116. The Object of Fear: Evil, Nature, and Guilt

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Fear as a Passion with Primary Object #

• Fear is fundamentally a motion of the appetitive power implying flight from something
• The proper object of fear (per se et primo) is the bad/evil, not the good
• Fear can regard the good only per accidens (accidentally) insofar as it relates to evil
• Two ways the good relates to evil in fear:
  1. The good can be lost through evil (evil deprives one of the good one loves)
  2. The good can be a cause of harm (a powerful good can inflict punishment)

The Object’s Essential Qualities #

• Fear requires its object to be: future, difficult (arduum), and not easily avoided
• What is entirely subject to human will and power does not have the notion of something terrible (terribilis)
• The feared evil must have an extrinsic cause beyond our control
• Sadness (tristizia) and fear differ: sadness regards present evil absolutely; fear regards future evil with arduousness

Fear Regarding Natural Evil (Malum Naturae) #

• Natural evil can be feared even though always imminent, because it is not always imminent in a near way
• Natural evil arises from universal nature but is resisted by particular nature so far as possible
• The evil of nature is both:
  1. Effective of nature (causes corruption contrary to nature itself)
  2. Privative of nature (deprives of the good of nature)
• When natural evil is imminent in the future, hope allows counsel to defer it (even if not entirely avoid it)

Fear Regarding Evil of Guilt (Malum Culpae) #

• Properly speaking, guilt itself cannot be feared because guilt is subject to human will
• Guilt lacks the arduousness required for true fear
• Fear can concern guilt indirectly through external causes:
  1. Fear of seduction into sin (fear of bad company or evil occasions that would incline one to sin)
  2. Fear of the shame/ignominy that follows guilt (fear of disgrace, not of the sin itself)
  3. Fear of punishment consequent upon sin (separation from God as punishment following guilt)
• The example of St. John of the Cross illustrates this: one can fear occasions of sin more than the sin itself

Shame (Verecundia) and Its Relation to Fear #

• Shame is a species of fear (species timoris)
• Shame concerns the ugly thing or ignominy that follows an act, not the act of guilt itself
• The object of shame is extrinsic to the guilty act—it is the disgrace
• Therefore shame, like fear, has an extrinsic cause

Key Arguments #

Against Fear Regarding the Good (Objection 1) #

Objection: Augustine says we fear nothing except what we love; we fear losing the good we love; therefore fear is about the good.

Response:

• Fear regards good only remotely and in a secondary way (remote cause)
• The proper object is the evil that deprives us of the good
• Fear looks to two things: (1) the evil being fled, and (2) the good power that can inflict harm (e.g., fearing God’s power to punish, not God’s nature)

Against Fear Regarding Natural Evil (Objection 2) #

Objection: We do not take counsel about things that come by nature; fear makes us take counsel; therefore fear is not about natural evil.

Response:

• Natural evil can be deferred even if not entirely avoided
• Through hope, counsel can address postponement of natural evils
• The key distinction: natural evil is imminent, but not always imminent in a near way
• When natural evil is far off, it does not provoke actual fear

Against Fear Regarding Guilt (Objection 3) #

Objection: Hope is about the good of virtue; fear should be about the evil of guilt as fear’s parallel; therefore fear is about guilt.

Response:

• Key distinction: Hope can be about a good in our power; fear is about evil not subject to our power
• Guilt is subject to human will and therefore lacks the necessary extrinsic difficulty
• Fear properly concerns only what has an extrinsic cause beyond our power
• Guilt can be feared only indirectly through the seduction that might cause it
• An analogy: one fears the medications that produce involuntary suicidal thoughts (extrinsic cause) more than suicide itself

Important Definitions #

Timor (Fear) #

• A motion of the appetitive power implying flight from a future evil
• The object must be: future, difficult (arduum), and not easily avoided
• Fundamentally an undergoing or being moved by an external agent

