73. Moral Character of Passions and the Order of Concupiscible Appetites

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• Moral Character of Passions: Whether passions possess intrinsic moral goodness or badness according to their species
• Love as First Passion: Why love, not desire, is the foundational passion of the concupiscible appetite
• The Role of Reason in Passions: How passions can participate in moral goodness when ordered by reason
• Shame and Envy as Examples: How certain passions are good or bad by their very nature
• Intention vs. Execution: The distinction between intention (end sought) and execution (means pursued)

Key Arguments #

On Moral Character of Passions (Article 4, Question 24) #

Objections presented:

• Passions are common to animals; moral good is proper to humans alone
• Passions reside in the sense appetite, not reason; therefore moral good does not pertain to them according to their species
• No passion according to its species is good or bad morally

Thomas’s Resolution:

• Passions can be considered in two ways: (1) according as they are in the genus of nature, and (2) according as they pertain to the genus of morals, insofar as they partake of the voluntary and judgment of reason
• Moral good and bad do pertain to passions considered as subject to reason’s judgment
• Shame (φοβος τοῦ αἰσχροῦ - fear of the base/ugly) is laudable by its very nature
• Invidia (ἐνιδία - sadness about another’s good) is bad by its very nature
• Passions whose objects are truly good (love, desire, joy) are good; those whose objects are truly bad (hate, aversion, sadness) are bad

On Love as First Passion (Article 2, Question 25) #

Objections presented:

• The concupiscible is named from concupiscentia (desire), suggesting desire, not love, is first
• Love implies union (ἑνωτική), which comes after pursuit and desire
• Pleasure can cause love, suggesting cause precedes effect

Thomas’s Resolution:

• Things are named from what is most known/manifest to us; desire (being motion) is more manifest than love (being aptitude/proportion)
• There is an affective union (aptitude/proportion) that precedes real union (actual possession)
• Pleasure is prior in intention (as end sought) but love is prior in execution (as source)
• Love is the aptitude or proportion (ἀναλογία) of the appetite to the good
• Desire is love pursuing what is not yet possessed
• Joy is love resting in what is possessed
• All other passions of the concupiscible flow from love as their source

Augustine’s Authority:

• From City of God XIV: “All passions are caused from love. For love seeking to have what is loved is cupiditas (desire). But having it and enjoying it is joy.”

Important Definitions #

• Passio (Passion): A motion or change in the sense appetite
• Concupiscibile (Concupiscible Appetite): The sense appetite oriented toward good and bad absolutely
• Amor (Love): The aptitude, proportion, or complacency (ἡ ἀρέσκεια) of the appetite with the good; a conformity of the desiring power to the good
• Concupiscentia (Desire/Concupiscence): The motion of the appetite toward obtaining a good not yet possessed
• Gaudium/Delectatio (Joy/Pleasure): Rest or repose in a good that is possessed
• Affective Union: Union according to aptitude or suitability (precedes actual possession)
• Real Union: Union according to actual conjunction with the thing itself (follows possession)
• Acidia (Acedia): Not laziness as commonly translated, but sadness that one lacks motivation for spiritual exertion (prayer, sacraments, spiritual reading). More serious than mere laziness.
• Ratio (Reason): The rational judgment that can command or order the passions
• Voluntarium (Voluntary): That which partakes of reason and will

Examples & Illustrations #

• Mozart and Desire: A philosopher loves Mozart’s music, desires to obtain a CD of it, and then rests in joy while hearing the beautiful music
• Shame as Good Passion: The fear of committing base or ugly actions is good by its very nature because its object is truly dissonant from reason
• Envy as Bad Passion: Sadness at another’s good is bad by its very nature because it opposes what is truly good
• Acedia vs. Laziness: A person may be active and busy (even workaholic) yet suffer from acedia—distraction from spiritual goods through excessive work or entertainment
• Animal Instinct as Similitude: A dog protecting its master from danger shows a similitude of moral goodness through the natural estimative power that is subject to divine reason
• Charlie Brown and Maternal Fear: A dog sensed its master’s fear and leaped at a suspicious car, showing how animals participate in a similitude of moral good through natural instinct
• Washington’s Speech to Troops: When soldiers were near mutiny due to lack of Congressional support, Washington removed his glasses and spoke of his own sacrifice and lost eyesight in service to the country, moving the troops through emotional appeal ordered to reason
• Envy Among Equals: Envy arises more readily among equals (peasant does not envy king), especially among those of similar status who mistakenly believe themselves equal and thus resent another’s superiority

Questions Addressed #

1. Can passions possess moral goodness or badness according to their species?

   • Answer: Yes, when considered as subject to reason’s judgment. Some passions like shame are good by nature; others like envy are bad by nature.

2. Why is the concupiscible named from desire rather than love if love is first?

   • Answer: Because we name things as we know them, and desire (being motion) is more manifest to us than love (being aptitude or proportion).

3. Is love truly the first passion of the concupiscible appetite?

   • Answer: Yes. Love is the aptitude of the appetite to the good; desire is this love pursuing a good not yet possessed; joy is love resting in a good possessed. All passions flow from love.

4. What is the order between intention and execution in passions?

   • Answer: What comes first in intention (the end/good sought) comes last in execution (the means pursued). Thus love is prior in execution but the good is prior in intention.

5. How do passions relate to moral goodness if they are in the sense appetite, not reason?

   • Answer: Passions themselves are not moral, but when the sense appetite obeys reason, passions participate in moral goodness per se (intrinsically, not accidentally).

Theological Notes #

• Acedia is classified as a capital sin, far more serious than mere laziness
• The doctrine that all passions flow from love relates to the theological virtue of charity
• Shame is described as a “laudable passion” (passio laudabilis) according to Aristotle
• The resurrection body will retain passions but they will be ordered to reason perfectively

Teaching Method Observations #

Berquist emphasizes looking “before and after” (a Thomistic method) to resolve apparent contradictions. The same approach applies to determining whether love or desire is first: they are both first in different senses (love prior in execution; good prior in intention).