72. Moral Good and Evil in the Passions of the Soul

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Moral Character of Passions #

• Passions in themselves: When considered as mere motions of the sense-desiring power without reference to reason, passions have no moral character (neither good nor bad)
• Passions subject to reason and will: When passions are commanded by the will or not prohibited by it, they acquire moral character
• Proximity to reason: The sense-desiring power is closer to reason than bodily members (hands, feet), making emotions more capable of being ordered by rational governance

The Stoic vs. Peripatetic Dispute #

• Stoic position: All passions are sicknesses (νόσοι) and disturbances of the soul; therefore all are morally bad
  • The Stoics failed to distinguish between sense appetite (αἴσθησις) and intellectual appetite (νοῦς)
  • They conflated all emotional motions outside reason’s limits with vice
  • Cicero (Tullius), following the Stoics, calls all passions “sickness” (morbus) and claims those possessing them are “foolish” (insani)
• Peripatetic position: All emotional motions of the sense power are passions; they are good when moderated by reason, bad when outside reason’s moderation
• The substantial disagreement: The Stoics fundamentally misunderstood the nature of sense appetite by failing to recognize it can participate in reason (μέθεξις λόγου)

The Perfection of Human Moral Good #

• Human good consists in reason as its root (radix)
• The perfection of moral good requires that not only the will but also the sense-desiring power be regulated by reason
• Just as bodily members (exterior acts) should be directed by reason’s rule, so too emotional responses should be ordered by rational judgment
• The complete human act involves both intellectual intention and emotional participation: “My heart and my flesh exalt in the living God” (Psalm 83)

Passions and Judgment of Reason #

• Antecedent passions: When emotions arise before and crowd out rational judgment, they diminish the moral goodness of acts
  • Anger clouds reason before deliberation can occur
  • Fear prevents clear assessment of what should be done
• Consequent passions (following from reason’s judgment):
  • By overflowing/redundancy: When the will is intensely moved to something good, motion naturally follows in the sense appetite, indicating greater moral intensity and fervor
  • By choice: When a person deliberately chooses to be emotionally affected in order to act more promptly and efficiently
  • In both cases, the consequent passion adds to moral goodness rather than diminishing it

Music and Emotional Education #

• Aristotle discusses music in Politics VIII as part of moral education, not merely relaxation
• Music serves as a bridge between reason and the senses
• Music representing emotions in harmony with reason (Baroque and Classical periods, particularly Mozart) disposes the emotions toward reasonable ordering
• Bad music and pornographic content move emotions in disordered ways, away from reason

Key Arguments #

Argument 1: Can Passions Possess Moral Character? #

• Objection: Moral good/bad is proper to humans; passions are common to humans and animals; therefore passions lack moral character
• Response: The lower desiring powers are “rational in some way” (κατὰ μέθεξιν) by participating in reason, as Aristotle teaches in Ethics I
• Resolution: Passions acquire moral character through subjection to the command (or permission) of reason and will

Argument 2: Are All Passions Morally Bad? #

• Stoic claim: Augustine reports that some call passions “sicknesses and disturbances of the soul”; sickness is always bad; therefore all passions are bad
• Counter-claim: Augustine himself in City of God XIV shows that rectified love (recta dilectio) rectifies all affections—fear of sin, desire to persevere, sadness over sin, joy in good works
• Resolution: Only disordered passions (those lacking moderation of reason) are morally bad; ordered passions pertain to virtue
• Key insight: John Damascene’s distinction between “operation according to nature” and “passion outside nature” clarifies that passion itself is not sinful; only passion deviating from reason’s proper ordering is

Argument 3: Do Passions Always Diminish Moral Goodness? #

• Objection: Whatever impedes reason’s judgment diminishes the goodness of moral acts; all passions impede judgment; therefore passions diminish goodness
• Counter-objection: Augustine says mercy (πίτια) serves reason when given to preserve justice or aid the needy
• Resolution:
  • Antecedent passions (clouding reason before judgment) diminish goodness
  • Consequent passions (resulting from reason’s judgment or its intensity) add to goodness
  • Examples: It is more praiseworthy to do charity from reasoned judgment than from passion alone, BUT it is more perfect to do charity both from judgment AND from the passion of mercy working with reason

Important Definitions #

Passio (Passion) #

• A motion or alteration in the sense-desiring power
• Distinguished from actio (action) as suffering/undergoing rather than active doing
• Can be considered naturally (without moral significance) or morally (as ordered or disordered by reason)

Concubiscible Power (vis concupiscibilis) #

• The sense appetite concerned with good and bad absolutely
• Passions: love, desire, joy (concerning good); hate, aversion, sadness (concerning bad)

Irascible Power (vis irascibilis) #

• The sense appetite concerned with good and bad as difficult/arduous
• Passions: hope, despair, fear, boldness, anger

Rational Participation (μέθεξις λόγου) #

• The way lower powers participate in the ordering of reason without themselves possessing reason
• The foundation for why emotions can be moderated and ordered by rational governance

