94. Pleasure: Causes, Memory, Hope, and Sadness

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Article 3: Hope and Memory as Causes of Pleasure #

• Objection: Pleasure concerns present goods; hope and memory concern absent goods (future and past), so they cannot be causes of pleasure
• Aquinas’s Key Insight: Something can be present to us in two ways:
  1. By knowledge (the known is in the knower according to its likeness/similitude)
  2. In the thing itself (real conjunction, in act or in potency)
• Hierarchy of Pleasure:
  • Most perfect: sensible pleasure (requires actual presence of the sensible thing)
  • Second grade: pleasure of hope (has both grasping/apprehension AND the faculty or power of obtaining the good)
  • Third grade: pleasure of memory (has only the conjunction of apprehension)
• Conclusion: Hope is assigned as a cause of pleasure more than memory because hope implies certitude of real presence and possibility of obtaining the good; memory only has what is past and gone
• Resolution of objection: Hope and memory are not simpliciter (simply) absent, but secundum quid (in a certain way) present—either according to apprehension alone, or according to apprehension and the faculty of obtaining them

Article 4: Sadness as a Cause of Pleasure #

• Objection: Sadness is contrary to pleasure; contraries cannot be causes of contraries

• The Problem of Contraries: Can the same thing be a cause of contraries? Classical answer: only per accidens (accidentally), not per se (in itself)

  • Example: Fire as such warms, but per accidens can cause cold (by being removed, leaving cold)
  • Empedocles spoke of love and hate as contrary causes in nature
  • Aristotle discusses how the four causes work: one thing can be cause of itself in different ways (e.g., making dinner is the efficient cause of dinner; dinner is the final cause of making dinner)
  • Key Corollary: The same thing can be a cause of contraries by its presence and absence (e.g., the captain—his negligence causes ship’s destruction; his skill causes its safety)

• Aquinas’s Resolution: Sadness can be a cause of pleasure in TWO ways:

  1. Sadness existing in act (actual sadness): Makes memory of something loved whose absence causes sadness pleasant—but only regarding the grasping/apprehension of the love itself, which is pleasant. “Parting is such sweet sorrow”—through the sadness of parting, one perceives mutual love, which is pleasant
  2. Sadness in memory: Pleasure comes from evasion or escape from sad things. We remember joyful things (feasts past) with some sadness because they are gone, but we also remember with joy that we are freed from painful things without the pain

• Theological Application: Saints in heaven contemplate hell and recognize what they deserve, but in doing so, understand God’s mercy toward them, which increases their joy (per St. Bonaventure)

• Conclusion: Sadness per accidens is a cause of pleasure, insofar as through it there is a knowing of something pleasant

Article 5: Actions of Others as a Cause of Pleasure #

• Objection: The cause of pleasure is one’s own good adjoined to us; the operations of others are not adjoined to us, so they cannot be causes of pleasure for us

• Further Objection: If others’ actions cause us pleasure, then all the goods of others would cause us pleasure, which is clearly false

• Yet Another Objection: Operation is delightful insofar as it proceeds from a habit in us; others’ operations proceed from their habits, not ours, so others’ actions are delightful only to those doing them

• Aquinas’s Resolution: Two things are required for pleasure: (1) the achieving/obtaining of one’s own good, and (2) knowledge of this attainment

• Three Ways Others’ Actions Cause Pleasure:

  1. Through effect: Insofar as through another’s doing, we achieve some good. To benefit from another is pleasant (e.g., winning the lottery and sharing it with a friend)
  2. Through knowledge/estimation: Others’ actions render or make possible for us an estimate of our own good. Men delight in being praised or honored by another because it gives them an estimate that they possess some good. Praise from the wise and good is more delightful than from foolish people (per Aristotle). Flattery is delightful because it is apparent praise (even false praise)
  3. Through affection/love: Others’ actions can be estimated as one’s own good on account of love, which makes one estimate a friend to be the same as oneself—“another self” or a “second self.” Hate can also cause this per accidens—when people hate the same enemy, they come together (e.g., Red Sox and Phillies fans united in hatred of the Yankees)

• Important Principle: “Your friend is another self” (Greek: φίλος ἐστιν ἕτερος αὐτός—from Greek proverb)

• Addressing the Third Objection: Others’ actions, although they do not proceed from habits in us, nevertheless cause in us something delightful because either: (1) they make in us some estimate or grasping of our own habit, or (2) they proceed from the habit of one who is united with us in love

Key Arguments #

The Principle of Per Accidens Causation #

• A cause can produce an effect per se (in itself/essentially) or per accidens (accidentally/incidentally)
• Applied to Sadness: Sadness per accidens causes pleasure when it makes us aware of something loved, or when remembering it reminds us we’ve escaped from pain
• Applied to Contraries: A contrary can cause a contrary per accidens (not per se)
  • Cold sometimes heats (per accidens, by being absent)
  • Sadness sometimes causes pleasure (per accidens, through knowledge of love or evasion)

