88. Pleasure as Passion and Its Relation to Time

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• Pleasure as Passion vs. Operation: Reconciling Aristotle’s claim that pleasure is an operation (operatio) with Augustine’s classification of pleasure as a passion (passio)
• The Nature of Motion and Perfection: Distinguishing between motion toward perfection and the state of having achieved perfection
• Pleasure in Time: Whether pleasure, by its very nature, exists in temporal succession
• Sensory vs. Intellectual Apprehension: How pleasure follows upon the grasping (apprehensio) of sense-knowledge
• The Etymology and Analogy of ‘Passion’: How the term passio is carried over from suffering to describe any undergoing or being acted upon

Key Arguments #

Is Pleasure a Passion? #

Objection 1 (Damascene’s position):

• Operation is motion according to nature; passion is motion against nature
• Pleasure consists in the good now attained (having been moved), not in being moved itself
• Therefore, pleasure is operation, not passion

Objection 2:

• To undergo (pati) means to be moved
• Pleasure does not consist in being moved but in having been moved
• Therefore, pleasure is not a passion

Objection 3:

• Pleasure consists in perfection of operation, not alteration
• To be perfected is not to be altered (per Aristotle’s Physics, Book 7)
• Therefore, pleasure is not a passion

Thomas’s Resolution:

• Pleasure is a passion of the sensitive appetite (sensus appetitus)
• It follows upon sensible apprehension (sensus apprehensio) of a fitting good
• The word “passion” is used analogically: just as sensing involves the senses being acted upon by objects, pleasure involves the appetitive power being moved by the presence of a fitting good
• Pleasure is a passion that perfects rather than corrupts, distinguishing it from passions like fear or sadness
• Augustine correctly places pleasure among the passions because it involves the sensitive appetite’s being affected by a sensible apprehension

Is Pleasure in Time? #

Objection 1:

• Aristotle defines pleasure as a motion (kinesis) of the soul (Rhetoric, Book 1)
• All motion involves temporal succession (before and after)
• Therefore, pleasure must be in time

Objection 2:

• Some pleasures are said to be “morose” (lingering, dwelling too long), implying temporal duration
• Therefore, pleasure is in time

Objection 3:

• The passions of the soul are one genus
• Some passions are in time
• Therefore, pleasure is also in time

Thomas’s Resolution:

• Something can be in time in two ways: (1) per se—by its very nature involving succession; (2) per accidens—through being subject to change
• Pleasure, by its very notion, is the attainment of a fitting good, which is the terminus (end or limit) of motion, not motion itself
• Therefore, pleasure is not in time per se
• However, if the good obtained is subject to changing causes, pleasure will be in time per accidens
• Example: The being of a man is not, by its notion, something with temporal succession (essence itself is complete), yet man is in time because his being is subject to generation and corruption
• Similarly, the beatific vision, being unchanging, is not in time in any way

Important Definitions #

• Passio (passion/emotion): The undergoing or being acted upon by an external object. The sensitive appetite’s being moved by sensible apprehension. The term originally meant suffering but is used analogically to describe any receiving or undergoing of influence.

• Operatio (operation): The act of a perfected power; an activity that is complete in itself rather than ordered toward a further end.

• Apprehensio (apprehension/grasping): The act by which a cognitive power grasps or knows an object. The thing known is in the knower; the heart (will) is in the object of desire.

• Sensus appetitus (sensitive appetite): The power of the soul ordered toward desiring or avoiding sensible goods based on sensible knowledge.

• Totum simul (all at once): A state complete without temporal succession or before-and-after, characteristic of eternity and the beatific vision.

• Terminus (term/limit/end): The end-point or completion of motion; the state achieved after motion ceases.

• Per se (by itself/intrinsically): By the very nature of a thing.

• Per accidens (accidentally/extrinsically): Through some other thing; not by the thing’s own nature.

Examples & Illustrations #

Sensory Pleasure:

• Hearing Mozart’s music: Pleasure is not the hearing itself but the perfection of hearing that results when the music is proportioned to the ear and not impeded by distraction or external noise. The music acts upon the ear, perfecting the act of hearing.
• Viewing fall foliage: The natural moderation of autumn colors (contrasted with the garish colors in a department store) creates pleasure by being proportioned to the eye. One is pleased because seeing is perfected when not distracted by the need for mental effort (such as driving attention).
• Rest and quiet: Contrast with noise (“the noise doesn’t do any good; the good doesn’t make any noise”); rest is pleasing because it allows the perfection of hearing and consciousness.

Intellectual Pleasure:

• Understanding God: Even imperfect knowledge of higher things delights more than leisurely knowledge of lower things. Example: knowing the number of chairs in a room is easy but gives no pleasure; knowing something of God, though difficult, gives greater delight.
• Contemplating a beloved person: A glimpse of someone we love delights us more than a leisure view of a bus driver or other stranger.
• Learning and perfection: Just as Michelangelo did not alter the marble but perfected it, learning perfects the intellect; one is not corrupted but enhanced.

Motion vs. Perfection:

• Artistic creation: The sculptor works through motion (chipping away), but the work is complete all at once when finished. The motion (process) is in time; the completion (state of being perfect) is all at once.
• Musical performance: Arthur Rubinstein works on perfecting a Chopin piece over time, but the complete performance is achieved all at once, even though the musical movements are in temporal sequence.

Temporal Duration of Pleasure:

• First sip of beer: The first sip is most enjoyable; subsequent sips diminish in pleasure. This illustrates that sensory pleasures are subject to change and thus in time per accidens.
• Conversation with beloved: Time passes unnoticed (“Where did the time go?”) when engaged with someone deeply loved, illustrating that the experience of pleasure can seem outside time even though it has temporal duration.

Notable Quotes #

“Pleasure does not consist in being moved, but in having been moved.” — Damascene (via Aquinas)

“Pleasure consists in a certain perfection of the one delighted.” — Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10, via Aquinas)

“The thing known is in the knower… the heart is in the object.” — Berquist, reflecting on epistemology of affection

“Le bruit ne fait pas de bien; le bruit ne fait pas de bruit.” (“Noise does no good; good makes no noise.”) — Francis (cited by Berquist)

“Hell is a kingdom of noise.” — C.S. Lewis

“To be perfected is not to be altered.” — Aristotle (Physics, Book 7)

Questions Addressed #

Question 1: Is Pleasure a Passion?

• Resolution: Yes, pleasure is a passion of the sensitive appetite, but understood analogically as a perfecting passion rather than a corrupting one. It is a passion because it involves the sensitive appetite’s undergoing the influence of a sensible apprehension, yet it perfects rather than damages the power involved.

Question 2: Is Pleasure in Time?

• Resolution: Pleasure is not in time per se (by its own nature), but may be in time per accidens (through being subject to change). The beatific vision, being unchanging, is not in time in any way. Bodily pleasures dependent on changing goods are in time per accidens.

Question 3: How is Pleasure Both Motion and Rest?

• Resolution: Pleasure involves a certain motion of the desiring power (from desiring something absent to possessing something present), yet it is essentially a resting in the good now attained. The motion (transition from lack to possession) occurs in time; the rest (enjoyment of possession) is the term or completion of that motion.