99. Pain and Sadness as Passions of the Soul

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Pain as a Passion of the Soul #

• Pain is properly a passion of the soul, not merely of the body, though its cause originates in the body
• Two elements are required for pain: (1) the joining of something bad to the subject, and (2) the perception of this union
• Augustine’s crucial distinction: pain is said to be “of the body” regarding its cause, but the emotion itself resides in the soul
• The body cannot experience sorrow without the soul experiencing it
• Pain is an emotion of the sense appetite following upon apprehension of a bad thing

Objections and Responses #

Objection 1: Pain is in the body, not the soul; therefore it is not a passion of the soul

• Response: Pain’s cause is bodily harm, but the emotion is always in the soul. The body itself cannot sorrow.

Objection 2: Pain pertains to apprehensive power, not appetitive power

• Response: Pain requires perception of something bad, and bad/good are objects of appetite (just as true/false are objects of reason)

Objection 3: Pain does not pertain to animal appetite but to natural desire

• Response: Nature desires something as good; when perceived as taken away, sadness/pain follows in the sense appetite

Pain vs. Sadness #

• Pain (dolor): caused by exterior sensory apprehension; concerns present evils; concerns bodily harms
• Sadness (tristitia): caused by interior apprehension (imagination or intellect); can concern past, present, or future evils
• Sadness is a species of pain, not a contrary passion
• Pain, as properly understood, concerns objects perceived by touch as contrary to nature (destructive)

Reason’s Temporal Structure and Passion #

• Shakespeare’s definition: reason is “the ability for large discourse looking before and after”
• The sense of time—perceiving not only the present but past and future—is unique to rational creatures
• This temporal awareness allows reason to override immediate sensory appetite
• Example: A fevered man desires wine in the present (pleasant to taste), but reason’s consideration of future harm causes abstinance
• The fallacy of “simply and not simply” (simpliciter vs. secundum quid): choosing something bad because it is good in some respect, or avoiding something good because it is bad in some respect

The Nature of Pleasure and Pain as Contraries #

• Good and bad (as such) are objects of the appetitive power
• Pleasure: rest of the appetitive power in a perceived good
• Pain: rest of the appetitive power in a perceived bad
• They are contraries because their objects are contrary

Key Arguments #

On Whether Pain Is a Passion of the Soul #

Thomas’s Answer: Yes. Although pain has its cause in bodily harm, the emotion of pain is always in the soul because the soul must perceive the bodily harm. Augustine confirms this when he says “the body cannot sorrow without the soul sorrowing.” Pain is properly called a passion of the soul in the same way that bodily affections are properly called passions of the body—the passion belongs to the subject that perceives or experiences it, not merely the location of its cause.

On the Relationship Between Pain and the Appetitive Power #

Thomas’s Answer: Pain pertains to the appetitive (desiring) power because:

1. Every appetitive inclination follows upon apprehension (knowing/grasping)
2. Good and bad are the proper objects of appetite (as true and false are of reason)
3. Pain requires perception of a bad thing joined to oneself
4. This perception and the appetite’s response constitute the passion

On Natural vs. Animal Desire #

Thomas’s Answer: Pain is not an act of natural desire itself, but a passion in the sense appetite that follows when something naturally desired is perceived as lost. Natural desire (like a plant desiring sun) does not require the apprehension of the desiring subject; animal appetite does.

Important Definitions #

Pain (Dolor) #

• The emotion of the sense appetite caused by perception of a present evil (something bad) joined to the subject
• Properly concerns bodily harms perceived through the sense of touch as contrary to nature (destructive)
• Requires: (1) the joining of something bad, and (2) the perception of this union
• Called a passion because it involves a kind of undergoing or suffering

Sadness (Tristitia) #

• The emotion caused by interior apprehension (imagination or intellect) concerning evils past, present, or future
• A species of pain, not a contrary passion
• Can be more spiritual than bodily pain
• More properly called a passion of the soul when considering interior apprehensions

