85. Concupiscence: Nature and Distinction of Appetite

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Nature and Scope of Concupiscence #

• Concupiscence (Latin: concupiscentia) is properly defined as desire for the pleasant good, particularly as known through the senses
• The Latin term itself implies con-associatium (living together) of soul and body, distinguishing sensible desire from purely intellectual desire
• While concupiscence properly belongs to the sensitive appetite, the term can be extended to rational desire in two ways: (1) by likeness—both are forms of desire; (2) by intensity—when rational desire overflows into bodily emotion

Concupiscence vs. Related Passions #

• Love is the primary affection and conformity of the heart to its object, existing whether the object is present or absent
• Concupiscence is the movement toward an absent good—it follows upon love when the beloved object is lacking
• Pleasure (or delectatio) is the resting in a present good—it occurs once the object is obtained
• The formal distinction depends on temporal presence: absent good → concupiscence; present good → pleasure

The Two Divisions of the Sensitive Appetite #

• The concupiscible power (appetitus concupiscibilis) is concerned with goods that are simply pleasant or unpleasant to the senses
• The irascible power (appetitus irascibilis) is concerned with difficult goods (requiring courage) or difficult evils (requiring fear)
• These powers are named from concupiscence and anger respectively because these passions are most characteristic and most knowable (motion is more apparent than rest)

The Six Passions and Natural Desire #

• The six passions of the concupiscible appetite: love, hate, concupiscence, aversion, pleasure/delight, sadness
• Natural desire belongs to each power of the soul without requiring knowledge or apprehension (present even in plants)
• Elicited desire follows upon some apprehension (sensory or intellectual) and pertains to desiring powers

Key Arguments #

Article 1: Is Concupiscence Only in the Sensitive Appetite? #

Objections:

• There exists concupiscence for wisdom, a non-sensible good, suggesting concupiscence extends beyond the sensitive appetite
• The desire for God’s commandments is not in the sensitive appetite but involves concupiscence (Psalm 118: “My soul desires concupiscence for your justifications”)
• Each power of the soul naturally desires its own good

Responses:

• Concupiscence properly means desire for the pleasant good as perceived by the senses
• The term extends to rational desires either through likeness or through the overflow (redundantia) of intense rational desire into the lower appetite, causing bodily restlessness
• Examples: Archimedes’s “Eureka!” moment and St. Teresa of Avila’s dancing after meditation illustrate how intellectual discovery or spiritual joy overflow into bodily emotion

Article 2: Is Concupiscence a Distinct Passion? #

Central Distinction:

• The formal difference between passions lies in the object’s character (the good as present vs. absent)
• Material differences in objects (steak vs. wine) do not create distinct passions
• The crucial distinction: the good as absent (causing concupiscence/desire) vs. the good as present (causing pleasure/rest)

Important Definitions #

Concupiscence (concupiscentia) #

• Desire for the pleasant good, particularly as mediated through sensory knowledge
• Involves both soul and body (the etymology suggests this union)
• Characterized by movement toward an absent good

The Concupiscible Power (appetitus concupiscibilis) #

• The sensitive appetite concerned with goods that are simply pleasant or unpleasant to the senses
• Named from concupiscence because this passion most characterizes it and is most knowable

The Irascible Power (appetitus irascibilis) #

• The sensitive appetite concerned with difficult goods (requiring courage) or difficult evils (requiring fear)
• Named from anger (thumos in Greek, ira in Latin) because anger is its most characteristic passion

Apprehension (apprehensio) #

• The grasping or knowing of something
• Contrasts with love: what is known is in the knower; what is loved is in the thing loved
• Simple apprehension (apprehensio simplex) is the first act of reason, grasping what something is (e.g., what a square is)

Examples & Illustrations #

Roommate Envy #

• One roommate is asked out by an attractive person with good prospects; the other feels envy
• Envy is a defect in friendship—true friendship requires rejoicing in a friend’s good
• This illustrates how concupiscence (desire) can be opposed to friendship when one desires what another possesses

Parental Love #

• A father rejoices when his son succeeds, even if the son surpasses the father’s own achievements
• A father never envies his son’s success because he sees the son as a continuation of himself, “another self”
• This exemplifies perfect friendship without envy, as found in Homer and Shakespeare

Overflow of Spiritual Joy #

• Archimedes’s “Eureka!” moment: discovering a theorem in the bathtub caused such intellectual joy that he ran naked through the streets
• St. Teresa of Avila: emerging from her cell after meditation, she began to dance—spiritual joy overflowed into bodily motion
• These examples show how intense rational desire or joy causes bodily restlessness and motion

Intensity vs. Rest #

• When uncomfortable (lacking comfort), we are acutely aware of seeking it
• When comfortable (possessing what we desire), we rest and are less aware of the pleasure itself
• “Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs” (Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida)

Shakespeare and the Wrath of Love #

• In As You Like It, Oliver and Celia fall in love quickly and “are in the very wrath of love”
• The metaphor compares the intensity and motion of passionate love to the forcefulness of anger
• Both anger and concupiscence are characterized by motion, not rest

Natural Desire in Plants #

• A nursery worker says certain plants “like” a lot of water or sunlight; they are “big feeders”
• This illustrates that even without knowledge or apprehension, all things naturally desire their own good

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Is concupiscence found only in the sensitive appetite? #

A: Concupiscence properly belongs to the sensitive appetite as desire for sensible pleasure. However, the term can be extended metaphorically to rational desire (e.g., desire for wisdom) either through likeness or through the intensity of rational desire overflowing into bodily restlessness.

Q2: Why are the concupiscible and irascible powers named from these particular passions? #

A: These powers are named from concupiscence and anger because these passions are most characteristic of their respective powers and most noticeable to us. Motion (as in concupiscence and anger) is more apparent than rest (as in pleasure), following the principle that “things in motion sooner catch the eye.”

Q3: How does presence and absence of the good object distinguish passions? #

A: The same good produces different passions based on temporal status: absent good → concupiscence (desire/seeking); present good → pleasure (resting). This explains why desire is more acutely felt than contentment—motion is more apparent than rest.

Q4: How does the word “concupiscence” differ from “desire”? #

A: The word “concupiscence” implies a union of soul and body (con-associatium), whereas “desire” is more neutral and can apply to purely intellectual appetite. Concupiscence’s etymology emphasizes the involvement of the body, which is appropriate for sensible desire.

Connections to Previous Material #

• Love and Friendship: Envy is opposed to true friendship; understanding envy illuminates the nature of friendship, as “opposites alongside each other are more clear” (Aristotle)
• Passions Framework: Concupiscence is one of six passions in the concupiscible appetite; understanding it requires distinguishing it from love (its cause) and pleasure (its effect)
• Natural Desire: All powers of the soul have natural desire for their proper good, but only desiring powers experience elicited desire following apprehension