Malum (Evil) #

• That which is contrary to nature or contrary to the will
• The proper and primary object of fear
• Includes natural evil (death, corruption) and moral evil (guilt, shame)

Arduum (Difficult/Arduous) #

• A quality of the feared evil indicating it exceeds easy resistance
• Distinguishes fear (which requires difficulty) from sadness (which can regard any evil, great or small)
• Essential to defining fear’s object

Tristizia (Sadness) #

• A motion of the appetitive power regarding a present evil
• Differs from fear by its temporal orientation (present vs. future) and scope (regards evil absolutely, not just arduous evil)
• Has greater power of commotion (vim commotionis) than other passions

Verecundia (Shame) #

• Species of fear regarding disgrace in an act yet to be done
• The object is the ignominy or turpitude that follows the act, not the act of sin itself
• Has an extrinsic cause (the public shame, not the voluntary guilt)

Turbatio (Disturbance/Commotion) #

• The bodily and spiritual upheaval characteristic of passion
• Particularly prominent in sadness and fear
• Christ demonstrates turbatio in John 13 when troubled about Judas’s betrayal

Examples & Illustrations #

From Berquist’s Teaching #

• Public meetings: People who experience fear when facing public situations may fear they will become afraid, illustrating how fear can relate to fear itself
• Mother in Minnesota: Example of someone who continually feared death in an habitual way rather than actually
• Medications with suicidal ideation: Modern example where patients fear the medication’s effects (extrinsic cause) rather than guilt for potential suicide
• The alcoholic and town routes: A recovering alcoholic who reasoned that he could not pass a particular bar, so he would take alternative routes—illustrating how external occasions of sin are feared more than sin itself because they have extrinsic power over us
• St. John of the Cross and the prostitute: He told her he would rather spend the night in hell with the devil than with her, because he would not sin with the devil but would with her—illustrating fear of seduction and external occasions more than the sin itself
• The politician’s shame: A politician caught with another woman during his campaign who claimed to be sorry, but the mother observed he was only sorry he was caught and lost the campaign, not sorry about the guilt itself

Notable Quotes #

“To the notion of passion belongs, first of all, in general, that be the emotion of the undergoing power, to which is compared its object as an active mover.” — Thomas Aquinas (on the definition of passion)

“Fear is about some future evil that is difficult and not easily avoided.” — Thomas Aquinas (on the object of fear)

“Nothing separates us from God except guilt.” — Augustine (cited regarding fear of guilt and separation from God)

“I’d rather spend the night in hell with the devil than with you, because I wouldn’t be sinning with the devil but I would be with you.” — St. John of the Cross (illustrating fear of seduction over guilt itself)

“Fear makes us take counsel.” — Aristotle, Rhetoric II (showing that fear has a deliberative function)

Questions Addressed #

Article 1: Is the Good or Evil the Object of Fear? #

• Resolution: Evil is the proper object per se et primo; the good is regarded only per accidens (accidentally) insofar as the good can be lost through evil or can be a cause of harm
• The good appears to be feared when we fear losing what we love, but properly we fear the evil of deprivation
• Example: fearing God means fearing God’s power to punish, not God’s nature (which is good)

Article 2: Is Natural Evil the Object of Fear? #

• Resolution: Yes, natural evil can be feared because although it is always imminent, it is not always imminent in a near way
• Natural evils like death can be deferred through counsel and hope
• The person who does not think about death on a particular day does not fear it, even though it is always possible

Article 3: Can Fear Be About Guilt? #

• Resolution: Properly speaking, no. Guilt itself cannot be feared because it is subject to human will and power
• However, fear can be about guilt indirectly:
  1. Fear of seduction into guilt (fear of bad company or occasions of sin)
  2. Fear of the shame/ignominy that follows guilt
  3. Fear of the punishment that follows sin
• The key is that in these cases, what is feared has an extrinsic cause beyond full human control
• An analogy: one can fear one’s own tendency to suicide if induced by medication, because the medication’s effect is not entirely subject to one’s will