The Distinction: Simpliciter vs. Secundum Quid #

• Simpliciter (simply/absolutely): fully absent
• Secundum quid (in a certain way): present in some respect
• Applied to hope and memory: They are simpliciter absent (as future/past) but secundum quid present (by apprehension, or by apprehension + faculty of obtaining)

Love as Creating Union #

• Love creates a real union: the good of another becomes one’s own good
• This explains why others’ actions, others’ goods, and even others’ virtues can cause pleasure in us

Important Definitions #

Pleasure #

• Requires two things: (1) the obtaining/achieving of a suitable good, and (2) knowledge of this attainment

Hope vs. Memory #

• Hope (spei): concerns future goods; has grasping AND faculty/power of obtaining (higher degree of presence)
• Memory (memoria): concerns past goods; has only grasping/apprehension (lower degree of presence)

Per Se vs. Per Accidens #

• Per se (in itself): directly and essentially
• Per accidens (by accident): indirectly or incidentally

Another Self (alter ego) #

• Through love, a friend becomes identified with oneself; their good becomes one’s own good
• Greek: “A friend is another self”

Examples & Illustrations #

Custom and Fashion (Opening Discussion) #

• Custom attracts because it is old and familiar (comfort to immigrants wanting to preserve Lebanese traditions—hummus, music, customs)
• Fashion attracts because it is new
• Both can be strong and attractive through different mechanisms

Hope and the Sailor #

• A sailor separated from his wife and family hopes to rejoin them—this hope causes pleasure
• But the absence (lack of actual presence) causes affliction
• Back and forth between pleasure and affliction depending on whether one focuses on hope of reunion or the current absence

The Widow’s Grief #

• “Parting is such sweet sorrow” (Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet)
• Through the sadness of separation, one becomes aware of mutual love—the apprehension of that love is pleasant
• Mixed: not unalloyed joy, but a certain joy in recognizing that sadness reveals mutual love

Memory and Lost Youth #

• Shakespeare’s sonnets: remembrance of feasts that have gone by; sadness because they are no longer
• “Youth is beautiful, she comes no more” (Shundes de Yugen, si Kampning Mer—appears to be from a beer stein)
• Pleasant to remember delightful things once enjoyed, but sadness that they are past

Praise and Estimation #

• If Monsignor Dian says something is good, it is more pleasant (carries more weight) than if Tom, Dick, or Harry say it
• The Pope honoring you is more pleasant than Obama honoring you
• Praise gives one an estimate of one’s own goodness

Political Example #

• Obama’s inauguration: crowds going “bonkers” at the sight of him (even though he could not be seen clearly through bulletproof glass)
• Illustrates how others’ actions and presence can cause great pleasure (through estimation of greatness, wonder, affection)

Common Enemies Creating Friendship #

• Red Sox fans and Phillies fans may both hate the Yankees—this shared hatred unites them
• Anti-Roosevelt sentiment in high school: two people united by their lack of affection for Roosevelt
• People who can’t stand Obama feeling drawn together
• Hate per accidens causes love insofar as people come together in hatred of a common enemy

Personal Family Example #

• Story of son saying goodbye before a trip; mother trying to hold back tears
• Father’s emotional response: “That’s a hard act to follow”
• Illustrates how sadness (parting) reveals love, making the emotion bittersweet
• Anxiety about child’s welfare if something happened to him on the plane—love manifests through concern

Questions Addressed #

Q3: Are hope and memory causes of pleasure? #

• A: Yes, but in different degrees. Hope is more a cause than memory because:
  • Hope has both apprehension AND the faculty of obtaining the good (two forms of presence)
  • Memory has only apprehension (the thing is gone)
  • Hope implies certitude of real presence and possibility of obtaining the good
  • Memory is of what has passed away

Q4: Can sadness cause pleasure? #

• A: Yes, per accidens (not per se). In two ways:
  1. Sadness in act makes memory of something loved pleasant (by revealing mutual love)
  2. Sadness in memory becomes pleasant when it makes us aware we have escaped from painful things
  • Applied to theology: Saints contemplating hell recognize God’s mercy, increasing their joy

Q5: Do the actions of others cause pleasure? #

• A: Yes, in three ways:
  1. Through effect: when another’s action produces good for us
  2. Through knowledge/estimation: when we’re praised or honored, gaining an estimate of our own goodness (especially from the wise and good)
  3. Through affection: when we regard another as another self (friendship) or through shared hatred of an enemy

Notable Quotes #

“Your friend is another self” (Aristotle, cited as Greek proverb: φίλος ἐστιν ἕτερος αὐτός)

“Parting is such sweet sorrow” (Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet)

“I remember God and am delighted” (Psalm 76: Memor fui dei e delictatus sum)

“Youth is beautiful, she comes no more” (Referenced from beer stein: Shundes de Yugen, si Kampning Mer)

“Hope deferred afflicts the soul” (Proverbs 13)

“My tears were for me bread, day and night” (Psalm 41—understood as refreshment/pleasure)

“Charity does not rejoice over iniquity, but rejoices with the truth” (1 Corinthians 13)

“I have greatly rejoiced because I have found my sons walking in the truth” (2 John 1—note: Berquist calls it “Canonica, Johannes”)