97. The Natural Beginning and Pleasure in Ethics

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Natural Beginning in Philosophy #

• Arxasai katafusim (ἀρχασαι κατα φύσιν): “Start from the natural beginning”—a principle found explicitly in Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations and Poetics
• Plato’s Theaetetus emphasizes that this is the greatest thing of all in philosophy
• When investigating any subject (plays, paintings, music, ethics), one must identify what is naturally primary
• Application to imitative arts: The natural starting point is mimesis (imitation/likeness), not the medium or manner

The Structure of Natural Beginnings #

• In tragic drama, definition proceeds by:
  1. What is imitated (the object: serious action)
  2. That in which it is imitated (the medium: words, music, action)
  3. How it is imitated (the manner)
• The unity of an art lies more in its object than in its medium—a carpenter is defined by materials (wood, metal, plastic) before by products (chairs, tables)
• A likeness is always a likeness of something in something—the object is primary

The Natural Beginning of Ethics #

• Before investigating virtue or happiness, one must establish: What is the good?
• Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics with a short induction showing that the good is what all desire
• This is introduced properly through Socratic dialogue: asking what things are considered good (baseball, candy, etc.) and what they have in common—they are all things that are wanted
• A dialectical follow-up: Is something good because we want it, or do we want it because it is good?

The Definition of Beauty (Related to Good) #

• Augustine defines: The beautiful is what pleases when seen (Pulchra est quae placent cum videantur)
• Immediately raises the key question: Is something beautiful because it pleases our senses, or does it please us because it is beautiful?
• Conclusion: Beauty (like goodness) is not in the eye of the beholder—it inheres in the thing itself

A Thing’s Own Act (Proprium Opus) #

• Plato’s definition: A thing’s own act is what that thing alone can do, or does better than other things
• Examples:
  • Seeing is the eye’s own act (the eye alone sees)
  • Hearing is the ear’s own act
  • Walking is the feet’s own act (better than hands)
  • Writing is the pen’s own act (better than a knife)
• Critical for understanding virtue and end: A thing’s proper end is its own act done well (proprium opus bene operatum)
  • The knife’s end is to cut well (not merely to cut)
  • The eye’s end is to see well
  • Man’s own act involves reason in some way, so the human end must be understood through reason

Virtue as Perfection of a Thing’s Act #

• Virtue (ἀρετή): The quality that makes a thing’s own act good
• Vice: The quality that makes a thing’s own act poor
• Examples:
  • Sharpness is a knife’s virtue; dullness is its vice
  • For understanding virtue and vice, one must first understand what a thing’s own act is

Key Arguments #

Article 4: Does Pleasure Perfect Operation? #

Objections:

1. Pleasure impedes the use of reason, so it cannot perfect operation (since human operations depend on reason)
2. Pleasure is an operatio (perfect act), not a motion; nothing perfects itself or its cause
3. If pleasure perfects operation, it would do so as end, form, or efficient cause—but:
   • Not as end: operations are not sought for pleasure; rather, pleasure follows from operation
   • Not as efficient cause: operation causes pleasure, not vice versa (one must hear Mozart before being pleased)
   • Not as form/habit: pleasure is not a stable quality like a virtue

Thomas’s Response: Pleasure perfects operation in two ways:

1. As a supervenient end (not as the end for which something is done, but as an additional good that completes it):

   • Pleasure is like frosting on the cake—not essential to the cake but completing and adorning it
   • Augustine: Beatitude is gaudium de veritate (joy in truth)—the vision itself is the essential reward, but joy supervenes upon it
   • Beauty perfects youth: not what youth essentially is, but something befitting and completing it

2. Indirectly, on the side of the agent:

   • The agent who delights in action pays attention to it more strongly and diligently
   • This is analogous to how health itself (not a doctor) perfects the body—by the very fact of being present, not by external action
   • Referenced as augmentum (increase) in the Nicomachean Ethics X: appropriate pleasure increases its own operation

Key Principle: One must seek the pleasure appropriate to that operation, not just any pleasure:

• Tragedy should provide the pleasure of catharsis (pity and fear), not the pleasure of comedy (happy endings)
• Shakespeare’s original King Lear is superior to 18th-century happy endings because it seeks the appropriate tragic pleasure
• C.S. Lewis emphasizes in the Preface to Paradise Lost that readers should read to enjoy the work as intended, not impose foreign pleasures
• Joseph Andrews (Fielding) warns that readers unfamiliar with his form may seek pleasure other than the author intended

Educational Application:

• Wine tasting: A novice finds dry wine bitter and unattractive; only after experience can they appreciate the pleasure appropriate to dry wine
• Mozart vs. popular music: Higher pleasures require education and habituation
• Teachers must gradually educate students toward appropriate pleasures, not abandon them when they initially lack taste
• Example of a high school teacher of Macbeth: When students cannot appreciate tragic pleasure, reducing the work to “a mystery story” concedes the pedagogical goal

The Distinction: Bodily vs. Intellectual Pleasures #

Bodily pleasure (sensible pleasure):

