external
  • Being clothed: garment is external to body, not part of the person
  • Being armed: armor worn externally
  • Being housed: dwelling around the person

The Divine as Exemplar of Having #

• Creatures have things they are not:
  • “I have knowledge of geometry” but that is not what I am
  • “I have health” but health is not my substance
• God is what He has:
  • “God has wisdom” = God is wisdom
  • “God has life” = God is life (“I am… the life”)
  • Everything God has, He is; what we have, we are not

New Names in Greek Philosophy #

• Episteme (scientia) and Sophia (sapientia):
  • Both are reasoned knowledge of causes
  • Wisdom is knowledge of first causes
  • In Metaphysics, wisdom keeps its own name as the superior form; other knowledge types keep episteme/scientia
• Pythagoras and Philosopher:
  • Refused to be called “wise” (sophos) — only God is wise
  • Accepted instead “lover of wisdom” (philosophos)
  • Reflects humility: human knowledge is defective compared to divine wisdom

Notable Quotes #

“The premium shouldn’t be confused with an introduction. The premium tells you what you’re aiming at, right? That’s an important thing.”

“Everything he has, he is. But what we have, we’re not, right? I have some knowledge of geometry, but that’s not what I am, you know? I have some health, but that’s not what I am.”

“You’ve got to find it over and over again, right? Sometimes a word is said of two things, right, and it’s kept by one of those two things later on as its own, and a new name is given to the other one.”

“Modern philosophers are too proud to stop and figure out what the words they’re using mean. Strange, yeah?”

“Wisdom is the knowledge of God in both senses of the phrase or speech, right?”

Questions Addressed #

Is Habit a Quality? #

Question: Does habit (habitus) belong to the category of quality, or is it the tenth category (to have)?

Resolution: When discussing habit as a principle of human action (virtues, vices, grace), habit is a quality—specifically a disposition that perfects a power. The word “habit” is equivocal: it can also refer to the tenth category (wearing or possessing something external), but the philosophical inquiry concerns habit as an internal quality of the soul.

How Does “To Have” Relate to the Categories? #

Question: What is the relationship between the equivocal word “to have” and Aristotle’s system of categories?

Resolution: The word “to have” has as many meanings as distinct ways things can be related to or ordered within categories. Aristotle addresses this in the post-Predicamenta of the Categories, showing that “to have” follows upon the diversity of genera, just as “opposites,” “before and after,” and “together” do.

What Distinguishes Habit from Temporary Disposition? #

Question: How do we distinguish habit (a principle of action) from temporary states like moods or passions?

Resolution: Both are dispositions, but dispositions can be understood according to different modes: temporary dispositions are easily changed (these keep the name “disposition”), while permanent dispositions add notable stability and resistance to change and receive the new name “habit.” This distinction shows why Thomas treats habits (not passions) as the basis of virtues and vices.

Why Does Disposition Apply to Three Different Modes? #

Question: If disposition means “order of parts,” why does Thomas say it applies according to place, potency, and species?

Resolution: Disposition always implies order, but this ordering can occur in three ways: (1) spatially in place (position/situs), (2) in potency as preparation (imperfect disposition), or (3) in actualization according to species (perfect habit). Only the third mode concerns habit as a quality perfecting a power.