86. Concupiscence as a Special Passion of the Concupiscible Appetite

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• Concupiscence as a Distinct Passion: Whether desire for pleasant goods constitutes a special passion separate from love and pleasure
• Presence and Absence of the Good: How the formal distinction between present and absent goods differentiates passions
• The Concupiscible vs. Irascible Appetites: The distinction between the appetite for what is simply pleasing and the appetite for what is difficult
• The Nature of Love and Its Relation to Desire: Love as conformity of the heart with its object; desire as movement toward absent goods
• Emotional Language and Etymology: The connection between passion (passio), motion, and emotion; the word “understand” as standing under something

Key Arguments #

Objection 1: Pleasant Good as Common Object #

• Claim: Passions are distinguished by their objects; the concupiscible appetite has one object (pleasant goods). Therefore, concupiscence cannot be a special passion distinct from other concupiscible passions.
• Response: The pleasant good differs formally according to whether it is present or absent. This formal difference in the active object (not merely material difference) creates distinct species of passion.

Objection 2: Concupiscence Not Distinguished from Love #

• Claim: Augustine says cupidity is a love of passing things. Since all special passions are distinguished from each other, and concupiscence is merely love of a certain kind, it cannot be a special passion.
• Response: To love is opposed hate; to pleasure is opposed pain; to joy is opposed sadness. But what is opposed to concupiscence? Something unnamed in Latin and English. This suggests concupiscence IS distinct.

Objection 3: Fear Opposed to Concupiscence #

• Claim: Damascene says an expected/awaited good constitutes concupiscence; when the good is present, it becomes joy. Similarly, evil that is expected causes fear; when present, it causes sadness. But fear is in the irascible power, not the concupiscible. Therefore, concupiscence is not a special concupiscible passion.
• Response: The opposition is not between concupiscence and fear directly, but between concupiscence (desire for absent good) and an unnamed concupiscible passion that relates to absent evil.

Thomistic Response #

• Diversity of Object: Differences in the object can be noted either by the nature of the object itself (material difference) or by the diversity in the active power (formal difference).
• Active Object vs. Passive Object: Diversity according to active power makes a formal difference by which passions differ in species, not merely in number.
• Presence vs. Absence as Formal Cause: The good as present causes the desiring power to rest in itself (pleasure). The good as absent causes movement toward it (concupiscence).
• Love’s Role: Love is the conformity of the heart with its object—the agreement of the heart with what it likes. Once this conformity exists, if the object is absent, desire arises.

Important Definitions #

• Passio (Passion/Emotion): An undergoing or being moved (ἀλλοίωσις). Named from motion (motio) because the subject is moved by its object; hence emotion.
• Concupiscence (Concupiscentia): The desire for a delightful/pleasant good, particularly when that good is absent. The movement of the desiring power toward what is agreeable to the senses.
• Concupiscible Appetite (Appetitus Concupiscibilis): The sensitive desiring power concerned with what is simply pleasant or displeasing according to the senses.
• Irascible Appetite (Appetitus Irascibilis): The “fighting” appetite; the sensitive desiring power concerned with difficult goods or difficult evils to avoid.
• Active Object (Obiectum Activum): The object insofar as it acts upon the power, not merely as it exists. Diversity in active object creates formal/specific differences in passions.
• Love (Amor): A conformity or agreement of the heart with its object; the disposition by which the desiring power is attuned to what it desires.
• Pleasure (Laetitia/Delectatio): Rest in the present good; the passion that arises when the loved and desired good is actually present.
• Substance (Substantia): In Latin, following Greek usage, can mean either “what a thing is” or “the individual substance underlying things” (what stands under).

Examples & Illustrations #

The Word “Understand” #

• Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night contains a pun on “understand” (stand under). To understand is to grasp what stands under something.
• In Latin, substantia (what stands under) corresponds etymologically to understanding. Understanding means knowing what substance—what stands under the accidents—a thing has.
• Application to the Eucharist: The senses perceive only accidents, but understanding grasps what stands under them (the substance).

The Pleasant Good and Sensation #

• The senses know only what is agreeable or disagreeable to them, not good in general (which all desire).
• A child learns to call a meal “good” if he likes it (it is agreeable to his senses), and “bad” if it is disagreeable, even if his wife likes the same meal.

Restfulness in the Present Good #

• Beautiful things (paintings, Mozart’s music, mountain scenery) are described as “restful.” This illustrates that the present good causes rest in itself.
• Example: West Point’s views along the Hudson, described as “a million dollar view,” exemplify how beautiful present things make one rest in them rather than desire them.
• The Comfort Inn slogan illustrates comfort and rest as contentment in the present good.

Desire in the Absence of the Good #

• A restless child will settle down if given an ice cream cone (the object becomes present).
• On a long car trip, children become restless (desiring various goods). Giving them bags with candy makes them content, then restless again when the supply runs out—illustrating desire in absence and contentment in presence.
• Being hungry makes one more aware of desire than being satisfied makes one aware of contentment.

The Opposed Passion Unnamed #

• English lacks a proper word for the passion opposed to concupiscence, just as Latin lacks a precise term.
• Compare: To love is opposed hate; to pleasure is opposed pain; to joy is opposed sadness. But there is no common name for the passion relating to absent evil (opposed to desire for absent good).
• Aristotle notes in the Ethics that we have words for vices of excess (drunkard, glutton) but no word for the person who pursues sensible pleasures insufficiently—because it is so rare.

Augustine on Cupidity #

• Augustine says in the Book of 83 Questions that cupidity is “a love of passing things.” He expresses this beautifully: “Cleave not to perishable things, unless you perish with them.”
• Thomas shows that Augustine uses “cupidity” in a broad sense, encompassing future goods as well, thus comprehending both love and hope under the term.

Questions Addressed #

Is Concupiscence a Special Passion Distinct from Love and Pleasure? #

Question: If love is the conformity of the heart with the good, and pleasure is rest in the present good, what makes concupiscence distinct from these?

Resolution:

• Concupiscence is the movement toward an absent good, formally caused by the absence of what is loved.
• Love is the conformity or agreement with the good (the cause of desire).
• Pleasure is the rest in the present good (the effect of desire when fulfilled).
• These three differ by formal cause: love (conformity), concupiscence (movement toward absent good), pleasure (rest in present good).
• Therefore, concupiscence is a special passion, distinguished in species from both its cause (love) and its effect (pleasure).

Why Is the Unnamed Passion Not Mentioned? #

• Unlike love/hate, pleasure/pain, and joy/sadness, there is no common name for the concupiscible passion relating to absent evil (aversion), opposed to concupiscence.
• This may be because such a passion is less commonly experienced or less developed in human emotional life.
• The irascible power addresses difficult evils more directly through fear and anger.

How Do Passions Differ in Species? #

• Diversity in the active object (how the object acts upon the power, not merely its material nature) creates formal or specific differences.
• Two diverse delightful things (steak vs. wine) create diverse concupiscences in number (different instances of the same passion), not in species.
• But presence vs. absence of the good creates diversity in species (different kinds of passion: love, desire, pleasure).