123. The Nature of Anger: Objects, Powers, and Reason

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• Is Anger a Special Passion? Whether anger constitutes its own distinct passion or merely combines other passions like sadness, desire, and hope
• The Objects of Anger: What anger formally regards—something bad (the injury), something good (revenge), or both
• Anger and the Appetitive Powers: Whether anger belongs to the irascible or concupiscible appetite, and what distinguishes these powers
• Anger and Reason: The relationship between anger and rational deliberation, and whether anger can be considered “with reason” despite being a passion

Key Arguments #

On Anger’s Two-fold Object #

From Gregory of Nyssa: Anger is the armor-bearer (armiger) of concupiscence, fighting against impediments to desire. Every impediment has the character of something bad; therefore anger regards the bad as its object.

From Augustine: Anger desires revenge. Since revenge pertains to justice, and justice is a good, anger must regard something good.

Thomas’s Resolution: Anger is unique among passions in having a two-fold object:

• It regards revenge (the desired punishment) as something good (which it desires and takes pleasure in)
• It regards the person against whom revenge is sought as something harmful/bad

This distinguishes anger from love (which regards only good) and hate (which regards only bad). Anger is, in a sense, partially contrary to itself, being composed of opposed elements.

On the Irascible vs. Concupiscible Appetite #

Objections claiming anger is concupiscible:

• Cicero defines anger as a libido (desire), and desire belongs to the concupiscible appetite
• Anger grows into hate, and hate is concupiscible (as are love and sadness)
• Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa say anger is composed of sadness and desire, both concupiscible passions

Thomas’s Response: The irascible and concupiscible appetites differ fundamentally:

• Concupiscible: Objects are good and bad absolutely (simpliciter)
• Irascible: Objects are good and bad with difficulty or elevation (cum aliqua difficultate)

Anger requires a certain magnitude in both its objects—it does not arise unless there is something significant at stake. One does not become truly angry at trifles (valde modica). This magnitude/difficulty/elevation in both objects places anger in the irascible appetite, not the concupiscible.

On Anger and Reason #

Objections denying reason’s role:

• Anger is a passion in the sensus appetitus (sense appetite), which follows sensory apprehension, not reason
• Brute animals lack reason yet experience anger
• Drunkenness impedes reason yet aids (or releases) anger

Thomas’s Resolution: Anger is “with reason” but imperfectly (qualitare). The angry person performs an act of reason—specifically, a collatio (comparison) between the harm suffered and the punishment deserved. However:

• Anger follows reason not as commanding (as the will does) but as manifesting/announcing the injury
• This rational act is imperfect—anger does not perfectly obey reason’s rule and often leads to excessive punishment
• Brute animals have anger through natural instinct that mimics reason’s operations (endowed by divine reason)
• The slightly drunk person retains some judgment of reason but in impeded form, allowing anger to emerge more readily

Important Definitions #

• Libido: Desire for a future good, without distinction as to whether difficulty is involved; used by Cicero to encompass anger broadly
• Collatio: A bringing together; the rational act of comparing (comparing one thing to another) the harm done with the punishment deserved
• Vindicta (Revenge): The infliction of punishment as a response to injury; pertains to justice
• Armiger (Armor-bearer): Gregory of Nyssa’s term for anger as the defender of concupiscence against impediments
• Valde modica: Very little, trifles; injuries of negligible magnitude that do not provoke true anger
• Cum aliqua difficultate/elevatio (With difficulty/elevation): The distinguishing feature of irascible objects, indicating something that requires effort, striving, or nobility
• Qualitare (In some way): Thomas’s term for the imperfect manner in which anger follows reason

Examples & Illustrations #

• Animal Anger: Dogs become angry when a bone is taken from them; animals lack reason yet experience anger through natural instinct
• The Neighbor’s Plant: A story of a neighbor’s child pushing over a plant and breaking it—the owner’s anger is justified as the child deserves punishment
• The Milk Glass Story: A child drops a glass of milk and says “nobody’s perfect.” Berquist controlled his anger and responded with sweetness, inducing the child to perfection rather than overwhelming him with sorrow
• The Cement Truck Story: A man discovers his wife’s infidelity, becomes angry, and dumps cement from his truck into the lover’s convertible—an extreme example of anger leading to disproportionate revenge
• Revenge in Fiction: Movies and plays often depict characters driven by desires for revenge, showing the pleasure people take in imagining or witnessing vengeance
• The Chicago Criminal: Berquist witnessed on television a murderer in prison who had killed a child abuser, describing with obvious pleasure how he stabbed him—illustrating how anger with hope produces pleasure

Notable Quotes #

“Anger is a desire for revenge” (Augustine, Confessions II, cited by Thomas)

“The angry man syllogized” (Aristotle, Rhetoric II—indicating that anger involves an implicit reasoning act)

“Anger operates with sadness” (Aristotle, Ethics VII)

“It is marvelous how delightful it is to get revenge” (Greek poet, cited by Aristotle and the Philosopher)

“Anger is with reason, not as commanding, but as manifesting the injury” (Thomas’s resolution of how anger relates to reason)

“Anger grows into hate” (Tullius/Cicero, in Augustine’s Rule)

“Hate is inveterate anger” (Tullius/Cicero—hate as anger grown old)

Questions Addressed #

1. Is anger one special passion or merely a combination of other passions? Thomas shows it is special, though caused by concurrence of multiple causes, somewhat like a child who partakes of characteristics from both parents.

2. What are the objects of anger? Anger has a unique two-fold object: revenge (as good, which it desires) and the person against whom revenge is sought (as bad/harmful). This makes anger unique among the passions.

3. Why does anger belong to the irascible appetite rather than concupiscible? Because both of anger’s objects involve magnitude, difficulty, or elevation—the characteristic feature of irascible objects. Trivial injuries do not provoke true anger.

4. How can anger involve reason if it is a passion? Anger involves reason imperfectly, through the rational act of comparing harm to deserved punishment. Reason manifests/announces the injury, though the angry person does not perfectly obey reason and may inflict excessive punishment.

5. Can brute animals experience anger without reason? Yes, through natural instinct endowed by divine reason. Their anger-like behavior mimics reason’s operations without requiring actual reason in the animal.

6. Why does drunkenness aid anger? Drunkenness impedes reason, allowing the irascible disposition (in a choleric person) to emerge without rational restraint. What comes out under drunkenness reflects one’s natural emotional disposition.

Connections to Broader Themes #

• Method of Distinctions: Berquist emphasizes Thomas’s use of distinctions (e.g., anger “with reason” but imperfectly; revenge as good and the harmed person as bad) to resolve apparent contradictions
• Aristotelian Psychology: The lecture grounds anger in Aristotle’s treatment of the passions and his observation that the angry person “syllogizes”
• Thomistic Virtue: Anger’s proper ordering toward justice and its moderation through the virtue of meekness connect to the broader virtue ethics framework
• Reason and Passion: The lecture illustrates Thomas’s understanding that reason does not simply command passions but can manifest truths to which the appetitive power responds