115. Fear as a Special Passion of the Soul

Summary

This lecture examines whether fear constitutes a special passion of the soul with its own distinct object, or merely a general condition of other passions. Berquist guides students through Thomas Aquinas’s systematic treatment of fear, establishing the four-part definition of fear’s object (future evil, difficult, not easily avoided), distinguishing fear from related passions like sadness and aversion, and addressing objections from Augustine, Aristotle, and John Damascene regarding fear’s nature and species.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Is Fear a Special Passion? #

Thomas argues that fear is a special passion with a special object, contra the objection that it is merely a general condition. The objection claims that since Augustine says removing fear removes other passions, fear must be a general condition rather than a special passion. Thomas’s response: all passions derive from love as their beginning, but this derivation does not make them general passions—anger is not desire, despite both arising from love.

The Four-Part Definition of Fear’s Object #

Fear’s special object must be defined with four components:

Malum (Evil) - Fear concerns something bad, not good
Futurum (Future) - The evil must be future, not present (present evil causes sadness)
Difficile (Difficult/Arduous) - The evil must be difficult or burdensome
Non facile vitabile (Not easily avoided) - The one cannot resist it

Berquist emphasizes that a complete definition requires all four parts in proper order, like spelling a word correctly: omit one letter, you misspell it; omit one definitional element, you misdefined the thing.

Flight (fuga) is general to appetite; not every fleeing is fear. Only flight from a special object—future evil that is difficult and not easily avoided—constitutes fear. This distinguishes fear from:

Mere aversion (dislike of present evil)
Sadness (pain about present evil)
Despair (when evil seems impossible to avoid)

Fear’s Location in the Irascible Appetite #

Though fear derives from aversion in the concupiscible appetite, fear itself properly belongs to the irascible appetite (not the concupiscible). The irascible appetite is closer to reason and properly concerns things that are difficult and arduous. When fear is attributed to the concupiscible, this occurs because of the irascible’s derivation from and termination in the concupiscible passions.

Key Arguments #

Objection: Fear is not a special passion #

From Augustine: Augustine says that removing fear removes all other passions, suggesting fear is a general condition
- Response: All passions derive from one beginning (love), but this connection does not make fear a general passion—just as love is not anger, though anger arises from love
From Aristotle: Flight and pursuit in appetite function like affirmation and negation in intellect. Since negation is not something special in intellect but common to many, neither should flight be special in appetite
- Response: Not every fleeing is fear; only flight from a special object (future evil, difficult, not easily avoided) constitutes fear
From Damascene and Aristotle: Fear appears in both irascible and concupiscible appetites (Aristotle calls it sadness; Damascene calls it desiderative), so it cannot be special to one
- Response: Fear is not properly in the concupiscible; when attributed there, it is because of connection and derivation. Fear is called sadness insofar as its object (future evil) would sadden us if present

Thomas’s Resolution #

Fear is a special passion because:

Passions receive their species from their special objects
Fear has a special object: malum futurum difficile non facile vitabile (future evil, difficult, not easily avoided)
This object is not shared with other passions—hope concerns future good (different object)

Important Definitions #

Timor (Fear): A passion of the irascible appetite regarding a future evil that is difficult and not easily avoided, characterized by flight from that evil.

Malum (Evil): The object of fear; that which is corruptive or harmful. Fear concerns the bad per se (primarily), though the good can be feared secondarily insofar as it might be lost or insofar as a good thing (like God’s power) can inflict harm.

Futurum (Future): Fear concerns what is to come, distinguishing it from sadness (present evil) and from the present itself.

Difficile (Arduous/Difficult): That which exceeds our power to easily overcome; the quality requiring effort or resources beyond the ordinary.

Fuga (Flight): General appetite’s recoil from the bad. Not every flight is fear; only flight from a special object constitutes fear.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Definition as Exact Specification #

Berquist compares defining to spelling: “Defining is like spelling. Leave one letter out, you’ve misspelled the word.” Just as strict graders at the Assumptionists would mark papers down for single misspellings, a definition missing one of its four parts is incomplete. The order of parts also matters—they must follow the proper sequence (malum, futurum, difficile, non facile vitabile).

Fear vs. Other Passions Through Examples #

Desire vs. Hope: If I desire steak when I don’t have it, and enjoy it when present, and become angry if the dog takes it—these all arise from the same love of steak, yet they are distinct passions, not love itself
Flight vs. Fear: One might have an aversion to something, but not fear it. Fear requires the special object of future evil difficult to avoid

Wonder vs. Stupor (Intellectual Analogue) #

Berquist references a student from the University of Minnesota who read Aristotle and conflicting commentaries, becoming so confused (stupor) that he abandoned books entirely and went to farm work. This illustrates stupor as a freezing of the mind when faced with complexity, versus wonder as the beginning of philosophical inquiry. Descartes begins with universal doubt (stupor); Aristotle reserves it for philosophy’s later stages when the mind is already formed.

Notable Quotes #

“Fear has more the notion of a passion than most other emotions” - Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist)

“Not every fleeing is fear, but flight from a special object” - Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist’s interpretation)

“From wonder men began to philosophize” - Aristotle (cited by Berquist, noting that wonder is a beginning of philosophy, but stupor is an impediment)

“Defining is like spelling. Leave one letter out, you’ve misspelled the word” - Berquist (pedagogical analogy)

Questions Addressed #

Question: Is fear truly a special passion, or merely a condition of passions? #

Resolution: Fear is a special passion because it has a special object: a future evil that is difficult and not easily avoided. While all passions derive from love, this derivation does not make them general or identical to love. The connection among passions does not eliminate their distinctness.

Resolution: The four-part definition distinguishes fear:

From mere aversion (adds futurum, difficile, non facile vitabile)
From sadness (adds futurum; sadness is about present evil)
From despair (fear includes non facile vitabile meaning avoidance is difficult but possible; despair implies impossibility)

Question: Can fear properly pertain to the concupiscible appetite? #

Resolution: No, fear does not properly belong to the concupiscible appetite, though it derives from aversion there. The irascible appetite, being closer to reason and concerning what is arduous/difficult, is fear’s proper seat. When fear is attributed to the concupiscible, this is derivative and per accidens.