• Can impede reason in three ways:
  1. Distraction: Intense focus on bodily pleasure withdraws attention from rational matters
  2. Contrariety: Excessive pleasures are contrary to the order of reason
  3. Bodily change: Physical disturbances bind or impede the use of reason
• Example: Conjugal pleasure, though not sinful in itself, necessarily impedes understanding due to bodily change (Jerome: during conjugal acts, the Holy Spirit is not given)
• These impediments would not exist in the state of innocence

Intellectual/Rational pleasure:

• Follows upon acts of reason itself (understanding, contemplation)
• Does not impede reason; rather, perfects and strengthens it
• Example: Enjoying understanding something motivates one to understand better
• The pleasure of intellectual understanding is itself a form of operating well

Important Definitions #

• Arxasai katafusim (ἀρχασαι κατα φύσιν): The natural beginning; that which is primary by nature and properly foundational for inquiry
• Mimesis (μίμησις): Imitation or likeness; the natural starting point for understanding imitative arts
• Proprium opus (πρόσιον ἔργον): A thing’s own act; what that thing alone can do or does best
• Proprium opus bene operatum: A thing’s own act done well; the proper end or function of a thing
• Operatio (ἐνέργεια): Perfect act; complete in itself (as opposed to motus, motion/becoming)
• Gaudium de veritate: Joy in truth; the pleasure that supervenes upon the vision of God
• Delectatio: Pleasure; the rest of the appetite in a good that is present
• Catharsis (κάθαρσις): Purgation; the emotional effect proper to tragedy (pity and fear)

Examples & Illustrations #

Wine Education #

A person new to wine finds dry wine bitter and unattractive, preferring sweet wines. Only through habituation does the novice develop the capacity to appreciate and take greater pleasure in dry wines. This illustrates how education shapes which pleasures we can appreciate and enjoy.

Shakespeare and Tragedy #

Some desire happy endings for Shakespeare’s tragedies (e.g., 18th-century versions of King Lear). However, one should seek the pleasure appropriate to tragedy—the catharsis of pity and fear. Seeking a happy ending is seeking the pleasure appropriate to comedy, not tragedy. The original tragic ending provides the correct pleasure for the form.

Art Education Progression #

Berquist describes a pedagogical progression: Begin with good food and wine to establish appreciation of sensible goods; then introduce music; then literature (Homer, Shakespeare); finally move toward contemplation of divine truth. This shows how pleasure must be educated gradually toward higher goods.

The Bent Metal Analogy #

When a piece of metal is bent, one must bend it in the opposite direction to straighten it, even beyond the straight point. Similarly, those prone to immoderate bodily pleasures may need to practice asceticism temporarily to reach virtue’s mean. Example: Early monastic asceticism may be necessary correction for excessive attachment to pleasures, though once straightened, one (like John Paul II) can again enjoy wine and good food in proper measure.

Candy Lipstick Example #

A newspaper advice column recounts a girl complaining that her boyfriend wanted her to wear candy lipstick when kissing. The advice: “Buy him a lollipop.” This illustrates seeking the wrong pleasure (candy) in the wrong act (kissing). The pleasure appropriate to a kiss is different from the pleasure of candy.

Parents Offering Candy #

When children receive candy, a parent regularly asks, “Can daddy have a piece?” Over time, children automatically offer their candy. This teaches sharing by example before words or prayers. It shows how pleasure-seeking behavior can be shaped toward virtue through example.

Notable Quotes #

“To begin, arxasai katafusim—from the natural beginning—is the greatest thing of all.” — Plato (Theaetetus 29b), cited by Berquist

“The good of man is to be in accordance with reason.” — Pseudo-Dionysius (Divine Names IV), cited by Thomas

“One shouldn’t seek every pleasure from tragedy, but the pleasure that is appropriate to tragedy.” — Aristotle (Poetics), cited by Berquist

“The beautiful is what pleases when seen.” — Augustine (Retractions), immediately raising the question: does it please because it is beautiful, or is it beautiful because it pleases?

“Pleasure perfects operation as beauty perfects youth.” — Thomas Aquinas, illustrating that pleasure is not essential but completing

“The Maronite liturgy is like frosting on the cake—beautiful, but not why I came here.” — Berquist, personal example of supervenient goodness

Questions Addressed #

Article 4: Does Pleasure Perfect Operation? #

Answer: Yes, in two ways:

1. As a supervenient end (like frosting on a cake)—an additional good that completes the operation
2. Indirectly, on the side of the agent—by motivating more careful and diligent attention to the operation

Critical note: One must seek the pleasure appropriate to the operation, not just any pleasure.

The Problem of Bodily vs. Intellectual Pleasures #

Answer: Bodily pleasures impede reason through distraction, contrariety, and bodily change; intellectual pleasures perfect reason because they follow upon acts of reason itself. The solution lies in educating oneself toward higher, intellectual pleasures and maintaining appropriate measure in bodily pleasures.