98. Pleasure: Its Goodness, Nature, and Moral Significance

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Stoic-Epicurean Extremes and the Aristotelian Mean #

• Stoic Position: All pleasure is bad
• Epicurean Position: All pleasure is good (as such)
• Aristotelian-Thomistic Position: Some pleasures are good, some are bad; the truth lies between these extremes
• Thomas argues that when two extreme positions exist, the middle position is likely correct because each extreme captures part of the truth

The Distinction Between Bodily and Intellectual Pleasures #

• Bodily Pleasures: Can impede reason through three mechanisms:
  1. Distraction of attention from reason toward the pleasant object
  2. Contrariety to reason itself (e.g., pleasure in cruelty, torture)
  3. Bodily change accompanying pleasure that binds up the use of reason
• Intellectual/Spiritual Pleasures: Do not impede reason; rather perfect and elevate it
  • Example: Pleasure in understanding, contemplation, hearing Mozart
  • These are perfect acts (operationes perfectae), not becomings or generations

Pleasure as Rest in a Good #

• Pleasure is the rest of the appetite (appetitus) in something apprehended as good
• The moral character of pleasure depends on what the will rests in: a true good (in accord with reason) or an apparent good (contrary to reason)
• Example: The pleasure of torturing someone is morally bad because it rests in something genuinely bad

The Problem of Apparent Goods #

• A thing may be good “in some way” (secundum quid) for someone in a particular condition without being good “simply” (simpliciter)
• Medical Example: Chemotherapy is good for a cancer patient (secundum quid) because of their diseased condition, but not good simply, as it exhausts and damages the body
• The pleasure in an apparent good is not truly pleasure but a deceptive seeming-good

Temperance and the Mean in Pleasures #

• The temperate person does not flee all pleasures but only excessive ones unsuitable to reason
• Musical Example: Mozart’s music represents temperance—emotions in harmony with reason, never going to excess
• Tchaikovsky: Despite his romantic excesses and passions, listened to Mozart because it saved him from himself, relieved excessive emotional turmoil
• The virtuous person is the measure of proper pleasure: we judge what is truly pleasant by what the virtuous person takes pleasure in

Pleasure and Generation vs. Perfect Acts #

• Plato wrongly assumed all pleasures follow generation (motion, becoming) and are therefore imperfect
• Not all pleasures involve generation; intellectual pleasures follow perfect acts (perfect operations), not becomings
• Understanding vs. Learning: One takes pleasure not only in the generation of science (learning) but also in contemplating already-acquired knowledge

Is Some Pleasure the Best? #

• Against the claim that no pleasure can be best (because generation cannot be the best thing):
  • Thomas distinguishes between pleasures tied to generation (bodily) and pleasures tied to perfect operations (intellectual)
  • The pleasure of contemplating God (beatitude) is the highest human pleasure
• This pleasure is not the supreme good simpliciter (which is God Himself), but it is the best among human pleasures

Key Arguments #

Argument 1: All Pleasure is Bad? #

• Objection: Pleasure corrupts prudence and impedes reason; generation is imperfect; therefore pleasure is bad
• Thomas’s Response: Only bodily pleasures impede reason. Pleasures arising from acts of reason itself (intellectual pleasures) perfect reason and are good. Sleep impedes reason temporarily but is not morally bad.

Argument 2: All Pleasure is Good? #

• Objection: Pleasure is per se good (good in itself); it is not sought for something else (it is ridiculous to ask “why do you want pleasure?”); all people desire some pleasure; therefore all pleasure is good
• Thomas’s Response: Not every pleasure is per se good. Pleasure is good only insofar as it rests in a true good. Pleasure in torturing is an apparent good, not a true good. The distinction: what is per se good belongs universally to its subject; pleasure in cruelty is not per se a good thing.
• Analogy: As a triangle is per se possessed of interior angles equal to two right angles (true of all triangles) but only per accidens green (not all triangles are green), so pleasure is per se good only when its object is truly good.

Argument 3: Is Some Pleasure the Best? #

• Objection: No generation is the best thing; pleasure follows generation; therefore no pleasure is best
• Objection: Nothing can become better through addition; but pleasure adds to something and makes it better; therefore pleasure is not the best thing
• Thomas’s Resolution:
  • Not all pleasure follows generation; intellectual pleasures follow perfect acts
  • The pleasure of contemplating God (seeing God face-to-face in beatitude) is the best human pleasure
  • This is not because pleasure is the supreme good simpliciter, but because the pleasure rests in the best object: God Himself
• Against Plato’s Error: Plato thought all pleasures follow generation and therefore none can be best. He failed to recognize intellectual pleasures as perfect acts, not becomings.