Apprehension (ἀντίληψις) #

• Grasping or knowing; the perception required for any passion to occur
• Can be exterior (through senses) or interior (through imagination or intellect)
• Without apprehension, there is no passion

Appetitive Power (Appetitus) #

• The desiring power of the soul
• Follows upon apprehension/knowing
• Has good and bad as its objects
• The seat of passions like pleasure, pain, desire, love, hate

Natural Desire vs. Animal Appetite #

• Natural desire: the inclination of a thing according to its nature, directed by the maker of that nature (e.g., a plant desiring sun)
• Animal appetite: desire that follows upon the animal’s own apprehension/knowing
• Only animal appetite constitutes passion; natural desire does not

Examples & Illustrations #

Falstaff and Loss of Temporal Reason #

• Shakespeare introduces Falstaff by having him ask “What time of day is it, lad?”
• Prince Hal responds that Falstaff, fat-witted with drinking and sleeping, has no reason to care about time
• Falstaff represents someone who has lost the temporal dimension of reason, living only for present sensory pleasures
• This illustrates how the sense of time is essential to being human

The Fevered Man and Wine #

• A man with fever desires wine in the present moment (pleasant to the taste)
• Reason, considering the future, judges that wine will worsen the fever
• The temperate man follows reason’s judgment; the intemperate man follows present appetite
• This demonstrates how temporal awareness allows reason to override immediate appetite

Pain in the Restaurant #

• Unpleasant background music is joined to one’s ear
• One perceives this union of something unsuitable to oneself
• This causes pain or discomfort
• Father Valais requests the music stop (an unusual but effective remedy)
• Contrasts with smelling wine: the union of a suitable object causes pleasure

The Daughter’s Tears at Parting #

• Berquist’s daughter fights back tears as he leaves for a trip
• The sadness of separation is a sign of love
• The wife comments that the tears show more love than the sons’ casual goodbyes
• This illustrates how sadness, when caused by interior apprehension (awareness of loss), can manifest virtue and be in some sense pleasant

Mozart’s Jupiter Symphony #

• Listening to Mozart represents a pleasure unique to humans
• The symphony represents the virtue of magnanimity through its musical structure
• This is a pleasure of interior apprehension (understanding the beauty and order)
• Contrasts with animal pleasure: a cat enjoys a can opener sound only because it refers to food

Notable Quotes #

“Sure, he that made us with such large discourse, / Gave him not to fuss on us unused” — Shakespeare, Hamlet

This encapsulates the idea that reason’s temporal dimension should not be wasted on mere animal pleasures.

“The body cannot sorrow without the soul sorrowing” — Augustine, City of God 14

This confirms that pain, though having bodily cause, is essentially a passion of the soul.

“What time of day is it, lad?” — Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part 1, Act 1, Scene 2

Falstaff’s opening question illustrates the lost sense of time in one living like a beast.

Questions Addressed #

Is pain a passion of the soul? #

Answer: Yes. Although pain’s cause is in bodily harm, the emotion of pain always resides in the soul because the soul must perceive the bodily harm. Pain is said to be “of the body” regarding its cause, not its location.

Why is pain said to pertain to the appetitive power if it involves perception? #

Answer: Because every appetitive inclination follows upon apprehension. Good and bad are the proper objects of appetite. Pain requires perception of a bad thing, which is why it pertains to appetite—the appetite responds to what is perceived as bad.

What distinguishes pain from sadness? #

Answer: Pain is caused by exterior sensory apprehension and concerns present evils perceived through the senses (especially touch). Sadness is caused by interior apprehension (imagination or intellect) and can concern past, present, or future evils. Sadness is more spiritual; pain is more bodily.

How does the sense of time relate to pain and the passions? #

Answer: Temporal awareness (perceiving before and after) allows reason to judge true good versus apparent good. A man with fever may feel pain at wanting wine withheld, but reason’s consideration of future suffering causes him to prefer the greater good. This temporal judgment is essential to virtue.