124. Anger Compared to Concupiscence and Hate

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Article 5: Is Anger More Natural Than Concupiscence? #

This article resolves an apparent contradiction: Aristotle claims anger is more natural to man than concupiscence, yet food and reproduction seem obviously more natural than revenge.

The Problem:

• Man is naturally mild/gentle, opposed to anger
• Reason opposes nature; anger involves reason while concupiscence does not
• Concupiscence (food, reproduction) conserves life more obviously than anger (revenge) does

Thomas’s Resolution: The Three-Fold Distinction of “Natural”

What is “natural” can be considered from three perspectives:

1. According to generic nature (man as animal): Concupiscence is more natural, concerning conservation of life and species
2. According to specific nature (man as rational): Anger is more natural, because anger involves reason more than concupiscence does
3. According to individual complexion (temperament): Depending on one’s disposition (e.g., choleric temperament), anger may be more natural

Key Insight: Aristotle is not mistaken; he speaks from the perspective of man’s specific nature as rational. Anger, which involves reason (λόγος), is indeed more natural to man’s rational nature than concupiscence, which can operate purely from sense appetite.

Article 6: Is Anger More Grave Than Hate? #

This article compares anger and hate, addressing whether anger is worse.

The Objections Suggest Anger is Worse:

• Proverbs 27:4: “Anger does not have mercy”
• The angry person seeks that the victim know and suffer from punishment
• Anger, composed of multiple passions, appears more stable

Augustine’s Position: Hate is like a beam; anger is like a speck—hate is worse.

Thomas’s Resolution: Two Critical Distinctions

In comparing anger and hate, two aspects must be considered:

1. The object desired:

   • Hate desires evil as such (evil in itself), absolutely and without measure
   • Anger desires evil under the aspect of justice (ὡς δίκαιον), as vindication of injury

2. The intensity and permanence:

   • Hate is unlimited in desire for evil
   • Anger is limited by the measure of justice
   • Hate proceeds from permanent disposition; anger from temporary commotion
   • Therefore, hate is more incurable and permanent

Conclusion: Hate is more grave because:

• It desires evil absolutely without measure
• It is more permanent (dispositional rather than emotional)
• It is more incurable
• It is more opposed to mercy

Anger, while more impetuous in the moment, is more compatible with virtue because it can be ordered toward justice. Christ’s anger at hardness of heart exemplifies virtuous anger; hate would not be.

Article 7: Is Anger Only Toward Those to Whom There is Justice? #

This article examines the proper objects of anger.

The Objections:

• We get angry at irrational things (tools, computers, animals)
• We can be angry with ourselves
• Justice applies only between persons

Thomas’s Resolution:

Anger properly pertains only to those toward whom there is justice and injustice because:

• Anger desires evil under the aspect of just vindication (ὡς ἔχον λόγον δικαίου)
• Vindication requires that an injury has been done
• Justice and injustice are the proper framework

Addressing the Objections:

1. Anger at inanimate things: This arises from imagination rather than reason. When we get angry at a computer, we imagine it has harmed us, but this is not true anger in the strict sense (which requires rational deliberation about justice). It is anger “by likeness” to animal motion.

2. Anger with oneself: This is metaphorical justice. One can speak of owing justice to oneself only in an analogical sense (when reason rules the appetites), but properly speaking anger is not directed at oneself.

3. Anger toward a class: When a whole city injures us, the city is computed as one singular entity, so anger can properly be directed toward it.

Key Arguments #

The Naturalness of Anger (Article 5) #

• Premise 1: What is natural is that which is caused by nature
• Premise 2: The cause of a passion can be considered from the object or from the subject
• Premise 3: From the object (food, reproduction), concupiscence is more natural
• Premise 4: From the subject, considering man’s specific nature as rational, anger is more natural because it inherently involves reason
• Conclusion: Aristotle is correct; anger is more natural to man as a rational being, even though concupiscence is more natural to man as an animal

