109. The Goodness and Badness of Sadness

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Problem: Is All Sadness Bad? #

Thomas addresses whether sadness is intrinsically evil or whether it can possess the character of genuine good. The opening objections argue that:

• Sadness will not exist in heaven, suggesting it is naturally bad
• All people, even the virtuous, flee sadness
• Spiritual sadness is an evil of the soul, just as bodily pain is an evil of the body

However, counter-arguments show that sadness about evil is itself good (contrary to pleasure about evil, which is bad).

Sadness: Bad in Itself, Good from Supposition #

Thomas establishes a crucial distinction:

Secundum se (in itself): Every sadness is bad because it impedes the rest and good of the appetitive power. The appetite, desiring to be in a good state, is troubled by present evil.

Ex suppositione (from supposition): Sadness can be good when it presupposes something worthy of being saddened over. This requires two conditions:

1. Knowledge of the evil through right judgment of reason
2. Refusal of the evil through a well-disposed will that detests it

Both of these are good, making sadness about genuine evil a manifestation of good.

Sadness as an Honorable Good (Bonum Honestum) #

Sadness can possess the character of an honorable/beautiful good when:

• It proceeds from right reason and a well-disposed will
• It is moderate—immoderate sadness (exceeding the bounds of reason) recedes from the honorable good
• It manifests proper judgment about evil

Example: “Blessed are those who weep, for they shall be consoled” (Matthew 5:5)

Objections against sadness being honorable argue:

• Excessive sadness can lead to disturbance and damnation (Jacob’s fear in Genesis)
• Sadness diminishes praise and merit (2 Corinthians 7:10 on sadness vs. necessity)
• Sadness about what happens against our will reflects a will repugnant to divine providence

Thomas responds that sadness must be regulated by reason—the root of the honorable good. Immoderate sadness exceeds this rational rule and thus loses its honorable character.

Sadness and Divine Providence #

One objection states that sadness about things we do not will reflects a will opposed to divine order. Berquist notes this raises the question: if God ordains all things, does proper acceptance require never being sad? Thomas’s response suggests that sadness about genuine evil remains good even when such evil is permitted by divine providence, because sadness manifests right judgment and proper rejection of the evil—not rejection of God’s providence.

Key Arguments #

The Twofold Goodness Analysis #

Argument structure:

• Something can be good or bad in two ways: simply (secundum se) or from supposition (ex suppositione)
• Example: Shame is bad in itself but good from the supposition of something shameful committed
• Similarly, sadness is bad in itself but can be good when it concerns something worthy of being saddened over

Application to sadness:

• If sadness concerns what is truly bad: it is good to be saddened and to refuse it
• If sadness concerns what is apparently bad but truly good: the sadness itself is based on false judgment, but the internal refusal of what appears bad is still a good act of the will

On Moderation and Excess #

• Sadness becomes contrary to the honorable good when it is immoderate (exceeds the bounds set by reason)
• Augustine’s example of Jacob: excessive sadness through which one might fail to reach the blessed rest but descend to hell
• The proper role of reason is to regulate all passions, including sadness

Why Sadness Cannot Be the Greatest Evil #

Thomas establishes (by implication in this lecture, though more fully elsewhere) that:

• Every sadness either concerns something truly bad OR something apparently bad
• In either case, there is something worse than the sadness itself
• Therefore, sadness is never the supreme evil

Important Definitions #

Tristitia (Sadness): A passion of the soul concerning a present evil that is repugnant to the will; it weighs down the appetitive power and impedes its operations.

Secundum se: In itself, intrinsically, as a thing is considered apart from any supposition or condition.

Ex suppositione: From supposition; good or bad depending on what is presupposed (e.g., sadness is bad in itself but good ex suppositione that something evil is present).

Bonum honestum: The honorable or beautiful good; that which is praiseworthy and meritorious, proceeding from right reason and well-disposed will. Distinguished from bonum utile (useful good) and bonum delectabile (pleasant good).

Delectatio: Pleasure; rest of the appetite in a suitable good.

Examples & Illustrations #

Literary and Theological Examples #

• Hamlet and excessive sadness: Hamlet’s exhortation to use reason and “look before and after” contrasts with his own excessive sadness over his father’s death, which his mother (Gertrude) and others view as immoderate

• Jacob’s excessive sadness: Augustine’s example of Jacob, whose exceeding sadness over Joseph’s apparent death threatened to disturb him so greatly he might not reach blessed rest but descend to hell instead

• Martyrs and contemplation: The example of St. Tiburzius walking on burning coals (ardentes punas) but perceiving roses through divine contemplation of Christ illustrates that even bodily pain can be mitigated by right understanding

• St. John of the Cross imprisoned: When imprisoned, John the Cross experienced wonderful contemplation despite harsh conditions, showing sadness about bodily suffering can coexist with spiritual joy

Personal Anecdotes #

• The spilled spaghetti: A child’s world seemed to end when his mother’s spaghetti went down the drain; her reassurance that she would make more provided consolation—illustrating how sadness about loss can be mitigated by hope in restoration

• Contemporary politics example: Berquist’s aside on college professors’ voting patterns (155 to 2 in favor of Obama at a major university) illustrates how knowledge (sadness about the direction of society) can affect judgment, leading some to mistaken conclusions about what is good

Questions Addressed #

Article 6: Is All Sadness Bad? #

Question: Can sadness ever be good, or is it always evil?

Objections:

1. All sadness will be absent in heaven; what naturally lacks from the perfect good is naturally bad
2. All people, even the virtuous, flee sadness
3. Spiritual sadness is an evil of the soul, as bodily pain is an evil of the body

Counter-argument: Sadness about evil is good (opposite of the bad pleasure about evil)

Resolution: Sadness is bad secundum se but can be good ex suppositione. It becomes good when it manifests right judgment of reason and proper refusal of evil through a well-disposed will. Both of these are goods, making sadness about genuine evil honorable.

Article 7: Can Sadness Be an Honorable Good? #

Question: Does sadness possess the character of something praiseworthy and meritorious?

Objections:

1. Excessive sadness leads to disturbance and potential damnation (Augustine on Jacob)
2. Sadness diminishes praise and merit (2 Corinthians: each is determined by his heart, not from sadness or necessity)
3. Sadness about unwilling events reflects a will opposed to divine providence

Resolution: Sadness can be an honorable good when it proceeds from right reason and well-disposed will that detests evil. However, immoderate sadness exceeds the bounds of reason and thus recedes from the honorable character. The virtue lies in regulated sadness, not sadness itself. Example: “Blessed are those who weep, for they shall be consoled” (Matthew 5:5) indicates that sadness rightly ordered to evil can be meritorious.