Catharsis (κάθαρσις) #

• Originally from medicine: removal of harmful or excess substance from the body
• In tragedy: purgation of pity and fear through emotional experience
• In comedy: purgation of melancholy through laughter and hope
• The emotions of pity and fear are balanced in tragedy: pity prevents sentimentality (excessive identification), fear prevents detachment (reminder it could happen to oneself)

Systole and Diastole (Σύστολή, Διαστολή) #

• Contraction and dilation of the heart
• Describe the physical manifestation of emotional movements
• Related to the natural operation of the heart that becomes modified by passion

Examples & Illustrations #

George Washington at the Battle of New York #

• Raw American soldiers fled before British troops
• Washington erupted in anger with sword, nearly captured
• Shows emotional passion preceding reason, though he maintained overall self-control
• Demonstrates that emotional fervor can indicate deeper commitment to cause when ultimately ordered to reason

Julius Caesar at Age 50 #

• Troops were frightened but not fleeing
• Caesar went to the front line and encouraged an all-out charge
• Illustrates how emotional boldness can serve military reason
• Shows influence and presence can move men when emotions are ordered to reasonable purpose

The Neighbor’s Broken Flowerpot #

• Neighbor’s child deliberately pushed over a potted plant
• Natural response of anger to deliberate destruction
• Illustrates that anger can be reasonable when proportionate to genuine wrong
• Shows how antecedent passion can still be morally intelligible

Washington at Valley Forge #

• Extreme suffering and privation
• Washington kept troops alive through constant movement around camp, encouragement, presence
• Emotional support ordered to the virtue of hope and perseverance
• Passion and emotional expression serving reason’s judgment about what the cause requires

The Cat and the Sandwich Wrapper #

• Cat ignores Mozart played for it
• Cat immediately responds to sound of sandwich wrapper
• Shows animals respond to passions based on appetite but lack rational ordering
• Demonstrates difference between animal appetite and human emotional life capable of rational governance

The Confused Teenager at the Record Store #

• Young person asked about Gregorian chant
• Could not provide it; asked instead for band names
• Illustrates cultural shift away from music that educates emotions toward reason
• Contrasts with animals’ indifference to what moves humans emotionally

Shakespeare’s “As You Like It” #

• Berquist gave friend the play to read
• Friend was angry with his brother
• Good fiction moves emotions in a way that disposed him to gentleness
• Shows how art can serve the moral education of passions

The Story of Leonardo da Vinci (Anecdote) #

• Grandfather wanted to teach young Leonardo something important
• Struck him hard so he would remember
• Illustrates how emotional intensity (fear) can fix something in memory
• Shows that fear, though painful, can serve reasonable purposes

Notable Quotes #

“Those things are bad if bad is the love. Good if good.” — Augustine, City of God XIV (on the rectification of passions through rectified will)

“The lower desiring powers are said to be rational in some way, according as they partake in some way of reason.” — Aristotle, Ethics I, as cited by Thomas

“The good of man consists in reason as in a root.” — Thomas Aquinas, on why perfection of moral good requires regulation of passions through reason

“To the perfection of moral good it pertains that man is moved to the good not only by the will, but also according to the sense appetite.” — Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae II-II, Q. 24)

“My heart and my flesh exalt in the living God.” — Psalm 83, cited to show that perfection requires both intellectual/rational participation and sensory/emotional participation

“The Stoics did not discern between sense and understanding, and consequently neither between the intellectual desiring power and the sense desiring power.” — Thomas Aquinas, explaining the root error of Stoicism

Questions Addressed #

Question 1: Can Passions Possess Moral Good or Evil? #

• Main question: Does moral good and bad apply to passions of the soul?
• Resolution: Passions considered in themselves (as natural motions) have no moral character. But insofar as they are subject to the command or permission of reason and will, they possess moral character—they can be good when ordered to reason, bad when contrary to it.

Question 2: Are All Passions Morally Bad? #

• Main question: Is it true, as the Stoics claim, that every passion is a moral evil?
• Resolution: No. The Stoics erred in failing to distinguish sense appetite from intellectual appetite. Only disordered passions—those lacking moderation of reason—are morally bad. Passions moderated by reason pertain to virtue.

Question 3: Do All Passions Diminish the Goodness of Moral Acts? #

• Main question: Does emotion always cloud judgment and reduce the moral quality of what we do?
• Resolution: Antecedent passions (arising before and clouding reason) do diminish goodness. But consequent passions—either by overflow (fervor of will showing in emotion) or by choice (deliberately choosing emotional response to act more promptly)—add to moral goodness. Perfect human action involves both rational judgment and emotional participation.

Question 4: Can Any Passion Be Good or Bad by Its Species? #

• Main question: Do some passions have an inherent moral character based on their nature?
• Resolution: Not addressed in detail in this lecture, but the framework suggests that passions whose objects are inherently suitable or unsuitable to reason acquire moral character. The lecture emphasizes that all passions’ moral character depends on their ordering to reason rather than on their species alone.