Lecture 71

71. Contrariety of Passions and the Eleven Emotions

Summary
This lecture examines Article 2 of Aquinas’s treatment of passions, focusing on whether irascible passions have contrariety only according to good and bad. Berquist explores two types of contrariety in motion (excess/recess and contrariety of terms), demonstrates how the irascible passions differ from concupiscible passions by exhibiting both types, and resolves the apparent paradox that anger has no contrary by explaining it as a privation rather than a true contrary. The lecture establishes the framework of eleven distinct passions (six concupiscible, five irascible) that serve as the matter for the virtues.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Two Types of Contrariety in Motions/Changes #

Aquinas distinguishes two forms of contrariety found in the Physics 5:

  1. Contrariety of excess and recess from the same term (e.g., generation as change to being, corruption as change from being)
  2. Contrariety of opposite terms (e.g., dealbatio, motion from black to white, versus blackening, motion from white to black)

The Good and Bad as Terms in Motion #

  • The good, as good, can only be terminus ad quem (that toward which one moves), never terminus a quo (that from which one moves)
    • Nothing flees the good per se; all desire it
  • The bad can only be terminus a quo (that from which one flees), never terminus ad quem
    • Nothing desires the bad per se; all flee it
  • This asymmetry grounds the difference between concupiscible and irascible passions

Contrariety in Concupiscible Passions #

The object of the concupiscible is sensible good or bad taken absolutely. Therefore:

  • Concupiscible passions exhibit only the first type of contrariety (good vs. bad as opposite objects)
  • When the object is good, movement is toward it (love, desire, joy)
  • When the object is bad, movement is away from it (hate, aversion, sadness)
  • No approach-and-withdrawal contrariety is possible with a single object

Contrariety in Irascible Passions #

The object of the irascible is sensible good or bad under the aspect of difficulty (arduum). Therefore:

  • Irascible passions exhibit both types of contrariety
  1. First type: According to good vs. bad (hope vs. fear)
    • Hope: toward a difficult good
    • Fear: away from a difficult evil
  2. Second type: According to approach/withdrawal from the same difficult object
    • Boldness (audacia): tending toward a difficult evil (insofar as one might overcome it)
    • Fear: withdrawing from the same difficult evil
    • Hope: tending toward a difficult good
    • Despair: withdrawing from the same difficult good

The Problem of Anger’s Contrariety (Article 3) #

Anger presents an anomaly: it has no true contrary, only a privation (cessation/calm).

Why anger lacks a contrary:

  • Anger arises from a difficult evil already present or past
  • When a difficult evil is actually upon you, there are only two possibilities:
    1. The appetite succumbs (sadness)
    2. The appetite tends to invade/attack the evil (anger)
  • Flight is impossible because the evil is already present, not future
  • The good supposedly obtained cannot have the character of the arduous/difficult
  • Therefore, neither approach/withdrawal from the same object nor contrariety of good/bad applies
  • Anger is opposed only by its privation: cessation, quieting (ἡσυχία), calm

Consequence for the number of passions:

  • Concupiscible: 6 passions (three pairs of contraries)
  • Irascible: 5 passions (anger alone, with two pairs of contraries)
  • Total: 11 passions (odd number)
    • This breaks the expectation that contraries come in twos
    • Demonstrates that the universe of passions is not perfectly symmetrical

Key Arguments #

The Objection’s Case (that all irascible contrariety reduces to good/bad) #

  • Three objections presented:
    1. Irascible passions arise from concupiscible; concupiscible show only good/bad contrariety; therefore irascible do too
    2. Passions differ by objects as motions differ by terms; contrariety in motions is according to contrariety of terms; therefore in passions, contrariety is according to contrariety of objects
    3. Every passion consists in excess/approach or recess/retreat; excess/approach flows from reason of good; recess/retreat from reason of bad; therefore no contrariety except good/bad

The Counter-Example #

  • Fear and boldness are contrary (Aristotle, Ethics 3)
  • Yet both regard a bad (difficult evil)
  • If you think you can overcome the evil: boldness (audacia)
  • If you think you cannot: fear (timor)
  • Therefore, contrariety is not solely according to good/bad

Thomas’s Resolution #

  • Passion is a kind of motion/change, so contrariety of passions follows contrariety of motions
  • There are two types of contrariety in motions (as per Physics 5)
  • The irascible object (difficult good/bad) admits both types of contrariety
  • The asymmetry of good and bad explains why irascible passions have dimensions concupiscible lack

Important Definitions #

Arduum (arduous/difficult): The formal object of the irascible appetite; a quality of good or bad that is not easily obtained or avoided; requires effort, struggle, or the overcoming of obstacles

Terminus ad quem: That toward which motion proceeds; a goal or end of movement

Terminus a quo: That from which motion originates; a point of departure

Passio (passion): An undergoing; involves both bodily change and motion of the sense-desiring power

Contrariety (contrarietis): Opposition between passions grounded in either opposite objects or opposite motions toward/away from the same object

Privation (privatio): Absence of a quality that should naturally be present; opposed to true contrariety

Examples & Illustrations #

The Difficulty-Good Distinction #

  • A difficult good (e.g., climbing a mountain) has the character of good (reason for hope) and difficulty (reason for potential despair)
  • A difficult evil (e.g., an enemy warrior) has the character of evil (reason for fear) and difficulty (reason for boldness if one believes one can overcome it)

The Grapes Example #

  • When someone despairs of getting grapes, they withdraw from pursuit of a good thing due to judging it unattainable
  • This shows hope and despair as opposing passions regarding the same difficult good

Anger’s Absence of Contrary #

  • A man who has done you wrong and is now before you angry
  • You cannot flee (the evil is present)
  • You can either submit in sadness or respond in anger
  • Calm/cessation is restoration to baseline, not a true contrary passion

David’s Humiliation Before the Ark #

  • St. Gregory praised David not primarily for conquering the Philistines but for conquering himself
  • Shows integration of emotion (humiliation) with reason’s judgment of what is fitting

Notable Quotes #

“The good is what all want; the bad is what all flee.” — Aristotle, cited by Thomas regarding the essential asymmetry of good and bad

“The good, insofar as it is good, can be a term to which, not from which.” — Core principle explaining why good is only a goal, not a source of flight

“It is singular in the passion of anger that it is not able to have a contrary.” — Thomas Aquinas, establishing anger’s unique status

Questions Addressed #

Q: Do irascible passions have contrariety only according to the contrariety of good and bad?

A: No. While some irascible passions (hope and fear) do exhibit contrariety according to good/bad, others (boldness and fear, hope and despair) exhibit contrariety according to approach and withdrawal from the same difficult object. This second type of contrariety is proper to the irascible because its formal object includes the aspect of difficulty.

Q: Does every passion of the soul have a contrary?

A: No. Anger is singular: it has no true contrary, only a privation (cessation/calm). This is because anger arises from a difficult evil already present, and the only options are submission in sadness or active resistance in anger. Flight is impossible since the evil is not future but present. This explains why there are eleven passions rather than twelve (an odd rather than even number).

Connection to Broader Framework #

This doctrine of the eleven passions serves as the foundation for understanding the virtues that moderate them:

  • Temperance moderates concupiscible passions (desire, joy, sadness)
  • Courage moderates irascible passions (fear, boldness, hope, despair)
  • Mildness/Meekness moderates anger
  • Magnanimity concerns hope and related passions

The asymmetry of contrariety in passions reflects the asymmetry of good and bad in reality itself, grounding moral psychology in metaphysics.