Important Definitions #

Laetitia (Pleasure, Joy) #

The rest of the appetite (appetitus) in an apprehended good, accompanied by perception of this union with the good.

Delectatio #

Another term for pleasure; the delighting in something apprehended as good.

Operationes Perfectae (Perfect Operations) #

Operations that are themselves acts of being rather than becomings—understanding, contemplation, perceiving. Contrasted with generation or motion (becoming).

Secundum Quid vs. Simpliciter #

• Secundum quid: “In some way”; good relative to a particular condition or person
• Simpliciter: “Simply”; good universally or in itself

Per Se Good vs. Per Accidens Good #

• Per se: Good in itself, by its own nature
• Per accidens: Good incidentally or accidentally

Ratio (Character, Aspect, Definition) #

The formal character or defining aspect under which something is understood. Pleasure has the ratio of rest in an apprehended good.

Examples & Illustrations #

Mozart and Temperance #

• Mozart’s music exemplifies temperance: emotions always in harmony with reason, never going to excess
• Tchaikovsky, prone to excessive romantic passions and emotional turmoil (nearly drowning himself in a river), would listen to Mozart because it relieved and moderated his excessive emotions
• Tchaikovsky even composed Mozartiana, taking Mozart’s melodies and playing with them, recognizing that Mozart “saved him from himself”

Torture and Diabolical Pleasure #

• A brutally tortured murder victim’s killer, recounting his acts in an interview, visibly took pleasure in remembering the torture
• This pleasure is “totally diabolical”—either demonic possession or complete loss of reason
• The pleasure in causing suffering is the intensification of moral evil: worse to want to torture someone than to want to but not do it; even worse to take pleasure in the torture

Bodily Pleasure and Reason #

• Sexual Union (Conjugal Acts): Although suitable to reason, conjugal pleasure impedes the use of reason due to bodily changes; yet this is not morally bad per se (not mortal or venial sin) because it arises from the sin of the first parent (Adam and Eve)
• In the state of innocence, such pleasure would not bind reason: the fall fractured the proper order where emotions should be subject to reason
• After the fall, Adam and Eve covered themselves because their emotions were no longer subject to reason

Sleep as Binding Reason Without Moral Evil #

• Sleep binds up the use of reason but is not morally bad
• This illustrates that impeding reason does not automatically make something morally evil
• Infants and young children sleep profoundly, often unmoved by loud noises—lucky to possess such peaceful sleep

The Grateful Dead #

• Berquist initially saw people with “Grateful Dead” merchandise and thought it represented a morbid wish for death (“I’d be grateful if I were dead”)
• Later learned it was the name of a rock band
• Followers called themselves “Deadheads,” illustrating how pleasure and identity become bound together

Crime Statistics #

• Observation that there are more murders in a weekend in Chicago than in a whole month in Iraq
• Illustrates the widespread pleasure taken in violence in certain societies

Cancer Treatment #

• A patient undergoing chemotherapy for cancer experiences a treatment that is good for them (secundum quid) due to their diseased condition, but not good simply (simpliciter)
• The treatment is exhausting and damages the body, even though it may slow cancer growth
• The patient might say, “It’s good for me to get this treatment,” but not “This is simply good”

Questions Addressed #

Is All Pleasure Bad? #

Answer: No. Bodily pleasures that impede reason can be bad, but intellectual pleasures that perfect reason are good. The distinction lies not in pleasure itself but in what the will takes pleasure in.

Is All Pleasure Good? #

Answer: No. While pleasure as such (rest in an apprehended good) has the character of goodness, not all pleasures are good because not every object in which the appetite rests is truly good. Pleasure in torture is not a true pleasure but an apparent good.

Is Some Pleasure the Best? #

Answer: Yes. Among human pleasures, the pleasure of contemplating God (beatitude) is the best, though God Himself (not the pleasure) is the supreme good simpliciter. This pleasure is best because it rests in the best object.

How Does Pleasure Relate to Generation and Perfect Acts? #

Answer: Not all pleasure follows generation. Intellectual pleasures (understanding, contemplation) follow perfect acts, not becomings. This is why intellectual pleasures do not impede reason but perfect it.

Connections to Broader Themes #

The State of Innocence #

• In Paradise, before the fall, emotions and sensory appetites were perfectly subject to reason
• After the fall, this order was disrupted; emotions no longer automatically obey reason
• This explains why bodily pleasures (like conjugal pleasure) now impede reason—a consequence of original sin, not the nature of the pleasure itself

The Virtuous Person as Measure #

• The virtuous person’s pleasures reveal the proper objects and moderation of pleasure
• One should judge what is truly pleasant by observing what the temperate, wise person takes pleasure in
• This connects to earlier discussions of virtue as the mean between extremes