The Comparative Gravity of Anger and Hate (Article 6) #

• Premise 1: Hate desires evil absolutely; anger desires evil under the aspect of justice
• Premise 2: What is desired absolutely is desired without measure
• Premise 3: Hate proceeds from a permanent disposition; anger from a temporary commotion of the soul
• Premise 4: Therefore, hate is more permanent and incurable than anger
• Conclusion: Hate is more grave and worse than anger, despite anger appearing more intense

The Justice-Based Object of Anger (Article 7) #

• Premise 1: Anger is the desire for vindication of injury
• Premise 2: Vindication properly pertains to justice
• Premise 3: Therefore, anger is properly only toward those to whom justice and injustice apply
• Objection: We get angry at inanimate things
• Response: This arises from imagination, not reason; it is anger only “by likeness,” not in the strict sense

Important Definitions #

Anger (ἱρά/ira): The desire for revenge or vindication of an injury, understood as a just response, involving both sadness (at the injury) and hope (of punishing the offender). It properly involves reason in grasping the injury as unjust.

Natural (φύσει/naturale): That which is caused by nature. Can be understood according to:

• Generic nature (what man shares with animals)
• Specific nature (what is peculiar to man as rational)
• Individual complexion or disposition (individual temperament)

Vindication (ἀντιπέμψας/vindicta): The infliction of punishment or harm as a just response to injury. Requires that the offender know and suffer from the punishment.

Justice (δικαιοσύνη/iustitia): In this context, the virtue of giving each their due; equality. Anger seeks to restore equality through vindication.

Imagination (φαντασία/imaginatio) vs. Reason (λόγος/ratio): Imagination grasps something as harmful without deliberation; reason brings together (σύγκρισις/collatio) the injury with the appropriate response to judge it as unjust.

Commotion vs. Disposition: A commotion (passio momentanea) is a temporary emotional movement; a disposition (habitudo) is a permanent state of character. Anger arises from commotion; hate from disposition.

Examples & Illustrations #

Mildness of Berquist’s Grandfather: Berquist’s “eternal grandfather” was so gentle he would not even slap a mosquito, merely brushing it away—illustrating extreme gentleness as the opposite of anger.

Getting Angry at Inanimate Objects:

• A pen that won’t write
• A computer that freezes
• A tool that breaks Berquist notes these arise from imagination (treating the object as if it had harmed him) rather than from reason grasping true injustice.

The Commercial with the Duck: A humorous commercial where a duck becomes frustrated with computer instructions to “strike any key” and attempts to smash the computer with a mallet—illustrating how we imaginatively project agency onto inanimate objects.

Horseman and Horse: The example of a horseman striking a horse when angry, showing how anger can be directed at non-rational creatures.

Penitential Anger: The example of a penitent person angry with himself on account of his sin—illustrating the metaphorical sense in which one can be angry with oneself.

Notable Quotes #

“Anger does not have mercy.” — Proverbs 27:4

“Become angry and do not wish to sin.” — Psalm 4

“That anger is natural, it’s more natural [than concupiscence].” — Aristotle, Ethics Book VII (as cited by Thomas)

“The angry man, if many things come to be, he takes mercy. But the one hating, for none.” — Aristotle, Rhetoric Book II

“Hate is more incurable than anger.” — Aristotle, Rhetoric Book II

“Would you have me be false to myself? Say I play the man I am.” — Coriolanus (Shakespeare), illustrating the connection between anger and one’s sense of self-worth

“Hell hath no fury like a woman’s woman.” — Berquist’s reference, illustrating the boundlessness of hate

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Is anger more natural than concupiscence?

A: Yes, if we consider man’s specific nature as rational. Anger involves reason more than concupiscence does. However, from the perspective of man’s generic nature as an animal, concupiscence (for food and reproduction) is more natural. The apparent contradiction is resolved by distinguishing three senses of “natural.”

Q2: Is anger more grave than hate?

A: No. Hate is more grave because it desires evil absolutely and without measure, whereas anger desires evil only under the aspect of justice. Hate is also more permanent (dispositional) and incurable. However, anger is more intense and impetuous in the moment.

Q3: Is anger only toward those to whom there is justice?

A: Properly speaking, yes. Anger seeks vindication of injury, which pertains to justice. However, we can speak of anger toward inanimate things or ourselves in an improper sense, arising from imagination rather than reason.